by Vitalii Rishko
Key Takeaways
- Significant Losses: Ukraine inflicted heavy losses on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, reversing many of Russia’s initial territorial gains and targeting critical assets like the Kerch Bridge.
- Strategic Objectives: Ukraine’s campaign in the Black Sea and Crimea aims to limit Russia’s influence, preserve economic stability through maritime exports, and apply psychological pressure on Russia.
- Key Victories: The sinking of the Moskva and recapture of Zmiinyi Island marked critical victories, disrupting Russia’s naval dominance and blockade.
- Economic Impact: Ukraine’s maritime trade routes, bolstered by NATO support, are crucial for its economy and global food security.
- Technological Innovation: Ukraine’s use of naval drones and long-range missiles, supported by Western technology, has been pivotal in its success against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
- Resistance Movements: Local resistance, exemplified by the Atesh movement, plays a vital role in intelligence gathering and sabotage, aiding Ukraine’s strategic strikes.
- Western Support: Continued and expanded Western military aid, particularly long-range capabilities, is essential for Ukraine’s ongoing and future success.
Ukraine’s military activities in the Black Sea and Crimea managed to inflict serious losses on the Russian Black Sea Fleet and dispel widespread skepticism regarding the country’s potential to resist. Now, Ukraine successfully targets various Russian military objects in Crimea, ranging from airfields and bridges to positions of Russia’s air defense systems. This analysis aims to study what enabled Ukrainian success, though the state was de facto deprived of its fleet after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and aggression in 2014. It also seeks to highlight the West’s limitations that could hinder Ukraine’s even greater progress and compromise its own security, as it is becoming more intertwined with Ukrainian as the war goes on.
Kyiv developed various means for its operations. In this respect, Ukraine’s defense and technological innovations, along with Western-supplied capabilities, became an important asset in its arsenal. In the research, we’ll also take a closer look at the range of weapons Ukraine uses in its campaigns and pay special attention to the local resistance movement that enables them.
Background of Ukraine’s Resistance and Intensifying Strikes on Crimea and Russia’s Black Sea Fleet
Attempting to break Ukraine’s will to resist at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Moscow used all the tools it had at its disposal while trying to penetrate the country from multiple directions. Many international relations and foreign policy observers had no confidence in Ukraine’s capacity to fight back on land, and the sea theater was not even considered a domain where Ukraine could inflict significant casualties on Russia’s invading troops. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet at that time was perceived to be a formidable force, and some of Ukraine’s most capable battleships were captured by Russia following its illegal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in 2014. 80% of Ukraine’s vessels were captured during the initial invasion back then. Not to mention that after losing the majority of its warships, Ukraine’s flagship frigate, Hetman Sahaidachnyi, had to be scuttled by Ukrainians themselves to prevent its use by the Russians during the initial stage of the full-scale war. Smaller Ukrainian ships or patrol boats indeed could not oppose Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, and it seemed that Ukraine, being invaded by land, air, and sea, would not be able to hold out for long anyway.
At the time when the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, was almost encircled, the invading forces managed to seize the land corridor from the occupied Crimea to Ukraine’s South. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet captured Zmiinyi (Snake) Island in the northwest part of the Black Sea, allowing Russia to impose a naval blockade on Ukraine, significantly damaging its economy and exposing major cities, like Odesa, to potential amphibious landings. In such circumstances, when Russian troops seemed to have the upper hand over Ukraine on several fronts, the belief that Ukraine would preserve its independence was diminished even further.
Nevertheless, Ukraine’s active defense reversed most of Russia’s territorial gains after a few weeks. This eventually allowed Kyiv to push Russian forces from the outskirts of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy. Against all odds, Ukraine managed to cause heavy losses on Russian warships in the Black Sea. The Ukrainian army also intensified strikes against Russia’s military targets in and around Crimea, including the Kerch Bridge, a chief logistical lifeline for Russia’s troops stationed there.
