{"id":39825,"date":"2026-09-10T14:38:16","date_gmt":"2026-09-10T11:38:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=39825"},"modified":"2026-09-10T15:50:37","modified_gmt":"2026-09-10T12:50:37","slug":"latin-america-perceptions-ukraine-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/uk\/2026\/09\/10\/latin-america-perceptions-ukraine-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Ideology and Narrative: How Political Currents in Latin America Shape Perceptions of Russia&#8217;s War Against Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\" data-icon-position=\"left\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px\" data-attachment-id=\"57170\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"\u0417\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043a\u0430\u0439\u0442\u0435, \u0431\u0443\u0434\u044c \u043b\u0430\u0441\u043a\u0430\u2026\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"true\" title=\"\u0417\u0430\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0442\u0430\u0436\u0438\u0442\u0438 PDF \u0430\u043d\u0433\u043b\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u044e\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>\u0417\u0430\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0442\u0430\u0436\u0438\u0442\u0438 PDF \u0430\u043d\u0433\u043b\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u044e<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M10 4H4c-1.1 0-1.99.9-1.99 2L2 18c0 1.1.9 2 2 2h16c1.1 0 2-.9 2-2V8c0-1.1-.9-2-2-2h-8l-2-2z\"><\/path><\/svg><span class=\"file-size\">3 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ideological currents continue to play a central role in Latin American political life. In the region, political identities are shaped not only by economic programs or electoral preferences, but also by historical memories, collective experiences, and narratives rooted in ideas of sovereignty, social justice, anti-imperialism, and relations with the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This historical and ideological background matters for how Latin American actors interpret international events. Foreign interventions, revolutions, military dictatorships, democratic transitions, and Cold War conflicts left a political vocabulary in which concepts such as non-intervention, self-determination, dependency, and strategic autonomy remain highly influential. As a result, left and right in Latin America often reflect not only domestic political positions, but also competing views of the international order, the role of the West, and the limits of great-power influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 exposed this complexity. Across Latin America, governments, political leaders, media outlets, and public opinion did not respond through a single regional lens. Instead, the war generated diverse and sometimes contradictory interpretations, shaped by national interests, ideological frameworks, and narratives about sovereignty, intervention, and global power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This article examines how these ideological traditions and narrative frameworks have influenced Latin American perceptions of Ukraine and Russia\u2019s war. It first outlines the historical and political factors that shaped the region\u2019s political culture, then analyzes the positions adopted by Latin American countries in international forums, and finally explores the political and media narratives that contributed to divergent understandings of the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 id=\"h-the-historical-and-ideological-context-of-latin-america-nbsp\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The Historical and Ideological Context of Latin America&nbsp;<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As a result of various factors, the traditional ideological divisions of \u201cleft\u201d and \u201cright\u201d cannot be understood in as linear a way as in Europe, having been forged through historical experiences marked by structural inequality, institutional fragility, and a profound influence\u2014both direct and indirect\u2014of external conflicts. These factors reshaped the scope and meaning of these ideologies within each country. These labels, which in other contexts are built around relatively stable parties and institutions, in Latin America tend to become intertwined with demands for redistribution, claims of sovereignty, and responses to crises of various kinds, <a href=\"https:\/\/nuso.org\/articulo\/la-derecha-en-america-latina-y-su-lucha-contra-la-adversidad\/\">producing a political map that is more plural and less predictable<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-the-influence-of-the-cold-war-and-the-rise-of-anti-imperialism\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The Influence of the Cold War and the Rise of Anti-Imperialism<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">During the Cold War, this complexity deepened. The ideological battle between the powers of the Western and Eastern blocs led to a series of coups d\u2019\u00e9tat carried out through military interventions in the Southern Cone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This scenario materialized in what became known as <a href=\"https:\/\/plancondor.org\/contexto-historico\">Operation Condor<\/a>, in which, led by the United States, the dictatorial regimes of Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina implemented a coordinated campaign of state