21 मिनट पढ़ने का समय2025 में, यूक्रेन के विरुद्ध रूस की निरंतर आक्रामकता और दूसरे ट्रम्प प्रशासन के ‘अमेरिका फर्स्ट’ एजेंडे के तहत अमेरिकी सुरक्षा गारंटियों को लेकर बढ़ते संदेह के जवाब में, यूरोपीय संघ पर अपनी रक्षा नीति में आमूल बदलाव करने का दबाव बढ़ता गया। युद्ध ने यूरोप की रक्षा में गहरे विखंडन को भी उजागर किया है, जिसमें हथियारों की सीमित पारस्परिक परिचालन-क्षमता, खरीद प्रयासों का दोहराव, तथा सदस्य राज्यों के बीच रक्षा बजटों और औद्योगिक क्षमताओं में भारी असमानताएँ शामिल हैं।
Recognizing the strategic imperative to strengthen European deterrence posture and provide sustained support to Ukraine, the EU adopted the SAFE instrument as part of the Rearm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 in March 2025. Building on two earlier EU initiatives, EDIRPA (common procurement) and ASAP (ammunition ramp-up), SAFE significantly surpasses them in terms of financing scale. However, questions remain about how Member States will utilize this instrument, whether it will achieve its intended impact on the European defence industry, and how Ukraine will benefit from it. This policy brief explores these issues.
The ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 aims to boost European defense capabilities and industrial base through several financial means, one of which is the Security and Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation, adopted on May 27, 2025. The core objective of the SAFE mechanism is to incentivize common military procurement between the Member States by allocating up to €150 billion in loans backed by the EU budget.
इस साधन का लक्ष्य उत्पादन लागत घटाना, विखंडन कम करना और रक्षा तथा सुरक्षा क्षेत्र में पूरे यूरोपीय संघ में पारस्परिक परिचालन-क्षमता बढ़ाना है। व्यापक अर्थ में, इसे यूरोप को अपनी रक्षा के लिए अधिक संप्रभु और जिम्मेदार बनाने के लिए बनाया गया है। कीव के लिए सकारात्मक रूप से, EEA/EFTA देश और यूक्रेन भी कुछ शर्तों के तहत SAFE से आंशिक लाभ ले सकते हैं।
ये दो मुख्य उद्देश्य श्वेत पत्र में उल्लिखित यूरोपीय संघ के नए वित्तीय साधनों के हैं:
- Increasing support for Ukraine through the urgent, short-term procurement of weapons, aimed at replenishing stocks or acquiring certain systems quickly.
- Developing EU defence industries in a collaborative manner through long-term investments, yielding results over time.
In light of the current capability shortfalls across the EU and lessons learned from the battlefield in Ukraine, the European Commission has prioritized the following categories of equipment to be procured under the SAFE funding scheme:
The European Commission has set a timeline for Member States to become funding recipients under the SAFE mechanism:
SAFE तंत्र की प्रभावशीलता सुनिश्चित करने के लिए, यूरोपीय आयोग ने कई प्रमुख आवश्यकताएं निर्धारित की हैं, जिनका वित्तपोषण प्राप्तकर्ताओं को पालन करना होगा।
1. Common procurement
Projects should normally involve at least two participants (e.g., two Member States, a Member State and an EEA/EFTA state or Ukraine, or a Member State and other third countries*). As a deviation from the rule, single-state procurements are temporarily permitted during an initial phase.
2. “Buy European” rule
At least 65% of the project value should derive from companies established within the EU, EEA/EFTA states, or Ukraine. A maximum of 35% of the estimated cost of the end-product’s components may come from external suppliers or subcontractors from third countries (e.g., the U.S.).
3. Loan access
ऋण अत्यंत अनुकूल शर्तों पर उपलब्ध हैं: उनकी अवधि 45 वर्ष तक हो सकती है और पहले 10 वर्षों में कोई पुनर्भुगतान आवश्यक नहीं है। इसके अतिरिक्त, परियोजनाओं को शुरू करने में मदद के लिए निधियों का 15% तक अग्रिम रूप से संवितरित किया जा सकता है।
Noteworthy, loans may be provided solely to EU Member States. If a third country, such as Ukraine, participates in common procurement, the funds will be disbursed to the Member State involved. Based on its European Defence Industry Investment Plan, the respective Member State will allocate the funding among the approved activities.