Key Objectives of Ukraine’s Campaign in the Black Sea and Crimea
To effectively counter Russia’s invasion, Ukraine employs various strategies to limit Russia’s influence in the Black Sea. This, in turn, guarantees freedom of navigation and helps preserve Ukraine’s exports, which are critical to sustaining its war-torn economy and global stability by supplying agricultural products to world markets and mitigating food security issues. Furthermore, in an attempt to critically alter Moscow’s calculus and certitude in its victory in this war, Kyiv seeks to destroy as many ships as possible or at least damage them severely so that they cannot be used against Ukraine anymore. At the same moment, Ukraine’s fierce fighting in the Black Sea and against Russia’s occupation forces in Crimea is vital not only for military reasons but also for creating cognitive and psychological pressure on Russia’s military, Putin himself, and Russia’s population in general.
A key parallel goal for Ukraine is to make Russia’s full-scale war unpopular among its domestic audience and to create tensions between society and the government, thereby pressuring the Kremlin to stop the war. Ukraine’s continuous success in hunting Russia’s battleships and targeting Crimea is possible thanks to its own technological innovations and, indeed, Western support. Despite having limited resources, Ukraine has achieved remarkable results so far.
This analysis will examine Ukraine’s activities in the Black Sea and Crimea, evaluate the means used by Ukraine, and uncover the West’s limitations that significantly hinder Ukraine’s even greater success. It will also examine long-term efforts necessary to ensure Ukraine’s and, consequently, the West’s security, which are becoming increasingly intertwined as the war goes on.
Ukraine’s Strategic Triumphs: Sinking the Moskva, Recapturing Zmiinyi Island, and Breaking the Black Sea Blockade
Ukraine’s success story in the Black Sea began with a significant blow to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in April 2022, when it sank Russia’s flagship, Moskva, using domestically produced anti-ship missiles—Neptunes—coupled with the Türkish-made Bayraktars TB2. These UAVs were used as a decoy to distract the ship’s radars and crew. The sinking of the Moskva flagship was a critical step and a painful loss for Russia’s power projection in the Black Sea, as Russia lost a ship with a triple-tiered air defense system that was crucial for providing air cover to other vessels and invading forces in general. Destroying this ship, which some observers contend was due to Russia’s own mistakes and underestimation of Ukraine’s will to resist, opened the chain of successful operations against Russia’s sea dominance, leading other battleships to withdraw from the range of Ukraine’s weapons.
The next critical operation in the Black Sea was the recapture of Zmiinyi Island. Despite its small size, this was paramount in weakening Russia’s dominance, reducing its intelligence capabilities along the Black Sea coast, and protecting port cities such as Odesa and Mykolaiv. This also eased Russia’s naval blockade and ensured that any potential amphibious landing by Russia was impossible. The operation against Russia’s troops on the island involved destroying radars, air defenses, and personnel that Russia had deployed there. To achieve this, Ukraine used a combination of large drone and fighter jet strikes, flying low under the cover of night to avoid detection by Russia’s radars. Using intelligence data gathered by satellites, once Russia’s forces and air defenses on Zmiinyi were significantly weakened, Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted their first landing by sea and air, using boats and helicopters. Although SOF managed to further degrade Russia’s equipment and personnel, they also suffered losses.
Further steps involved intensive missile and artillery strikes, bolstered by Western supplies, as Ukraine received its first Western-made systems and ammunition. The distance to the island (around 40 km at different points) allowed these systems to be used effectively. Eventually, Russian forces had to flee the island, marking another critical victory for Ukraine. This victory also boosted the morale of its troops and people, especially since the flagship used by Russia to conquer the island was destroyed, and Ukraine recaptured the island itself. In parallel, Ukraine also hit two drilling platforms in the Black Sea, known as the “Boyko Towers,” which were seized by Russia in 2014 and used for military purposes by equipping them with radars and other installations. The following year, Ukraine succeeded in regaining control over them. The Battle of Zmiinyi was crucial for Ukraine in loosening Russia’s grip on the Black Sea and resuming maritime exports by establishing the Grain Deal, which functioned for almost a year and provided critical support for Ukraine’s economy.
Indeed, the Russian Navy blocking Ukraine’s Black Sea trade routes significantly impacted its economy despite Ukraine’s efforts to establish alternative land routes for its goods. In light of uncertainties stemming from Russia’s withdrawal from the UN and the Türkiye-brokered Grain Deal, Ukraine’s push to establish its own maritime trade route proved to be a considerable success. The new route starts in Odesa and lies close to Ukraine’s coastline and NATO members such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye. These NATO members have recently launched a joint mission to clear the Black Sea waters of sea mines, further contributing to the freedom of navigation and safety of trade vessels while strengthening Ukraine’s and international efforts to maintain global food security.