terrorism. This model combined authoritarianism, state repression, and conservative development projects, resulting in a series of crimes against humanity carried out through transnational coordination against sectors ideologically opposed to the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Within this framework, it was the United States (through its National Security Doctrine and other instruments of political and military influence in the region) that promoted the stigmatization of left-wing sectors, social movements, and progressive groups within the states themselves, labeling them as internal threats. This designation served as justification for providing financial, intelligence, and training support to military personnel ahead of the establishment of the various authoritarian regimes across the continent, in order to secure pro-American alliances in the region and eliminate Soviet influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In parallel, Central America and the Caribbean experienced their own dynamics of interventionism under a far more direct logic of confrontation. In this region, the United States focused its actions on halting any political project that threatened its hegemony or direct interests through covert operations, economic strangulation, and financing of insurgent forces. Thus, in 1954, the CIA intervened to orchestrate the overthrow of democratically elected president Jacobo \u00c1rbenz in Guatemala, whose agrarian reform policies affected the monopolies of American companies and were therefore stigmatized as a communist threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full is-resized\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"638\" height=\"714\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-39827\" style=\"width:374px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2.png 638w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2-536x600.png 536w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2-11x12.png 11w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 638px) 100vw, 638px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>\u0414\u0436\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043b\u043e:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/plancondor.org\/contexto-historico\"><em>Plan C\u00f3ndor<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Within this framework, it was the United States (through its National Security Doctrine and other instruments of political and military influence in the region) that promoted the stigmatization of left-wing sectors, social movements, and progressive groups within the states themselves, labeling them as internal threats. This designation served as justification for providing financial, intelligence, and training support to military personnel ahead of the establishment of the various authoritarian regimes across the continent, in order to secure pro-American alliances in the region and eliminate Soviet influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In parallel, Central America and the Caribbean experienced their own dynamics of interventionism under a far more direct logic of confrontation. In this region, the United States focused its actions on halting any political project that threatened its hegemony or direct interests through covert operations, economic strangulation, and financing of insurgent forces. Thus, in 1954, the CIA intervened to orchestrate the overthrow of democratically elected president Jacobo \u00c1rbenz in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/mundo\/noticias-48776961\">Guatemala<\/a>, whose agrarian reform policies affected the monopolies of American companies and were therefore stigmatized as a communist threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Cuba, following the triumph of the Revolution and as direct retaliation for the nationalization of American-owned properties, a strict commercial, economic, and financial embargo was imposed (one that <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/es\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2021\/07\/amr250072009spa.pdf\">remains in effect to this day<\/a>) designed to isolate the island and bring about the collapse of the Castro government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For its part, the case of Nicaragua clearly demonstrated the use and financing of paramilitary forces during the 1980s, which were deployed to destabilize the government of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), which had previously defeated the pro-American Somoza dictatorship in 1979. In this regard, the United States <a href=\"https:\/\/oig.justice.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/legacy\/special\/9712\/appa.htm\">financed, armed, and trained<\/a> the \u201cContras,\u201d a coalition of counterrevolutionary insurgent groups made up largely of former members of Somoza\u2019s National Guard.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1008\" height=\"544\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-3.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-39828\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-3.png 1008w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-3-600x324.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-3-18x10.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-3-767x414.png 767w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1008px) 100vw, 1008px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Fighters of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) during the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua.<br>\u0414\u0436\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043b\u043e:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/overlay\/media\/es\/nicaragua-39-a%C3%B1os-de-una-revoluci%C3%B3n-extraviada\/44751455\/44809218\"><em>DW Espa\u00f1ol<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-the-influence-of-regional-history-on-foreign-policy-principles\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The Influence of Regional History on Foreign Policy Principles<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As has been shown, the existence of various anti-imperialist discourses in Latin America (both at the level of states and of their political spectrums) does not stem solely from an abstract ideological adherence. Rather, it has left a deep mark on the very principles of diplomacy in the region, particularly in <strong>the tendency to reject automatic alignment with great powers<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this way, many governments in the region have prioritized sovereignty and non-subordination to blocs, which translates into a <a href=\"https:\/\/legrandcontinent.eu\/es\/2022\/10\/03\/el-no-alineamiento-activo-y-america-latina-en-el-orden-global\/\">discourse<\/a> \u00ab <em>\u201c<strong>active non-alignment<\/strong>.\u201d<\/em> &nbsp;This explains why, in the face of international conflicts such as the war in Ukraine, much of the region tends to diplomatically condemn the invasion while maintaining a critical or ambiguous stance toward sanctions and arms shipments, so as not to compromise its margin of autonomy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this context, the positions of Latin American states tend to be pragmatic and nuanced: they reject the violation of borders and military invasion, but also resist bearing economic or political costs that they perceive as imposed by external powers. This mix of normative principles (rejection of aggression) and calculations of national interest (avoiding sanctions) produces a foreign policy that, from the outside, may appear contradictory or ambiguous. However, it responds to a historical tradition of preserving autonomy and avoiding becoming a battleground for great powers. This logic helps explain why some governments emphasize the need for negotiation and a diplomatic way out, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.clarin.com\/opinion\/america-latina-alineamiento-oportunismo-periferico_0_oMvLOUiCUk.html\">prioritizing multilateral channels and public neutrality in the face of the war<\/a>.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nevertheless, it is essential to clarify that this shared historical legacy does not mean that Latin America acts as a single bloc. While the defense of autonomy vis-\u00e0-vis the great powers is a common denominator, its practical application in the face of Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine and its multidimensional impact reveal a profound fragmentation, dependent precisely on the government in power and its ideological makeup. For example, within the same left-wing spectrum, one finds outright condemnation and adherence to international law (as in the case of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.minrel.gob.cl\/minrel\/sala-de-prensa\/gobierno-de-chile-condena-crimenes-de-guerra-ocurridos-en-ucrania\">\u0427\u0438\u043b\u0456<\/a>); ambiguous mediating positions that avoid alienating Moscow (as in the diplomacy pursued by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gov.br\/planalto\/es\/ultimas-noticias\/2025\/05\/lula-destaca-la-postura-proactiva-de-brasil-a-favor-de-la-paz-entre-rusia-y-ucrania\">\u0411\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0438\u043b\u0456\u044f<\/a>); and explicit support for Russia from authoritarian regimes (such as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.swissinfo.ch\/spa\/maduro-condena-un-%22ataque-terrorista-nazi%22-de-ucrania-a-rusia\/89458613\">Venezuela<\/a> &nbsp;or Nicaragua), which instrumentalizes classic anti-imperialist discourse not as a principle of neutrality, but as a tool for political survival and direct confrontation with the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finally, it is necessary to consider the influence exerted by Latin America\u2019s trade ties with China and Russia, which can shape the room for maneuver of many governments amid fears of unilateral sanctions. China has now become the region\u2019s second-largest trading partner, with a flow of imports and exports that exceeded 500 billion dollars in 2022, <a href=\"https:\/\/cegdes.org\/america-latina-frente-a-los-conflictos-internacionales-posturas-y-retos\/\">implying a dependence<\/a> on this market for raw materials, infrastructure, and financing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By comparison, trade with Russia is much more limited, but its presence as a supplier of food and energy (and as a symbolic actor in anti-Western discourse) influences the willingness of certain governments to <a href=\"https:\/\/elpais.com\/opinion\/2022-08-18\/china-y-rusia-aprovechan-el-hueco-que-occidente-ha-dejado-en-america-latina.html\">adopt more cautious or critical positions<\/a> toward Western powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The above context can help explain why Latin American foreign policy toward global conflicts tends to be averse to rigid