The SAFE instrument is a pragmatic step toward strengthening EU defence capabilities in response to growing geopolitical threats. Its core advantage lies in its aim to promote common procurement, intended to foster greater collaboration among Member States' industries and reduce fragmentation in the EU defence market. By mandating that 65% of spending be directed toward EU-based production, SAFE seeks to strengthen Europe’s defense industrial base, while also embracing a holistic European—rather than strictly EU-exclusive—approach by enabling participation from third countries such as Ukraine, EEA/EFTA members, and acceding, candidate, and potential candidate countries.
Despite the EU’s ambitious goals under SAFE, its overall scale is still modest. While Commission officials note that SAFE’s size (€150 billion) accounts for over half of the EU member states' annual defence spending, this figure appears modest relative to its objectives. Reducing reliance on the United States—as envisioned in the SAFE Regulation—would, according to some estimates, require close to $1 trillion. For decades, the EU has depended heavily on the US for airlift, satellite communications, and aerial refueling, with 78% of European defence procurement in 2022–2023 spent on non-European products. SAFE alone cannot cover these expenses and has several limitations that remain unresolved.
चूंकि SAFE को महत्वपूर्ण क्षमता-अंतरालों को शीघ्र दूर करने के लिए बनाया गया है, यह एक ऋण सुविधा के रूप में कार्य करता है जो सभी देशों को आकर्षक न लगे। पहला, ऋण राष्ट्रीय ऋण में जुड़ते हैं और सीमित राजकोषीय गुंजाइश वाले सदस्य राज्यों को SAFE का प्रभावी उपयोग करने में कठिनाई हो सकती है। सरल शब्दों में, राजकोषीय गुंजाइश से आशय किसी सरकार की वित्तीय स्थिरता को खतरे में डाले बिना अतिरिक्त ऋण लेने की क्षमता से है।
Not all EU countries are equally positioned in this regard: those with higher debt levels have less fiscal space, and vice versa. France, for instance, currently carries one of the largest budget deficits (-5,8%) in the EU and a pretty high budget debt (around 113%) but aims to raise defence spending to 3–3.5% of GDP. As of July 2025, France has expressed interest in SAFE loans, though likely for a modest sum.
Additionally, borrowing at the EU’s interest rates is not attractive for all Member States. SAFE essentially allows the EU to raise up to €150 billion on stock markets and re-loan it to Member States at comparatively low interest rates. With EU bond yields around 3%, SAFE loans are expected to carry a similar rate. This presents a significant advantage for countries with higher borrowing costs—such as Romania (7%), Poland (5.4%), and the Czech Republic (4.3%)—which stand to benefit from accessing cheaper EU-level financing.
However, for many Member States, the gap between EU and national borrowing costs is relatively small. Wealthier countries with strong (AAA) credit ratings—like Germany (2.6%), the Netherlands (2.8%), Sweden (2.4%), and Denmark (2.5%)—have little incentive to use SAFE, as their own borrowing costs are lower than the EU’s. Yet, surprises are possible - for instance, Denmark back in July, has openly stated it does not plan to use SAFE loans, preferring to finance its defence investments independently. In September, however, it became the last EU member state to express interest in receiving SAFE loans. Reportedly, the possibility to support Ukraine via SAFE pushed the country towards this decision.
As of September 1, 2025, nineteen EU Member States had expressed interest in taking out loans worth at all €150billion. These include Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Finland and Denmark.
