Ukraine’s Long War: Changing Strategies and Great Power Competition

Executive Summary

The Russo-Ukrainian war has transitioned into a prolonged, attritional contest where staying power–air defense, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) continuity, munitions, energy resilience, and industrial output – matters more than any single diplomatic or combat breakthrough. A sharp U.S. policy shift–from alliance-centric predictability to a more conditional, transactional approach — is forcing Europe to accelerate defense spending and co-production even as fragmentation persists. Meanwhile, Russia continues to exploit allied ambiguity through calibrated and creeping escalation, and China quietly accrues strategic and economic gains while hedging. In effect, Ukraine has reframed victory as national survival, racing to localize production, harden its grid, and secure multi-year defense capabilities.

United States

• Under President Trump, Washington seeks greater burden‑sharing, favors bilateral deals over large multilateral packages, and prioritizes the Indo‑Pacific in force‑planning. This policy shift has practical implications, which consider them not as a clean break but a higher variance – support can surge or pause based on U.S. cost–benefit calculus – so allies are planning for episodic U.S. engagement rather than continuous guarantees.
• The U.S. is shifting from large, predictable direct budget support toward investment‑linked vehicles (e.g., a critical‑minerals‑anchored reconstruction fund) and increased use of FMS/drawdowns. The approach aims to mobilize private capital, tie aid to U.S. economic interests, and keep options flexible. The trade‑off is less predictability for Kyiv’s treasury planning and more reliance on Europe and IFIs to smooth budget gaps in between U.S. transfers.
• The late‑January to mid‑March 2025 ISR pause — including Ukraine’s temporary loss of access to the GEGD satellite imagery feed — reduced early‑warning and targeting fidelity. Even though access was later restored, the episode signaled that high‑end U.S. enablers are not automatic; they can be throttled. Russia read this as an opening to press on multiple fronts while Europe’s ISR substitutes remained patchy.

European Union

• European military and security initiatives seek to scale production of air‑defense interceptors, artillery, and munitions, improve joint procurement, and treat EU strategic autonomy as a complement to NATO — an attempt to insure against U.S. variability while keeping the Alliance central.
• Western Europe prioritizes industrial policy, joint procurement, and strategic autonomy, whereas Eastern Europe emphasizes NATO posture and U.S. presence while also surging national defense outlays. The result is momentum with integration frictions: Europe is investing more, but standardization, timelines, and governance differ across camps, creating execution risk in a long war.
• September 2025 saw Russian drone and fighter jet incursions over EU/NATO countries. Tactically, these incidents forced scrambles and interceptor expenditures; strategically, they normalized low‑level violations that are politically costly but fall below clear retaliation. The lack of a strong response may invite Russia to further probe NATO’s procedures and public tolerance.

Russian Federation

• Russia’s objective is to consolidate control over occupied territories, raise the recurring costs of Ukrainian defense and Western support, and probe allied cohesion without crossing thresholds that invite overwhelming response. In effect, Russia is utilizing a dual-strategy approach: calibrated escalation through visible, controlled and reversible actions — e.g., strikes on energy infrastructure, snap exercises to signal, coerce and put pressure as well as creeping escalation through incremental, ambiguous and cumulative actions — e.g., passportization, airspace probes, cyber intrusions–that cumulatively change facts on the ground and normalize higher risk without a single dramatic leap.
• Russia’s calculus points to preparation for a prolonged confrontation: consolidation of hard-line decision makers, steady offensive tempo, and a preference for actions that keep allied “water at a simmer” rather than trigger a decisive backlash. The approach bets that time and attrition erode Western cohesion faster than they deplete Russia’s capacity.

People’s Republic of China

• Beijing has used the Russia-Ukraine war to expand its geopolitical influence and present itself as a neutral mediator while tacitly siding with Moscow.
• China is closely studying the conflict to learn about modern warfare, U.S. defense limitations, and alliance dynamics. These insights could shape its military modernization and strategy in a future great-power conflict.
• The continuation of the war benefits Beijing economically and politically, deepening Russia’s dependence on China while allowing the latter to secure discounted energy supplies and accumulate leverage over Moscow.

Ukraine

• Ukraine’s war narrative has shifted from the prospect of military victory in 2022–2023 to a focus on long-term national survival by 2025, with priorities centered on sustaining sovereignty, resilience, and imposing costs on Russia rather than rapid territorial liberation.
• The defense industrial base has undergone a major transformation, with nearly 60% of Ukraine’s weapons now domestically produced, monthly drone output exceeding 200,000 units, and offshore production lines launched in NATO states to mitigate Russian strikes and foreign supply interruptions.
• Despite progress in defense production, Ukraine remains critically dependent on Western partners for air defense systems, ISR capabilities, and advanced components, with U.S. aid becoming less predictable under Trump and Europeans accelerating co-production and technology transfer.
• Energy and fiscal resilience remain under pressure: Ukraine is decentralizing its power grid and expanding renewables to counter Russian strikes, while facing a 20% budget deficit and external financing needs of $39–40 billion in 2025 to sustain both war efforts and reconstruction.

Introduction

More than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the war in Ukraine has become the central test of 21st-century deterrence, industrial resilience, and Western cohesion. What began as a high-intensity conventional campaign has evolved into a grinding contest of adaptation in which logistics, defense production, and political will outweigh battlefield maneuver. The conflict’s duration has forced a recalibration of transatlantic assumptions: U.S. security guarantees are now more conditional and episodic, while Europe’s fragmented defense industrial base struggles to translate unprecedented spending commitments into sustainable output. The resulting strategic landscape is one of endurance rather than breakthrough, where marginal advantages in production, innovation, and coordination may prove decisive.

At the same time, the Kremlin’s strategy of calibrated and creeping escalation has widened the confrontation’s gray zones, from airspace violations and cyberattacks to energy coercion. Moscow is probing NATO’s tolerance below the threshold of retaliation. These dynamics have made deterrence management more complex than at any point since the Cold War. Russia’s long-term bet rests on political fatigue within Western societies, assuming that democratic systems will find it harder to sustain costly commitments over time. This approach blurs the boundaries between war and peace, compelling the West to rethink escalation control, signaling, and resilience in non-kinetic domains.

On the other hand, China’s opportunistic neutrality underscores how the war’s consequences are being leveraged by other major powers to extract political and economic advantage, signaling that Ukraine’s struggle is as much about the configuration of the international order as about territorial sovereignty. Beijing’s balancing act — profiting from discounted Russian resources while avoiding sanctions — illustrates the emergence of a transactional multipolarity where conflicts become sources of leverage rather than alignment.

For Kyiv, the imperative has shifted from short-term victory to long-term viability. The country’s survival now depends on its ability to localize defense production, maintain fiscal stability amid uncertain aid flows, and build energy and industrial resilience resilient enough to outlast Russia’s attrition strategy. Ukraine’s internal adaptation — from decentralized energy generation to drone mass production — demonstrates a new model of wartime innovation under constraint. However, sustaining these efforts requires predictable international financing mechanisms and coherent Western coordination, both of which remain uneven. The trajectory of the war through 2025 thus reveals an emerging multipolar competition in which endurance, coordination, and adaptability will determine strategic outcomes.

Against this backdrop, this policy brief examines how evolving U.S. policy, Europe’s defense-industrial adaptation, Russia’s dual-track escalation strategy, China’s opportunistic neutrality, and Ukraine’s efforts at self-reliance are interacting to define the next phase of the war.

