Ukraine Is Heading to the EU: Who Is Opposed to a New Member on Board?

By Alina Horbenko

Key Takeaways

• Hungary’s Opposition and Russian Influence: Hungary’s resistance to Ukraine’s EU accession underscores the enduring impact of Russian influence within the bloc, as Budapest views Kyiv’s membership as a threat to its strategic ties with Moscow.
• Slovakia’s Shift and Political Volatility: Slovakia’s recent pivot toward a more cautious stance on Ukraine reflects how domestic political changes can disrupt EU unity and complicate foreign policy, especially in Eastern Europe.
• Economic Fears and Market Disruption: Concerns about Ukraine’s agricultural potential and cheaper goods highlight fears of economic disruption, questioning the EU’s ability to integrate a large, resource-rich country without upsetting existing market balances.
• Euroscepticism and Disinformation: Rising Euroscepticism and Russian propaganda in Hungary and Slovakia show how external narratives can shape public opinion, posing challenges to Ukraine’s EU aspirations.
• Testing EU Identity and Unity: Ukraine’s accession journey challenges the EU to define its core values and adapt to geopolitical shifts, testing its ability to maintain cohesion while integrating a country in war.
• Need for Enlargement Strategy Rethink: Ukraine’s case may force the EU to develop more flexible, pragmatic approaches to enlargement, balancing solidarity with the realities of integrating war-torn states.

Negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union officially commenced on June 25, 2024. While this milestone does not guarantee swift accession—European Council President Charles Michel suggested membership by 2030 if both sides “do their homework”—it is a significant success for Ukraine’s European integration aspirations.

Ukraine and its people increasingly feel ready to join the EU. However, the readiness of the bloc itself remains a question. Although most member states support Ukraine’s path to accession, some react cautiously, and others actively promote skepticism. Who are the primary opponents of Ukraine’s accession, and why?

State of Affairs

Ukraine’s accession is a politically sensitive issue, with opposition most evident in the political sphere. A country’s stance on Ukraine’s EU membership often correlates strongly with its position on supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia. Those who advocate for increased aid to Ukraine often prove to be the biggest supporters of the country’s accession to the Union. On the other hand, states with solid pro-Russian sentiments (either because of sympathy for the Russian leadership or because of the economic benefits of trade with Russia) are the most opposed.

Beyond political biases, the future of the EU economy post-accession is a concern for both top officials and the population of member states. Questions arise about maintaining fair competition with the influx of Ukrainian products, potential price increases, and the share of the EU budget required to boost post-war Ukraine’s economy. Thus, the issue of accession is also evaluated from the perspective of potential economic risks for existing EU members.

Hungary: the Principal Opponent

Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has emerged as the principal opponent of Ukraine’s EU accession. Over the past two years, Orban has delayed negotiations, stalled sanctions, obstructed aid deals, and questioned Ukraine’s ability to defeat Russia. His diplomatic tour as a “peace advocate” to Kyiv, Moscow, Beijing, and Washington in July 2024 shocked both the EU and Ukraine. Not surprisingly, his departure from the room during the December 2023 decision to start Ukraine’s accession negotiations was met with relief.

At the heart of Kyiv’s complicated relationship with Budapest are strong ties of the latter with Moscow, particularly in the energy sector. Sanctions against Russia have been a contentious issue, with Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic requesting exemptions from the EU’s Russian oil import ban due to their landlocked status. Unlike Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which reduced their dependence on Russian energy, Hungary signed new deals to increase its supplies, becoming the EU’s largest buyer of Russian energy (purchasing $343 million worth of oil and gas in January this year alone) and planning a new pipeline to Serbia. Additionally, Russia is building the Paks II nuclear power plant in Hungary.

According to Politico, the EU’s hostility towards Budapest is growing due to Orban’s friendship with Russia and efforts to lift sanctions. His Slovakian counterpart, Robert Fico, is taking a similar direction, pushing Bratislava to take a more pro-Russian stance and suspending funding for military aid to Ukraine.