जहां कुछ सदस्य राज्य अपनी रक्षा मुद्रा मजबूत करने के लिए वास्तव में प्रतिबद्ध प्रतीत होते हैं—मिसाल के लिए, पोलैंड ने परियोजनाएं तैयार की हैं जिनका मूल्य लगभग €45 billion है—वहीं अन्य, ठोस भागीदारी के बिना, EU के रक्षा उद्देश्यों के समर्थन का संकेत देने के लिए SAFE का अधिक प्रतीकात्मक उपयोग कर सकते हैं। उदाहरण के लिए, इटली ने €14 billion, जबकि ग्रीस मांग रहा है €1.27 बिलियन। अंतिम वित्तपोषण अनुरोध और विस्तृत यूरोपीय रक्षा उद्योग निवेश योजनाएँ नवंबर में अपेक्षित हैं, लेकिन देश निधियों को सहयोगात्मक रूप से या स्वतंत्र रूप से कैसे खर्च करना चुनते हैं, यह कितना खर्च होगा, उससे अधिक महत्त्वपूर्ण हो सकता है।
The EU defence market remains highly fragmented, with procurement typically conducted at the national level and often favouring domestic industries. This leads to missed opportunities for synergies and economies of scale, further exacerbated by excessive platform diversity across Member States and the absence of harmonized export regulations across the EU.
SAFE के लक्ष्य—संयुक्त खरीद, बाज़ार विखंडन में कमी और बेहतर पारस्परिक परिचालन-क्षमता—तभी पूरे हो सकते हैं जब देश निधियों के लिए प्रतिस्पर्धा करने के बजाय एकता और राजनीतिक इच्छाशक्ति से कार्य करें। पारस्परिक अविश्वास आसानी से राष्ट्रीय हितों को साझा पहलों पर हावी कर सकता है और कार्यक्रम के उद्देश्य को कमजोर कर सकता है।
इस संदर्भ में, SAFE द्वारा राष्ट्रीय संरक्षणवाद को प्रभावी ढंग से संबोधित किए जाने की संभावना कम है, अपने सहयोगात्मक उद्देश्य के बावजूद। मौजूदा नियमों के तहत SAFE ऋणों के लिए कम-से-कम दो सदस्य राज्यों के आवेदन आवश्यक हैं, लेकिन पहले वर्ष में, मई 2026 तक, अलग-अलग सदस्य राज्य भी स्वतंत्र रूप से आवेदन कर सकते हैं। इसके अतिरिक्त, कुछ सदस्य राज्यों के अनुरोध पर आयोग ने अनुमति दी है कि मौजूदा रक्षा कार्यक्रमों को SAFE के तहत वित्तपोषित किया जाए।
These conditions may not offer sufficient incentives for broad cooperation, and Member States may instead use SAFE primarily to bolster their own industries. This trend is already apparent in the preliminary applications submitted as of July 2025, with Member States reportedly putting forward individual proposals prioritizing domestic industries. For example, Polish officials state that Warsaw will likely use the funding to support domestically produced equipment—such as drones and counter-drone systems under the “Eastern Shield” initiative, artillery ammunition, Krab self-propelled howitzers, Rosomak vehicles, and Jelcz logistics trucks.
If most of the 19 applicant countries submitted individual proposals, they would nearly exhaust SAFE, turning a tool intended for common procurement into one for individual financing.
इस प्रकार, SAFE यूरोपीय संघ के रक्षा बाज़ार में संयुक्त खरीद को बढ़ावा देने और विखंडन घटाने के अपने लक्ष्य को प्राप्त करने में विफल रहने का जोखिम उठाता है। इस जोखिम को अभी भी आयोग कम कर सकता है, जो निधि आवंटन पर अंतिम निर्णय लेता है; फिर भी, इन निर्णयों के मानदंड और आयोग के भीतर जिम्मेदार विशिष्ट निकाय, साथ ही उसकी विशेषज्ञता, दोनों अस्पष्ट बने हुए हैं।
Given the above, SAFE should not be considered a sustainable long-term solution for European security. The very regulation establishing SAFE defines it as a temporary, ad hoc instrument, complementary to existing EU initiatives like the European Defence Fund (EDF). It is not the first time the EU has used Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to offer emergency financial assistance. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU launched the SURE instrument under the same legal basis to support employment.