Phase	Russian Federation	United States	European Union	China	Ukraine
2014 – 2015	Russia moved quickly in Crimea and Donbas because it calculated that Western military intervention was unlikely, especially if actions were hybrid and deniable. Accepting the Minsk agreements allowed Moscow to reframe its aggression as a “conflict management” process while securing time to entrench administrative and military control. The broader context was a belief that calibrated faits accomplis could change borders at low cost if paired with a diplomatic cover.	Washington prioritized keeping the G7/EU sanctions front unified, which meant accepting a narrower toolbox centered on finance and diplomacy. The Obama administration deliberately held back on lethal aid, fearing escalation and alliance fracture. The context was U.S. risk management: projecting leadership but drawing a ceiling around military involvement, which Russia internalized as predictable restraint.	European governments balanced political outrage with economic self-preservation: sanctions were coordinated but deliberately stopped short of energy cut-offs. NATO rotations signaled solidarity but avoided permanent basing that Moscow could brand as escalation. This revealed Europe’s structural vulnerability – willing to punish but not to fundamentally alter its dependence on Russian energy or commit to large-scale defense posture change.	Beijing’s priority was to avoid entanglement while quietly benefiting from Russia’s isolation; neutrality offered flexibility and preserved trade. Its rhetoric emphasized sovereignty and dialogue, but it avoided sanctioning Moscow or openly criticizing the annexation. The wider context was a strategic hedge: keeping ties with Russia intact, learning from Western sanctions design, and observing military innovation without incurring reputational costs.	Kyiv faced existential threats and chose a dual track: mobilize militarily while engaging diplomatically to buy time. Accepting Minsk meant sacrificing territory in the short term but preserving state survival, while reforms were launched to unlock Western sympathy and assistance. The deeper context was dependence: Ukraine could fight, but sustaining the fight depended on external security and financial backers, embedding asymmetry into its war effort.
Strategic objective	Secure territorial gains while avoiding full-scale Western military intervention.	Lead coalition response – preserve alliance cohesion while avoiding direct combat with Russia.	Raise costs on Russia while avoiding immediate military escalation that could trigger wider war.	Preserve economic ties; avoid being dragged into confrontation; exploit opportunities from Western fragmentation.	Survive, protect territorial integrity where possible, and mobilize international support.
Strategic pattern	Expansionism → hybrid warfare → diplomatic freeze → normalized control, institutionalizing the seize-and-freeze model.	Preserve alliance cohesion → prioritize multilateral sanctions → avoid kinetic engagement → manage escalation risk, embedding restraint into coalition leadership.	Unity in sanctions → avoidance of military escalation → reliance on economic tools → vulnerability through energy dependence, shaping a reactive rather than proactive security posture.	Public neutrality → economic continuity → silent enabling → leverage building, turning ambiguity into a strategic hedge.	Immediate survival → compromise via Minsk → reform as leverage → dependence on Western support, fusing military endurance with political signaling.
2017–2020	Kept “the war at a simmer” while broadening the battlespace to the sea (the 2018 Kerch Strait/Azov Sea confrontation) and deepening passportization of residents in occupied Donetsk/Luhansk to lock in influence without full escalation. Strategy: pressure, probe, and entrench while testing Western red lines.	Shifted from non‑lethal only to calibrated lethal aid (2018 Javelins, a 2019 top‑up, and 2020 Mark VI patrol boats), expanded sanctions authorities (CAATSA 2017), targeted Nord Stream 2 (PEESA in the FY2020 NDAA, prompting Allseas to suspend pipelaying in Dec 2019), and withdrew from the INF Treaty citing Russian non‑compliance. A late‑2019 hold on Ukraine security funds drew a GAO legal violation finding.	Maintained sanctions unity via six‑monthly rollovers and added measures after the Kerch/Azov escalation, while still balancing energy exposure and intra‑EU differences (e.g., over Nord Stream 2). NATO‑EU signaling continued; fundamental posture changes remained incremental.	Stayed publicly “neutral” – no sanctions on Russia and no recognition of Crimea’s annexation – while pursuing economic leverage, notably attempts by Chinese investors (Skyrizon) to acquire Ukrainian engine-maker Motor Sich (stakes frozen from 2017; U.S. later blacklisted Skyrizon). A classic hedge: keep ties with both Kyiv and Moscow, learn from Western sanctions design, avoid entanglement.	Political reset with Zelenskyy (2019) enabled humanitarian steps and renewed diplomacy (Paris Normandy summit) and ushered in the Jul 27, 2020 additional measures ceasefire, which temporarily suppressed violations. Simultaneously, Kyiv absorbed U.S. lethal aid (Javelins, naval kits) and began rebuilding maritime resilience after Kerch.
Strategic objective	Consolidate de‑facto control in Donbas and Crimea, expand coercive leverage (including at sea), and avoid a West–Russia war while shaping facts on the ground for a future bargain.	Raise costs on Moscow without direct combat: sanctions + energy geopolitics (NS2), selective arms transfers, allied posture via EDI, and arms‑control pressure (INF exit) – all while containing escalation risk.	Preserve unity and deterrence at acceptable economic pain, keep Minsk/Normandy mechanisms alive, and manage energy dependencies without fracturing consensus.	Exploit ambiguity for economic and tech gains (e.g., Motor Sich), avoid secondary exposure to Western sanctions, and watch/learn from sanction mechanics, all while keeping optionality with Russia.	Survive and stabilize: secure Western backing, de‑escalate tactically (prisoner exchanges, July 2020 ceasefire), modernize selectively (Javelins/boats), and rebuild maritime deterrence after Azov/Kerch.
Strategic pattern	Low‑intensity war + hybrid integration (passports, legal/administrative creep) → maritime coercion → diplomatic freeze punctuated by tactical deals.	Coalition leadership with calibrated hard power: CAATSA/PEESA sanctions → targeted lethal aid (but not game‑changing) → arms‑control exit (INF) → episodic policy volatility (2019 aid hold), all within an escalation‑managed framework.	Routine renewals + selective add‑ons (Kerch response) → process‑first diplomacy (Normandy/Minsk), while energy realities limit bolder moves; unity sustained but cautious.	Ambiguity-as-strategy: public neutrality, tech/industry entries in Ukraine under scrutiny, no overt breaks with Moscow; leverage grows without formal commitments.	Reset → humanitarian confidence‑building → tactical quiet (mid‑2020 ceasefire) while banking Western kit and keeping negotiation channels open; resilience grows but remains externally dependent.
2021–2025	Launched the full‑scale invasion (Feb 24, 2022), then pivoted from a failed blitz on Kyiv to an attritional, industrialized campaign backed by partial mobilization (Sep 21, 2022) and the annexation claims over four regions (Sep 30, 2022). Intensified winter strikes on energy and made incremental gains such as Avdiivka (Feb 2024), while being pushed at sea – Ukrainian strikes forced Black Sea Fleet assets to disperse away from Sevastopol. Also quit the Black Sea Grain Initiative (Jul 17, 2023).	Led the coalition response and scaled aid by capability “rungs”: HIMARS/air defense → DPICM cluster munitions (Jul 2023) → ATACMS (300 km) (April 2024). Allowed limited use of U.S. weapons for strikes inside Russia near Kharkiv (May 30, 2024). Secured the $60.8 B supplemental (Apr 2024) and concluded a 10‑year bilateral security agreement with Kyiv (June 2024). Cumulatively $66.9 B in U.S. military assistance since Feb 2022 (as of Jan 2025).	Became Ukraine’s anchor for macro‑financial and military support: launched the €50 B Ukraine Facility (2024‑27); used and topped‑up the European Peace Facility for lethal aid; stood up EUMAM Ukraine to train forces; and iterated sanction packages (e.g., the 14th in Jun 2024), tightening enforcement and energy‑related measures. Opened EU accession talks with Ukraine (June 25, 2024).	Declared a no‑limits partnership with Russia (Feb 4, 2022) and rolled out a 12‑point position paper on the war (Feb 2023). Publicly avoided lethal aid to Russia while expanding trade/dual‑use channels that drew Western sanctions against PRC‑based entities. Xi also spoke with Zelenskyy (Apr 26, 2023) without shifting core alignment.	Survived and adapted: defended Kyiv (spring 2022), liberated Kharkiv oblast and Kherson (right bank) in 2022, then shifted to attritional and deep‑strike warfare – drones/missiles degrading Russian energy and Black Sea Fleet assets and reopening a “temporary” grain corridor in 2023 after Moscow quit the UN deal. Tightened manpower policy (draft age to 25; updated mobilization rules) and began integrating F‑16s/Mirage-2000s in 2024.
Strategic objective	Impose a new territorial reality and a negotiation on Moscow’s terms by outlasting Western resolve, sustaining the war economy, and grinding forward where feasible while hardening control over occupied areas.	Enable Ukraine to defend, deter and endure – raise costs on Russia, avoid direct NATO-Russia war, and lock in multi‑year support (supplemental + 10‑year pact) while tightening export controls/sanctions.	Sustain Ukraine and constrain Russia at scale (financial, military, industrial) while binding Kyiv to the EU path and closing sanction‑evasion seams.	Preserve strategic ambiguity: posture as neutral mediator, avoid Western sanctions, keep economic leverage with Moscow, and shape any settlement toward Chinese talking points.	Survive, adapt, and impose costs: defend critical population/energy nodes, expand long‑range strike leverage, strengthen air defense, and accelerate Euro‑Atlantic integration to anchor long‑term security.
Strategic pattern	Blitz → attrition → entrenchment: mobilization + annexation claims; seasonal energy bombardment; stepwise advances (e.g., Avdiivka) even as naval risk in Crimea forced dispersion.	Capability ladder + policy guardrails: steady escalation of systems (DPICM → ATACMS) and bounded authorities(limited cross‑border use), coupled with financing surges (Apr 2024 supplemental) and a 10‑year security framework.	Process + scale: sanction packages, EPF top‑ups and EUMAM training, then accession talks and the €50 B Facility to make support predictable and more insulated from U.S. politics.	Rhetorical neutrality, practical hedging: peace messaging while deepening Russia ties and testing sanctions lines – prompting targeted U.S./EU measures against PRC entities.	From maneuver to systemic pressure: after 2022 offensives, emphasis shifted to air defense + deep strikes (energy/logistics, Black Sea Fleet) and manpower repair (draft age 25), while modern fighter jets integration slowly began to reshape the air‑war balance.

The evolution of the Russo-Ukraine war is no longer viewed as a sequence of crises but a continuum of strategic adaptation. Russia’s conduct has remained structurally consistent: hybrid coercion, calibrated and creeping escalation, alternating between overt offensives and bureaucratic annexation to normalize occupation. For the United States, the pendulum has swung from predictable multilateralism to conditional bilateralism, redefining the limits and instruments of Western engagement, shifting the balance between deterrence, escalation management, and burden sharing. Europe, in effect, was forced to move from dependence to hesitant self-assertion through industrial policy, defense loans, and co-production schemes. Meanwhile, China’s ostensible neutrality matures into material enabling – a sanctions‑aware hedge that deepens leverage over Moscow while exploiting transatlantic seams. Against this backdrop, Ukraine has transformed from a recipient of aid into a co-producer of security – sustaining air defense and ISR, industrializing at home and with allies, keeping the grid alive under fire, and locking in Euro‑Atlantic integration faster than Russia can normalize faits accomplis. The strategic implication is clear: only a broad coalition–wide strategy that insulates assistance from political cycles, closes sanction‑evasion channels, and accelerates co‑production and Euro‑Atlantic integration will outpace Moscow’s time‑and‑pressure approach.

From Multilateralism to America First: The U.S. Foreign Policy Shift

Under Biden, foreign policy was explicitly alliance-centric, multilateral, and values-driven. His administration sought to prioritize allies by revitalizing America’s global network of partnerships and reaffirming the commitment to collective defense. Biden’s Doctrine explicitly framed U.S. engagement as part of a broader effort to defend the liberal international order against authoritarian resurgence. He consistently elevated NATO, the G7, and the EU as strategic cornerstones – a view codified in the 2022 National Security Strategy, which described alliances as America’s most important strategic asset. Russia’s war in Ukraine became a key animating element for American and European democracies alike, transforming solidarity with Kyiv into a defining test of Western unity. The administration also reengaged with global institutions such as the UN, WTO, and WHO, underscoring a return to multilateral cooperation on cross-border challenges from health to climate and trade.

The hallmark of Biden’s foreign policy was predictability and solidarity. The administration sought to reassert America’s traditional leadership role on the international stage after the turbulence of the first Trump administration, placing democratic values at the center of U.S. engagement and framing competition with Russia and China as a global contest between democracy and authoritarianism. This approach reassured allies of the durability and normative anchoring of U.S. leadership. Yet it also created strains, as defending democracy worldwide required sustained military, economic, and diplomatic commitments that risked overstretching U.S. resources. Balancing credibility abroad with domestic political and fiscal constraints remained a persistent challenge.

The transition from President Joe Biden to President Donald Trump represents not only a change in leadership but a fundamental redefinition of how the U.S. conceives its role in the world. Both administrations acknowledged intensifying great-power competition, but they diverged sharply in doctrine, instruments, and political foundation.

In this second administration, foreign policy was explicitly pragmatic and cost-conscious. President Trump’s advisers argued that U.S. leadership had too often been a subsidy for allies who failed to invest in their own defense, and called for a dramatic shift in fair burden-sharing. The President consistently framed alliances as conditional bargains rather than enduring obligations, reflecting his long-held assertion that U.S. commitments should be judged against immediate national benefit.

Unlike President Biden, who emphasized democracy promotion as the organizing principle of U.S. engagement, President Trump rejected values-based foreign policy in favor of interest-based prioritization. Analysts observed that this approach was designed to prevent strategic overstretch by narrowing the scope of U.S. obligations and focusing on regions offering the highest return. This produced a hierarchy of priorities: China as the pacing challenge for defense planning and resource allocation; Europe expected to assume greater responsibility for its own security; and the Middle East reframed around counterterrorism and energy stability rather than large-scale democracy promotion.

The hallmark of Donald Trump’s foreign policy is conditionality paired with deliberate unpredictability. For Washington, this strategy promised efficiency and leverage: it aimed to reduce the costs of global leadership while compelling allies to shoulder a greater share of the burden. His administration consistently presents U.S. engagement as contingent rather than automatic, coupling assurances of support with suggestions of retrenchment. Yet systemic uncertainty is forcing partners to question the reliability of American commitments and spurring parallel efforts in Europe and Asia to hedge against American volatility. In this sense, unpredictability was not a tactical byproduct but an organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy – recasting America’s role in the international system on terms explicitly tied to its national interest.

President Trump’s foreign policy emphasizes U.S. interests over universal norms, preferring bilateral deals and selective club-style engagements, rather than fully embracing universal or institutional multilateral frameworks, emphasizing U.S. interests and renegotiations rather than broad commitment to global governance and toward the presidency itself.

Donald Trump also centralized foreign policy decision-making in the White House, reducing the influence of traditional institutional checks. Unlike previous presidents who relied heavily on interagency processes, President Trump consistently privileged personal instinct and bilateral deal-making over bureaucratic consensus. His second administration entered office with fewer internal or external constraints, since many of the “grownups” who tempered his first-term decisions were no longer in place. This personalization of diplomacy was already evident in his first term through high-profile summits with leaders such as Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, which bypassed State Department and Pentagon vetting. In parallel, President Trump increasingly relies on special envoys – figures who enjoyed his exclusive trust and often operated outside traditional interagency coordination – thereby institutionalizing an alternative channel of diplomacy shaped more by presidential trust per se. Analysts also observed that President Trump often approached high-profile events, privileging the performative component over traditional diplomatic protocol. 