Thanks to the stable operation of Ukraine’s sea corridor, Kyiv was able to export 71 million tonnes of goods, increasing physical exports by 35% in the first half of 2024, as mentioned by Yuliia Svyrydenko, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy of Ukraine. Among the exported goods are wheat, corn, barley, soybeans, rapeseed, and other agro-processed products, critical for fighting famine in Africa and the Middle East.
The ongoing maritime exports demonstrate success and contribute directly to the functioning of Ukraine’s damaged economy. Even if not used for funding the war effort, the revenue gained is crucial for covering other social-related expenditures. Additionally, the results could have been much higher in terms of Ukraine’s important exports to global markets if not for Russia still occupying 16 of Ukraine’s seaports. Regaining control over them is of paramount importance for the country. Yet, the current dynamics, showcased by the 24/7 work of the three ports controlled by Ukraine in and around Odesa, have enabled the safe passage of around 700 ships despite threats from Moscow to strike them. This demonstrates that Ukraine’s efforts against Russia’s dominance in the Black Sea bring tangible results for Ukraine and maintain global security and stability by continuing to ship agricultural goods to vulnerable countries and contributing to the stability of prices on world markets.
Even though Ukraine is winning the Black Sea battle and has managed to push Russia’s warships farther from its shores, Russia is still targeting seaport infrastructure in Odesa, reducing or hindering Ukraine’s export capacities and striking other historic UNESCO-listed sites in the city. This underscores the paramount importance of further boosting Ukraine’s long-range capabilities, as most of the missile and drone strikes on Odesa are launched from the occupied Crimea.
Ukraine’s Hunt for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet: Eroding Moscow’s Power Projection
Following further successful operations on land, after pushing Russians from almost the entire territory of the Kharkiv region, as well as the liberation of Kherson, Ukraine confronted significant challenges such as shortages of ammunition, delays in Western equipment supplies, and heavily fortified Russian positions in the occupied territories coupled with extensive minefields.
Russia’s war economy has also thus far demonstrated resilience, and Western-made sanctions have had a limited short-term effect on the Kremlin’s ability to fund its war effort. On top of that, Russia’s advantage in manpower, military equipment, and money has become an even more acute problem for Ukraine, especially taking into account delayed financial and military support from the United States. Despite all the challenges, Ukraine has not stopped for a moment to fight in the sea, further creating pressure on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and its warships, pushing them farther away from Ukraine and the temporarily occupied Crimea.
In its strategy to continue weakening Russia’s presence and dominance in the Black Sea, Ukraine relied on a diverse set of tools that, when applied in combination, could bring necessary military outcomes. Hence, by also counting on an asymmetric warfare approach and having further strengthened its advantage in technological innovation, Kyiv has undoubtedly surprised the world’s best navies. It is being said that Ukraine has currently destroyed or significantly damaged one-third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
For the sake of clarity, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet included around 80 surface ships and submarines, encompassing a guided-missile cruiser, guided-missile frigates, guided-missile corvettes, various classes of landing ships, patrol ships, anti-submarine warfare corvettes, seagoing minesweepers, and inshore minesweepers. As of July 9, 2024, according to official data from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), Russia’s maritime losses include 29 ships or vessels and one submarine.
Most of Ukraine’s successful targeting of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet occurred with the help of uncrewed remotely piloted systems. Ukraine’s UAVs have been used against Russia’s maneuvering patrol boats. For instance, Ukraine managed to destroy two Raptor-class patrol boats using Bayraktars. More importantly, Ukraine gained much experience integrating naval drones in swarms against larger and better-protected ships, achieving a degree of success never before seen in maritime warfare with such technology.
Furthermore, Ukraine’s application of naval drones has yielded truly tangible results, managing to sink several important Black Sea Fleet battleships. Specifically, naval drones have destroyed or damaged the Russian Sergey Kotov patrol ship, the Ropucha-class landing ship Caesar Kunikov, the Tarantul-class Ivanovets missile corvette, Serna-class landing ships, the reconnaissance ship Ivan Khurs, and other Black Sea Fleet missile corvettes, minesweepers, and so on. Russia’s new Black Sea Fleet flagship, Admiral Makarov, was also reported to be struck by a sea drone; however, the scale of the damage is uncertain.