However, the defense and security sector differs fundamentally from areas like unemployment: defense spending cannot be treated as a temporary deviation from fiscal norms. This makes the short-term nature of SAFE its core limitation. For defense firms on both sides of the Atlantic, the main barrier to scaling up production is not a lack of funding per se, but rather the absence of predictable, long-term government orders. Defense requires consistent, long-term investment rather than one-off emergency funding.
To build on SAFE’s foundations and address its limitations, the EU will need to adopt more permanent, centralised funding mechanisms to ensure lasting strategic autonomy. One example is the proposed European Defence Mechanism (EDM), an intergovernmental body that would centralise European defence procurement and capabilities, while enforcing cooperation through shared funding and binding rules.
A coordinated strategy with a substantial budget (e.g., €500 billion over five years) may be the only way to tackle the persistent fragmentation of the EU defence market. The Commission’s proposal to allocate €131 billion for defence in the next Multinational Financial Framework is unlikely to address this issue.
So far, for SAFE to achieve its intended impact, Member States should take a proactive role. The EU has created a strong and promising financial instrument, but its success ultimately depends on how effectively and ambitiously Member States choose to implement it.
Key provisions for Ukraine’s participation as a third country
अक्सर कहा जाता है कि यूक्रेन EU सदस्य राज्यों के बराबर स्तर पर SAFE में भाग ले सकता है और इस प्रक्रिया से बहुत लाभ उठा सकता है। हालाँकि, यह केवल आंशिक रूप से सही है।
The novelty of the SAFE mechanism lies in the fact that Ukraine’s arms producers and tech companies can participate in common procurement as (sub)contractors, along with EU-based companies, receiving funding from the loan acquired by an EU Member State.
65% of components of the end product should originate from either EU Member States, EEA/EFTA countries and or Ukraine. In this sense, Ukraine can indeed be considered part of Europe. In contrast, acceding, potential candidate, and other EU candidate countries (referred to in the SAFE Regulation as "other third countries") can also participate in SAFE as subcontractors, but under much stricter conditions. Their contributions are considered to originate from “outside the Union” and can only constitute up to 35% of the end product.
SAFE विनियमन के अनुसार, यूक्रेन के क्षेत्र का उपयोग विनिर्माण के लिए भी किया जा सकता है,
“the infrastructure, facilities, assets, and resources of the contractors and subcontractors involved in the common procurement that are used for the purposes of the common procurement shall be located in the territory of a Member State, an EEA EFTA State, or Ukraine”.
One of the ways for Ukraine to benefit from the SAFE mechanism is through being designated as a recipient of equipment delivered as military aid. The SAFE Regulation contains a separate clause encouraging Member States to include, where relevant, a description of Ukraine’s anticipated involvement in their planned activities in their European Defence Industry Investment Plans. In a recent resolution, the European Parliament included a clause encouraging Member States to devote a significant part of their European Defence Industry Investment Plans to assistance for Ukraine. Several scenarios appear feasible within the framework of the SAFE provisions:
Ideally, beyond promoting common procurement, the SAFE financial instrument was also intended to encourage Member States to increase military support for Ukraine. The underlying idea is to provide financial support for EU Member States to procure new military equipment for themselves, thereby enabling them to provide equipment from existing stocks to Ukraine. This would deliver prompt results for Ukraine while ensuring that Member States receive guaranteed replenishment (a mechanism similar to the American Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA)). However, much will depend on the political decisions and national priorities of each Member State, as well as the pace of SAFE implementation.
Similar to the previous scheme, Ukraine may be designated as a potential recipient of military equipment procured by the Member States under the SAFE financial instrument. However, such a scenario would delay support for Ukraine, as procurement procedures and the establishment of new production lines would take time (a mechanism similar to the American Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)).
