Kateryna Rassolova
Key Takeaways:
- The war in Ukraine and potential uncertainty surrounding future US military aid are forcing the EU to urgently seek alternative defense partners and arms suppliers.
- South Korea is a compelling partner candidate not only due to shared concerns over unpredictable state behavior (like North Korea’s missile launches) but also because of an established framework, including an upgraded Strategic Partnership in 2010 and a new Security and Defense Partnership signed in November 2024.
- South Korea possesses a rapidly expanding defense industry, evidenced by exports soaring from $2.97 billion in 2020 to $14 billion in 2023. This capacity directly addresses European needs.
- For instance, South Korea exported three times more artillery (735 TIVs) than the US (245 TIVs) between 2022-2024, and specific systems like the K239 Chunmoo MLRS offer viable alternatives to previously US-dominated supplies.
- The basis for deeper ties is already present through South Korea’s past participation in EU crisis management operations (like contributing the Cheonghae Unit to Operation Atalanta) and recent successful bilateral defense deals, notably Poland’s plans to acquire K2 tanks, K9 howitzers, and other machinery.
- Recent political turbulence in South Korea, including the former president’s impeachment process (December 2024 – April 2025) and upcoming elections, introduce a factor of uncertainty regarding the consistency and direction of Seoul’s foreign policy, which could impact the pace of cooperation with Europe.
Why the EU Should Extend Partnerships Across the World
Since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2024, the security landscape in Europe has experienced drastic changes. The EU quickly became aware of the need to develop the Common Security and Defence Policy toolkit to effectively withstand the security threat of Moscow’s aggressive foreign policy. Although with occasional delays, the EU member states and the United States succeeded in delivering a fair amount of financial and military aid to Ukraine up to 2024.
However, after Donald Trump was elected the president of the US in November last year, European security has been going through a massive shake-up yet again. Since February 24, 2022, the US has provided $66.5 billion in military assistance to Ukraine, while the EU has leveraged €49.3 billion for Kyiv. This means that if Trump’s administration ceases all military aid, the EU will need to double its assistance to maintain the previous pace, which would place a significant toll on the EU economy.
Additionally, according to data provided by the Kiel Institute, the US has transferred, on average, from one-third to two-thirds of various types of weapons in US dollars (see Table 1). Therefore, with the Russo-Ukrainian war remaining unresolved despite the ongoing negotiations in Saudi Arabia, the EU must find an alternative source of arms imports to ensure uninterrupted supplies to Ukraine and replenish its own arms stockpile. After all, if Ukraine is safe, the rest of Europe is also out of danger.
| Assistance | United States | Europe | Share of U.S. in Total Assistance from the U.S. and Europe |
| Total military assistance | $66.5 billion | $53.3 billion (the EU) | 55.5% |
| Tanks (value) | $634 million | $1.815 billion (Poland, Germany, United Kingdom, Australia, Czechia, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia, Croatia, Canada, Norway) | 25.88% |
| Air Defense Systems (value) | $1.513 billion | $7.620 billion (Germany, Romania, Italy, Czechia, Spain, Slovakia, Canada, France) | 16.57% |
| Howitzers (value) | $977 million | $3.476 billion (United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Denmark, Norway, Estonia, Netherlands, Poland, Czechia, Sweden, Australia, Latvia, Canada, Luxembourg) | 21.93% |
| Infantry Fighting Vehicles (value) | $669 million | $1.386 billion (Netherlands, Germany, Czechia, Denmark, Sweden, Greece, Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia) | 32.57% |
| Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (value) | $588 million | $269 million (Czechia, Norway, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy) | 68.64% |
Even though European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has already proposed the ReArm initiative to mobilise about €800 billion to boost defence spending, strengthening security partnerships with other allies remains crucial. In this sense, South Korea emerges as a like-minded partner. First of all, the bilateral framework between the two parties is already well-developed. Not only have the EU-Korea bilateral relations upgraded to a strategic partnership in 2010, but also the new agreement in the area of security and defence was signed in November 2024.
Apart from that, the recent geopolitical turmoil also dictates the cooperation. With the involvement of North Korean troops in the Russo-Ukrainian war on Moscow’s side in autumn 2024, South Korea’s security is threatened even more. North Korea has already gained a reputation as a highly unpredictable state by repeatedly launching ballistic missiles into the sea near Seoul and Japan. After deployment in Russia, its soldiers are directly gaining combat experience, which the nuclear country may or may not use somewhere else. This is not to mention that Pyongyang reportedly receives food aid, financial resources, and perhaps advanced military technology from Moscow in return for its contribution, all of which can potentially be used to satisfy the needs of its army.
Across the Pacific Ocean, Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric also raises fears. Considering the president will likely drift away from the European allies, there is no guarantee he will continue supporting partners in East Asia within the established multilateral framework. As the EU is also wary of North Korea’s soldiers on the front and Trump’s policies, Seoul and Brussels now have even more shared concerns through which they can strengthen ties.