Among the most effective naval drones is the Magura V5, which Ukraine had developed and tested throughout the war. Magura is relatively small, highly maneuverable, and hard to detect and destroy. It can reach targets 800 kilometers away while carrying roughly 300 kilograms of explosive payload, which is enough to sink or critically damage a ship, although sometimes it requires several attempts. In terms of cost-efficiency, naval drones, when compared with UAVs, are much more expensive. The estimated price of the Magura V5 drone is around $250,000, while the Sea Baby model costs $221,000. Their production is also financed through similar crowdfunding initiatives as Ukraine’s society collective efforts to buy UAVs (e.g., by donating to the UNITED24 platform). However, the potential benefits, namely causing destruction or damage to a Black Sea Fleet warship worth millions of dollars, are definitely worth the investment.
The performance of Ukraine’s naval drones has been the subject of a recent study in the Polish Political Science and Security Studies Journal, which claimed that the deployment of Magura drones resulted in strikes on 14 Russian ships, destroying 8 of them. Other data suggested by this study includes Sea Baby targeting four ships, Mykola – 2 ships, and Mamay 2 ships. Hence, based on this study, one could conclude that Magura drones are by far the most efficient means of fighting Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Additionally, unofficial estimates suggest that Russia’s losses as a result of Magura strikes exceed half a billion dollars, emphasizing their importance in reducing Moscow’s naval dominance.
Advancing Naval Innovations Coupled with Western Long-Range Weapons: Key to Ukraine’s Success?
Given that Russia is trying to find ways of fighting those naval drones—whether by using large-caliber machine guns or trying to protect Black Sea Fleet bases with barges and other fortifications—Ukraine keeps its eye on further expanding and improving its existing capabilities while finding new solutions. Therefore, considering Russia’s attempts to prevent further Black Sea Fleet losses, more innovation in maritime drone technology could be expected. After all, Magura, Sea Baby, Mamay, and other sea drones are being constantly upgraded, not to mention that there is another idea to invent an underwater drone, which will be even more difficult for Russia to spot and protect against.
The existing drones, like Sea Baby, could also be deployed not only as one-way munitions but also to lay mines, and there are already reported cases of successful targeting of Russia’s warships using this method. Another creative solution to further strengthen Ukraine’s naval drone fleet is equipping Ukrainian sea drones with Grad MRL 122mm rocket launchers, which were already tested in real combat. Therefore, more innovative solutions in naval drones could be anticipated, and creating a hybrid drone-MLRS system is no longer a fantasy.
Other attacks were carried out using Ukraine’s own modified anti-ship missiles and long-range cruise missiles provided by the West, namely the British Storm Shadow and French SCALP. Multiple Russian ships were hit in the occupied Berdiansk port, for instance, Saratov and Novocherkassk landing ships. Other Russian ships were destroyed or damaged at the Sevastopol shipyard or around Crimea. A Neptune anti-ship missile reportedly damaged Russia’s Admiral Essen frigate. One of the most painful losses for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, however, was Ukraine striking and severely damaging the improved Kilo-class submarine Rostov-on-Don on a dry dock in Sevastopol, allegedly using Storm Shadow. Not only was it necessary to hit this submarine because it directly attacked Ukraine’s cities with cruise missiles, but also because it is a limited asset in Russia’s navy, which was playing an indispensable part in competing with NATO in terms of naval power projection. During that attack, along with the submarine, Russia lost the damaged Minsk Ropucha-class landing ship, which was crucial for maintaining Russia’s maritime strategy vis-à-vis NATO, given its extensive amphibious capabilities. Besides that, if confirmed, one of the latest cruise missile attacks destroyed the only cruise missile carrier left in Crimea after the majority of the Black Sea Fleet warships were relocated.
Drawing a more precise picture of the situation of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is indeed complicated, given the topic’s sensitivity and sometimes lack of information concerning the means used against it and the degree of damage caused. The list of destroyed or damaged Black Sea ships is undoubtedly incomplete here. Nevertheless, it provides enough understanding to comprehend that given Ukraine’s mixed approach in using its air and naval capabilities, strengthened by its own technological innovation and long-range capabilities supplied by the West, it can yield strategically essential results.