Crucially, President Trump’s foreign policy represents a significant departure from earlier U.S. commitments to Ukraine, particularly those enshrined in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Under that agreement, the United States, alongside the United Kingdom and Russia, pledged to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and provide security assurances in exchange for Kyiv’s relinquishment of the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. Although the memorandum offered “assurances” rather than binding guarantees, it symbolized Washington’s political commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Donald Trump’s America First doctrine, by contrast, reinterprets such commitments through a transactional lens – emphasizing reciprocity and conditionality rather than open-ended assurance. This shift underscores the broader transformation in U.S. foreign policy: from normative guardianship toward a calculus of selective engagement driven by national benefit.

In its second iteration, America First reframed U.S. leadership not as a guarantor of global order but as a transactional system designed to preserve American primacy at lower cost. This shift has reasonably generated questions among some allies about the durability of U.S. commitments, particularly in Europe, where uncertainty over Washington’s posture could affect perceptions of deterrence. A narrower, interest-based leadership model can allow Washington to concentrate on core strategic challenges, rather than diluting effort across every global issue. Still, analysts warn that excessive ambiguity over commitment could embolden adversaries and weaken the credibility of U.S. alliances. Others note that a narrower, interest-based conception of leadership may constrain the scope of U.S. coalition-building on global issues such as climate change, trade, or pandemics. The central test for Washington is whether this conditional model – one that emphasizes fair burden-sharing and reciprocity in bilateral trade relations – can preserve U.S. influence without undermining the very alliances and institutions that have underwritten it.

For President Trump and his advisors, the Russian invasion of Ukraine was never about safeguarding the liberal international order, but rather an arena through which to apply the principles of America First in practice. What once appeared ad hoc in his first term has been formalized into a governing framework. For U.S. allies, this recalibration introduces persistent uncertainty about the scope and durability of American commitments. For Ukraine, it underscores the necessity of preparing for a U.S. role that is narrower, more interest-driven, and less anchored in universal obligations.

Europe Was Left Without Solid Ground, Yet Seeks a Fair Balance

Under Biden, the U.S. reinvested in NATO, re-engaged with the G7 and the EU, and returned to global institutions. For Europe, this meant a restoration of predictability: transatlantic cooperation on climate, trade, and global health crises signaled that Washington saw allies as strategic assets rather than competitors. This allowed the EU to position itself as a partner in shaping multilateral governance, from climate diplomacy to WTO reform, while maintaining close alignment with U.S. global priorities. Predictability, per se, also caused a broad consensus among the allies, which enabled coordination on sanctions, strengthened and deepened cooperation on security and defense, and fostered energy diversification. The U.S. took significant steps to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defense posture, with NATO remaining the indispensable guarantor of deterrence in the face of Russian aggression. Notably, while the U.S. supplied 52% of European members’ military equipment between 2015 and 2019, the share rose to 64% in the subsequent 5-year period. Even though NATO members relied on Washington’s strategic umbrella, Europe remained heavily under-invested in defense. 

Yet from the European perspective, Biden’s multilateralism was not without its limitations. Brussels often viewed Washington’s NATO approach as excessively U.S.-driven, with key initiatives framed as transatlantic partnerships but shaped primarily by American priorities. Biden’s limited multilateralism often puts U.S. domestic interests first, even while rhetorically restoring cooperation. Tensions surfaced over trade, with the persistence of steel and aluminum tariffs, over the Inflation Reduction Act, which Europeans criticized as protectionist, and over the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, which reinforced perceptions that Washington still acted unilaterally on core security matters. Europeans also pointed to a lack of long-term strategic clarity in foreign policy. While the administration effectively mobilized allies in response to immediate crises, critics argued that it often failed to translate short-term solidarity into a coherent strategy for managing systemic challenges. The London School of Economics’ IDEAS report described Europe as “hedging by default,” preparing for scenarios in which U.S. leadership was inconsistent or absent. Biden’s foreign policy ambiguity was evident in the Indo-Pacific, where European partners often struggled to discern Washington’s ultimate strategy toward China, noting that U.S. commitments appeared ambitious in rhetoric but less clear in execution. In the Middle East, shifting U.S. priorities – from a desire to reduce military footprint to renewed engagement during crises – left European allies uncertain about the durability of American commitments. The absence of clearly articulated red lines at times enabled adversaries, from Russia to Iran, to probe Western resolve without facing decisive consequences. For many in Europe, this reinforced a sense of vulnerability: even under a President who placed alliances at the center of U.S. foreign policy, leadership frequently oscillated between high rhetoric and hesitant execution. The result was an enduring concern that transatlantic unity, though revitalized, remained reactive and crisis-driven rather than anchored in a sustainable, forward-looking strategic vision.

European allies experienced a stark contrast between Joe Biden’s limited multilateralism and Donald Trump’s America First. For many in Europe, Donald Trump’s second inauguration confirmed fears that U.S. foreign policy was entering a new structural phase. This led European policymakers to increasingly view American security assurances as contingent on Washington’s shifting strategic interests rather than as permanent obligations. President Trump’s emphasis on transactional and episodic diplomacy another time raised questions about NATO’s credibility and whether Article 5 would continue to be treated as an unshakeable guarantee. This marked a clear signal to Europeans that U.S. disengagement from traditional multilateralism might no longer be episodic turbulence but a structural feature of Washington’s approach. 

European governments thus began recalibrating their strategies along both geographic and political lines. Central and Eastern European states, particularly Poland and the Baltic countries, despite their efforts to increase defense spending – for example, Poland’s rose from around 2.7% of GDP in 2022 to about 4.2% in 2024, with a projection of 4.7% in 2025 – continue to treat the U.S. military presence as indispensable. Western European states, by contrast, have interpreted Trump’s conditionality as reinforcing long-standing debates over Europe’s strategic autonomy. In this context, French arguments – most prominently advanced by President Emmanuel Macron – about the risks of overreliance on U.S. guarantees have gained renewed attention, even if not universal acceptance. Berlin, having embraced its Zeitenwende, has cautiously aligned with parts of this outlook: it not only raised defense spending but has also devoted political capital to EU-level defense mechanisms, such as new PESCO projects, the European Defence Fund, and the European Sky Shield Initiative. These efforts aim to pool resources and advance a more integrated air and missile defense architecture – even as challenges remain over financing, coordination, and political alignment across member states.

At the EU level, institutions have been anchored in the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (adopted in 2022), which set out a roadmap through 2030 to strengthen Europe’s ability to act independently. In 2024, the European Commission unveiled the first European Defence Industrial Strategy, which identified “defence readiness” as a priority and introduced new tools to stimulate joint procurement, expand production capacity, and consolidate the defence industrial base. This was followed in 2025 by the launch of the Security Action for Europe programme, worth €150 billion in preferential loans, designed to accelerate procurement of critical capabilities such as air defence, artillery, and munitions. These and other initiatives were designed to present autonomy not as a substitute for NATO but as a necessary complement to strengthen Europe’s ability to act when U.S. leadership wavers. European analysts emphasize that real autonomy requires building a consolidated European defence industrial base and prioritizing intra-EU procurement to reduce dependency on non-European suppliers. In this context, the U.S. transactional approach to alliances is interpreted both as a warning and as an opportunity: a warning that U.S. disengagement from multilateral commitments could become structural, and an opportunity for Europe to overcome chronic underinvestment and fragmentation in its defence policy.

Still, the European assessment of Trump’s conditionality is not uniformly negative. On the one hand, U.S. pressure has spurred long-delayed investments, narrowing some of NATO’s burden-sharing gaps. On the other hand, deterrence credibility increasingly depends on perception: ambiguity surrounding NATO’s red lines and Article 5 heightened fears that a transactional U.S. posture could embolden adversaries to test the Alliance’s cohesion. In this environment, European leaders have advanced the Coalition of the Willing approach, which has sought to finalize robust security guarantees for Ukraine. The initiative has been primarily driven by France and the United Kingdom, whose proactive leadership contrasts with the more cautious engagement of Germany and Poland – countries that remain hesitant to assume a front-line role. Twenty-six states have pledged to contribute to a post-conflict reassurance force, yet many remain reluctant to deploy personnel inside Ukraine unless the United States does so as well. In effect, the EU-US-Ukraine groups are working to design a pragmatic operational framework – defining what must be implemented, when (with some elements to be implemented before ‘the war is finished’), and how to ensure coherence across actors. The Biden-to-Trump transition thus crystallizes a broader paradox: the United States remains central to Europe’s security architecture, but its reliability is no longer taken for granted. The strategic imperative now is to preserve U.S. engagement while simultaneously building autonomous European capabilities capable of acting when American priorities shift.

The result of such a paradigm, however, so far has materialized in a fragmented European response. Western European capitals emphasize the urgency of reducing dependence by reinforcing defense industrial policy, enhancing joint/common procurement, and investing in long-term strategic autonomy. Frontline states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, are instead focused on securing bilateral agreements with the U.S. and ensuring enhanced NATO deterrence on the eastern flank, while also increasing their own defense budgets. Both approaches reflect a shared recognition that the transatlantic compact has fundamentally changed. Under Trump, Europe no longer assumes automatic solidarity but must actively negotiate its place in America’s security calculus. This dynamic has generated both anxiety and momentum: anxiety over the durability of U.S. commitments, but also momentum to invest in greater European capacity while keeping the U.S. engaged as the indispensable partner in Europe’s security and international influence.

Russia’s Calculus Amid U.S. Foreign Policy Shifts

From Moscow’s vantage point, the contrast between Joe Biden’s limited multilateralism and Donald Trump’s America First has also been stark. Under Biden, NATO’s unity and the imposition of sanctions on Russia, together with ongoing Western military assistance to Ukraine, reinforced what analysts see as a containment-plus approach. The Kremlin viewed Biden’s frequent framing of the conflict as a contest between democracy and authoritarianism as not just ideological, but existential – an implicit signal that Moscow was being isolated and portrayed as a pariah.

Trump’s return, however, was read in Moscow as both a risk and an opportunity. Russian analysts note that Washington’s emphasis on burden-sharing and conditional alliances could become a test of cohesion: if European allies repeatedly fail to meet Washington’s expectations, internal frictions may deepen and credibility may erode. Such strains are viewed in Moscow as fertile ground for hybrid tactics designed to aggravate divisions within NATO – whether through disinformation, cyber intrusions, energy leverage, or escalation in contested spaces. Russian officials have consistently portrayed U.S. conditionality as hesitation, reinforcing the narrative that time favors Moscow: sustained military and political pressure, they argue, will eventually fracture allied cohesion. This perception underpins Moscow’s belief that ambiguity in U.S. intentions defines the scope of freedom of action to consolidate territorial gains in Ukraine, probe the resilience of European governments, and preserve influence in the post-Soviet region.

