Artur Koldomasov
Key Takeaways:
- Moldova’s Political Divide: The country remains split between pro-European and pro-Russian factions, with the July 2025 parliamentary elections set to shape its geopolitical course.
- Oligarchic Influence: Figures like Ilan Shor and Vlad Plahotniuc continue to manipulate Moldova’s political system through media control, corruption, and financial power.
- Transnistria and Gagauzia as Flashpoints: Both regions oppose Moldova’s EU integration, with Transnistria aligning closely with Russia and Gagauzia’s leadership actively seeking Moscow’s support.
- Media as a Battleground: Russian-backed disinformation remains widespread despite government efforts to curb foreign influence, deepening political divisions.
- 2024 Elections and EU Referendum: President Maia Sandu secured re-election, but strong opposition in pro-Russian regions highlighted Moldova’s internal fractures. The EU referendum passed by a razor-thin margin (50.35% in favor).
- Foreign Policy Struggles: While Moldova’s government pushes for EU and NATO integration, opposition groups advocate federalization and stronger ties with Russia.
- Identity Crisis: Historical, linguistic, and geopolitical tensions fuel national identity debates, further polarizing the electorate.
- A Test Case for Regional Influence: Moldova’s struggle offers key lessons for Ukraine and other post-Soviet states navigating similar challenges.
Moldova’s contemporary political landscape is a dynamic and often volatile space, shaped by historical legacies, geopolitical pressures, and internal struggles between reform and corruption. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the country has oscillated between pro-European and pro-Russian political forces, a divide that continues to define its governance, foreign policy, and national identity. While the 2009 “Twitter Revolution” set Moldova on a path toward European integration, systemic corruption and oligarchic influence have repeatedly undermined progress. At the heart of Moldova’s political tug-of-war are key players such as the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), led by President Maia Sandu, and the pro-Russian Socialist Party (PSRM), represented by former president Igor Dodon. The country’s media landscape further complicates its political trajectory, with outlets aligning along ideological lines and Russian-backed disinformation shaping public opinion. Meanwhile, Moldova’s unresolved territorial disputes, particularly with the breakaway region of Transnistria and the autonomous region of Gagauzia, serve as critical flashpoints that Moscow continues to exploit. Against this backdrop, the 2024 presidential elections and EU membership referendum have deepened societal divisions, with narrow margins reflecting an electorate torn between European aspirations and historical ties to Russia. As Moldova prepares for the crucial 2025 parliamentary elections, the stakes remain high. The outcome will not only determine the country’s path toward European integration but also test its resilience in the face of internal and external challenges.
Key players on the domestic political field
The contemporary political landscape of Moldova is characterized by a complex interplay of political parties, influential politicians, oligarchic structures, and a diverse media environment. It reflects the country’s ongoing struggle to navigate its identity and governance in the post-Soviet context, particularly in light of its geopolitical positioning between the European Union and Russia.
Few key political parties dominate there that align with either pro-European or pro-Russian ideologies. The Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), led by Maia Sandu, emerged as a significant force following the 2021 parliamentary elections, advocating for European integration and anti-corruption measures. The PAS’s victory marked a shift in the political landscape, as it capitalized on public discontent with corruption and governance issues associated with previous administrations.
Conversely, the Socialist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), which has historically favored closer ties with Russia, remains a prominent player. The PSRM has utilized populist rhetoric to appeal to voters nostalgic for the Soviet era, often framing its agenda around social welfare and national identity. Representing the pro-Russian camp, PSRM has traditionally enjoyed strong support in regions like Gagauzia and Transnistria. It focuses on preserving Moldova’s neutrality and maintaining close ties with Russia. Igor Dodon is the most prominent representative of the party at the moment, being its former president and leader, advocating for Moldova’s neutrality and close ties with Russia.
Founded by businessman and controversial politician Ilan Shor, the Shor Party blends populism with regional development promises. Shor has been implicated in the “billion-dollar bank scandal,” but his party continues to gain traction in economically depressed areas.