Disrupting “Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier”: Ukraine’s Efforts to Make Crimea Untenable for Russia
Crimea, following Russia’s illegal annexation, was turned into a large military base hosting Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and invading forces. Russia has invested significant effort into building military infrastructure and bringing more troops to the occupied peninsula. Since 2014, Russia’s militarization of Crimea has created increasing threats to Ukraine’s security. Hence, striking and liberating Crimea remains Ukraine’s chief task to ensure its security.
Crimea is a critical logistical base for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and a crucial part of Russia’s logistical supply line for its invading troops in the South of Ukraine, aided by the Kerch Bridge that connects mainland Russia with the occupied peninsula. Besides being integral to Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Crimea is also a key asset for Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, as it symbolizes his image as a strong political leader and Russia’s status as a great power. Conversely, for Ukraine, it continues to be a reminder of Russia’s expansionist and imperialist policies, currently crucial for Russia’s success in land warfare.
Given these arguments, it is clear why the Ukrainian government, General Staff of the AFU, and the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence prioritize making Russia’s occupation of the peninsula unsustainable, bearing in mind its strategic significance in this war. As stated by Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of the US Army in Europe, the key to Ukraine’s victory lies in de-occupying Crimea, disrupting Russia’s logistics, and targeting critical military objects on the peninsula, especially the Kerch Bridge. Apart from that, striking other smaller but equally important bridges linking Crimea with the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, such as the Chonhar railway and road bridge, as well as the Henichesk road bridge, is also critical. Making the life of Russia’s forces in Crimea untenable by depriving them of food, medical supplies, ammunition, and reinforcements should be a key aim for Ukraine. This task is crucial, despite Russia’s efforts to hedge potential risks with further attacks on the bridge by building a new railway connecting its regions with occupied areas in Ukraine. Given that the bridge’s capacity to transfer heavy military equipment is limited, it is still used to transfer additional personnel for the invasion.
Despite facing significant weapon shortages and a lack of long-range capabilities, Ukraine has been striking military targets on and around the peninsula repeatedly, given Crimea’s strategic significance. Crimea is filled with military bases, airfields, command and control centers, arms depots, docks, and barracks. Russia uses at least six airfields, such as Belbek Airfield, Saky Airfield, Dzhankoy Air Base, Kacha Air Base, Gvardiyske Airfield, and Kirovske Airfield. Some of these are used not only for aviation but also to launch drone strikes, including Iranian-made Shahed kamikaze drones. Striking all these targets remains a high priority for the AFU. With the delivery of the long-awaited ATACMS, missile strikes on the airfields are likely to increase. In one of the most recent attacks on Belbek Airfield in May, Ukraine managed to destroy several warplanes and allegedly left one more damaged. In addition, suppressing or destroying Russia’s air defense systems, radars, and reconnaissance equipment remains a chief priority to increase the efficiency of Ukraine’s strikes. For instance, in a June attack, the AFU destroyed several air defense systems, such as the S-400 near Dzhankoy and the S-300 close to Yevpatoriya and Chornomorske. These efforts are crucial as they are vital to preparing the ground for Ukraine’s safe operationalization of F-16s once they arrive this summer while also making the Kerch Bridge more exposed to future missile strikes.
Provision of Western-Made Long-Range Missiles as a Game Changer?
This year, the frequency of Ukraine’s missile attacks has grown significantly, tied to the delivery of Storm Shadows and SCALPs. These missiles were critical in striking several valuable assets of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. In September 2023, another major attack using Western-provided cruise missiles targeted Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Headquarters in Sevastopol, significantly hindering Russia’s logistics, coordination, and chain of command while also eliminating several high-ranking officers. Not long after this attack, as well as other coordinated attacks on warships and other military objects using cruise missiles, UAVs, and naval drones, Russia’s leadership decided to order the majority of Black Sea Fleet ships to relocate from Crimea to the port of Novorossiysk, as well as to Sochi, demonstrating the significant damage Ukraine has been inflicting on Russia’s occupation forces. Even there, despite the Kremlin’s attempts to protect its ships, Ukraine continues to cause them harm. For instance, a naval drone hit the Olenegorsky Gornyak, another Black Sea Fleet landing ship, leaving it significantly damaged at Novorossiysk port. Other reports also indicate that the Kremlin plans to build a new Black Sea naval base in Russian-controlled Abkhazia, a sovereign part of Georgia.