Yet Moscow also recognizes constraints and risks. President Trump’s transactional diplomacy signals potential adjustments, but not full U.S. disengagement from European security. On the contrary, increased defense investments and planning in Washington are interpreted as bolstering deterrence vis-à-vis both Russia and China. For example, Russia has sharply criticized U.S. initiatives to expand missile defense – such as a proposal for the Iron Dome for America – casting them as efforts to alter the strategic balance. Russian strategists emphasize that the Kremlin is responding by accelerating defense modernization, fortifying bases, and sustaining high readiness across its western and southern military districts. These measures are framed as defensive necessities, but externally they signal intent to preserve coercive leverage over neighbors and maintain relevance in the global balance.

At the same time, Russian officials have warned of a potential spiral of escalation, portraying U.S. actions as destabilizing while seeking to retain at least minimal strategic communication channels. Notifications of missile tests and deconfliction mechanisms are maintained, reflecting Moscow’s recognition that miscalculation could lead to uncontrolled confrontation. In practice, Russia’s calculus thus combines opportunism and caution: exploiting perceived Western divisions while bracing for a prolonged confrontation in which deterrence, hybrid tactics, and escalation remain central instruments of statecraft.

Exploiting Strategic Ambiguity

Moscow has long treated ambiguity in U.S. commitments as an exploitable opening. Russian analysts frame uncertainty in Washington’s willingness to uphold collective defense as an opportunity to advance the Kremlin’s strategic interests without provoking a decisive response. As such, debates around burden-sharing, allied fatigue, and conditional U.S. guarantees expose vulnerabilities that can be systematically tested. Hybrid tactics – ranging from cyber operations and disinformation to energy coercion and covert political financing – are seen as particularly effective because they deepen divisions within allied societies and delay collective decision-making. The ambiguity in U.S. leadership thus magnifies the utility of such tools, providing freedom of action to entrench influence in the post-Soviet region and test Western resolve at low cost.

Late January–Mid March 2025: Intelligence Suspension and Strategic Signaling

The first major test of the new transatlantic signaling environment came in late January through mid-March 2025, when Washington briefly curtailed the flow of intelligence to Ukraine. In early March, U.S. authorities suspended Kyiv’s access to critical intelligence streams, including the Global Enhanced GEOINT Delivery (GEGD) satellite imagery platform operated by Maxar. For Ukraine, this meant a sudden narrowing of situational awareness: air-defense units reported degraded early-warning capacity, while front-line commanders faced delays in receiving precision targeting data. Access was later restored around March 12, 2025, but the interruption itself carried significant strategic weight.

From Moscow’s perspective, this suspension was interpreted less as a technical adjustment than as a revealing signal of conditionality in U.S. commitments. Russian planners appear to have concluded that U.S. support for Ukraine was no longer automatic or steady, but contingent and reversible–dependent on shifting political calculations in Washington. In response, Russian forces escalated offensive pressure. On March 8, Russia conducted the (Failed) Operation “Potok” (Stream): this involved an infiltration maneuver through the disused Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod pipeline into Ukrainian territory near Sudzha, Kursk Oblast – a rare example of using unconventional access routes to gain positional leverage. The Kremlin also sustained long-range missile and artillery barrages elsewhere, taking advantage of Ukraine’s temporarily reduced situational awareness due to degraded intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support.

The episode had profound battlefield and strategic effects. On the battlefield, Ukraine was forced to absorb greater losses and operational friction at a moment when its ability to respond quickly depended heavily on ISR inputs. Kyiv had to lean more on uneven European sources of reconnaissance and imagery, which often lagged both in precision and speed. Strategically, Moscow achieved a low-cost probe: Washington could restore the intelligence flows, as it indeed did, yet the rupture itself allowed Russia to paint U.S. guarantees as episodic rather than steadfast. This reinforced the Kremlin’s long-standing belief that time favors Russia – that sustained military pressure, combined with selective exploitation of Western ambiguity, will eventually fracture the cohesion of Ukraine’s supporters.

March–August 2025: Administrative Annexation by Paperwork

The second phase of Russia’s exploitation of U.S. and Western ambiguity unfolded less through overt battles and more through paperwork and coercive administration. As the U.S. emphasized burden-sharing and conditionality in its rhetorical and policy framework, Moscow accelerated its passportization drive in the occupied territories. On March 5, 2025, President Vladimir Putin asserted that authorities had virtually completed issuing Russian passports to residents in the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev reported that 3.5 million passports had been issued in total.

Also on March 20, 2025, Putin signed a decree ordering Ukrainian citizens in those four occupied regions (and Crimea) to regulate their legal status by September 10, 2025, or leave on their own; failure to comply would mean being classified as foreigners under Russian authorities. To residents of the occupied territories, the process is neither neutral nor optional. Reports from human rights groups describe intense coercion: denying access to health care, social benefits, employment, or property rights for those without Russian passports; bureaucratic pressure to accept Russian documentation; and legal threats (including deportation or classification as “foreigners”) for those who resist.

The effects of this creeping plan are significant. First, the population for whom Russia can claim responsibility (including for conscription) has expanded sharply: those with passports are now formally under Russian jurisdiction in many legal and administrative matters. Second, the distinction between occupation and annexation is being blurred in daily life – not only in documentation but in the imposition of Russian legal, educational, and service systems. Third, at minimal military cost, Russia constructs facts on the ground that complicate any downstream settlement or reintegration scenario. Western governments, while condemning these moves as violations of international law and Ukraine’s sovereignty, have so far treated them in statements and sanctions, rather than matching structural policy adjustments.

August–Early September 2025: Signalling Against NATO’s New PURL Channel

By late summer 2025, the transatlantic debate over how to sustain Ukraine had coalesced around a new institutional mechanism – the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL). This NATO-U.S. initiative was designed to match the U.S. administration’s push for burden-sharing: Washington would continue to supply weapons from its stocks, while European allies would provide the funds. Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, and a joint group (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) each pledged approximately $500 million under the PURL mechanism in early August.

Moscow, however, interpreted these pledges not as signs of strengthened unity but of conditionality dressed in formal commitments. Russian state-media commentary quickly seized on the narrative that the U.S. was “outsourcing” its burden, shifting the cost (financial, political, logistical) of Ukraine’s defense onto Europe. In Russian strategic assessments, PURL’s structure reinforced the idea that U.S. support was subject to allied performance and continuity, heightening Moscow’s incentive to test how durable those contributions would be, both in delivery and in allied political will.

Operationally, Moscow’s reading has translated into a campaign of deliberate and calibrated infrastructure strikes aimed not only at degrading Ukraine’s warfighting capacity but also at weakening Ukrainian and Western resolve. By striking energy and transport nodes, the Kremlin seeks to impose recurring costs on the civilian economy and military logistics while producing highly visible hardship, aiming to diminish the Ukrainian will to fight. In effect, on September 8, 2025, a Russian attack struck a thermal power facility in the Kyiv region, resulting in local blackouts and gas outages and cutting supply to more than 8,000 households; most power was restored by the next morning. Then, on September 17, 2025, Russian drones attacked the Kirovohrad region, cutting power and disrupting railway services.

These strikes achieve several strategic aims in Moscow’s calculus. First, by targeting energy and railway – vital for both civilian economy and military logistics – Russia imposes recurring financial and operational burdens on Ukraine, forcing Kyiv to divert resources to repairs and emergency response. Second, the highly visible disruptions these attacks cause are intended to shape perceptions beyond the battlefield: blackouts, transport delays, and cascading economic costs are meant to erode public morale, weaken Ukraine’s societal resilience, and amplify war fatigue among European publics. Third, the Kremlin’s aim is not only to degrade Ukraine’s will to fight but also to signal that while Europe pledges millions under PURL, Russia can continuously impose costs that erode Ukrainian resilience faster than those pledges can stabilize the situation, thereby testing Western political will and the durability of allied support over time.

September 2025: Probing NATO’s Airspace

In early September 2025, in parallel to intensified strikes towards Ukraine’s logistics and critical infrastructure, Russia also ramped up its campaign of testing NATO’s external periphery. The sequence of probes illustrates how Moscow combines calibrated disruption of Ukraine’s supply arteries with creeping tests of allied defenses. Taken together, these actions show how Russia exploits ambiguity in U.S. commitments and the debates over allied burden-sharing to erode cohesion both inside Ukraine and across NATO’s frontline.

On September 9–10, 2025, between 19 and 23 Russian drones crossed into Polish airspace, some loitering for hours before being intercepted. Warsaw invoked Article 4 consultations, and NATO scrambled jets, including Dutch F-35s, to engage several of the intruders. This marked the first kinetic air-defense engagement over NATO territory in the war, forcing the alliance to expend high-value munitions against low-cost drones while confronting the operational complexity of defending large airspaces. The incident was immediately taken up at the UN Security Council, underlining its global resonance, and NATO formally flagged the pattern as part of a broader Russian pressure campaign.

Just three days later, on September 13, 2025, the Kremlin repeated the tactic against another frontline ally. A Russian drone flew approximately 10 kilometers into Romanian territory and remained for nearly 50 minutes before exiting, despite F-16s being scrambled to intercept. The long loiter time suggested a deliberate test of NATO’s detection and response procedures, but also underscored the ambiguity of such intrusions: the target was neither decisive enough to warrant retaliation, nor harmless enough to ignore. By repeating the probe so soon after Poland, Moscow sought to normalize these brief, ambiguous incursions as a feature of the regional security environment.

The pattern escalated again on September 19 and 21–22, 2025, when three MiG-31 fighter jets entered Estonian airspace for about 12 minutes before departing. Unlike drones, the use of manned aircraft raised the political stakes, triggering a NATO Council session but falling short of crossing into uncontestable casus belli. Moscow denied the violation, preserving deniability while raising allied anxiety. By choosing Estonia – NATO’s northeastern flank – Russia sent a pointed signal that even direct aerial challenges could be calibrated to raise political temperature without triggering military escalation.

These high-profile cases were set against a persistent backdrop of near-daily intercepts of Russian intelligence aircraft, such as IL-20s, over the Baltic Sea. While technically legal when conducted in international airspace, such sorties require constant NATO responses, keeping the operational tempo high and diverting allied resources from Ukraine. For Moscow, the steady rhythm of aerial probes serves as a low-cost tool to “keep the water at a simmer” – gradually normalizing risk, habituating allies to heightened tension, and forcing NATO to consume time and resources on air policing.

The strategic effect of this September campaign was cumulative. By combining drones, prolonged loitering, manned fighter incursions, and constant ISR flights, Russia demonstrated that it could raise alliance costs and test cohesion without crossing red lines. Each move was reversible and deniable, but together they eroded the predictability of NATO’s security environment. For Moscow, these actions were less about military effect than about exploiting strategic ambiguity in U.S. commitments and widening the gap between Washington’s conditional guarantees and Europe’s uneven capacity to respond.

What’s Next: Spiral of Escalation Without End

Despite periodic calls from Western governments for a truce or forecasts of a potential end to the war, Russia shows no signs of preparing for peace. On the contrary, both political and military indicators suggest the Kremlin is preparing for a long confrontation. Politically, the recent resignation of Dmitry Kozak–once seen as an advocate of hybrid approaches and limited accommodation – along with the dismantling of his Office for Cross-Border Cooperation, signals the triumph of the so-called “war party” around Sergei Kirienko. The prominence of figures such as General Andrei Mordvichev, who accompanied President Putin at the West-2025 exercises and is notorious for brutal “meat assault” tactics, further underscores the consolidation of hardliners in Putin’s inner circle. These shifts point not to negotiation but to the institutionalization of endless war as the Kremlin’s default posture.