Ion Marandici introduces the concept of oligarchic state capture in the case study of Moldova to describe the temporary dominance of wealthy elites over all branches of government, hindering democracy and perpetuating corruption. Oligarchs, as winners of the post-Soviet economic transition, exploited state institutions for personal gain. That is why they play a crucial role in Moldova’s political landscape, often exerting significant influence over political parties and the electoral process. The intertwining of business and politics has led to a system where oligarchic interests can overshadow democratic processes, contributing to widespread corruption and public disillusionment.
Notable figures such as Vlad Plahotniuc, who previously led the Democratic Party, exemplify the challenges posed by oligarchic control, as they have been accused of manipulating political outcomes to maintain power. In addition to Ilan Shor, Vlad Filat was also a central actor, leveraging political parties and state resources for private gain. These oligarchs used such mechanisms as control over media and judiciary, party sponsorship and direct engagement in politics, and exploitation of state resources through schemes like the 2014 bank fraud, which is also called the “theft of the century.” As a part of this scheme, $1 billion was siphoned from the economy, equaling 12% of Moldova’s GDP. Rivalries among oligarchs triggered reforms and arrests but also intensified the exploitation of state resources. Popular backlash and international pressure highlighted the need for systemic reforms.
Trying to define Moldovan foreign policy
Moldova’s foreign policy is shaped by its historical oscillation between pro-European and pro-Russian alignments and reflects the internal political division of the country. It includes three main tendencies at the moment – EU and NATO integration, special relations with Romania, and federalization. The EU aspirations in Moldova reflect a preference for cooperative internationalism that is constrained by economic dissatisfaction and Russian influence, while NATO membership is the least supported tendency, constrained by constitutional neutrality and Russia’s strong opposition. Federalization is often seen as a pro-Russian policy due to its potential to strengthen Transnistria’s influence. Poverty, as a multidimensional indicator, is significantly correlated with opposition to foreign policy openness in Moldova – subjective poverty aligns with resistance to EU membership and unification with Romania. Trust in Russian media also correlates strongly with opposition to EU and NATO membership, underscoring Moscow’s ability to shape narratives in Moldova. Higher education and younger demographics favor cooperative internationalism, opposing isolationist and federalist measures.
As of late 2024, Moldova remains politically polarized. The recent elections showed a divided electorate, with significant support for both pro-European and pro-Russian factions. The upcoming parliamentary elections in 2025 will be crucial in determining Moldova’s future direction amid ongoing pressures from Russia and aspirations for EU membership. This polarization between pro-European and pro-Russian parties has created a dynamic political environment where party allegiances can shift based on public sentiment and external influences.
Media landscape in Moldova
The media landscape in Moldova during 2020–2025 reflects its broader socio-political and cultural dynamics, defined by tensions between pro-European aspirations and Russian influence. The sector is marked by political alignment, oligarchic ownership, and challenges in fostering independent journalism. External factors, such as Moldova’s path toward EU integration and domestic issues, such as media literacy, play critical roles in its development. Despite the Internet becoming the main information source in the country, television is still a primary source for news in Moldova, which is especially important with every prominent Moldovan TV channel having its own web portal. According to Media Ownership Monitor Moldova, in the first half of 2024, Cinema1 was the most-watched TV channel in the country, followed by PRO TV and Jurnal TV. This proves that even despite attempts to block it, Russian influence through the media is still quite prevalent in Moldova.
Cinema 1 is an aggregator TV channel that was used to broadcast Russian content manufactured by foreign Russian broadcasting services after the Chișinău authorities suspended or withdrew the licenses of several TV stations retransmitting programs produced in Russia. TRM, the state broadcaster, is positioned as a neutral entity but has been criticized for perceived biases toward the ruling government. Efforts to modernize TRM’s infrastructure and programming have been initiated, aiming to meet European broadcasting standards. Known for its pro-European stance and investigative journalism, Jurnal TV has gained a reputation for exposing corruption. It is a popular source among urban audiences critical of oligarchic influence. Positioned as a neutral and independent outlet, TV8 focuses on investigative reporting and political analysis. It receives funding from international organizations to maintain its editorial independence. Part of the Romanian ProTV network, ProTV Chisinau focuses on entertainment, cultural programming, and news. Its content appeals to younger audiences and promotes a pro-European narrative. Formerly linked to oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, Publika TV leans toward pro-Russian narratives and sensationalist content. Its credibility has been questioned due to political affiliations. Its TV license was suspended in 2023, and currently, it is broadcasted only via the web.
