Per aspera ad EU. Problems and Prospects of Ukrainian-Polish Relations

By Andrii Svintsov

Key Takeaways

• Strategic Partnership Tested: Ukraine and Poland share a longstanding strategic partnership, strengthened since 2014 by opposition to Russian aggression. However, unresolved historical disputes and new economic tensions are straining this relationship, revealing areas of friction previously set aside.
• Historical Disputes: The Volhynia tragedy remains a sensitive issue in Ukrainian-Polish relations. Poland expects a more conciliatory stance from Ukraine on historical interpretation and permission for exhumation works. Without addressing these historical grievances, Polish leaders warn that Ukraine’s EU accession may be hindered, as this issue resonates deeply within Polish society.
• Agricultural Disputes: The EU’s preferential trade policies for Ukraine have led to friction with Poland and other neighboring countries, who are concerned about the impact on their domestic agriculture. Poland’s call for grain import restrictions reflects the depth of these economic tensions.
• Impact on Weapons Supply and Humanitarian Aid: The agricultural disputes and resulting blockades have had a direct impact on Poland’s military and humanitarian support for Ukraine. Although Poland clarified that older arms would continue to be supplied, domestic political pressure has caused temporary disruptions, underscoring the potential risk to ongoing support.
• Declining Public Support: Recent polling in Poland indicates waning public support for Ukrainian refugees, a trend that could worsen bilateral relations if refugee numbers rise. This decline could reflect broader societal fatigue or economic concerns, adding another dimension to the challenges facing the partnership.
• Compromise as a Path Forward: For Ukraine and Poland to maintain a resilient alliance, both sides must show readiness to compromise on historical and economic issues. This is crucial not only for sustaining bilateral support and weapons supply but also for advancing Ukraine’s EU membership ambitions, as Poland’s role as a European advocate remains vital to Ukraine’s integration path.

Relations between Ukraine and Poland, as neighboring states, have taken on a strategic character since Ukraine’s independence. With Ukraine’s aspirations for European integration and the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, these relations have evolved into a close strategic partnership. However, despite these close ties, several issues, which had initially been set aside during the early stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion, have resurfaced.

Thus, Ukraine now faces longstanding challenges in its relations with Poland, such as historical differences over the interpretation of the Volhynia tragedy, as well as new issues, including the agricultural dispute and a decline in attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees in Poland. These issues complicate Ukrainian-Polish relations not only bilaterally but also within the broader European integration context.

Given Ukraine’s resolve to continue its path toward full EU integration and the importance of having allies within the Union to facilitate this process, it is essential to examine the problematic issues in Ukrainian-Polish relations in greater detail and outline the prospects for their resolution.

A Partner with an Asterisk

With Ukraine’s move toward the European Union, Poland has become one of its key partners on this path. Following Ukraine’s commitment to the European course in 2014, Poland has positioned itself as one of the most active advocates for deeper EU integration for Ukraine, actively promoting this issue within the European Union.

After the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Poland emerged as one of Ukraine’s principal partners, providing comprehensive assistance—humanitarian, economic, and military. Simultaneously, Poland continues to firmly support Ukraine’s EU membership ambitions, advocating for further integration on the international stage.

However, old issues have since begun to resurface within this atmosphere of allied relations. This became evident in the demands of Poland and four other European countries to impose restrictions on Ukrainian agricultural exports to the EU following the EU’s introduction of trade preferences for Kyiv in 2022.

With the European Commission’s refusal to act on these demands and Ukraine’s opposition to the decision, relations between Ukraine and Poland have become strained. The situation further deteriorated with Polish farmers blocking the Ukrainian border and mutual criticisms exchanged between the Ukrainian and Polish presidents at the 78th session of the UN General Assembly.

Adding to the tension, historical disputes over the Volhynia tragedy have resurfaced, impacting bilateral relations. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk emphasized this point, stating that without resolving these sensitive historical issues with Poland, Ukraine will not be able to join the EU.

The Grain of Discord

One of the first issues to emerge between Ukraine and Poland after Russia’s full-scale invasion was the almost unrestricted export of Ukrainian agricultural products to the EU. The Polish government’s demand to impose restrictions on Ukrainian agricultural exports to the EU was rejected by the European Commission, sparking public dissatisfaction from the Ukrainian side. Tensions escalated when Polish farmers began blocking checkpoints along the Ukrainian-Polish border, applying additional pressure on Polish authorities. Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria joined Poland in calling for a ban on Ukrainian grain imports.

This sudden escalation, manifested in border blockades, adversely affected both Ukrainian businesses, for whom this issue at one point overshadowed concerns about corruption and workforce shortages, and Polish companies, over 3,500 of whom incurred losses. Eventually, the European Commission conceded, implementing a temporary ban on Ukrainian grain exports to the five EU countries demanding the embargo in May 2023, though it lifted the ban in September 2023 with the condition that Ukraine would implement effective controls over exports of four commodity groups to prevent market disruptions in neighboring countries.

In early 2024, Poland’s newly elected government initially hesitated to lift the embargo and even threatened to expand it if the EU did not find more effective means to protect Polish and European markets. However, with the onset of intergovernmental consultations between Ukraine and Poland regarding restrictions on Ukrainian agricultural exports to Poland, tensions somewhat eased (similar consultations began with the governments of neighboring countries as well). The volume of Polish authorities’ criticisms directed at Ukraine diminished, and Ukraine temporarily halted its complaints to the WTO regarding the actions of the Polish, Hungarian, and Slovak governments, which had violated regulations under the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Agriculture, both binding for WTO members. Although the consultations remain tense, Ukrainian negotiators report progress in lifting restrictions on exports and transit of some Ukrainian agricultural products and a continuation of consultations on others. By the end of April 2024, the blockade of the Polish-Ukrainian border was lifted.

