The US administration’s foreign policy shift has made European support the lifeline for Ukraine’s defense. After the most devastating winter since the full-scale invasion began, the pressure on Ukraine is only intensifying. As Europe’s largest economy and top contributor of military aid, Germany is uniquely positioned to lead. The Bundestag, with its authority over defense policy, budgetary decisions, and international commitments, can turn this position into immediate, concrete action to sustain Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.
Procuring from Ukraine’s Defense Industry
Ukraine’s defense production capacity reached $35 billion in 2025 but the state can only buy a third of this output. Foreign financing through the Danish model and its variants reached $6.7 billion in 2025. Even combined, domestic and foreign procurement leaves significant capacity idle. Germany — with only one joint production site for Ukrainian defense systems on its soil — is barely tapping the potential of partnership.
Strategic rationale: Ukrainian producers offer combat-tested systems at a fraction of Western costs. German procurement would sustain Ukrainian capacity that risks being lost to underuse, while helping address Europe’s own defense production shortfalls — a strategic investment in collective deterrence.
Current challenge: 10-Point Plan on the strengthening of German-Ukrainian defense-industrial cooperation commits to joint ventures, investment guarantees, and procurement of Ukrainian systems — but actual procurement from Ukraine remains marginal relative to its defense budget.
Action space: Germany can channel more military assistance funds to procure directly from Ukrainian producers, while also acquiring Ukrainian-made systems for the Bundeswehr itself. Both tracks should be prioritized in domains where Ukraine holds a proven technological edge, such as drones, electronic warfare, and interceptor systems.
Accelerating Ukraine’s EU Accession
As the US withdraws from European security commitments, Ukraine becomes indispensable to Europe’s own defense. Yet the traditional enlargement framework is increasingly mismatched with today’s urgency. A new accession model is needed — one that reflects the security reality and can be advanced separately from other candidacies. The European Commission is already developing possible models.
Strategic rationale: EU membership is the only credible long-term guarantee of Ukraine’s stability and prosperity as well as a structural deterrent against future aggression. A stalled process weakens not only Ukraine but the EU’s own credibility, creating openings for hostile external actors.
Current challenge: Member states, including Germany, have not prepared domestically for enlargement. The conversation about its implications has barely begun, while in Ukraine and Moldova accession dominates the agenda. Hungary’s blocking of the opening of negotiation clusters has exposed how one spoiler can undermine the entire process.
Action space: Germany should launch a substantive domestic and European debate on EU enlargement, positioning itself as a constructive leader on both the substance and the process. Concrete steps include working with the European Commission on its reform proposals and building consensus among member states for a solution that preserves both the merit-based principle and the strategic urgency of Ukraine’s European path.
Circumventing Vetoes on Ukraine Aid
Hungary and Slovakia continue to block the €90 billion EU aid package for Ukraine. In response, Nordic and Baltic countries have committed to providing up to €30 billion in bilateral loans to meet Ukraine’s immediate financial needs through mid-2026, regardless of the veto.
Strategic rationale: Predictable financial support underpins Ukraine’s defense capacity, economic resilience, and negotiating position in peace talks. Allowing a single member state to hold European security policy hostage sets a dangerous precedent — for Ukraine and for Europe’s crisis-response capacity.
Current challenge: With Hungary’s electoral campaign in full swing and the “threat from Ukraine” among its central themes, the blockage is unlikely to be lifted before a new government takes office around late May or June. Until then, Ukraine faces an acute funding gap that could trigger worsening conditions on the ground and a new wave of refugees.
Action space: Germany can join or co-lead the bilateral loan coalition, giving it the financial and political weight it needs. In the longer term, Berlin should reignite the discussions on a gradual transition to qualified majority voting in foreign policy and sanctions decisions (as demonstrated by the recent decision on the indefinite freeze of Russian assets) as well as on a functioning Article 7 TEU procedure that can hold member states accountable.
Disrupting Russia’s Shadow Fleet in the Baltic Sea
European enforcement against Russia’s shadow fleet has entered a new operational phase, with Belgium, France and Sweden taking the lead. The US has seized at least seven tankers since late 2025. None of these operations prompted Russian retaliation.
Strategic rationale: The EU’s oil price cap stands at $44.10 per barrel. Some 68% of Russia’s crude exports now move on sanctioned vessels, bypassing the cap entirely. These same vessels pose acute environmental and intelligence risks to European waters. After the start of the war in Iran, Russia has earned an additional €6 billion in fossil fuel revenue. With Washington already easing sanctions, Europe must be prepared to uphold and enforce the sanctions regime independently.
Current challenge: Over 300 shadow fleet vessels now sail under fake flags or no flag at all — making them subject to boarding under UNCLOS Article 92 — but Germany lacks operational protocols to act on this authority.
Action space: Germany can follow the UK model, using existing sanctions law to authorize military enforcement, or legislate domestic authority to board, inspect, and detain suspected vessels. It should ensure full transposition of EU Directive 2024/1226 so that sanctions evasion is prosecutable as a criminal offense. And it should allocate dedicated resources for joint Baltic Sea patrols with Nordic and Baltic partners — demonstrating readiness to enforce the sanctions.
Delivering Taurus Missles to Ukraine
Ukraine has destroyed 54 Russian air defense systems over the winter and 19 more in the first half of March, opening a window to strike defense-industrial targets deeper behind the front line — as demonstrated by the March 10 strike on the Kremniy-El factory in Bryansk. Yet the long-range strike arsenal remains dangerously thin: the British and French production capacities are limited.
Strategic rationale: Taurus would expand Ukraine’s long-range strike capability and further strain Russia’s already weakened air defenses. As the war in Iran deepens shortages of Western interceptors, striking Russia’s missile production at the source becomes even more critical to prevent another humanitarian catastrophe in winter 2026/27.
Current challenge: Germany has prioritized Ukraine’s indigenous long-range strike program — a sound investment, but one that does not close the spring–summer gap, when the Russian offensive is expected. Comparable Ukrainian systems are unlikely to reach reliable serial production before late 2026 at the earliest, and drones cannot substitute the firepower of cruise missiles.
Action space: Taurus can be integrated on F-16s already in Ukrainian service, with training completed in 3–4 months. Delivered stocks can be replaced by an upgraded Taurus Neo variant. The Bundestag can play a catalytic role — through parliamentary debate and by mandating that the long-range weapons cooperation agreement with Ukraine include interim measures to bridge the gap until Ukrainian-produced systems reach serial production.