21 دقائق للقراءةفي عام 2025، تعرض الاتحاد الأوروبي لضغوط متزايدة لإصلاح وضعه الدفاعي استجابةً لاستمرار العدوان الروسي على أوكرانيا، ولتنامي الشكوك بشأن الضمانات الأمنية الأمريكية في ظل أجندة «أمريكا أولاً» لإدارة ترامب الثانية. كما كشفت الحرب عن تشرذم عميق في دفاع أوروبا، يشمل محدودية قابلية التشغيل البيني للأسلحة، وتكرار جهود المشتريات، وفوارق هائلة في ميزانيات الدفاع والقدرات الصناعية بين الدول الأعضاء.
Recognizing the strategic imperative to strengthen European deterrence posture and provide sustained support to Ukraine, the EU adopted the SAFE instrument as part of the Rearm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 in March 2025. Building on two earlier EU initiatives, EDIRPA (common procurement) and ASAP (ammunition ramp-up), SAFE significantly surpasses them in terms of financing scale. However, questions remain about how Member States will utilize this instrument, whether it will achieve its intended impact on the European defence industry, and how Ukraine will benefit from it. This policy brief explores these issues.
The ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 aims to boost European defense capabilities and industrial base through several financial means, one of which is the Security and Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation, adopted on May 27, 2025. The core objective of the SAFE mechanism is to incentivize common military procurement between the Member States by allocating up to €150 billion in loans backed by the EU budget.
تهدف الأداة إلى خفض تكاليف الإنتاج وتقليص التشرذم وتعزيز قابلية التشغيل البيني في أنحاء الاتحاد الأوروبي في مجال الدفاع والأمن. وعلى نطاق أوسع، صُممت لجعل أوروبا أكثر سيادةً ومسؤوليةً عن دفاعها الذاتي. ومن الجوانب الإيجابية لكييف أن بلدان المنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية/الرابطة الأوروبية للتجارة الحرة وأوكرانيا يمكنها أيضاً الاستفادة جزئياً من SAFE بشروط معينة.
يتمثلالهدفان الرئيسيانللأدوات المالية الجديدة للاتحاد الأوروبي، كما وردا في الورقة البيضاء، في:
- Increasing support for Ukraine through the urgent, short-term procurement of weapons, aimed at replenishing stocks or acquiring certain systems quickly.
- Developing EU defence industries in a collaborative manner through long-term investments, yielding results over time.
In light of the current capability shortfalls across the EU and lessons learned from the battlefield in Ukraine, the European Commission has prioritized the following categories of equipment to be procured under the SAFE funding scheme:
The European Commission has set a timeline for Member States to become funding recipients under the SAFE mechanism:
لضمان فعالية آلية SAFE، وضعت المفوضية الأوروبية عدة متطلبات أساسية يتعين على متلقي التمويل الامتثال لها.
1. Common procurement
Projects should normally involve at least two participants (e.g., two Member States, a Member State and an EEA/EFTA state or Ukraine, or a Member State and other third countries*). As a deviation from the rule, single-state procurements are temporarily permitted during an initial phase.
2. “Buy European” rule
At least 65% of the project value should derive from companies established within the EU, EEA/EFTA states, or Ukraine. A maximum of 35% of the estimated cost of the end-product’s components may come from external suppliers or subcontractors from third countries (e.g., the U.S.).
3. Loan access
تتوافر القروض بشروط ميسرة للغاية: يمكن أن تمتد حتى 45 عاماً، من دون اشتراط سداد خلال السنوات العشر الأولى. وإضافةً إلى ذلك، يمكن صرف ما يصل إلى 15% من الأموال مقدماً لمساعدة المشاريع على الانطلاق.
Noteworthy, loans may be provided solely to EU Member States. If a third country, such as Ukraine, participates in common procurement, the funds will be disbursed to the Member State involved. Based on its European Defence Industry Investment Plan, the respective Member State will allocate the funding among the approved activities.
The SAFE instrument is a pragmatic step toward strengthening EU defence capabilities in response to growing geopolitical threats. Its core advantage lies in its aim to promote common procurement, intended to foster greater collaboration among Member States' industries and reduce fragmentation in the EU defence market. By mandating that 65% of spending be directed toward EU-based production, SAFE seeks to strengthen Europe’s defense industrial base, while also embracing a holistic European—rather than strictly EU-exclusive—approach by enabling participation from third countries such as Ukraine, EEA/EFTA members, and acceding, candidate, and potential candidate countries.