On the battlefield, Russia’s actions reinforce this conclusion. The two “truces” announced in 2025 – for Easter and May – were tactical ruses, exploited to regroup and redeploy rather than genuine pauses in hostilities. Current redeployments, such as the transfer of elite naval infantry and airborne units from the Sumy direction to reinforce the Pokrovsk front, reflect Moscow’s preparation for sustained offensive activity into the autumn-winter campaign and beyond into 2026. Strengthening of the North and Kupyansk directions shows that Russia is already aligning forces for the next phase of attrition, with few indications of operational de-escalation. Even the September drone raid into Polish airspace, unprecedented in scope and duration, demonstrates that Moscow prefers testing NATO’s thresholds to building conditions for talks.

Taken together, these political and military markers confirm that Russia’s strategy is not oriented toward a ceasefire or peace negotiations but toward managing a protracted war of attrition. Escalation – whether through bureaucratic integration of occupied territories, calibrated strikes on Ukraine’s infrastructure, or probing incursions into NATO airspace – is both the method and the message. Moscow’s aim is to entrench territorial control, erode Western unity, and normalize a climate of permanent confrontation. In this sense, what lies ahead is not a pathway to peace, but a Spiral of Escalation Without End, one that challenges not only Ukraine’s national survival but the credibility of international institutions and the durability of the post-Cold War security order itself.

Calibrated & Creeping Escalation

Russia’s conduct of the war against Ukraine is best understood not as a static campaign but as a dynamic strategy of incremental adaptation. Two overlapping concepts capture the Kremlin’s approach: “calibrated escalation” and “creeping escalation.” Both serve to expand Moscow’s freedom of action, undermine deterrence, and test the limits of Western resolve.

Calibrated Escalation	Creeping Escalation
A strategy of controlled, visible, and reversible actions designed to impose costs and send signals without crossing thresholds that would trigger overwhelming retaliation. Its essence lies in signaling, coercion and psychological pressure.	A strategy of incremental, ambiguous, and cumulative actions designed to gradually normalize new realities and raise tolerance for risk. Its essence lies in normalization, habituation and gradual fait accompli.
Strikes on Energy infrastructure Visible: Attacks are large enough to be noticed. Controlled: Targets are chosen to seriously disrupt – not destroy – the grid. Reversible: Damage can often be repaired within days or weeks. -> It demonstrates capability and resolve while retaining the option to stop further strikes and allow recovery.	Drone/Jet Probes of NATO Airspace Incremental: Frequent but limited incursions become “routine”. Ambiguous: Each incident is deniable as a navigation error or an accident. Cumulative: Normalizes a higher baseline of risk for NATO air defense. -> Instead of a dramatic clash, repeated small probes are testing NATO boundaries, putting divisions between the allies and undermining trust.
Military Exercises Near NATO Borders Visible: Troop and equipment movements are highly visible and public. Controlled: Can be withdrawn or redeployed quickly if the intended deterrent or coercive signal has been achieved. Reversible: Allies must respond with readiness measures, but no territory is seized, and escalation can be rolled back. -> It raises tension, tests allied responses, and communicates risk, yet remains temporary and reversible.	Gradual Integration of Occupied Territories Incremental: Ruble imposed, curricula in schools introduced, local elections run, Russian passports issued. Ambiguous: Each step appears “administrative.” Cumulative: Together, they institutionalize Russian governance structures. -> No single decisive move, but steady normalization of Russian authority over time.
Negotiation Track Management Visible: Moscow declares a “stop” to talks or withdraws from dialogue while simultaneously sustaining strikes, using the suspension of diplomacy as a coercive signal. Controlled: The Kremlin maintains minimal backchannels and can at any moment announce readiness to resume dialogue, preserving its flexibility Reversible: Russia can re-enter or exit negotiations at will, portraying these moves as concessions or retaliations depending on its tactical needs. -> It buys time, gains diplomatic cover, and tests Western unity–whereas in fact it has no real interest in substantive peacetalks, only in shaping perceptions and sustaining leverage.	Gradual Expansion of Cyber Intrusions Incremental: Continuous low-level cyber operations against Western infrastructure. Ambiguous: Attributed ambiguously, often masked as criminal or technical incidents. Cumulative: Over time, Western actors adjust to persistent interference as the “new normal.” -> No single attack justifies full retaliation, but the steady pace habituates to enduring Russian pressure in the cyber domain.
Temporary Suspension of Arms–Control Obligations Visible: Public announcement that Russia is suspending inspections or information-sharing (e.g., New START). Controlled: Suspension covers certain provisions while others remain. Reversible: Compliance can be reinstated quickly if negotiations change. -> It raises strategic pressure by undermining transparency but leaves space for restoration, showing coercive intent without a point of no return.	Negotiation Track Management Incremental: Establishing new bases, radar sites, or patrol routes one by one. Ambiguous: Each move framed as “routine defense” or “infrastructure modernization.” Cumulative: Over years, Russia achieves de facto control of key Arctic zones without a single dramatic clash. -> Individually low-cost steps gradually normalize expanded Russian military presence and strategic claims.

Escalation Ladder vs Calibrated & Creeping Escalation

The Escalation ladder, originally conceptualized by Herman Kahn and later adapted in NATO and Russian debates, is a hierarchical, stage-based, structured, and linear model that maps the progression from diplomatic pressure to full nuclear exchange. Each rung signifies a qualitatively higher level of violence and risk, making the ladder a broad and formal model well suited for capturing the full spectrum of potential escalation, especially at nuclear thresholds.

By contrast, the distinction between Calibrated & Creeping escalation describes modes of action rather than rungs.

• Calibrated escalation reflects the selective use of higher rungs in a visible but reversible way, intended to send signals and impose costs without irreversibly moving upward. Formula (simplified): short, controlled, reversible actions → signaling, coercion, psychological pressure.
• Creeping escalation reflects the incremental occupation of lower and mid-level rungs through ambiguous, deniable steps that accumulate over time, effectively normalizing new realities without a dramatic leap. Formula (simplified): long-term, incremental, deniable moves → normalization, habituation, gradual fait accompli.

Analytically, the Escalation ladder provides the structural map, while Calibrated vs. Creeping escalation offers behavioral insight into how Russia navigates within and between rungs. For assessing Russia’s day-to-day strategy in Ukraine and vis-à-vis NATO, the calibrated/creeping distinction is often more precise, as it explains not only where Moscow operates on the ladder but also how it advances – sometimes through demonstrative, controlled strikes, and at other times through gradual, salami-slice tactics.

For Ukraine and its partners, the central challenge lies in recognizing these tactics as part of a coherent doctrine rather than disparate provocations. Calibrated escalation must not be dismissed as “mere signaling,” and creeping escalation should not be tolerated as an unavoidable by-product of war. Instead, a strategy of pre-emptive resilience and proactive deterrence is needed: strengthening civil defense against infrastructure strikes, bolstering Europe’s counter-sabotage and air defense capacity, and integrating Ukrainian security into the broader Western planning framework.

China’s Silent Gains

During the Biden years, Beijing cultivated the image of a neutral mediator. In February 2023, it released its 12-point peace plan, which called for dialogue, territorial integrity, and the end of Cold War thinking, while carefully avoiding criticism of Russia’s invasion. Official statements often accused NATO and the United States of fanning the flames of conflict, but China avoided explicitly endorsing Moscow’s aggression.

Since Trump’s return to office, Chinese rhetoric has sharpened. Chinese media blame the U.S. for exercising unilateral coercion against its own allies, pressuring them to impose tougher sanctions against Russia and halt the purchases of Russian oil and gas. Beijing has also more assertively promoted its narrative of an orderly multipolar world, often aligning its messaging with Russia’s denunciation of Western hegemony. While still calling for peace talks, Beijing’s tone has shifted from mediation to a critique of Western disunity, capitalizing on U.S.-Europe tensions under Trump. Nevertheless, Beijing appears to be one of those who greatly benefit from the war – strategically, economically, and politically, pursuing its own agenda under the proclaimed neutrality.

Drawing Lessons from the War

For China, one of the most significant strategic gains from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been the opportunity to study modern battlefield dynamics in real time. Researchers within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have closely analyzed the performance of U.S. weapons systems and technologies, as well as the innovations developed jointly by Ukraine and its Western partners. In effect, Beijing may even attempt to replicate capabilities that proved decisive in the war, such as the use of Starlink for secure communications and battlefield coordination.

Perhaps the most consequential insight for Chinese strategists concerns the limitations of the U.S. defense industrial base. PLA assessments increasingly highlight that Washington cannot easily sustain a prolonged, high-intensity conflict at current levels of production, stockpiles, and cost-efficiency. While the United States retains a clear technological edge over Russia, its ability to maintain that advantage weakens in a war of attrition – precisely the type of conflict that Ukraine has become.

Beijing is also watching the political dimension of the war with equal attention. Chinese analysts study how U.S. alliances have responded to Russian aggression, probing whether Western governments act preemptively or reactively, and how sustained their unity remains under pressure. At the same time, China has drawn lessons from Russia’s battlefield experience, absorbing both Moscow’s tactical missteps and the adaptations that have enabled it to endure.

China’s Stake in the War Continuation

China has little incentive to promote an early end to the Russia-Ukraine war, because the conflict yields strategic, economic, and geopolitical dividends for Beijing. In 2024, Sino-Russian trade surged to a record of roughly $237 billion. Even with growth slowing, the volume underscores how essential China has become to Moscow. The trade relationship is heavily asymmetric: Russia relies on China for a key export market and supply of industrial goods; China benefits from discounted energy and deeper economic ties. 

Beyond trade volume, Beijing has played a critical enabling role in Russia’s war effort. Chinese exports of microelectronics, optics, drone components, machine tools, and other dual-use goods continue to flow into Russia, facilitating Moscow’s defense industrial base under sanctions. In early 2025 alone, China ramped up exports in optics for UAVs, aerial/radar reflector parts, printed circuit boards, and engine components. Chinese firms have also allegedly supplied gunpowder, special chemicals, tooling equipment, and defense components to at least 20 Russian military production facilities, often via shell companies to mask the transaction. This evidently places China as an enabler of Russia’s war machine.

From China’s perspective, a Russia that has collapsed, fragmented, or undergone severe internal turmoil would pose serious risks. Instability along the 4,200-kilometer border, refugee flows, or an unpredictable regime in Moscow would be costly. It is therefore in China’s interest to allow Russia to remain weakened but stable enough to be a reliable partner or buffer. Beijing’s approach to Russia is defensive in this regard: preventing Moscow’s defeat or collapse helps preserve a predictable geopolitical buffer and ensures continuity of energy and resource access. Also, losing Russia as a counterbalance in Eurasia would leave China more exposed in a geostrategic sense. By letting the conflict drag on, China indirectly benefits from the geopolitical frictions and fractures it can exploit: strains in U.S.-Europe relations, pressure on Western defense budgets, and questioning of alliance cohesion.

Finally, the longer the conflict lasts, the more leverage China accumulates vis-à-vis Moscow and, potentially, the West. Because Russia depends on China for economic sustenance, arms inputs, and trade access under sanctions, Beijing has bargaining chips. Beyond this leverage, China and Russia share overlapping interests through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has anchored cooperation in infrastructure, trade, and energy. Projects such as the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, the New Eurasian Land Bridge, and cross-border infrastructure like the Heihe-Blagoveshchensk bridge tie Russia more deeply into China’s connectivity agenda, while joint discussions on aligning the BRI with the Eurasian Economic Union aim to harmonize trade rules and logistics across Eurasia. For Beijing, these projects secure reliable access to energy, raw materials, and faster routes to Europe; for Moscow, they offer investment and transit opportunities amid Western sanctions. Yet the asymmetry is clear: Russia increasingly risks becoming a junior partner and transit hub in China’s grand strategy, which only enhances Beijing’s capacity to demand political, economic, or security concessions in any future post-war settlement. 