camps and more inclined toward mediation strategies and relative neutrality. Viewed through this lens of distrust toward the West, it becomes possible to understand why certain Latin American sectors and governments interpret the war in Ukraine by predominantly focusing on NATO\u2019s expansion. From an analytical standpoint, this framing generates an asymmetry in the perception of the conflict: by centering the discussion on the role of the security alliance, these narratives tend to push into the background the debate over Ukrainian territorial sovereignty and Russia\u2019s military aggression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 id=\"h-latin-america-and-the-war-in-ukraine-fragmented-positions-in-international-forums\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Latin America and the War in Ukraine: Fragmented Positions in International Forums<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The complex historical context, the constant pursuit of autonomy, and the ideal of neutrality discussed above are not limited to the region\u2019s internal dynamics; they also have a direct bearing on the global diplomatic stage. Within this framework, Russia\u2019s military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked a turning point in the international system, particularly in the dynamics of cooperation and security. For Latin America, it meant bringing to the fore its historical heterogeneity and distrust of hegemonic blocs within the main multilateral forums.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While the region is geographically distant from the conflict (and its own economic and political circumstances have pushed interest in the war\u2019s development and consequences into the background of national agendas), international resolutions forced Latin American states to take public positions. These responses did not come together as a unified bloc, but rather as a full spectrum of positions that reveals how each nation strikes its own internal balance between its normative principles, strategic alliances, and claims of sovereignty vis-\u00e0-vis hegemonic blocs. Accordingly, this section prioritizes votes in multilateral forums over the rhetoric of speeches by Latin American leaders or presidential statements. Unlike statements, a formal vote in an international body constitutes an act of foreign policy that represents a state\u2019s official position and generates concrete diplomatic consequences. It therefore facilitates systematic comparison, since it involves individual responses to the same texts within the same timeframes, reducing the subjectivity inherent in interpreting speeches of differing nature, length, and purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One of the most relevant multilateral forums is the United Nations (UN). Following Russia\u2019s veto in the Security Council, the General Assembly adopted Resolution ES-11\/1, which demanded an end to the invasion and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory. In response to this scenario, blocs of countries formed to support the resolution, notably including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. In contrast, governments such as those of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gatopardo.com\/articulos\/entre-geopolitica-y-derecho-internacional-america-latina-ante-rusia\">chose to abstain<\/a>, a position that would remain consistent across the various multilateral forums and that reaffirms closer political and strategic ties with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1006\" height=\"726\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-4.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-39829\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-4.png 1006w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-4-600x433.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-4-17x12.png 17w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-4-768x554.png 768w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1006px) 100vw, 1006px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Sources:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/digitallibrary.un.org\/record\/3959039?ln=es\"><em>Resolution ES-11\/1<\/em><\/a><em>,<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/report\/ukraine\/human-rights-council-establishes-independent-international-commission-inquiry\"><em>Resolution A\/HRC\/49\/1<\/em><\/a><em>,<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/UN_News_Centre\/status\/1512095779535609862?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1512095779535609862%7Ctwgr%5Ef2b30e88825dbe91648721d3ced534a5992949b0%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fnews.un.org%2Fen%2Fstory%2F2022%2F04%2F1115782\"><em>UN HRC<\/em><\/a><em>,<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.diariolasamericas.com\/america-latina\/oea-aprueba-resolucion-que-pide-cese-la-guerra-ucrania-n4245748\"><em>OAS Declaration<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For its part, within the same body, the Human Rights Council proposed Russia\u2019s suspension through a vote in the General Assembly. In this regard, Latin American nations\u2014including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay\u2014backed Russia\u2019s suspension, while Mexico chose to abstain along with another group of countries. Nicaragua, meanwhile, voted against the motion, aligning itself with Cuba, China, Syria, and Belarus. Along these lines, the UN Human