Despite the EU’s ambitious goals under SAFE, its overall scale is still modest. While Commission officials note that SAFE’s size (€150 billion) accounts for over half of the EU member states' annual defence spending, this figure appears modest relative to its objectives. Reducing reliance on the United States—as envisioned in the SAFE Regulation—would, according to some estimates, require close to $1 trillion. For decades, the EU has depended heavily on the US for airlift, satellite communications, and aerial refueling, with 78% of European defence procurement in 2022–2023 spent on non-European products. SAFE alone cannot cover these expenses and has several limitations that remain unresolved.
نظراً إلى أن SAFE صُمم لسد فجوات القدرات الحرجة بسرعة، فإنه يعمل كتسهيل ائتماني قد لا يجذب جميع البلدان. أولاً، تُحتسب القروض ضمن الدين الوطني، وقد تواجه الدول الأعضاء ذات الحيز المالي المحدود صعوبة في استخدام SAFE بفاعلية. وبعبارات بسيطة، يشير الحيز المالي إلى قدرة الحكومة على تحمل ديون إضافية من دون تعريض الاستقرار المالي للخطر.
Not all EU countries are equally positioned in this regard: those with higher debt levels have less fiscal space, and vice versa. France, for instance, currently carries one of the largest budget deficits (-5,8%) in the EU and a pretty high budget debt (around 113%) but aims to raise defence spending to 3–3.5% of GDP. As of July 2025, France has expressed interest in SAFE loans, though likely for a modest sum.
Additionally, borrowing at the EU’s interest rates is not attractive for all Member States. SAFE essentially allows the EU to raise up to €150 billion on stock markets and re-loan it to Member States at comparatively low interest rates. With EU bond yields around 3%, SAFE loans are expected to carry a similar rate. This presents a significant advantage for countries with higher borrowing costs—such as Romania (7%), Poland (5.4%), and the Czech Republic (4.3%)—which stand to benefit from accessing cheaper EU-level financing.
However, for many Member States, the gap between EU and national borrowing costs is relatively small. Wealthier countries with strong (AAA) credit ratings—like Germany (2.6%), the Netherlands (2.8%), Sweden (2.4%), and Denmark (2.5%)—have little incentive to use SAFE, as their own borrowing costs are lower than the EU’s. Yet, surprises are possible - for instance, Denmark back in July, has openly stated it does not plan to use SAFE loans, preferring to finance its defence investments independently. In September, however, it became the last EU member state to express interest in receiving SAFE loans. Reportedly, the possibility to support Ukraine via SAFE pushed the country towards this decision.
As of September 1, 2025, nineteen EU Member States had expressed interest in taking out loans worth at all €150billion. These include Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Finland and Denmark.
وبينما تبدو بعض الدول الأعضاء ملتزمة حقاً بتعزيز وضعها الدفاعي—فقد أعدت بولندا، على سبيل المثال، مشروعاتتبلغ قيمتها قرابة €45 مليار—قد تستخدم دول أخرى SAFE بصورة رمزية أكثر، في إشارة إلى دعمها لأهداف الاتحاد الأوروبي الدفاعية من دون انخراط كبير. فعلى سبيل المثال، أبدت إيطاليا اهتماماً بمبلغ€14 مليار، فيماتسعى اليونان إلى€1.27 مليار. ومن المتوقع تقديم طلبات التمويل النهائية وخططالاستثمار في الصناعة الدفاعية الأوروبيةالمفصلة في نوفمبر،لكن طريقة اختيار الدول لإنفاق الأموال—بصورة تعاونية أم مستقلة—قد تكون أهم من حجم ما سيُنفق.
The EU defence market remains highly fragmented, with procurement typically conducted at the national level and often favouring domestic industries. This leads to missed opportunities for synergies and economies of scale, further exacerbated by excessive platform diversity across Member States and the absence of harmonized export regulations across the EU.
لا يمكن تحقيق أهداف SAFE—المشتريات المشتركة، وتقليل تجزؤ السوق، وتحسين قابلية التشغيل البيني—إلا إذا تصرفت الدول بوحدة وإرادة سياسية بدلاً من التنافس على الأموال. وقد يؤدي انعدام الثقة المتبادل بسهولة إلى تغلّب المصالح الوطنية على المبادرات المشتركة، بما يقوض غرض البرنامج.