At the same time, Russia has little interest in being perceived as a junior partner, as it is being reduced to a supplier of raw materials and a transit corridor for Chinese trade. These dynamics represent friction points in the relationship that can be strategically exploited: while a full rupture between Moscow and Beijing is unlikely, raising the costs of cooperation, for example, through secondary sanctions and tariffs that would significantly affect Chinese firms trading with Russia. Such measures could dampen Beijing’s appetite for deepening economic ties, thereby weakening the incentive structure underpinning the partnership. 

Kyiv’s Perception of Beijing’s Role

Kyiv has oscillated between caution and skepticism toward Beijing. Under Biden, Ukraine welcomed Chinese envoy Li Hui’s 2023 visit, but Ukrainian officials consistently voiced doubts about China’s neutrality, noting its refusal to condemn Russia’s aggression. President Zelenskyy signaled openness to Chinese involvement in peace efforts, though only as a supplement to Western support.

Trump’s second tenure has pushed Kyiv further away from Beijing. In April 2025, Ukraine imposed sanctions on several Chinese companies for supplying Russia with missile-related technologies. Ukraine increasingly sees China as too closely aligned with Moscow to play a constructive role. Nevertheless, China has continued to promote itself as a potential mediator in the war. Throughout 2025, Beijing has advanced ceasefire proposals under the umbrella of its Global Security Initiative, while envoy Li Hui has maintained contacts in Kyiv and Moscow. Yet Ukrainian officials regard these peace efforts with deep skepticism, noting that China avoids pressing Russia to withdraw its troops and frames negotiations in a way that would freeze the conflict on unfavorable terms. Furthermore, active Chinese involvement in peace efforts risks sidelining the U.S. and Europe, bolstering Russia’s position and reinforcing the narrative that the West bears responsibility for the conflict.  

Despite ongoing geopolitical tensions, Ukraine has remained heavily dependent on Chinese components for drone production. The country has particularly relied on DJI, a Chinese state-backed company and one of the world’s leading suppliers of drone components. Encouragingly for Ukraine, however, this dependence is beginning to shift. Among the most critical items that cannot yet be produced domestically are optical fiber, transmitters, batteries, and electric motors. Earlier this year, President Zelenskyy announced that China had restricted drone exports to Ukraine, while continuing deliveries to Russia, where Chinese components account for as much as 80% of the supply.

This situation has accelerated Ukraine’s drive to build domestic capacity. Given the potential to export Ukrainian-made drones to European markets, local manufacturers are increasingly focused on establishing independent production of key components. For instance, in July 2024, Vyriy Drone announced the successful production of the first batch of 1,000 FPV drones assembled entirely from Ukrainian-made components. Similarly, other companies such as Wild Hornets and Odd Systems are developing domestically produced parts that are not only cheaper but also better suited to the specific needs of Ukraine’s defense sector.

By reducing reliance on Chinese supply chains, Ukraine strengthens its defense resilience and lays the groundwork for closer integration into Europe’s defense industry. In the long term, the emergence of a robust domestic drone manufacturing ecosystem positions Ukraine not only as a consumer but also as a potential exporter of cutting-edge defense technology, deepening its role as a strategic partner in the Euro-Atlantic security community.

Ukraine: From Hopes of Victory to National Survival

In the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s war narrative was dominated by the prospect of victory. After halting Russia’s assault on Kyiv and retaking Kharkiv and Kherson in late 2022, Western and Ukrainian leaders openly spoke about pushing Russian forces back further and restoring full territorial integrity. Media and political discourse in 2022–2023 frequently portrayed Ukrainian resilience as proof that Moscow’s defeat was plausible with sustained Western support. Western military assistance reflected this optimism: high-end systems such as HIMARS rocket artillery, Leopard tanks, and eventually F-16 fighter jets were delivered in the expectation that Ukraine could convert qualitative advantages into rapid battlefield gains.

By 2023–2024, however, this victory narrative gave way to the reality of a protracted war of attrition. Ukraine’s long-anticipated counteroffensive in summer 2023 did not deliver the expected results, while Russia entrenched itself in defensive lines, ramped up mobilization, and adapted its economy to sustain prolonged fighting. Analysts and officials began warning of war fatigue in Western capitals, as ammunition shortages and delays in aid deliveries undermined operational tempo. Support packages shifted away from prestige platforms toward more fundamental needs, such as artillery shells, air defence interceptors, and repair capacity for equipment worn down in grinding positional battles. Such a transition can be explained by the prolonged nature of the war and the need to sustain combat effectiveness under a grinding operational environment.

By 2025, with the arrival of the Trump administration and mounting uncertainty over U.S. commitments, Ukraine’s political and strategic discourse shifted decisively toward national survival. President Volodymyr Zelensky and key ministers emphasized that the central task was not immediate liberation of all territory, but ensuring Ukraine’s continued existence as a sovereign, functioning state. This required sustaining the war effort across multiple dimensions: a defense and industrial base capable of producing at least 60% of Ukraine’s equipment needs by late 2025, an energy system resilient against Russian strikes, an economy that could finance record-high defense spending, and a diplomatic strategy to keep international partners invested despite political headwinds. In this new narrative, victory is redefined not as a rapid battlefield breakthrough but as the capacity to endure, ensuring long-term national survival. This should not be considered a stalemate but rather a strategic approach, as Ukraine’s goal shifts to imposing sufficient costs on Russia until continued aggression becomes clearly futile. That moment of recognition, when Moscow concludes that further fighting delivers no strategic returns, can be reached sooner if Ukraine is supplied with the right mix of capabilities. In practice, this means prioritising sustainment items (artillery munitions, air-defence interceptors, spare parts and repair capacity, logistics, and ammunition production) over prestige platforms, so Ukrainian forces can maintain the fight at a tempo and cost that steadily erodes Russia’s will.

Defense & Industrial Base

The Trump administration’s early 2025 approach introduced a two-stage shock: several freezes of foreign assistance followed by a more conditional, transactional re-engagement that emphasises U.S. presidential authority (drawdowns, security guarantees, negotiated packages) rather than the steady congressional appropriations and clear, predictable supply lines that characterized earlier U.S. policy. That shift accelerated a European move from ‘send weapons’ to ‘buy & co-produce weapons’, and pushed Kyiv to prioritize industrial self-reliance, ammunition stockpiling, and air-defense capacity. The result is a more uncertain short-term operational environment for Ukraine due to supply interruptions, but also a partial structural benefit: faster European industrial mobilization and a boost to Ukraine’s own defense production.

As a result of the more than three-year-long battlefield developments, rapid adoption of new tactics and technologies, and the fluctuating nature of Western support, Ukraine’s defense industrial base has undergone a profound transformation. It has shifted from a largely Soviet-inherited structure into a wartime innovation hub that prioritizes adaptability, decentralized production, and integration with European supply chains. With defense budget allocations of about 26% of Ukraine’s GDP, the country’s defense industrial base has mobilized a wide spectrum of resources, starting from foreign financing and procurement to joint ventures with Western companies and to civil society’s proactivity in order to expand domestic production and cover as many of the country’s defense needs as possible. This encompasses unmanned aerial systems, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, munitions, cruise missiles, and communications equipment. According to President Zelenskyy, as of September 2025, “Ukraine has reached the point where nearly 60% of the weapons we have, the weapons in the hands of our soldiers, are Ukrainian-made.” 

Ukraine has dramatically ramped up its drone industry, turning unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and first-person-view (FPV) drones into one of the most important asymmetric warfare tools on its battlefields. Growing out of necessity, Ukraine’s drone industry has become a central pillar of its wartime industrial response: inexpensive, rapidly manufactured unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and FPV “kamikaze” drones offer a high cost-to-kill ratio that is well suited to a sustained, attritional conflict. Production has surged: monthly output is now cited by Ukrainian media and industry observers at around 200,000+ drones per month, while Kyiv has set procurement plans for roughly 4.5 million FPV drones in 2025 alone, backed by a multibillion-dollar procurement budget. 

Ukraine has also initiated a strategic approach by establishing offshore weapons production lines. This move allows Ukrainian-designed military equipment to be manufactured in allied countries, circumventing domestic production limitations and reducing vulnerability to Russia’s strikes. For instance, in September 2025, Ukrainian company Fire Point launched its first joint production facility in Denmark. This initiative is part of the broader “Build for Ukraine” program, which aims to protect critical defense infrastructure by relocating production to NATO-member states. Denmark has contributed $50 million to support the localization of production lines on its territory. Norway, Germany, the UK, and Lithuania have also expressed interest in participating in this program. These offshore production lines not only enhance the security and scalability of Ukraine’s drone capabilities but also foster deeper defense ties with European partners. 

Range and capability likewise span a broad spectrum – from short-range FPV quadcopters used for trench-level strikes and reconnaissance, commonly operating over a few kilometres, to tactical loitering munitions and purpose-built strike UAS that extend beyond 40–300 km. Ukraine’s producers have also moved beyond swarms of cheap FPV drones, developing long-range capabilities. Examples include the Peklo “rocket-drone,” a turbo/rocket-powered, cruise-like weapon intended for strikes at several hundred kilometres, as well as much larger cruise-missile-style designs such as Fire Point’s Flamingo, capable of travelling 3,000km and delivering a payload of 1,150kg. Strategically, credible deep-strike weapons expand Ukraine’s deterrent and operational options by forcing Russian forces to disperse and defend rear areas, complicating Moscow’s logistics and command posture. At the same time, mid-range drones enabled Ukraine to establish a kill-zone, a territory up to 30 km on both sides of the front line, where UAVs track every movement and neutralize targets with ease. This tactic is widely used by both sides, and the constant development of such capabilities increasingly defines who leads the contest for battlefield initiative.

Ukraine’s exposure to foreign supply disruptions and political halts in aid also becomes less acute. However, cutting-edge components (optical sensors, engines, secure guidance, and communication systems) still depend heavily on imports, especially from Europe and the U.S.

Nevertheless, Ukraine still heavily relies on foreign military assistance, technology, and capabilities. Among all, Ukraine is particularly dependent on Western air defense systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Air defense remains the single most critical shortfall: Ukraine relies on U.S.-supplied Patriot and NASAMS systems and European contributions such as IRIS-T (Germany), SAMP/T (France–Italy), and Gepard anti-aircraft guns (Germany). Encouragingly enough, Western defense manufacturers are increasingly willing to establish production lines and joint ventures in Ukraine. Germany’s Diehl Defence signed a €2.2 billion contract with Kyiv to produce IRIS-T air defense systems and missiles, while Norway’s Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace plans to manufacture NASAMS missiles locally and is negotiating a joint venture to enable mass production based on Ukrainian technology. Similar initiatives are underway with France’s Thales International, which will cooperate on air defense, radars, electronic warfare, and communications systems, and Denmark has agreed to host Ukrainian production of solid rocket fuel on its territory – a first for a NATO country. These efforts highlight a broader trend toward technology transfer and the increasing trust in Ukrainian partners. 