Ground for the EU-Korea Cooperation
The extensive bilateral framework with the Union and successful cases of Seoul’s collaboration with individual European countries suggest that there is potential for the EU-Korea relations to advance greatly soon.
Speaking of the EU-Korea ties, the strategic partnership between them was established in October 2010, when the parties signed the revised Framework Agreement and the Free Trade Agreement. Three years later, the EU and the Republic of Korea (ROK) established another “Future-oriented Partnership.” Moreover, Seoul also contributed to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). After the Framework Agreement for the participation in EU Crisis Management Operations entered into force in 2016, Korea deployed the Cheonghae Unit to counter piracy within the EU’s naval military operation Atalanta.
with the Polish Deputy Defense Minister Pawel Bejda in Seoul in
April 2024. Source: Indo-Pacific Defense Forum.
As for the military cooperation with European countries, successful cases include Poland and the Czech Republic. In particular, the Czech government selected Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Company (KHNP) to construct two supplementary blocks of the Dukovany nuclear power plant. Warsaw also forged connections with KHNP and went even further, holding several defense meetings with the ROK. Furthermore, after a visit by Polish defense officials to Seoul in April 2024, Poland announced plans to acquire Korean weaponry, such as K2 Black Panther tanks, K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, FA-50 light combat aircraft, and Chunmoo multiple rocket launch systems.
On top of that, the Republic of Korea has a long-standing relationship with NATO, which intensified after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The measures taken after 2022 include establishing Korea’s Diplomatic Mission to NATO, signing an agreement on mutual recognition for military airworthiness certification, and participation in NATO summits. Earlier, Seoul directly contributed to the military efforts of the alliance, leading an integrated civilian-military Provincial Reconstruction Team (about 470 personnel) in Parwan Province, Afghanistan, and deploying a naval force to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
After North Korean troops were deployed at the front of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Seoul has also shown early signs of willingness to cooperate with Kyiv. Ukraine’s ambassador to Seoul, in particular, asserted that the DPRK’s participation in the Russo-Ukrainian war would push South Korea to ramp up the scope of the military aid to Ukraine and deepen military-technical cooperation. Before, Seoul only aided Ukraine with financial packages and avoided directly sending weapons. In 2023, it settled for the compromising move, sending 300,000 155 mm artillery shells to the US with the premise of Washington giving those supplies to Ukraine on its own.
However, no concrete actions to deepen cooperation have been taken so far, apart from the tentative steps. In December, in confirming that Ukraine captured a North Korean soldier, South Korea proved “real-time information sharing with a friendly nation’s intelligence organization.” Moreover, just recently, in March 2025, there were phone calls between Seoul and Kyiv to negotiate the repatriation of North Korean captured military personnel.
Relying on this experience, the European Union could initiate a deeper military cooperation with the Republic of Korea, too. It could do so, for instance, by acquiring Korean weapons, sharing intelligence data, or introducing joint defence forums to work out ways to counter Russia and North Korea’s aggressive policies together.
How the EU Could Benefit: Seoul’s Defense Capabilities
Speaking of weapons, South Korea represents a perfect opportunity for the Union to diversify its defense imports and find new, reliable suppliers. Not only does Seoul rank among the twenty most successful economies around the world in general, but it has also significantly ramped up its defense industry over the last few years. The exports of arms and ammunition grew by about 40% from 2013 to 2019 (see Table 2), while the total defense exports skyrocketed from $2.97 billion in 2020 to $14 billion in 2023 (see Image 1).
| Year | Trade Value (US$) |
| 2019 | $547,450,930 |
| 2015 | $437,201,544 |
| 2013 | $390,208,376 |
The media have referred to such a success as the “K-Defence” phenomenon. Of course, South Korea cannot be a sole replacement of the US in this regard. While its share in global arms exports climbed from 2.1% to 2.2%, Washington’s percentage makes up 43%. Nevertheless, as one of the top ten arms exporters, ROK remains important enough for the EU to consider acquiring more of its defense equipment.
Data on arms exports by the US and South Korea provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reveal that while ROK is far behind the United States in the area of armoured vehicles and air defense systems exports, its artillery supply is quite promising. During 2022-2024, Seoul provided three times as many artillery weapons as Washington (see Table 3).
| Type of weapon | Exported weapons in 2022-2024 (TIVs) | Percentage of total exported weapons | ||
| Country | United States | South Korea | United States | South Korea |
| Artillery | 245 | 735 | 0.6% | 40% |
| Armoured vehicles | 4039 | 455 | 10% | 10% |
| Air defense systems | 1006 | 60 | 2.5% | 3.3% |
The US used to provide 68.64% of all Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) to Ukraine, so the EU could seriously consider ramping up Korean MLRS exports to make up for that share. In fact, some EU member states have already considered such an option. As such, the acquisition of South Korea’s K239 Chunmoo, a multiple launch rocket system developed by Hanwha Aerospace, has been on the table in Estonia and has already been done by Poland after the HIMARS delivery delays started causing concerns. Not only is it faster to arrive, but it is also cheaper, which makes it a valid alternative.