Apart from these decisive blows to Russia’s occupation forces in Crimea, Ukraine has successfully struck and damaged the Kerch Bridge on several occasions. Still, its complete destruction remains an integral plan for Ukraine. The attacks in October 2022 and July 2023, using a truck full of explosives and naval drones, respectively, reduced the bridge’s capacity for transferring heavy equipment. The bridge, however, remains operational to supply Russia’s occupation forces. At the same time, Russia finalizes the construction of a new railway connecting Rostov-on-Don with temporarily occupied cities like Mariupol, Berdiansk, Melitopol, Volnovakha, Donetsk, and Dzhankoy in Crimea. This alternative route presents additional risks for Ukraine but is also more exposed to Ukraine’s strikes and countermeasures, including sabotage on the ground.
Nevertheless, the Kerch Bridge should be made entirely dysfunctional. However, Ukraine currently lacks the necessary capabilities to make this happen. Military experts contend that providing Storm Shadows, SCALPs, and even ATACMS will not be enough to destroy the bridge. Another vital capability to this end is considered to be German-made TAURUS cruise missiles, which Berlin refuses to supply, citing the fear of escalation. Without the provision of such a much-needed long-range powerful capability as TAURUS and the disruption of the link between mainland Russia and Crimea, Moscow’s logistics are likely to continue improving, as will its pressure on Ukraine in the land war. Therefore, the bridge’s destruction should be a key focus for Ukraine and its partners.Pushing Russia’s occupation forces from Crimea by significantly disrupting the logistical supply lines, targeting vital military infrastructure, and making Crimea untenable for Russia’s occupation forces and administration is a crucial strategic goal for Ukraine to achieve victory in this war. As long as Russia occupies the peninsula, Ukraine will never feel secure, and the Black Sea will never be prosperous due to hindered freedom of navigation and shattered stability posed by Russia’s militarization of Crimea. To achieve this objective, further provision of long-range capabilities to Ukraine is vital while removing barriers to the delivery of TAURUS missiles to eliminate the Kerch Bridge and supplying longer-range ATACMS missiles to enable Ukraine to strike every inch of the Crimean eninsula and Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. All these efforts should parallel supporting the development of Ukraine’s own technological advancements in UAVs, naval drones, and long-range capabilities.
Atesh: The (Un)seen Resistance Force Behind Ukraine’s Strategic Strikes in Crimea
Ukraine’s consistent success in targeting Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and military objects in Crimea would not have been possible without proper intelligence gathering on the ground. Sometimes underestimated and poorly covered in Western media, the activities of resistance movements in Crimea prove to be an essential element in Ukraine’s battle for the liberation of the peninsula. In parallel with the active work of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and military intelligence (HUR) in Crimea, other resistance networks also play a critical role in fighting Russia’s occupation. In this respect, one of the most prominent movements is “Atesh” (meaning “fire” in the Crimean Tatar language), which consists of pro-Ukrainian activists and Crimean Tatars.
Because Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine did not go exactly as planned, many inhabitants of the peninsula realized that Russia would resort to mobilizing the population. This provided a critical impetus and opportunity to infiltrate the Russian army with agents who could provide necessary intelligence to Ukraine. According to “Dzhokhar,” co-coordinator of the movement, Atesh currently relies on a network of nearly 18,000 informants, agents, and activists. The movement is involved in intelligence gathering and conducts vital operations behind enemy lines, including sabotage, disrupting logistics and blowing railways, guiding missiles onto command posts and critical assets, and eliminating representatives of occupier administrations and collaborators.
Atesh’s broader intelligence role involves understanding the plans of Russia’s occupiers, uncovering their resources, and accounting for Russia’s war crimes. Additionally, the movement is trying to expand as much as possible by recruiting new agents, boosting the morale of the population to fight the invasion, and creating psychological pressure on the occupiers, for instance, by targeting vehicles of representatives of occupier administrations or damaging cars of Z-patriots supporting Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.