मुख्य समस्या यह है कि सदस्य राज्यों के पास अपने भंडार की पुनःपूर्ति करने के बजाय नव-निर्मित उपकरण यूक्रेन को दान करने के लिए पर्याप्त प्रोत्साहन हों। समाधान के रूप में, यूक्रेन उन सदस्य राज्यों के साथ संपर्क कर सकता है जिन्होंने पहले आवश्यक उपकरण उपलब्ध कराए हैं और जिनके ऐसे उपकरणों की यूक्रेन को अब भी आवश्यकता है, ताकि उन्हें उन्हीं प्रणालियों की अतिरिक्त इकाइयाँ उपलब्ध कराने के लिए प्रोत्साहित किया जा सके, जिनका इस बार वित्तपोषण SAFE वित्तीय साधन से हो।
Within this scenario, Ukraine will benefit from the local manufacturing of defence equipment in cooperation with EU companies operating on Ukrainian territory. This approach is similar to elements of the “Danish model,” which allows interested countries to finance Ukraine’s defence industry and donate the produced equipment back to Ukraine. Spearheaded by Denmark, the “Danish model” has become the first mechanism to involve direct procurement from Ukrainian defence manufacturers. This model could serve as a blueprint for SAFE-funded procurement, involving Ukrainian defence and technology companies and their facilities in Ukraine.
हालांकि, SAFE के तहत मुख्य अंतर ऋण प्राप्तकर्ताओं के रूप में EU सदस्य राज्यों की अनिवार्य भागीदारी है। तकनीकी रूप से, कोई EU सदस्य राज्य किसी यूरोपीय कंपनी को धन वितरित कर सकता है, जो यूक्रेनी क्षेत्र में दूसरी कंपनी की सुविधाओं का उपयोग करते हुए किसी यूक्रेनी कंपनी के साथ मिलकर उत्पादन करेगी। वैकल्पिक रूप से, ऋण प्राप्त करने वाला EU सदस्य राज्य किसी एकल मुख्य ठेकेदार के रूप में कार्य करने वाली यूक्रेनी कंपनी से हथियार खरीदकर उन्हें यूक्रेन को वापस दान कर सकता है। इस स्थिति में यूक्रेन का निर्यात प्रतिबंध लागू नहीं होगा।
अल्प अवधि में, SAFE वित्तपोषण यूक्रेन की वर्तमान आवश्यकताओं के लिए युद्ध में प्रभावी सिद्ध समाधानों के साथ त्वरित खरीद को जोड़ेगा। चूँकि अनेक यूक्रेनी उद्योग EU से घटक प्राप्त करते हैं, निवेश से यूरोपीय उद्योग को भी लाभ होगा; साझेदार विश्वसनीय यूक्रेनी मुख्य ठेकेदारों का चयन कर सकेंगे और आपूर्ति शृंखला की सुरक्षा सुनिश्चित कर सकेंगे।
दीर्घकाल में, SAFE ऋण प्राप्त करने वाले EU सदस्य राज्य के लिए यूक्रेन को (उप)ठेकेदार नामित किए जाने पर, न केवल यूक्रेनी सेना को उपकरणों के प्राप्तकर्ता के रूप में SAFE से लाभ होगा, बल्कि यूक्रेनी उद्योगों को भी दीर्घकालिक निवेशों और यूरोपीय साझेदारों के साथ संयुक्त उद्यमों के लाभार्थी के रूप में फायदा होगा।
The Ukrainian defence industry is among the most rapidly developing and expanding in the world. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has increased its production capacity thirty-fivefold: from $1 billion in 2022 to $35 billion in 2025. However, in 2024, Ukraine only managed to secure around $10 billion in funding. SAFE-funded investments could further unlock the potential of Ukrainian industries by expanding their production lines, accelerating delivery schedules, and scaling up innovative projects already tested in combat.
Additionally, allowing Ukrainian companies to participate in joint ventures represents a positive shift in mindset, granting the Ukrainian defence industry at least partial access to collaboration with European companies. This is an important step toward broader integration of Ukraine’s arms producers into the European defence ecosystem, helping to promote standardization, interoperability, and improve cost-efficiency. As of late 2024, Ukraine has established five joint ventures with Western arms manufacturers, including companies from Germany and Lithuania. In addition, European companies, such as Germany’s Rheinmetall, began constructing production facilities in Ukraine, while the UK’s BAE Systems is partnering with local firms to service and maintain its equipment. The Franco-German manufacturer KNDS plans similar cooperation, and the Czechoslovak Group is setting up ammunition plants in the country. SAFE could provide another important push in this direction.