Rights Council adopted resolution A\/HRC\/49\/L.1, which became Resolution A\/HRC\/49\/1, establishing the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. It condemned the grave human rights and international humanitarian law situation resulting from the invasion, and tasked the Commission with documenting violations, gathering evidence, identifying those responsible, and preserving evidence for future criminal proceedings. On that occasion, Bolivia and Cuba were the only two Latin American states that abstained from this vote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A similar trend was observed at the Organization of American States (OAS). Although the organization condemned the Russian invasion and subsequently suspended Russia\u2019s status as a permanent observer, the voting again reflected divisions within the region. While a majority of states supported these measures, countries such as Bolivia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, and Mexico adopted more cautious positions through abstentions or absences. This shows that, while there was broad regional consensus around rejecting the use of force, differences persisted regarding the degree of diplomatic isolation that should be imposed on Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-the-three-groups-of-regional-positioning\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The Three Groups of Regional Positioning<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Analysis of the positions adopted allows us to distinguish at least three main groups, whose alignment goes beyond a simple scale of closeness to Russia or Ukraine. A first group, made up of Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Bolivia, maintained <strong>a consistent stance of non-condemnation<\/strong> across all the forums examined. This group <a href=\"https:\/\/populi.org.bo\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/AP-251-Reporte-de-la-democracia-2025.pdf\">shares common political traits<\/a>, particularly in terms of governance and democratic quality. Some cases correspond to authoritarian regimes, such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, while others display hybrid characteristics or deficient and limited democracies, such as Bolivia. In this regard, it is worth noting that Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are <a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/RegData\/etudes\/BRIE\/2024\/762473\/EPRS_BRI(2024)762473_EN.pdf\">Russia\u2019s main security partners<\/a> in Latin America, maintaining defense cooperation agreements that include the sale of military equipment, technical assistance, and intelligence activities, with Venezuela having become the largest recipient of Russian weaponry in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From this vantage point, this group concentrates the greatest degree of Russian closeness and influence. In particular, the Kremlin\u2019s relations with Cuba and Venezuela have been described by scholars as \u201cautocratic cooperation,\u201d whose core bond is not based solely on ideology but on the strategic exchange of resources, narratives, and practices that strengthen authoritarian resilience both domestically and internationally. In this sense, the relationship is not grounded in equal capabilities, but in the respective <a href=\"https:\/\/www.giga-hamburg.de\/en\/publications\/giga-focus\/the-war-in-ukraine-and-latin-america-reluctant-support\">level of complementarity<\/a>: while Russia provides energy resources, arms sales, diplomatic backing, and tools for mass disinformation, Cuba contributes its revolutionary legitimacy and networks of political, cultural, and professional exchange that translate into the export of social-control techniques, anti-imperialist narratives, and strategies for weakening democratic institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The second group, in turn, refers to countries that <strong>voted in favor of the condemnatory resolutions<\/strong> in the UN General Assembly and backed human rights investigation mechanisms, but abstained from joining economic sanctions or offering material support to Ukraine (notably Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and Peru). Their stance reflects adherence to the principles of international law, without this implying political or military alignment with either of the blocs in dispute. Their vote in multilateral forums can therefore be interpreted more as a rejection of the violation of international norms than as a geopolitical stance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This distinction is essential to understanding why these countries condemn the invasion in the context of multilateral forums while maintaining a prudent distance from the practical consequences of the conflict. In this regard, it is important to consider that, for most countries in the region, taking part in economic sanctions or supplying resources to Ukraine would mean compromising trade relations or political consensuses that are economically difficult to sustain. Their behavior therefore reflects a recognition of respect for international law without assuming the costs of direct confrontation with major global actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finally, a third group consists of <strong>Mexico and Brazil<\/strong>, notable for their complex <strong>ambivalence<\/strong>: they condemn the invasion without actively participating in sanctions, while at the same time raising