A leading investigative journalism outlet in Moldova, Ziarul de Gardă focuses on exposing corruption and human rights issues. It is well-respected in the international community but faces financial challenges. Positioned as an independent, multilingual outlet, NewsMaker.md covers Moldovan politics, economy, and social issues in-depth. It has built a reputation for balanced reporting. Known for its pro-European stance, Deschide.md provides news and analysis on Moldovan politics and international relations. It has been a reliable source for timely updates.
Linked to exiled oligarch Ilan Shor, TV6 was stripped of its broadcast license due to allegations of spreading Russian propaganda. Its content has also migrated to online platforms. Another channel associated with Shor’s media empire, Orizont TV, focused on local and regional news but was suspended in 2023 for spreading disinformation.
A pro-Kremlin outlet targeting Russian-speaking audiences, Sputnik Moldova is criticized for promoting propaganda and disinformation aligned with Russian geopolitical interests. A Moldovan edition of the Russian tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda promotes Kremlin narratives and targets Russian-speaking audiences in Moldova.
The media landscape varies significantly between urban and rural areas. Urban audiences have access to diverse sources, while rural regions often rely on pro-Russian outlets. Social media has become a dominant force, particularly among younger populations. However, it has also been a channel for disinformation campaigns, especially targeting issues like EU integration and minority rights, for instance, via a network of Telegram channels in Russian.
Transnistria & Gagauzia as the most important variable for Moldovan politics
The situation with Transnistria is more or less known to the general public. After the active phase of the armed conflict that lasted from 1990 to 1992, a Russian military contingent remained in the country, which is why the conflict itself is still being considered “frozen.” Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has revitalized the debate over Transnistria, as the Russian army stationed there poses a security risk to both Ukraine and Moldova itself. Transnistria and its internationally unrecognized “authorities” lightly oppose Moldova’s European integration course and are gradually synchronizing their legislation with Russian law. For instance, since 2017, the Russian flag has become the second official flag to be used in Transnistria. Recently, the Transnistrian “authorities” asked Russia to help solve the problem of “Moldova’s transport and economic blockade,” appealing to the OSCE for “new methods of conflict resolution.”
Supported significantly by the Russian Federation, Transnistria functions as a de facto state. The region’s governance has been marked by a hybrid regime that combines elements of authoritarianism with some degree of pluralism, particularly evident during the 2011 presidential elections when long-standing leader Igor Smirnov was ousted, indicating a shift in political dynamics. Often described as a Russian “enclave,” Transnistria resembles and depends on Russia. Transnistrian officials frequently advocate for annexation by Russia, though Russia itself does not officially recognize it. A 2006 referendum indicated strong support (98%) for joining the Russian Federation, despite a number of ways Russia uses to distort the concept of “referendum.” Russian passport holders in Transnistria can vote in Russian elections at local polling sites, and the region still maintains 1,500 Russian soldiers on its territory as “peacekeeping” personnel. Transnistria’s economic existence as a “successful failed state” relies heavily on Russian support through financial aid, subsidies, and free natural gas, even though it is slowly changing. Culturally, over 95% of Transnistrians see their region as part of the russkiy mir, which is the ideological term for the Russian sphere of influence. Yet, Transnistria promotes a civic identity that transcends ethnic divisions rooted in Soviet internationalism.
Transnistria was initially speculated to play a military role in the Russian war against Ukraine. However, this idea proved implausible due to logistical isolation from Russia, limited military capacity, and a lack of support for pro-war narratives within the region. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Transnistrian so-called “officials,” such as the Transnistrian President Krasnoselsky, referred to the Russian aggression not as a “Special Military Operation,” as in Russian media, but as a war. Since then, Transnistria has maintained a neutral stance on the war, which puzzled researchers. The decision appears to be related to the vast connections with Ukraine and the Ukrainian minority. Approximately 100,000 residents hold Ukrainian citizenship, which tempers anti-Ukrainian sentiment. It might also be connected with the slight disappointment by the lack of action from Russia and the Transnistrian role in Moldova’s Free Trade Agreement with the EU. However, the situation has changed because of Ukraine’s recent decision to halt the Russian gas transit to Europe, which led to blackouts in the region. Now, the “authorities” of Transnistria are blaming Ukraine for causing the energy collapse, and such rhetoric is amplified by Russian propaganda present in local Telegram channels.