At the same time, Ukrainian producers are testing advanced, domestically developed air defense systems supported by the government-backed Brave1 defense tech incubator to help address gaps created by limited Western supplies and ammunition.

Under the Trump administration, the U.S. has signaled a pivot away from open-ended support, leading to the creation of a new NATO mechanism, the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), designed to coordinate urgent battlefield needs. PURL channels U.S. weapons from American stockpiles but requires European allies to finance the deliveries, aligning with Trump’s burden-sharing approach. So far, the Netherlands, the Nordic states, and Germany have pledged roughly $1.5 billion through PURL, and the first packages are focused heavily on air defense and munitions. By enabling Ukraine to rely on allied funding to procure U.S.-made weapons, PURL provides a buffer against unpredictable U.S. aid flows. As of July 2025, the U.S. has committed almost $960 million in arms sales to Ukraine under the FMS program. However, should U.S. stockpiles run low, further Foreign Military Sales (FMS) may be subject to Trump’s more transactional foreign policy.

On ISR, Ukraine depends heavily on Western capabilities. U.S. satellite imagery, signals intelligence, and airborne platforms remain important for targeting and early warning. The March 2025 suspension of U.S. intelligence transfers, including the disabling of Ukrainian access to the Global Enhanced GEOINT Delivery (GEGD) satellite imagery platform, had immediate battlefield consequences: Ukrainian air defense operators lost timely warning of incoming missile and drone attacks, while front-line commanders reported delays in precision targeting data. European actors have attempted to step up their contributions, with the EU directing fresh funding toward satellite reconnaissance under the European Defence Fund. However, European ISR capacity remains underdeveloped: most EU member states lack sovereign satellite constellations capable of providing persistent, high-resolution battlefield imagery, and joint projects are years away from operational maturity. Analysts note that the fragmented and slow-moving nature of European defense procurement makes it unlikely that Europe will be able to close the ISR gap in the short to medium term. Without steady access to U.S. space-based ISR, Ukraine is forced to rely on patchwork European systems, leaving critical infrastructure more exposed and limiting Kyiv’s ability to sustain effective battlefield operations.

Energy & Critical Infrastructure

Since 2022, Ukraine’s energy and critical infrastructure have suffered severe damage after becoming one of Russia’s key targets. From the pre-war capacity to generate 25 GW, Ukraine’s energy production plummeted to approximately 9 GW in 2023-2024. Following reparation campaigns, the power-generating capacity accounted for approximately 15 GW in early 2025, with a 3 GW shortage to meet the country’s basic power needs. 

Ukraine has steadily built a layered system to protect its energy and critical infrastructure, learning in the process. At first, the response was ad hoc: emergency generators, patchwork repairs, and humanitarian fuel deliveries kept essential services running. This gradual evolution turned infrastructure protection from an emergency patchwork into a coordinated national resilience effort. By 2025, the emphasis shifted away from simply repairing damaged centralized plants toward reshaping the architecture of the grid itself. Decentralization became a guiding principle: municipalities and industrial zones were encouraged to deploy local generation capacity, often powered by gas turbines or renewables, which could keep critical services running even if transmission lines were cut. At the same time, donors and Ukrainian planners began to see renewable energy not just as part of the country’s green transition but as a security asset: distributed solar and wind installations, paired with battery storage, offered redundancy that large thermal or nuclear plants could not. 

Foreign aid has played a key role in supporting Ukraine’s energy resilience. The U.S., once a leading source of direct technical and financial assistance, has shifted its approach under President Trump. Between 2022 and 2024, U.S. support, channeled largely through USAID’s Energy Security Project and related programs, funded emergency repairs, grid stabilization, and advisory support for renewable market reforms. This brought the overall U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s energy system to approximately $1.5 billion since 2022. Since early 2025, Washington has reframed its role around strategic investment and resource security. The U.S.–Ukraine Mineral Resources Agreement, signed in May 2025, provides American companies with preferential access to Ukraine’s critical minerals in exchange for support in rebuilding the energy sector. According to CSIS, the idea of a Ukraine Clean Energy Fund, seeded jointly by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and European partners, is currently under consideration. It would allow them to co-invest in decentralized renewable projects nationwide. Unlike past USAID programs, this approach privileges private-sector partnerships over direct aid.

Economy & Fiscal Resilience

Ukraine’s economy remains under severe fiscal strain as the war continues to sap output and require large public expenditures. Real GDP growth is modest (around ~2% in 2025), while inflation remains elevated. The government’s fiscal position is stretched: public spending, particularly elevated defense outlays, has pushed the budget deficit to roughly 20% of GDP in 2025, with public and publicly-guaranteed debt rising toward triple-digits as a share of GDP. These dynamics have forced Kyiv to rely heavily on foreign budget support and concessional financing to cover both recurrent needs and reconstruction priorities.

Donor financing and IFIs support underpin short-term fiscal stability and medium-term reconstruction planning. An updated World Bank assessment places Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction needs at roughly $524 billion over the coming decade, while a near-term financing gap for 2025 alone was estimated at about $10 billion after donor allocations. Kyiv’s external financing needs for 2025 have been put at around $39-40 billion, of which a significant share must be secured from multilateral lenders, EU packages, and bilateral partners.

Under the Biden administration, the United States provided substantial economic and financial assistance to Ukraine to support its war-torn economy and reconstruction efforts. Between 2022 and early 2025, Congress appropriated approximately $37.8 billion for direct financial support to Ukraine’s central budget. This funding aimed to stabilize Ukraine’s economy, cover essential expenditures such as pensions and public sector salaries, and facilitate reconstruction initiatives. Additionally, the U.S. fully delivered on its commitment to provide economic support through Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans, making available approximately $20 billion as part of the broader G7 ERA package totaling $50 billion. These loans, disbursed through the World Bank’s FORTIS Financial Intermediary Fund, were designed to be repaid using revenue generated from immobilized Russian sovereign assets, ensuring that the support did not burden U.S. taxpayers. 

In contrast, the Trump administration, which took office in January 2025, adopted a more transactional approach to economic aid. The U.S. and Ukraine have set up the United States–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, following the signing of the U.S.-Ukraine Critical Minerals Agreement. Ukraine and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation have recently announced commitments of $75 million to the fund, designed to finance projects in energy, infrastructure, and critical minerals. Under the agreement, the U.S. gains preferential access to new Ukrainian mineral projects, while half of the revenues generated from mineral extraction are directed to the fund, with profits shared between Kyiv and Washington. By leveraging Ukraine’s rich natural resources, the agreement aims to provide a steady stream of funding for reconstruction projects, thereby contributing to the country’s economic resilience in the face of ongoing challenges. Nevertheless, the reduction in direct U.S. financial aid has placed additional pressure on Ukraine to secure funding from other international partners.

References

From Multilateralism to America First: The U.S. Foreign Policy Shift

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Europe Was Left Without Solid Ground, Yet Seeks a Fair Balance

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Russia’s Calculus Amid U.S. Foreign Policy Shifts

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4. Dmitriy Danilov (April, 2022). В НАТО делают расчет на истощение и победу. [NATO is Counting on Exhaustion and Victory]. Russian Council. https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/interview/v-nato-delayut-raschet-na-istoshchenie-i-pobedu/
5. Kathleen McInnis, Daniel P. Fata, Benjamin Jensen & Jose M. Macias (February, 2024). Pulling Their Weight: The Data on NATO Responsibility Sharing. CSIS. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep58044?seq=1
6. William Chislett (April, 2025). Spain under pressure to spend more on defence. Real Instituto Elcano. https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/commentaries/spain-under-pressure-to-spend-more-on-defence
7. Zhao Huasheng (March, 2025). The New ‘Reset’ of US-Russia Relations and Its Possible Prospects. Valdai Club. https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-new-reset-of-us-russia-relations
8. Ivan Timofeev (November, 2024). Russia-West: The Radical Scenario and Its Alternatives. RIAC. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-west-the-radical-scenario-and-its-alternatives/
9. Camilla Pletuhina-Tonev (July, 2025). NATO Unity: Some Assembly Required. New America. https://www.newamerica.org/future-frontlines/blogs/nato-unity-some-assembly-required/
10. Johannes Thimm (April, 2018). NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin. SWP. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/nato-us-strategic-dominance-and-unequal-burden-sharing-are-two-sides-of-the-same-coin
11. Catherine Belton & Robyn Dixon (July, 2025). As Trump turns toward Ukraine, Russians wonder if an opportunity was missed. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/15/trump-russia-putin-war
12. Ivan Timofeev (August, 2025). After Alaska. A New Stage in International Relations. RIAC. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/after-alaska-a-new-stage-in-international-relations
13. Dmitry Antonov (January, 2025). Russia condemns Trump missile defence shield plan, accuses US of plotting to militarise space. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-condemns-trump-missile-defence-shield-plan-accuses-us-plotting-militarise-2025-01-31
14. Editorial Staff (June, 2025). Russia Analytical Report. Harvard Kennedy School – Russia Matters. https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-analytical-report/russia-analytical-report-june-23-30-2025
15. Mark Trevelyan (November, 2024). Russia warns US against ‘spiral of escalation’ but says it will keep channels open. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-warns-us-against-spiral-escalation-says-it-will-keep-channels-open-2024-11-27

Exploiting Strategic Ambiguity

1. Editorial Staff (March, 2025). US government revokes some access to satellite imagery for Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-aerospace-firm-maxar-disables-satellite-photos-ukraine-2025-03-07
2. Stepan Haftko (March, 2025). Maxar restores access to commercial satellite imagery for Ukraine. Ukrainska Pravda. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/03/12/7502459
3. Editorial Staff (March, 2025). How will US pause on intelligence sharing affect Ukraine? AlJazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/6/how-will-us-pause-on-intelligence-sharing-affect-ukraine
4. Editorial Staff (March, 2025). Operation Potok – Inside Story of (Failed) Russian Gas Pipeline Infiltration. KyivPost. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/4934
5. Editorial Staff (March, 2025). Russia Finishes Issuing Passports in Occupied Ukrainian Regions, Putin Says. The Moscow Times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/03/05/russia-finishes-issuing-passports-in-occupied-ukrainian-regions-putin-says-a88258
6. Editorial Staff (June, 2025). ‘A false semblance of choice’ Putin’s latest passportization deadline dials up the pressure on civilians in Ukraine’s occupied territories. Meduza. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/06/19/a-false-semblance-of-choice
7. Elina Beketova (May, 2025). Behind the Lines: Russia Makes Ukrainians Foreigners in Their Own Country. CEPA. https://cepa.org/article/behind-the-lines-russia-makes-ukrainians-foreigners-in-their-own-country
8. Kseniya Kvitka (March, 2025). Get a Passport or Leave: Russia’s Ultimatum to Ukrainians. New Decree Threatens Rights of Civilians in Russian-Occupied Areas. HRW. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/25/get-passport-or-leave-russias-ultimatum-ukrainians
9. Editorial Staff (August, 2025). Germany to fund $500m PURL package for Ukraine. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_237162.htm
10. Editorial Staff (September, 2025). Russian forces attack power station in Kyiv region, Ukraine’s energy ministry says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-attack-power-station-kyiv-region-ukraines-energy-ministry-says-2025-09-08
11. Editorial Staff (September, 2025). Russian attack on Ukraine’s Kirovohrad region cuts power, governor says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-attack-ukraines-kirovohrad-region-cuts-power-governor-says-2025-09-17