When Ukrainian sanctions blocked the transit of pipeline oil from the Russian private oil company Lukoil through Ukraine to Hungary and Slovakia, both countries appealed to the European Commission to “solve the problem.” The stoppage of transit could deprive the two countries of a third of their oil imports. Hungary and Slovakia’s attempts to use EU rules to maintain access to Russian oil irritated EU diplomats, as other countries in the bloc have put efforts into reducing the volume of Russian energy imports. “Many EU members have made costly but necessary efforts to get rid of their dependence on Russian gas and oil […] Mainly because it smells like blood,” said one EU diplomat, speaking anonymously. He added that Hungary has problems not only with its sense of smell but also with a lack of determination to break its dependence.

Thus, Hungary perceives Ukraine as a “threat” to the “friendly and economically beneficial” relations of the former one with Russia. Moreover, Budapest started having a similar perception of Brussels, which “does not understand the importance of promoting peace between Russia and Ukraine.”

Another burning issue in Ukraine-Hungary relations is the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. The welfare of Hungarian minorities living in Hungary’s neighboring countries has been a constant concern of governments in Budapest. In 2010, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a law on a simplified procedure for obtaining Hungarian citizenship for foreigners, with Deputy Prime Minister of Hungary Semjén Zsolt later saying that “Hungary is developing a unified demographic program, including with the participation of ethnic Hungarian communities abroad, with the support of all its relevant initiatives.” Just weeks after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Orban gave a speech calling for autonomy, collective rights, and dual citizenship for the Hungarian minority, which Ukrainian authorities immediately interpreted as a call for separatism.

Relations between the two countries were particularly strained in 2017, when the Ukrainian Parliament, Verkhovna Rada, passed a law on education, according to which the language of instruction in educational institutions should be the state language, i.e., Ukrainian, but one or more subjects may be taught in two or more languages. Hungary, in turn, has criticized the law, claiming that it allegedly restricts the rights of national minorities and is a threat to the cultural and linguistic rights of the Hungarian minority.

Since then, Budapest’s rhetoric includes accusations of persecuting the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, which it uses to justify a lack of support for Ukraine’s European integration. For several months in 2022, Hungary constantly threatened to veto the EU’s planned €18 billion loan to Ukraine but eventually agreed. However, later, Orban rejected the supply of weapons to Ukraine, refusing to allow the transit of arms through Hungarian territory. In September 2023, Viktor Orban said he would not support Ukraine in any international affairs issue “until the language rights of ethnic Hungarians there are restored.”

At the same time, in December 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen praised Ukraine’s law on national minorities, which is necessary for further progress towards EU membership. A disagreement between Victor and Ursula’s opinions raises the concern that the issue of national minorities might be used by Hungary to advance an agenda that diverges from the EU’s position and Ukraine’s interests.

Orban’s primary political opponent, Peter Magyar, head of the Hungarian Tisza Party, takes a more balanced approach. On 11 July 2024, he arrived in Kyiv to commemorate the victims of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Nevertheless, Péter is still cautious about making statements on sending weapons. In a public speech on 18 June, Magyar condemned Russian President Vladimir Putin but said he did not support the deployment of Hungarian troops to Ukraine. “We share the position of the Budapest government,” the politician said. “We will not send troops or weapons to Ukraine from Hungary. You know how sensitive Hungary’s situation is in this war.”

However, does the Hungarian population support the position of their leader? Before the full-scale invasion in February 2022, only 22% of Hungarians viewed Ukraine positively, 46% could not answer how they perceived Ukraine, while 32% responded negatively. It was the lowest level of sympathy for Ukraine among all surveyed countries (Moldova, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic). Positive perceptions of Ukraine by Hungarians slightly improved to 24% in October 2022, while negative perceptions rose to 40%.