more forceful criticisms of the West and of existing power asymmetries in the international system. Political figures such as Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva and Andr\u00e9s Manuel L\u00f3pez Obrador <a href=\"https:\/\/www.latimes.com\/espanol\/mexico\/articulo\/2022-06-13\/lopez-obrador-critica-politica-de-otan-sobre-invasion-rusa\">have been critical<\/a> of the <a href=\"https:\/\/time.com\/6172611\/brazil-president-lula-interview\/?utm_source=twitter&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_campaign=editorial&amp;utm_term=world_&amp;linkId=163587859\">\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0456\u043b\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0441\u044f<\/a> responsibility of the United States and the European Union in the conflict, particularly regarding NATO\u2019s expansion and the West\u2019s lack of more active preventive diplomacy . In parallel, the restrained stance of both countries stems, in part, from <a href=\"https:\/\/www.giga-hamburg.de\/en\/publications\/giga-focus\/the-war-in-ukraine-and-latin-america-reluctant-support\">deeply rooted diplomatic traditions<\/a>: \u201cBrazil has historically maintained autonomy as an essential element of its grand strategy, while Mexico has traditionally upheld the <em>Estrada Doctrine<\/em>, centered on non-intervention\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These voting patterns should not be read simply as a scale of sympathy toward Russia. In many cases, they reflect a longer regional effort to preserve autonomy in an asymmetric international order. Yet this same framework can also make certain narratives, especially those emphasizing NATO expansion or Western responsibility, more politically persuasive, even when they obscure Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty and Russia\u2019s agency as the aggressor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Following the latter premise, one could argue that these inconclusive positions are a way of seeking autonomy from the great powers, especially considering that \u201csome regions of Latin America and the Caribbean have retained a certain nostalgia for the myth of the USSR as a defender against Western imperialism, and Moscow has <a href=\"https:\/\/static.rusi.org\/ukraines-wartime-diplomacy-latin-america-caribbean_0.pdf\">sought to exploit that nostalgia<\/a> to generate support, presenting its actions in Ukraine as <em>\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0456\u0447\u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0456\u044f\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0456\u0441\u0442\u044c<\/em> <em>\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0439<\/em> response to Western expansion\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this sense, multilateral bodies do not merely serve as spaces for reaching consensus on international affairs; they also act as an instrument for questioning perspectives within the international order and the power asymmetries embedded in it. Among the main criticisms are the selective application of international norms, the great powers\u2019 scant accountability for violations of international law, and the unequal attention given to certain crises depending on their strategic relevance to Western countries. Thus, the caution shown by governments such as those of Brazil and Mexico regarding the war in Ukraine can be interpreted less as an expression of support for Russia and more as an attempt to avoid aligning with either pole of power in the international system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While the analysis of votes in multilateral bodies helps reveal the formal positions of each state, the truth is that the differences between the positions of Latin American countries cannot be explained solely by strategic interests or diplomatic ties with the parties involved. Behind each position also lie deep ideological framings that have shaped perceptions of the conflict from various angles. In response to this, it is necessary to examine the main political narratives that emerged in the region around Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine and the way these narratives were reinforced and instrumentalized by different media actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 id=\"h-political-narratives-and-the-construction-of-perceptions-of-the-war-in-ukraine\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Political Narratives and the Construction of Perceptions of the War in Ukraine<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The response of Latin American governments to the Russian invasion cannot be reduced to a simple alignment of geopolitical preferences; it largely reflects the activation of ideological frameworks with deep historical roots in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To structure the analysis, it is useful to distinguish two positions: first, that of explicit support for Russia, and second, that of so-called \u201cactive neutrality,\u201d which, while differing in intensity, share an underlying narrative architecture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The Explicit Support Bloc: Sovereignty as a Selective Framework<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, the war was systematically framed within the ideological repertoire of Latin American anti-imperialism, albeit with different emphases that reveal the differing bases of legitimacy of each regime.