On the other hand, arms trade with Europe is also a good way for the ROK to broaden and diversify its own defense exports, increasing its geopolitical influence. One of the tools could be transferring technologies and overseas production, which Seoul’s defense industries tend to do with recipient countries while establishing trade. For example, Seoul agreed on the joint production of a military cargo aircraft with the UAE’s Tawazun. If it strikes similar deals with the EU, without a doubt, both parties will benefit.
Possible Challenges
Nevertheless, in crafting a strategy for cooperation with Korea, European politicians may want to consider the country’s recent political crisis and its potential outcomes.
In December 2024, Yoon Seok Yeol, Seoul’s president at the time, declared martial law in an unannounced press conference, explaining it was necessary to “protect the Republic of Korea from the threats of North Korean communist forces” and to fight “pro-Pyongyang antistate forces.” Shortly after, martial law troops broke into the National Assembly through the window as Martial Law Commander and Army Chief of Staff Park An Su declared that all “political activities” of the National Assembly were prohibited.
Parliament perceived this as an attempt to seize control over democratic institutions and voted for the impeachment of the politician. Yoon was, therefore, prevented from carrying out his duties. However, he officially remained in office until at least six of the eight judges in the constitutional court approved the impeachment. Despite the trial having ended on February 25, the court only confirmed Yoon’s suspension on April 4, after months of protests all over the country.
Yoon’s foreign policy strategy differed from his predecessors’ in many ways. The approach towards European security was one of such developments he introduced. The leader decided to increase Seoul’s role in the region by visiting the NATO summit in Spain for the first time in June 2022. Later, he also travelled to summits in 2023 and 2024. Additionally, he adopted a wary stance on China in parallel with Russia, reproaching Tokyo instead.
With the new presidential elections ahead, it is unclear which strategy the elected candidate will adopt. In 2022, the Democratic Party’s (DP) leader Lee Jae Myung lost to Yoon Seok Yeol only by a small margin, and the DP won in the 2024 parliamentary elections. Therefore, Lee will likely attempt to run for president again. In February 2025, his party announced that they had formed a committee for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia to shape diplomacy based on the pragmatic approach. As they explained, that would include ramping up trilateral security cooperation between Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo.
Source: The Wall Street Journal
While South Korea’s political crisis persisted, foreign policy naturally took a back seat. This may partly explain why the Republic of Korea has been somewhat slow to engage with Ukraine, even after North Korean troops joined Russian forces at the front. Right now, however, the EU should already be preparing for the potential outcomes of South Korea’s 2025 elections.
At the same time, with the North Korean threat now amplified by its alignment with Russia, it is highly unlikely that Seoul will entirely dismiss cooperation with Europe. In the current circumstances, the only logical course of action for the Union is to advocate for cooperation regardless, pursuing agreements that are advantageous for both parties.
Conclusion
Therefore, military cooperation with South Korea is highly relevant and beneficial for the European Union right now. First of all, the security landscape in Europe is highly turbulent and unpredictable. North Korea joined Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine, while Trump is retreating from arming Europe and pushing Kyiv to sign the “peace deal.” In light of these events, the EU is in dire need of reliable security allies, and South Korea could be one of them.
Considering Seoul has already traded its weapons with Poland and collaborated with the Czech Republic in nuclear energy, the Union should follow suit and set up military cooperation with Seoul as well. Acquiring Korean weaponry would be especially helpful, seeing as Europe needs to urgently diversify its defense imports after Trump retreated from supporting the region. For South Korea, such trade would also be highly advantageous. It would allow Seoul to expand its geopolitical influence, strengthen its role as a security provider in Europe, and ramp up its defence exports.
The only obstacle hindering the EU-Korea military alliance from quickly developing is South Korea’s political crisis, which continued for months after ex-president Yoon’s impeachment. As the eyes of the entire population were set on the constitutional court, which delayed its decision on approving or dismissing the impeachment since February, foreign policy was obviously not relevant for the government. Right now, the important question is whether the candidate elected in the upcoming presidential elections to replace Yoon will adopt a hard stance against Russia and continue collaborating with Europe.
Naturally, the EU must also understand that neither South Korea nor any other state is capable of being a sole replacement for Washington’s defense support. With Trump’s retreat from Europe, the global rise of far-right and pro-Russian movements suggests that similar political shifts could occur in any country. This is precisely why the EU should not seek to replace the United States all at once, but rather focus on diversifying its security partnerships and sources of arms imports. That said, South Korea must not be underestimated. With its highly developed defense industry and strong economy, it represents a strategic security partner from which the EU can gain significantly.
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