It is important to note that Hungary’s negative perception of Ukraine parallels the trends of Euroscepticism there. According to an October 2022 survey, unlike other countries where the majority considered the war unprovoked, Hungarian society is split: about half see the war as a reaction to the actions and decisions of the West, while the other half view it as an unprovoked event.

According to the GLOBSEC Trends 2024 poll, conducted in mid-February this year, most Hungarians (55%) see Russia as the main culprit in the war, and only 36% see Ukraine as a future member of the EU, NATO, or both. Additionally, more than 50% believe that the West provokes Russia by providing military assistance to Ukraine.

“The current policy of the Hungarian prime minister is anti-European, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-Polish,” said Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Teofil Bartoszewski, quoted by PAP. “I really don’t understand why Hungary wants to remain a member of organizations that it dislikes so much [the EU and NATO] and that obviously mistreat it. Why doesn’t [Orban] create an alliance with [Russian dictator Vladimir] Putin and some authoritarian states of this type?” Bartoszewski said.

Such a difference in the countries’ positions on the Ukrainian issue has called into question the long-term alliance between Poland and Hungary within the EU, where they have been united on various topics (in migration by opposing mandatory EU quotas for refugee resettlement, in economic issues by skepticism about the idea of creating a common EU budget or issuing joint debt, etc.).

With Hungary currently holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union, there are fears that processes related to Ukraine’s accession to the EU will be increasingly stalled, and important decisions, such as the approval of new aid or further membership negotiations, could be delayed. Notably, the Hungarian representative holds the EU portfolio in the policy area of Neighbourhood and Enlargement, which is critical for any country’s accession to the EU. Furthermore, Hungarian Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi has already faced repeated criticism from Brussels officials for his portfolio management. 

Slovakia: Between Love and Hate

Back in 2014, Slovakia condemned Russia’s aggression, supported anti-Russian sanctions, and sided with Ukraine as it fought for national survival, freedom, and independence. The Slovak government consistently emphasized its support for Ukraine and aligned with the EU’s policies against Russia. Following the Russian invasion in 2022, Slovakia provided Ukraine with comprehensive political, diplomatic, military, and humanitarian assistance.

However, in October 2023, Slovakia’s stance on military aid shifted as the left-wing nationalist and populist political party, the Course for Social Democracy, won the elections. Newly appointed Prime Minister Robert Fico announced an end to military assistance to Ukraine and refused further anti-Russian sanctions. In November, Fico blocked Ukraine’s 14th military aid package, totaling €40.3 million. Conversely, former Prime Minister Eduard Heger had expressed his commitment to continue military support for Ukraine, emphasizing shared values of democracy and freedom. Thus, Slovak politics is now divided, with the prime minister favoring Russia.

Fico stated, “Ukraine is not a NATO member. Slovakia has nothing to do with the war in Ukraine, and I am sending a very clear message to the whole of Slovakia: regardless of who asks us for anything, the foot of a Slovak soldier will not cross the Slovak-Ukrainian border.” Slovakia continues to benefit from cheap Russian oil, a point Fico emphasizes in alignment with Orban’s position.

Despite this, the Slovak defense industry remains cooperative with Ukraine. Defense Minister Robert Kalyniak plans a significant increase in ammunition production, with a goal of 200,000 large-caliber shells next year, up from 125,000 this year, Bloomberg reports. “Our political declaration says that we will not provide free military assistance to Ukraine because, in this way, we will support the conflict. But we will not limit defense production when it supports the gross domestic product because, in this way, I would harm the interests of Slovakia,” the country’s defense minister explained.

Furthermore, Slovak President Peter Pellegrini supported the Czech initiative to purchase artillery shells for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It appears that, politically, Slovakia is cautious and skeptical about the war and Ukraine’s accession, while in defense, it supports the latter.