In comparison with Transnistria, the Gagauz situation is quite different. Under Soviet rule, Gagauzia turned from a relatively poor region to a well-developed one economically and culturally. This sparked a rise in Gagauz nationalism in the 1980s. At that time, Gagauz leaders voiced a desire for political self-determination, motivated by fears of cultural extinction, given the absence of a political protector for the Gagauz elsewhere. They sought autonomy or even independence from Moldova, holding a 1990 referendum to establish an independent Soviet republic and functioning semi-independently for several years.
Following the Transnistria conflict, concerns over potential Gagauz secession led to complex and often contentious negotiations between the Moldovan government in Chișinău and Gagauz authorities in Comrat on achieving autonomy. Gagauzia’s autonomy was formalized through a December 1994 law that created the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, known as Gagauz Yeri. This law granted Gagauzia the right to self-determination should Moldova lose its sovereignty, largely reflecting Gagauz’s concerns over a potential Moldovan unification with Romania. The law also recognized Moldovan, Gagauz, and Russian as the official languages of the region and established Gagauzia’s political structures: the People’s Assembly as its legislature and the Bashkan (governor) as its executive leader. Regional borders were determined based on ethnic demographics and referenda held in 1995. Nearly a decade later, the principles of Gagauz autonomy were integrated into the Moldovan constitution through amendments to Article 111.
The political system in Gagauzia is characterized by a degree of self-governance, yet it remains intertwined with the national political landscape of Moldova. The relationship between Gagauzia’s regional elites and the central government has been historically fraught, with ongoing tensions regarding autonomy and representation. The Gagauz people, predominantly Turkic-speaking, have sought to assert their identity and political claims, often in response to perceived marginalization by the Moldovan state. The region’s political dynamics are further complicated by external factors, particularly the influence of Russian politics, which has historically supported Gagauz autonomy as a counterbalance to Moldovan nationalism. The sympathy for Russia is growing and evident with the results of the most recent elections. In particular, if we talk about the case of Evgenia Gutsul, who is the current Bashkan of Gagauzia, she has made a trip to the World Youth Festival in Russia, had a personal meeting with Putin, and signed cooperation agreements with a number of Russian local governments, including the Krasnodar region’s one. As well as the “authorities” of Transnistria, Gutsul also asked Moscow for help with the “blockade” issue. Both regions call the recent implementation of a new version of the Customs Code of Moldova, according to which both Transnistria and Gagauzia must reimburse entrepreneurs for taxes on their own, calling it a blockade. The Bashkan of Gagauzia responded to this with a stamp of Russian propaganda – she said that this was an “infringement of the rights of the Gagauz.”
Gutsul is a person from the pool of Shor. Neither Maia Sandu nor Western diplomats are in contact with her. Officials from Gutsul’s team can be found on EU sanctions lists, and Gutsul herself is under US sanctions. Russian propaganda is fueling this conflict through anonymous Telegram channels, spreading messages within several messages localized to the Moldovan context and sometimes in line with Russian propaganda in other parts of the world.
2024 elections and referendum as a catalyst for the Moldovan divide
The 2024 presidential elections and EU referendum in Moldova hold significant importance, particularly in the context of its relations with Transnistria and Gagauzia. The elections were seen as a vote on Moldova’s geopolitical alignment. Transnistria and Gagauzia, with their predominantly pro-Russian stances, could react by demanding greater autonomy or even seeking secession under Russian support if the country’s trajectory shifts westward. The results of the vote revealed significant regional sentiments and political divides.
On October 20, 2024, Moldova held a referendum to amend its constitution to include a commitment to EU membership. The results were extremely close – 749,719 people voted in support of that idea (50.35%), and 739,155 people voted against it (49.65%). This narrow margin indicates deep divisions within the electorate. Notably, regions like Gagauzia and Transnistria contributed to the opposition against EU integration due to their pro-Russian leanings.