في هذا السياق،من غير المرجح أن يعالج SAFE الحمائية الوطنية بفاعلية، رغم نيته التعاونية. وبموجب القواعد الحالية، تتطلب قروض SAFE طلبات من دولتين عضوين على الأقل، لكن خلال السنة الأولى، وحتى مايو 2026، يجوز للدول الأعضاء المنفردة أيضاًالتقدم بطلب بصورة مستقلة. وإضافة إلى ذلك، وبناءً على طلب بعض الدول الأعضاء، فإن المفوضيةسمحتبتمويل برامج دفاعية قائمة في إطار SAFE.
These conditions may not offer sufficient incentives for broad cooperation, and Member States may instead use SAFE primarily to bolster their own industries. This trend is already apparent in the preliminary applications submitted as of July 2025, with Member States reportedly putting forward individual proposals prioritizing domestic industries. For example, Polish officials state that Warsaw will likely use the funding to support domestically produced equipment—such as drones and counter-drone systems under the “Eastern Shield” initiative, artillery ammunition, Krab self-propelled howitzers, Rosomak vehicles, and Jelcz logistics trucks.
If most of the 19 applicant countries submitted individual proposals, they would nearly exhaust SAFE, turning a tool intended for common procurement into one for individual financing.
بهذه الطريقة، يواجه SAFE خطر الإخفاق في تحقيق هدفه المتمثل في تعزيز المشتريات المشتركة وتقليل التجزؤ في سوق الدفاع في الاتحاد الأوروبي. ولا يزال من الممكن أن تخفف المفوضية هذا الخطر، إذ تتخذ القرار النهائي بشأن تخصيص الأموال؛ غير أن معايير هذه القرارات والهيئة المحددة المسؤولة داخل المفوضية، إلى جانب خبرتها، تظل غير واضحة.
Given the above, SAFE should not be considered a sustainable long-term solution for European security. The very regulation establishing SAFE defines it as a temporary, ad hoc instrument, complementary to existing EU initiatives like the European Defence Fund (EDF). It is not the first time the EU has used Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to offer emergency financial assistance. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU launched the SURE instrument under the same legal basis to support employment.
However, the defense and security sector differs fundamentally from areas like unemployment: defense spending cannot be treated as a temporary deviation from fiscal norms. This makes the short-term nature of SAFE its core limitation. For defense firms on both sides of the Atlantic, the main barrier to scaling up production is not a lack of funding per se, but rather the absence of predictable, long-term government orders. Defense requires consistent, long-term investment rather than one-off emergency funding.
To build on SAFE’s foundations and address its limitations, the EU will need to adopt more permanent, centralised funding mechanisms to ensure lasting strategic autonomy. One example is the proposed European Defence Mechanism (EDM), an intergovernmental body that would centralise European defence procurement and capabilities, while enforcing cooperation through shared funding and binding rules.
A coordinated strategy with a substantial budget (e.g., €500 billion over five years) may be the only way to tackle the persistent fragmentation of the EU defence market. The Commission’s proposal to allocate €131 billion for defence in the next Multinational Financial Framework is unlikely to address this issue.
So far, for SAFE to achieve its intended impact, Member States should take a proactive role. The EU has created a strong and promising financial instrument, but its success ultimately depends on how effectively and ambitiously Member States choose to implement it.
Key provisions for Ukraine’s participation as a third country
يُقال كثيراً إن أوكرانيا تستطيع المشاركة في SAFE على قدم المساواة مع الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي والاستفادة كثيراً من العملية. غير أن ذلك صحيح جزئياً فقط.
The novelty of the SAFE mechanism lies in the fact that Ukraine’s arms producers and tech companies can participate in common procurement as (sub)contractors, along with EU-based companies, receiving funding from the loan acquired by an EU Member State.
65% of components of the end product should originate from either EU Member States, EEA/EFTA countries and or Ukraine. In this sense, Ukraine can indeed be considered part of Europe. In contrast, acceding, potential candidate, and other EU candidate countries (referred to in the SAFE Regulation as "other third countries") can also participate in SAFE as subcontractors, but under much stricter conditions. Their contributions are considered to originate from “outside the Union” and can only constitute up to 35% of the end product.