Questions remain about Ukraine’s real opportunities for participation. Despite the SAFE's proclaimed objective of establishing an additional mechanism to enhance support for Ukraine, its key provisions and participation conditions suggest that Ukraine’s potential benefits may be narrow in scope.
One of the main concerns is whether the EU Member States would actually be willing to include Ukraine in their European Defence Industry Investment Plans. Given that Ukraine can only participate as one of the (sub)contractors, Member States may tend to focus on boosting their domestic defense producers’ capabilities. Furthermore, trust issues and the lack of common priorities may prevent interested countries from planning joint projects with Ukraine, as it may be more time-consuming and require additional due diligence processes.
The Commission, in turn, also has very limited tools at its disposal to influence the decisions of Member States. At the same time, Ukraine risks missing the opportunity to derive real benefits from this financial instrument due to the short timeframe for submitting Member States’ European Defence Industry Investment Plans.
यूक्रेन की ओर से भी चुनौतियाँ हैं। यद्यपि SAFE विनियमन उसके क्षेत्र का सह-उत्पादन के लिए उपयोग करने देता है, यह टकराता है 2022 के आक्रमण के बाद से यूक्रेन द्वारा लागू किए गए निर्यात प्रतिबंध से। इसके अनुसार यूक्रेनी कानून, विशेष रूप से कानून “सैन्य तथा दोहरे उपयोग वाली वस्तुओं के अंतरराष्ट्रीय हस्तांतरणों पर राज्य नियंत्रण”, रक्षा वस्तुओं का निर्यात सामान्यतः प्रतिबंधित है और यह केवल नामित राज्य प्राधिकारियों से उचित प्राधिकरण के साथ ही हो सकता है।
Therefore, technically, any equipment manufactured in Ukraine using SAFE funding should remain for end-use within the country, unless the government lifts the export ban.
हालांकि, यह उन यूक्रेनी कंपनियों पर लागू नहीं होता जो EU सदस्य राज्यों में पंजीकृत हैं और वहाँ विनिर्माण सुविधाओं की मालिक हैं।
In addition, legal barriers related to third-country control and intellectual property restrictions in Ukraine may create additional obstacles for Ukraine’s engagement in common procurement. In parallel, Ukraine’s expanding network of R&D accelerators, innovation hubs, and associations lacks sufficiently robust intellectual property (IP) protection mechanisms. Ensuring robust IP protection protocols would foster investor confidence, enable secure technology transfer, and facilitate Ukrainian participation in European and global defense initiatives.
Such a framework suggests that there is no guarantee that Ukraine will be systematically included in planned investments. Without strong incentives or coordination tools to prioritize Ukraine’s involvement, there is a risk that Member States will pursue purely national agendas, sidelining collaboration with Ukrainian defense industry actors.
In May-June 2025, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence outlined Ukraine’s priorities for the SAFE funding and what the country can offer to the EU. Ukraine is particularly interested in common procurement and production of the following categories of equipment:
Ukraine is particularly interested in common procurement with the Nordic countries and Germany, which have both capabilities and interest in supporting Ukraine. However, SAFE loans offer unattractive interest rates for these countries. Despite this, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Germany - each with strong economies - have recently pledged $1.5 billion to purchase U.S.-made weapons for Ukraine through the NATO Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative. Ukraine has also flagged its interest in working with key European suppliers of air defence systems and ammunition, such as France and Italy.