In the presidential runoff held on November 3, 2024, incumbent President Maia Sandu secured her second term with approximately 55% of the vote against challenger Alexandr Stoianoglo, who garnered about 45%. However, the results varied greatly by region. Sandu received less than 3% of the votes in Gagauzia, showcasing a strong pro-Russian sentiment in this autonomous region. In Transnistria, Sandu obtained around 20% of the vote, reflecting a similarly low level of support amidst a population that largely favors Russian alignment.
The EU referendum, conducted alongside the elections, was pivotal for unifying or further polarizing Moldova. The decision to proceed toward EU membership faces staunch opposition from Transnistria and Gagauzia, which argue for stronger ties with Russia. The elections and referendum results can prompt Transnistria to lobby for international recognition or even escalate tensions in collaboration with Moscow, but it faces more challenges related to its energy policy due to recent developments.
The outcomes of both the presidential election and the EU membership referendum underscore the geopolitical tensions within Moldova, particularly in Gagauzia and Transnistria. The strong pro-Russian sentiments in these regions present challenges for Sandu’s pro-European agenda and reflect broader regional dynamics influenced by external actors like Russia.
Identity crisis?
The struggle to define a cohesive Moldovan identity is a complex issue deeply rooted in the country’s historical, political, and social contexts. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova has grappled with competing national narratives, linguistic distinctions, and external influences that have shaped its contemporary identity crisis.
Moldova’s history of foreign domination, including periods under the Ottoman Empire and the Soviet Union, has resulted in a diverse population with varying cultural affiliations. This eclectic background has fostered a duality in national identity, where many Moldovans identify either as Romanian or as part of a distinct Moldovan ethnicity. The 1991 Declaration of Independence initially emphasized a connection to Romanian heritage, but subsequent political developments have complicated this narrative.
The political landscape reflects this identity struggle. There are Romanian-speaking Moldovans who often support pro-Russian politicians and Russian-speaking Moldovans who lean towards pro-European parties. This division is not merely linguistic but also ideological, as it influences political allegiances and public sentiment regarding Moldova’s future direction. Many younger Moldovans and urban populations advocate for EU integration, viewing it as a pathway to modernization and economic stability. Conversely, older generations may favor closer ties with Russia, often due to cultural ties and economic dependencies.
The debate over Unionism—the idea of uniting Moldova with Romania—is a significant aspect of the identity struggle. Proponents argue that such a union would enhance economic opportunities and strengthen cultural ties. However, opponents fear that it would undermine Moldova’s sovereignty and alienate Russian-speaking populations. This debate intensifies during election cycles, influencing party platforms and voter mobilization.
Moldova is home to various ethnic groups, including Ukrainians, Russians, and Bulgarians. This diversity adds layers to the national identity discourse as different groups advocate for their interests and recognition within the broader Moldovan state.
The question of language further complicates identity formation. The designation of the language as “Moldovan” versus “Romanian” has been politically contentious and is a tool in the Russian soft power toolbox in the country.
The media landscape plays a crucial role in shaping public perception of national identity. Pro-Russian media outlets often promote narratives that emphasize Moldova’s separation from Romania and advocate for closer ties with Russia. In contrast, pro-European media focus on integration with the West and highlight the benefits of EU membership. This polarization contributes to the ongoing identity crisis by reinforcing existing divisions within society.
All these tendencies will definitely have an impact on this year’s parliamentary elections, which is why it is important to understand them. At that moment, Moldova is looking like a perfect case study or even “patient zero” in terms of seeing how both Russian and Western influences are being battled out in real time. This can be a good lesson learned not only for Ukraine, especially in the context of European support for Ukraine being in such a turbulent state currently, but also for Western policy-makers and other relevant stakeholders regarding what is working well in the post-Soviet context and what could actually be improved. The saddest part of all these processes, though, is that Moldova, being a country with an urgent need to recover from all its issues from the past, cannot catch a break because it is being torn apart by Russia, which is leaving Moldovans a bit less hopeful for their future.
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