يمكن أيضاً استخدام أراضي أوكرانيا لأغراض التصنيع، إذ تنص لائحة SAFE على أن
“the infrastructure, facilities, assets, and resources of the contractors and subcontractors involved in the common procurement that are used for the purposes of the common procurement shall be located in the territory of a Member State, an EEA EFTA State, or Ukraine”.
One of the ways for Ukraine to benefit from the SAFE mechanism is through being designated as a recipient of equipment delivered as military aid. The SAFE Regulation contains a separate clause encouraging Member States to include, where relevant, a description of Ukraine’s anticipated involvement in their planned activities in their European Defence Industry Investment Plans. In a recent resolution, the European Parliament included a clause encouraging Member States to devote a significant part of their European Defence Industry Investment Plans to assistance for Ukraine. Several scenarios appear feasible within the framework of the SAFE provisions:
Ideally, beyond promoting common procurement, the SAFE financial instrument was also intended to encourage Member States to increase military support for Ukraine. The underlying idea is to provide financial support for EU Member States to procure new military equipment for themselves, thereby enabling them to provide equipment from existing stocks to Ukraine. This would deliver prompt results for Ukraine while ensuring that Member States receive guaranteed replenishment (a mechanism similar to the American Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA)). However, much will depend on the political decisions and national priorities of each Member State, as well as the pace of SAFE implementation.
Similar to the previous scheme, Ukraine may be designated as a potential recipient of military equipment procured by the Member States under the SAFE financial instrument. However, such a scenario would delay support for Ukraine, as procurement procedures and the establishment of new production lines would take time (a mechanism similar to the American Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)).
تكمن المشكلة الرئيسية في الحوافز التي تدفع الدول الأعضاء إلى التبرع لأوكرانيا بالمعدات المنتجة حديثاً بدلاً من تجديد مخزوناتها الخاصة. وكحلٍّ ممكن، تستطيع أوكرانيا التواصل مع الدول الأعضاء التي قدمت سابقاً معدات أساسية لا تزال أوكرانيا تحتاج إليها، لتشجيعها على توريد وحدات إضافية من الأنظمة ذاتها، على أن يُموَّل ذلك هذه المرة عبر الأداة المالية SAFE.
Within this scenario, Ukraine will benefit from the local manufacturing of defence equipment in cooperation with EU companies operating on Ukrainian territory. This approach is similar to elements of the “Danish model,” which allows interested countries to finance Ukraine’s defence industry and donate the produced equipment back to Ukraine. Spearheaded by Denmark, the “Danish model” has become the first mechanism to involve direct procurement from Ukrainian defence manufacturers. This model could serve as a blueprint for SAFE-funded procurement, involving Ukrainian defence and technology companies and their facilities in Ukraine.
غير أن الفارق الأساسي في إطار SAFE يتمثل في وجوب مشاركة الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي بصفتها متلقيةً للقروض. ومن الناحية الفنية، يمكن لدولة عضو في الاتحاد الأوروبي صرف التمويل لشركة أوروبية تنتج بالاشتراك مع شركة أوكرانية مستخدمةً منشآت الأخيرة على الأراضي الأوكرانية. وبدلاً من ذلك، يمكن لدولة عضو في الاتحاد الأوروبي تتلقى قرضاً أن تشتري أسلحة من شركة أوكرانية تتصرف متعاقداً وحيداً، ثم تتبرع بها لأوكرانيا. وفي هذه الحالة، لا ينطبق حظر التصدير الأوكراني.
على المدى القصير، سيجمع تمويل SAFE بين الشراء السريع والحلول التي أثبتت فاعليتها في الحرب لتلبية احتياجات أوكرانيا الحالية. ونظراً إلى أن كثيراً من الصناعات الأوكرانية تستورد مكونات من الاتحاد الأوروبي، فستفيد الاستثمارات الصناعة الأوروبية أيضاً، إذ تتيح للشركاء اختيار متعاقدين أوكرانيين موثوقين وضمان أمن سلسلة الإمداد.
على المدى الطويل، ومع تعيين أوكرانيا متعاقداً أو متعاقداً من الباطن للدولة العضو في الاتحاد الأوروبي التي تتلقى قرض SAFE، لن يستفيد الجيش الأوكراني من SAFE بوصفه متلقياً للمعدات فحسب، بل ستستفيد الصناعات الأوكرانية أيضاً بوصفها مستفيدة من استثمارات طويلة الأجل ومشروعات مشتركة مع شركاء أوروبيين.