रिपोर्टों के अनुसार, पुर्तगाल, स्पेन, फ्रांस, बुल्गारिया और स्लोवाकिया अपनी यूरोपीय रक्षा उद्योग निवेश योजनाओं में यूक्रेन को शामिल करने में रुचि रखते हो सकते हैं। SAFE ऋण तक पहुँच में रुचि रखने वाले सदस्य राज्यों में UAV विकास, तैनाती और प्रौद्योगिकी साझाकरण में यूक्रेन के साथ सहयोग के प्रति मजबूत उत्साह है। क्रोएशिया और लातविया राष्ट्रपति Zelenskyy और पूर्व प्रधानमंत्री Shmyhal के साथ यूक्रेन की आवश्यकताओं के लिए SAFE वित्तपोषण आवंटित करने पर पहले ही चर्चा कर चुके हैं।
निम्नलिखित केस अध्ययन संभावित परिदृश्यों को रेखांकित करते हैं जिनमें संयुक्त EU–यूक्रेन रक्षा उत्पादन का समर्थन करने के लिए SAFE ऋणों का उपयोग किया जा सकता है।
गोला-बारूद की यूक्रेन की निरंतर आवश्यकता से यह स्पष्ट किया जा सकता है कि SAFE खरीद मॉडल व्यवहार में कैसे काम कर सकता है।
के अनुसार EU का श्वेत पत्र में, संघ ने प्रतिवर्ष कम-से-कम दो मिलियन बड़े-कैलिबर तोपखाना गोले पहुँचाने की प्रतिबद्धता जताई। SAFE ऋण लेने में रुचि व्यक्त कर चुके चेक गणराज्य यूक्रेन को 155 mm तोपखाना गोलों के मुख्य आपूर्तिकर्ताओं में से एक रहा है। उल्लेखनीय रूप से, अक्टूबर 2024 में Czechoslovak Group (CSG) ने यूक्रेन में स्थानीय रूप से तोपखाना गोला-बारूद के लिए Ukrainian arms के साथ एक समझौता संपन्न होने की घोषणा की। CSG की प्रेस विज्ञप्ति के अनुसार, CSG और Ukrainska Bronetechnika 2025 में 100,000 तोपखाना गोले बनाएंगे, और 2026 से उत्पादन बढ़कर प्रतिवर्ष 300,000 से अधिक हो जाएगा। चेक गणराज्य और यूक्रेन दोनों में उत्पादन का उद्देश्य यूक्रेनी सेना के लिए आपूर्ति बढ़ाना और लागत कम करना है।
Given that ongoing projects can also receive funding under the SAFE mechanism, the CSG and Ukrainska Bronetechnika can potentially request SAFE funding to expand their manufacturing capabilities in Ukraine, further reduce costs, and provide Ukraine with vitally important equipment. In this case, Ukrainska Bronetechnika could act as a subcontractor, whose Ukraine-based facilities will be used for localised production with further supplies to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
2. Estonia and Ukraine: SAFE funding potential of the European-Ukrainian USHORAD alliance
In May 2025, Ukraine and Estonia formed the Air Defence Tech Alliance for Ukraine, aiming to
“close critical capability gaps on ultra-short-range air defence (USHORAD) and establish a European-Ukrainian defence industrial partnership capable of rapid innovation and scalable production. ”
Under this cooperation framework, DefSecIntel Solutions (Estonia), Ukrainian defence industry partners (Gauss Glide, Drone space labs, LLC Proinvest, Vk Systems, EW Spectrum), and Weibel Scientific (Denmark) have agreed on integrating Weibel’s radar technology with DefSecIntel’s ultra-short-range air defence (USHORAD) systems and Ukrainian interception effectors into fully automated, scalable defence platforms. Such an initiative represents a step towards developing joint solutions to meet Ukraine’s current need for anti-drone systems and support broader European initiatives, such as the Baltic Drone Wall.
Assessing the eligibility criteria, this project meets a key requirement of the SAFE mechanism. It represents a potential flagship model for cross-border EU–Ukraine defence cooperation with direct battlefield relevance and scalable industrial benefits for Europe’s own security needs. As such, it represents a strong candidate for potential funding under SAFE.
For the EU Member States:
For Ukraine:
यह पाठ अंग्रेज़ी मूल से स्वचालित रूप से अनुवादित किया गया है, जो साइट की भाषा अंग्रेज़ी में बदलने पर अब भी उपलब्ध है।