Historical Zugzwang

Another obstacle in Ukrainian-Polish relations has been historical differences, particularly regarding interpretations of the Volhynia tragedy of 1943 and the practical consequences of these disputes. With the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the issue of historical differences was temporarily set aside. However, as the war stabilized and Ukraine made progress on meeting EU accession requirements, the issue resurfaced.

The Polish side insists that Ukraine should lift the “moratorium” introduced in 2017, which restricts permissions for search and exhumation work related to the Volhynia tragedy, and adopt a revised historical interpretation of these events.

The Ukrainian side claims that no “moratorium” on search and exhumation exists but rather that it adopts a selective approach to granting permissions (notably, the head of Ukraine’s Institute of National Remembrance indicated that three permits were granted to Poland in 2019). Ukraine also highlights a joint statement by the Ukrainian and Polish parliaments in 2003 condemning the crimes that led to the Volhynia tragedy, emphasizing that a shared historical interpretation should be developed by expert Ukrainian-Polish groups of historians, not politicians.

Both Ukraine and Poland continue to adhere to these positions today. Ukraine expressed hope that the newly elected Polish government would adopt a more accommodating stance on historical issues, viewing Poland’s position as a political maneuver in the election campaign. However, this expectation has not materialized, as evidenced by statements from the current Polish prime minister. This underscores that the issue is systemic and of deep importance to Polish society at large rather than to specific political parties alone.

Strategic Implications

The above-mentioned differences between Ukraine and Poland have also impacted their broader strategic cooperation. In September 2023, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki announced that Poland would halt the transfer of weapons to Ukraine as it was focusing on modernizing its own military. After public backlash, Polish President Andrzej Duda clarified that the Prime Minister’s comments were misunderstood—while modern weaponry would be retained for Poland, older Western and Soviet arms would continue to be supplied to Ukraine. This announcement came just a day after a public exchange between the Polish and Ukrainian presidents at the 78th session of the UN General Assembly, amid calls from some Western neighbors, including Poland, for the European Commission to extend the ban on Ukrainian grain imports.

An obvious obstacle to the supply of weapons and humanitarian aid to Ukraine was the border blockade by Polish farmers. Consequently, in early 2024, the situation reached a point where Prime Minister Donald Tusk designated border crossings with Ukraine and certain sections of highways and railways as critical infrastructure to ensure the unimpeded flow of arms and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.

Another notable factor is the gradual decline in support for accepting Ukrainian refugees among Poles, which reached 52%—the lowest level since February 2022—in October 2024. While most Poles still support aiding Ukrainians in Poland, this negative trend could impact Ukrainian-Polish relations in the future, especially if the influx of refugees increases.

The First Step is Always the Hardest

Despite a slight easing in agricultural disputes between Ukraine and Poland following the change in the Polish government in the fall of 2023 and the start of intergovernmental consultations, the conflict underscores that agricultural issues will likely be one of the most challenging areas in Ukrainian-Polish relations during Ukraine’s EU accession talks.

In fall 2023, Polish Agriculture Minister Robert Telus emphasized in an interview that while Poland supports Ukraine’s EU membership, it favors specific conditions. He recalled that when Poland was on the path to EU membership, it had to meet strict conditions imposed by then-member states, especially concerning agriculture. Although retrospectively beneficial, as it allowed Poland to join the EU and receive subsidies as compensation, these conditions were viewed as painful at the time.

Given that agriculture is even more crucial to Ukraine’s economy today than it was to Poland’s over 20 years ago, Telus stressed that Ukraine will likely have to undergo a similar process. Unlike agricultural matters, which Ukraine will address with Poland and other EU states as part of EU accession negotiations, resolving historical disputes will require one-on-one engagement with Poland.

There are precedents for such resolutions. For instance, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski cited in an interview that during Poland’s EU accession negotiations, Poland and Germany created a joint commission on history textbooks, where historical facts were agreed upon by an expert committee comprising historians from both countries.

Regarding permits for exhumation and search activities at the Volhynia tragedy sites, considering the significance of this issue for Poland (both for the government and the opposition), Ukraine may need to make certain concessions to reopen dialogue with Poland on resolving historical disagreements. “You will need friends. You need them now. And you will need them in the EU accession process,” Sikorski emphasized.

Conclusions

In summary, Poland has been and remains one of Ukraine’s key partners in its resistance to Russian aggression while also serving as a vocal advocate for Ukraine’s membership in the European Union.

Progress has been made regarding the agricultural conflict between Ukraine and Poland. Poland’s parliamentary elections and the subsequent change of government have softened Poland’s negotiating stance, allowing for certain compromises. However, tensions remain high, as do negotiations, and since EU accession talks began, both countries will have to tackle broader agricultural issues beyond the current import bans on select Ukrainian products.

The periodic threats of border blockades by Polish farmers are a separate concern. Nevertheless, the Polish government’s technical measures to unblock the Polish-Ukrainian border have enabled the continued flow of vital humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine, lessening the potential negative impact of any future blockades compared to prior disruptions.

The issue of historical differences between Poland and Poland may prove as challenging as the agricultural one. This pertains both to bilateral Ukrainian-Polish relations and to the EU accession process. Polish officials have repeatedly stressed that without resolving these issues, Ukraine’s EU membership path could face obstacles—an unequivocal signal from the Polish side. The Ukrainian government has, to some extent, tried to sidestep this matter by prioritizing political and economic disagreements, but during the closure of chapters in the EU accession talks, this issue, if the Polish side is to be believed, will inevitably resurface.

Thus, the presence of serious historical and economic disputes with a key partner underscores Ukraine’s need for careful diplomatic work and readiness for compromises to successfully conclude its EU accession negotiations.

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