The Ukrainian defence industry is among the most rapidly developing and expanding in the world. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has increased its production capacity thirty-fivefold: from $1 billion in 2022 to $35 billion in 2025. However, in 2024, Ukraine only managed to secure around $10 billion in funding. SAFE-funded investments could further unlock the potential of Ukrainian industries by expanding their production lines, accelerating delivery schedules, and scaling up innovative projects already tested in combat.
Additionally, allowing Ukrainian companies to participate in joint ventures represents a positive shift in mindset, granting the Ukrainian defence industry at least partial access to collaboration with European companies. This is an important step toward broader integration of Ukraine’s arms producers into the European defence ecosystem, helping to promote standardization, interoperability, and improve cost-efficiency. As of late 2024, Ukraine has established five joint ventures with Western arms manufacturers, including companies from Germany and Lithuania. In addition, European companies, such as Germany’s Rheinmetall, began constructing production facilities in Ukraine, while the UK’s BAE Systems is partnering with local firms to service and maintain its equipment. The Franco-German manufacturer KNDS plans similar cooperation, and the Czechoslovak Group is setting up ammunition plants in the country. SAFE could provide another important push in this direction.
Questions remain about Ukraine’s real opportunities for participation. Despite the SAFE's proclaimed objective of establishing an additional mechanism to enhance support for Ukraine, its key provisions and participation conditions suggest that Ukraine’s potential benefits may be narrow in scope.
One of the main concerns is whether the EU Member States would actually be willing to include Ukraine in their European Defence Industry Investment Plans. Given that Ukraine can only participate as one of the (sub)contractors, Member States may tend to focus on boosting their domestic defense producers’ capabilities. Furthermore, trust issues and the lack of common priorities may prevent interested countries from planning joint projects with Ukraine, as it may be more time-consuming and require additional due diligence processes.
The Commission, in turn, also has very limited tools at its disposal to influence the decisions of Member States. At the same time, Ukraine risks missing the opportunity to derive real benefits from this financial instrument due to the short timeframe for submitting Member States’ European Defence Industry Investment Plans.
وتوجد تحديات أيضاً من الجانب الأوكراني. ففي حين تسمح لائحة SAFE باستخدام أراضيها للإنتاج المشترك، يتعارض ذلك مع حظر التصدير الذي أقرّته أوكرانيا منذ غزو 2022. ووفقاً لـالتشريع الأوكراني، وتحديداً قانون «بشأن رقابة الدولة على عمليات النقل الدولية للسلع العسكرية والسلع ذات الاستخدام المزدوج»، يُحظر تصدير المواد الدفاعية عموماً ولا يجوز أن يتم إلا بتصريح مناسب من سلطات الدولة المختصة.
Therefore, technically, any equipment manufactured in Ukraine using SAFE funding should remain for end-use within the country, unless the government lifts the export ban.
غير أن ذلك لا ينطبق على الشركات الأوكرانية المسجَّلة في الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي والتي تمتلك منشآت تصنيع هناك.
In addition, legal barriers related to third-country control and intellectual property restrictions in Ukraine may create additional obstacles for Ukraine’s engagement in common procurement. In parallel, Ukraine’s expanding network of R&D accelerators, innovation hubs, and associations lacks sufficiently robust intellectual property (IP) protection mechanisms. Ensuring robust IP protection protocols would foster investor confidence, enable secure technology transfer, and facilitate Ukrainian participation in European and global defense initiatives.
Such a framework suggests that there is no guarantee that Ukraine will be systematically included in planned investments. Without strong incentives or coordination tools to prioritize Ukraine’s involvement, there is a risk that Member States will pursue purely national agendas, sidelining collaboration with Ukrainian defense industry actors.
In May-June 2025, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence outlined Ukraine’s priorities for the SAFE funding and what the country can offer to the EU. Ukraine is particularly interested in common procurement and production of the following categories of equipment:
Ukraine is particularly interested in common procurement with the Nordic countries and Germany, which have both capabilities and interest in supporting Ukraine. However, SAFE loans offer unattractive interest rates for these countries. Despite this, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Germany - each with strong economies - have recently pledged $1.5 billion to purchase U.S.-made weapons for Ukraine through the NATO Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative. Ukraine has also flagged its interest in working with key European suppliers of air defence systems and ammunition, such as France and Italy.