However, it is not only the country’s political leadership that expresses ambivalent opinions about Ukraine. On the one hand, according to the GLOBSEC Trends 2024 survey, 41% of Slovaks said that Russia is the one guilty of the war in Ukraine, while the majority of the population claims that Ukraine or the West is responsible for the Russian aggression: 31% blames the Western countries, while 20% said Ukraine was culpable, by “harassing Russians in the east of the country since 2014”. 

Slovaks are also the least supportive of Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO in the region, with just 30% support for membership, which is even lower than in Hungary (36%). More than 60% of respondents agree with providing military assistance to Ukraine. Still, the exact number of people agree that the aid brings Europeans closer to war because Ukraine is provoking Russia with it.

The influence of Russian disinformation is crucial in shaping these outcomes, as, according to the sociologist Michal Vásčka, about half of Slovaks are exposed to misleading narratives.  “Today, Slovakia is the most pro-Russian country in Central Europe. It is also the most pro-Putin country. Despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, Putin remains popular for 25% of Slovaks, and they would like to have such a president,” the expert said, adding that Slovakia is currently the most anti-Western country.

On the other hand, there is a specific opposite phenomenon that does not have a place in Hungary, namely pro-Ukrainian activism.  Slovak activists have raised funds for the Czech initiative to purchase ammunition for Ukraine despite the government’s stance. As of April 19, 2024, over €2.15 million had been raised, with the fundraiser being open-ended. “Many people in Slovakia are ashamed of the government’s orientation towards Russia. That’s why people are donating,” said Zuzana Izhakova, co-organizer of the fundraiser. This demonstrates an “active pro-Ukrainian center” within Slovakia, contrasting with Hungary.

Kratos, Not Demos: Opposition to Ukraine by Individual Politicians

While the general public broadly supports Ukraine and its EU accession ambitions, individual politicians often oppose the “Ukrainian issue.” They (not being the state leaders but rather influential politicians) typically belong to the far right or are sympathetic to Russia, and frequently, they embody both stances.

Following the June 2024 European Parliament elections, the third-largest group in the European Parliament, Patriots for Europe, was formed by national conservatives and Eurosceptics. Many members are skeptical or outright opposed to aiding Ukraine in the war or supporting its EU accession.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the ideological inspirer for this new alliance, attracted Marine Le Pen’s French National Rally and several other parties from across Europe to join. The group is led by Jordan Bardella, the official leader of Le Pen’s party. On the second day of the new European Parliament’s session, a resolution supporting Ukraine was put to a vote. The majority of MEPs (495) supported the resolution, but 137 out of 720 MEPs voted against it, and 47 abstained. Many of these dissenting votes came from the Patriots for Europe group, with 84 members—56 voting against, 15 abstaining, and only 2 in support.

The Patriots’ primary focus is on restructuring the EU with stricter border controls and redefining the role of central institutions, with the issue of Ukraine partially uniting certain members. The alliance does not have a unified stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine, so the Patriots for Europe cannot be fully classified as opponents of Ukraine. However, the very certain members of this political formation are distinguished by their position against Ukraine’s interests.

In addition to Viktor Orban, this refers, for example, to Herbert Kieckl, the head of the Austrian Freedom Party, who blamed both Russia and NATO for the full-scale war and believed that Ukraine’s accession to the EU would “destroy our agriculture” and called for a veto on membership negotiations. To be mentioned, Austria’s leadership and population, although far from being at the forefront of supporting Ukraine, preferring to appeal to “neutrality,” do not express a negative stance on Ukraine’s potential accession. 

The French National Rally officially condemns Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and the party’s leader, Jordan Bardella, has stated that “Russian imperialism” should not be allowed to devour Ukraine. Nonetheless, he declared in the European Parliament that Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the EU would escalate tensions with Russia and threaten the sustainability of the EU’s economy and agriculture due to imbalances in the Common Agricultural Policy. Marine Le Pen also opposed a bilateral security guarantee agreement between Ukraine and France and criticized Ukraine’s path to NATO and the EU. 

Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party, has long opposed Ukraine’s EU and NATO accession. Although he condemned Russia’s invasion, he argued that the West made a mistake by not declaring Ukraine’s NATO accession impossible.

Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini’s Italian “League” has repeatedly opposed sanctions against Russia over the annexation of Crimea, and he even wore a T-shirt with Putin’s image in the European Parliament. However, the “League” is now far behind Meloni’s “Brothers of Italy” among the Italian right, and decisions to supply arms to Ukraine continue, circumventing Salvini’s desires and not affecting Italy’s official positive position on Ukraine’s EU accession.

Concerns of Demos

There are significant concerns among the ordinary population of the EU, who prioritize security, stability, and economic prosperity. Many see potential risks in these areas with Ukraine’s possible EU membership.

Security and stability.

Admitting a country in a state of war is sensitive. There are fears of war expansion and indirect spread to other countries, with Hungary and Slovakia often citing “possible escalation.” Member states will also have to address war-related issues, such as dealing with war veterans, the spread of legal and illegal weapons, and mine safety.

In addition, Ukraine’s accession could lead to a rapid migration westward, potentially causing a massive migration crisis, initially affecting eastern countries but eventually impacting all member states. This crisis could lead to increased aggression and crime from both local populations and new arrivals. Southern EU countries, which struggle with African migrant influxes, understand the difficulties of regulating migration and assimilation. The EU might adopt strategies similar to its approach with Egypt, providing financial aid to boost local economies and reduce migration. Harmonizing Ukraine’s criminal code with EU legislation is another concern.

Economic prosperity.

A reasonably common narrative is that Ukraine, as Europe’s giant breadbasket with a population of about 40 million people, is a potential threat to the economies of other member states. In large quantities, cheap, high-quality agricultural products from Ukraine threaten “fair competition” within the bloc, while the influx of migrant workers from Ukraine will affect the number of jobs.

However, it should not be forgotten that past EU expansions saw similar issues when grain from Poland flooded the European markets, leading to an oversupply in European markets and driving down prices. The accession of Greece in 1981 and Bulgaria in 2007 resulted in a substantial number of labor migrants moving to more developed member states such as Germany and the UK in search of better job opportunities. Yet, through negotiation and bargaining, the countries of the bloc managed to reach agreements to some extent and are still trying to maintain a balance within the Union. Rebuilding Ukraine is another economic concern—who will finance the reconstruction, and how will the funds be managed? The low economic development rates during and immediately after the war could heavily burden Europeans. Indeed, according to the Eurobarometer on Public Opinion on Russia’s War Against Ukraine, 59% of European respondents believe that the EU will face an economic burden due to the reconstruction of Ukraine. In comparison, 41% think that it will provide a financial opportunity. Interestingly, in Estonia, 60% support Estonia’s contribution to the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.

Despite these concerns, 60% of EU respondents support Ukraine’s membership. This trend holds true across most member states, with one significant deviation observed in Germany. In Germany, a slim majority of 52% stands against the notion of Ukraine joining the EU, while a narrow 48% minority is in favor. In Spain, the largest support for the bloc’s expansion is observed – 78%. What is more, widespread support for the EU’s response to the Russian invasion remains strong: humanitarian aid (89%), refugee hosting (84%), sanctions against Russia (72%), and financial support for Ukraine (72%).

Conclusion

Thus, Ukraine’s journey towards European Union membership is not just a diplomatic milestone but a testament to the nation’s resilience and determination. Despite Hungary’s vehement opposition and Slovakia’s ambivalence, as well as apprehension from certain politicians and concerns of some populations, the broader European community’s support highlights a collective recognition of Ukraine’s potential contribution to the EU. The complexities of geopolitical alliances and economic concerns underscore the need for strategic diplomacy both within the bloc and between the EU and Ukraine. As negotiations progress, the EU must navigate these challenges with unity and foresight, ensuring that Ukraine’s accession strengthens the alliance both politically and economically while addressing the legitimate concerns of all member states.

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