Ukraine’s intelligence capacities are generally much more robust thanks to Atesh and other movements with which it cooperates. To add more specifics, Atesh participated in several vital activities on its own and supported Ukraine’s operations. In September 2023, Atesh agents guided a missile strike on Sevastopol Bay, destroying the Minsk large landing ship and the Rostov-on-Don submarine. That same month, Atesh agents coordinated an attack on the Black Sea Fleet Headquarters, causing partial destruction of the building and significant losses of Russian military personnel, including senior commanders, significantly affecting the operational capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet. Additionally, Atesh agents played a crucial role in guiding air strikes on airfields, particularly in Saky, Dzhankoy, and Kacha. Their activities also extend beyond Crimea, including sabotage operations on Russian territory or disrupting logistics between occupied Crimea and the occupied region of Kherson.Atesh is an example that, despite Russia’s continuous efforts to repress the civilian population, pro-Ukrainian elements still exist and continue to assist Ukraine in conducting various daring operations critical to further weakening Russia’s presence in Crimea.
Conclusions: Charting Ukraine’s Way Forward in Weakening Russia’s Black Sea Dominance
Through the course of the full-scale war, Ukraine has thus far achieved truly remarkable results in fighting Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and its occupation of Crimea despite facing difficulties in acquiring necessary military capabilities from its partners. Ukraine has demonstrated its effective use of aerial and naval drones against Russia’s warships while simultaneously creating pressure on Russia’s occupying forces in Crimea.
Ukraine’s persistent attacks on logistical supply lines and various military installations on the peninsula play a critical role in making Russia’s presence there unpleasant. Ukraine has become a role model in deploying uncrewed systems against a bigger and more powerful navy, serving as a crucial case study for any other navy. Indeed, one should not take Ukraine’s case for granted, as naval drones, for example, might not be as effective in ocean spaces. Furthermore, Ukraine’s success is not static, and its continuation will depend on how Kyiv upgrades its capabilities further and how Moscow responds to their application. The constant ability to adapt to realities on the battlefield, including at sea, is a critical lesson of this war. Considering that Russia is trying to find a counter-strategy to Ukraine’s mosquito fleet of drones, Ukraine’s future success is not unquestionable.
Furthermore, both Ukraine and its partners should not ignore that, eventually, Ukraine will have to rebuild its navy to guarantee its own security and the stability of Black Sea trade routes. To do this, a long-term strategy for how Ukraine’s partners could contribute to building that navy is needed, even if this navy cannot participate in the ongoing war. Specific efforts are being made by Türkiye, which is building corvettes for Ukraine and the Netherlands to provide maneuverable rubber and patrol boats and assault craft. It is also considering supplying two Alkmaar-class minehunters. However, a more systematic approach to rebuilding Ukraine’s navy is necessary. This can be done within the framework of signed bilateral security cooperation agreements between Ukraine and its partners, members of the EU, and NATO. For instance, the United States and the United Kingdom could lead these efforts, given their significant expertise and possession of powerful navies.
A critical lesson to be learned by the West is that it has to step away from self-imposed red lines and start providing more long-range capabilities to Ukraine. Ukraine could have achieved even greater success if the delivery of necessary capacities was more timely and in larger quantities. The delivery of TAURUS cruise missiles by Germany to Ukraine remains a critical issue since it is a more suitable weapon to be used against the illegally-built Kerch Bridge that Moscow exploits for military benefits and to sustain its war effort.
Another key lesson for the West is that Russia’s so-called red lines over targeting Crimea are nothing more than a bluff. There is no reason anymore for the West to follow self-imposed red lines concerning Russia because Putin is using them to his benefit, while the West’s and NATO’s deterrence is becoming less credible.
Not only is the recalibration of the West’s policy on Russia vital, but the removal of the ban on Ukraine using Western-made weapons against Russia’s targets far behind enemy lines is indispensable. Considering that Russia’s purchases of drones, ammunition, and ballistic missiles from Iran and North Korea will likely grow as their relations deepen, the necessity of removing these restrictions will only become more urgent. It is also critical to enable Ukraine to further degrade Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which is now operating much further due to Ukraine’s successful naval strategy. Even more, it is essential to target military groupings on Russia’s territory long before they reach Crimea or other temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories. This is the only way to ensure Ukraine wins this war in a broader strategic sense, acquiring substantial security for itself and its partners and ensuring stability in the broader Black Sea region.
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