وبحسب التقارير، قد تكون بلدان منها البرتغال وإسبانيا وفرنسا وبلغاريا وسلوفاكيا مهتمة بإشراك أوكرانيا في خططها للاستثمار في الصناعة الدفاعية الأوروبية. وبين الدول الأعضاء المهتمة بالحصول على قروض SAFE، يوجد حماس كبير للتعاون مع أوكرانيا في تطوير المركبات الجوية غير المأهولة ونشرها وتبادل التكنولوجيا بشأنها. كرواتيا ولاتفيا ناقشتا بالفعل مع الرئيس زيلينسكي ورئيس الوزراء السابق شميهال تخصيص تمويل SAFE لاحتياجات أوكرانيا.
تعرض دراسات الحالة التالية سيناريوهات ممكنة يمكن فيها استخدام قروض SAFE لدعم الإنتاج الدفاعي المشترك بين الاتحاد الأوروبي وأوكرانيا.
يمكن الاستفادة من حاجة أوكرانيا المستمرة إلى الذخيرة لتوضيح كيفية عمل نموذج الشراء في SAFE عملياً.
وفقاً لـالورقة البيضاء للاتحاد الأوروبي، التزم الاتحاد بتسليم ما لا يقل عن مليوني طلقة من ذخيرة المدفعية كبيرة العيار سنوياً. وكانت الجمهورية التشيكية، التي أبدت اهتمامها بالحصول على قروض SAFE، من الموردين الرئيسيين لقذائف المدفعية عيار 155 mm إلى أوكرانيا. ومن الجدير بالذكر أن Czechoslovak Group (CSG) أعلنت في أكتوبر 2024 إبرام اتفاق مع Ukrainian arms لإنتاج ذخيرة مدفعية محلياً في أوكرانيا. ووفقاً للبيان الصحفي لـCSG، ستنتج CSG وUkrainska Bronetechnika 100,000 قذيفة مدفعية في 2025، على أن يرتفع الإنتاج إلى أكثر من 300,000 سنوياً اعتباراً من 2026. يهدف الإنتاج في كل من الجمهورية التشيكية وأوكرانيا إلى زيادة الإمداد للجيش الأوكراني وخفض التكاليف.
Given that ongoing projects can also receive funding under the SAFE mechanism, the CSG and Ukrainska Bronetechnika can potentially request SAFE funding to expand their manufacturing capabilities in Ukraine, further reduce costs, and provide Ukraine with vitally important equipment. In this case, Ukrainska Bronetechnika could act as a subcontractor, whose Ukraine-based facilities will be used for localised production with further supplies to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
2. Estonia and Ukraine: SAFE funding potential of the European-Ukrainian USHORAD alliance
In May 2025, Ukraine and Estonia formed the Air Defence Tech Alliance for Ukraine, aiming to
“close critical capability gaps on ultra-short-range air defence (USHORAD) and establish a European-Ukrainian defence industrial partnership capable of rapid innovation and scalable production. ”
Under this cooperation framework, DefSecIntel Solutions (Estonia), Ukrainian defence industry partners (Gauss Glide, Drone space labs, LLC Proinvest, Vk Systems, EW Spectrum), and Weibel Scientific (Denmark) have agreed on integrating Weibel’s radar technology with DefSecIntel’s ultra-short-range air defence (USHORAD) systems and Ukrainian interception effectors into fully automated, scalable defence platforms. Such an initiative represents a step towards developing joint solutions to meet Ukraine’s current need for anti-drone systems and support broader European initiatives, such as the Baltic Drone Wall.
Assessing the eligibility criteria, this project meets a key requirement of the SAFE mechanism. It represents a potential flagship model for cross-border EU–Ukraine defence cooperation with direct battlefield relevance and scalable industrial benefits for Europe’s own security needs. As such, it represents a strong candidate for potential funding under SAFE.
For the EU Member States:
For Ukraine:
تُرجم هذا النص تلقائيًا من الأصل باللغة الإنجليزية، الذي يظل متاحًا عند تغيير لغة الموقع إلى الإنجليزية.