China’s Silent Gains

1. Howard Wang & Brett Zakheim (May, 2025). China’s Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War: Perceived New Strategic Opportunities and an Emerging Model of Hybrid Warfare. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3141-4.html
2. Editorial Staff (April, 2025). Ukraine bans China’s firms for helping Russia make missiles. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-hits-chinese-firms-with-sanctions-after-accusing-beijing-arming-russia-2025-04-18/
3. Luke Harding (February, 2023). Zelenskiy open to China’s peace plan but rejects compromise with ‘sick’ Putin. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/24/zelenskiy-open-to-chinas-peace-plan-but-rejects-compromise-with-sick-putin
4. Jasper Ward (September, 2025). Zelenskiy thinks Trump could help change Xi’s position on Russia’s war in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/zelenskiy-thinks-trump-could-help-change-xis-position-russias-war-ukraine-2025-09-23/
5. Editorial Staff (September, 2025). US coercion over Ukraine crisis an attempt to shift responsibility, pursue own interests. Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202509/1343588.shtml
6. Christopher S. Chivvis & Jack Keating (October, 2024). Cooperation Between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia: Current and Potential Future Threats to America. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/cooperation-between-china-iran-north-korea-and-russia-current-and-potential-future-threats-to-america?lang=en
7. Editorial Staff (January, 2025). China-Russia 2024 trade value hits record high – Chinese customs. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/china-russia-2024-trade-value-hits-record-high-chinese-customs-2025-01-13/
8. Filip Rudnik (May, 2025). China-Russia trade: asymmetrical, yet indispensable.  MERICS. https://merics.org/en/comment/china-russia-trade-asymmetrical-yet-indispensable
9. Patricia M. Kim, Asli Kim,  Aslı Aydıntaşbaş,  Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Angela Stent & Tara Varma (December, 2024). The China-Russia relationship and threats to vital US interests. Brookings Institution https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-china-russia-relationship-and-threats-to-vital-us-interests/
10. Maciej Kalwasiński (July, 2025). China-Russia trade in early 2025: Fueling Moscow’s war despite headwinds. OSW. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-07-30/china-russia-trade-early-2025-fueling-moscows-war-despite-headwinds
11. Editorial Staff (June, 2025). China has become the most important enabler of Russia’s war machine. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/china/2025/06/19/china-has-become-the-most-important-enabler-of-russias-war-machine
12. Editorial Staff (July, 2025). China Assists Russia in Gunpowder Production for War against Ukraine. RLI. https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/07/14/china-assists-russia-in-gunpowder-production-for-war-against-ukraine/
13. Editorial Staff (September, 2025). Russia in a multipolar world: equal player or junior partner to China? NEST Centre. https://nestcentre.org/russia-in-a-multipolar-world/
14. Anna Fratsyvir (May, 2025). China сuts drone sales to Ukraine, West but continues supplying Russia, Bloomberg reports. Kyiv Independent. https://kyivindependent.com/china-suts-drone-sales-to-ukraine-west-but-continues-supplying-russia-bloomberg-reports/
15. Kollen Post (August, 2025). ‘Little by little away from China’ – Inside Ukraine’s new mass-production of drone parts. Kyiv Independent. https://kyivindependen2t.com/little-by-little-away-from-china-ukraines-new-mass-production-of-drone-parts/
16. David Hambling (April, 2025). Ukraine Is Making FPV Drones Without Chinese Parts And At Lower Cost. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2025/04/08/ukraine-is-making-fpv-drones-without-chinese-parts-and-at-lower-cost/
17. Kyrylo Kushnikov (March, 2025). Ukraine Produces First Thousand Fully Domestic FPV Drones. Militarnyi. https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukraine-produces-first-thousand-fully-domestic-fpv-drones/
18. Pavel K. Baev, Robin Brooks, Jonathan A. Czin & others (March, 2025). Should China have a role in ending the war in Ukraine? Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/rivals-and-responders-the-us-china-and-global-crisis-management/

Ukraine: From Hopes of Victory to National Survival

1. Dr. Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk & Nick Reynolds (July, 2024). Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine’s Offensive Operations, 2022–23. RUSI. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-ukraines-offensive-operations-2022-23
2. William Courtney (January, 2025). Ukraine Is Determined, but Tired. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/01/ukraine-is-determined-but-tired.html
3. Editorial Staff (November, 2024). Zelensky unveils ‘resilience plan’: ‘We will not give up our rights to our territory’. Ukrinform. https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3928784-zelensky-unveils-resilience-plan-we-will-not-give-up-our-rights-to-our-territory.html
4. Olena Harmash (November, 2024). Ukraine passes 2025 budget with record defence spending. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/ukraines-parliament-approves-2025-budget-boosts-funds-defence-efforts-lawmaker-2024-11-19/
5. Editorial Staff (September, 2025). Zelenskiy says nearly 60% of Ukrainian arms home-produced. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/zelenskiy-says-nearly-60-ukrainian-arms-home-produced-2025-09-06/
6. Editorial Staff (February, 2025). Explainer: What weapons can Ukraine produce and where does it need help? BBC. https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0003eae
7. Julia Struck (July, 2025). Ukraine’s Drone Output Soars 900%, Producing 200K UAVs a Month. Kyiv Post. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/55897
8. Editorial Staff (March, 2025). Ukraine to sharply raise purchases of home produced FPV drones in 2025. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-sharply-raise-purchases-home-produced-fpv-drones-2025-2025-03-10/
9. Vladyslav Smilianets & Max Hunder (December, 2024). Ukraine shows off new ‘rocket-drone’ in bid to boost long-range strikes. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-shows-off-new-rocket-drone-bid-boost-long-range-strikes-2024-12-06/
10. Johanna Urbancik (August, 2025). Will Ukraine’s new long-range Flamingo cruise missile put Russia on red alert? EuroNews. https://www.euronews.com/next/2025/08/26/flamingo-will-ukraines-new-wonder-weapon-replace-the-taurus
11. Editorial Staff (August 14, 2025). Zelenskiy says Ukraine has secured $1.5 billion from European allies for US weapons. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-says-ukraine-has-secured-15-billion-european-allies-us-weapons-2025-08-14/
12. Mark F. Cancian & Chris H. Park (July, 2025). The Trump Administration Boosts Immediate Military Aid Deliveries to Ukraine. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trump-administration-boosts-immediate-military-aid-deliveries-ukraine
13. Editorial Staff (March, 2025). US government revokes some access to satellite imagery for Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-aerospace-firm-maxar-disables-satellite-photos-ukraine-2025-03-07/
14. Alex Horton & Siobhán O’Grady (March, 2025). U.S. suspends commercial satellite imagery service to Ukraine. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/07/maxar-ukraine-sateliite-imagery/ 
15. Editorial Staff (April, 2025). Commission invests €910 million to boost European defence and close capability gaps. European Commission. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-invests-eu910-million-boost-european-defence-and-close-capability-gaps-2025-04-30_en
16. Rudy Ruitenberg (May, 2025). European Defence Fund funnels money to drones, hypersonic defense, AI. DefenseNews. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/05/01/european-defence-fund-funnels-money-to-drones-hypersonic-defense-ai/
17. Dr. Jack Watling & Darya Dolzikova (August, 2024). Fighting for the Light: Protecting Ukraine’s Energy System. RUSI. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/fighting-light-protecting-ukraines-energy-system
18. Dan Black (July, 2024). Russia’s Cyber Campaign Shifts to Ukraine’s Frontlines. RUSI. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-cyber-campaign-shifts-ukraines-frontlines 
19. Christoph Winkler, Kristina Dabrock, Serhiy Kapustyan, Craig Hart & others (2024). High-Resolution Rooftop-PV Potential Assessment for a Resilient Energy System in Ukraine. IEA. https://www.iea.org/reports/empowering-ukraine-through-a-decentralised-electricity-system
20. Romina Bandura & Alexander Romanishyn (July, 2025). Striving for Access, Security, and Sustainability: Ukraine’s Transition to a Modern and Decentralized Energy System. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/striving-access-security-and-sustainability
21. Editorial Staff (June, 2024). Actions to Support Ukraine’s Economic Recovery. U.S. Embassy in Poland. https://pl.usembassy.gov/actions-to-support-ukraines-economic-recovery/
22. Editorial Staff (June, 2025). Ukraine: Eighth Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, Requests for Modification of Performance Criteria, Rephasing of Access, and Financing Assurances Review-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Alternate Executive Director for Ukraine. IMF. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2025/156/article-A001-en.xml
23. Editorial Staff (February, 2025). Updated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment Released. World Bank Group. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/02/25/updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released
24. Nick Brown & Emily McCabe (January, 2025). U.S. Direct Financial Support for Ukraine. Congress GOV. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12305
25. Yuliia Dysa (September, 2025). Ukraine, US launch fund for critical minerals projects with $150 million investment. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/ukraine-us-launch-fund-critical-minerals-projects-with-150-million-investment-2025-09-17
26. Editorial Staff (August, 2025). On Ukraine’s front lines the kill zone is getting deeper. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/08/04/on-ukraines-front-lines-the-kill-zone-is-getting-deeper 
27. Max Hunder, Sabine Siebold & Manuel Ausloos (July, 2025). Enter the kill zone: Ukraine’s drone-infested front slows Russian advance. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/enter-kill-zone-ukraines-drone-infested-front-slows-russian-advance-2025-07-17/
28. Bohdan Babaiev (September, 2025). Ukraine plans a 30-kilometer Kill Zone to trap Russian forces. RBC. https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-plans-30-kilometer-kill-zone-to-trap-1757794534.html
29. Oleksandr Kunytskyi (February, 2025). Виробник ракет ППО NASAMS створить компанію в Україні [NASAMS air defense missile manufacturer to establish a company in Ukraine]. DW. https://www.dw.com/uk/virobnik-raket-ppo-nasams-stvorit-kompaniu-v-ukraini/a-71783042
30. Lara Finke (May, 2025). Pistorius sagt Ukraine-Unterstützung in Höhe von rund fünf Milliarden Euro zu [Pistorius pledges around five billion euros in support for Ukraine]. Bundesministerium der Verteidigun. https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/pistorius-ukraine-unterstuetzung-rund-fuenf-milliarden-euro-5949746
31. Inder Singh Bisht (March, 2025). Kongsberg to Produce NASAMS Air Defense Missiles in Ukraine. The Defense Post. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/03/03/kongsberg-nasams-air-defense/
32. Editorial Staff (August, 2025). Analysis: Ukraine develops indigenous air defense systems to reduce reliance on foreign military aid. Army Recognition Group. https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/analysis-ukraine-develops-indigenous-air-defense-systems-to-reduce-reliance-on-foreign-military-aid
33. Editorial Staff (August, 2025). Ukraine Is Working To Develop Its Own Air Defense Systems. TWZ. https://www.twz.com/news-features/ukraine-is-working-to-develop-its-own-air-defense-systems
34. Sinéad Baker  (September, 2025). Ukraine is starting to move weapons production into NATO, where Russia’s missiles can’t reach it without risking all-out war. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-starting-produce-nato-state-away-from-russia-attacks-2025-9
35. Editorial Staff (June, 2025). Ukraine’s 2025 Build with Ukraine Program Boosts Military Tech Exports and Production. Mezha. https://mezha.net/eng/bukvy/ukraine-s-2025-build-with-ukraine-program-boosts-military-tech-exports-and-production/

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This publication was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. It’s content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.