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Nicol\u00e1s Maduro<\/strong> announced \u201chis full backing for President Putin in the defense of peace, of his people, and of his homeland,\u201d <a href=\"https:\/\/diariodecuba.com\/cuba\/1645708860_37716.html\">framing the invasion<\/a> as part of a process in which \u201cthe American empire and NATO are seeking, by military means, to destroy Russia\u201d. His discourse privileges the concept of <em>multipolarity<\/em> as a normative horizon, allowing him to present the invasion not as an act of aggression but as a response to an unbalanced world order\u2014a framing consistent with Chavismo\u2019s self-identification as a Global South actor in conflict with the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"812\" height=\"514\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-5.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-39830\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-5.png 812w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-5-18x11.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-5-600x380.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-5-768x486.png 768w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 812px) 100vw, 812px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel and Vladimir Putin at the inauguration of a monument to Fidel Castro in Moscow (2022). Source:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/evoking-castro-putin-cuban-leader-pledge-deepen-ties-2022-11-22\/\"><em>Reuters<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel<\/strong> <a href=\"https:\/\/adncuba.com\/noticias-de-cuba\/politica\/diaz-canel-justifica-invasion-rusa-ucrania\">drew on<\/a> a different but functionally convergent repertoire: that of <em>legitimate security<\/em>. By arguing that the conflict \u201ccould have been avoided had Russia\u2019s security guarantee demands been addressed\u201d, Cuban discourse shifts the moral burden from the aggressor to those supposedly forcing its hand. This framing follows a particular logic, since Havana has historically built its foreign policy on the doctrine of non-intervention and the defense of national sovereignty. In this case, however, it applies these principles asymmetrically, invoking Russian sovereignty against NATO but not Ukrainian sovereignty against Russia\u2014showing that the selection of legal principles is not neutral, but ideologically driven.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Daniel Ortega<\/strong>, in Nicaragua, took the most explicit <a href=\"https:\/\/www.telemundo51.com\/noticias\/mundo\/maduro-diaz-canel-y-ortega-muestran-su-apoyo-a-rusia-en-conflicto-con-ucrania\/2273414\/\">position<\/a> of the three by backing Russia\u2019s recognition of the separatist territories of Donetsk and Lugansk, blaming the European Union and the United States for \u201cencircling and threatening Russia\u201d since 2014.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Despite these differences in approach (with Maduro prioritizing the geopolitical framework of multipolarity and D\u00edaz-Canel appealing to the legal framework of collective security), Ortega adopted the purest version of the Russian narrative. This stance is explained, in part, by the fact that Nicaragua lacks the diplomatic capital that Cuba and Venezuela have accumulated in multilateral forums, and therefore has less need to maintain the appearance of an autonomous foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Beyond this, all three converge in mobilizing a shared conceptual repertoire (anti-imperialism, multipolarity, selective sovereignty) inherited from long-standing regional political traditions\u2014one flexible enough to absorb and justify a territorial invasion in Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-soviet-nostalgia-as-an-ideological-substrate-the-myth-of-the-ussr-as-defender\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Soviet Nostalgia as an Ideological Substrate: The Myth of the USSR as Defender<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The reach of these repertoires beyond the Bolivarian bloc responds to a historical dimension that structures political perceptions in significant sectors of Latin America and the Caribbean. This is expressed through <em>Soviet nostalgia<\/em>\u2014that is, the representation of the Soviet Union, and by extension of Russia as its geopolitical successor, as a necessary counterweight to American hegemony.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"752\" height=\"536\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-6.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-39831\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-6.png 752w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-6-600x428.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-6-17x12.png 17w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 752px) 100vw, 752px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Czechoslovak propaganda poster: Socialism opened the path of liberation for colonial nations (1970s\u20131980s). \u00a0It represents the Soviet narrative linking socialism to decolonization and support for recently independent countries during the Cold War. Source:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/socialismgoesglobal.exeter.ac.uk\/\"><em>Socialism Goes Global<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><br>This representation is not marginal: for decades, the USSR was perceived by sectors of the Latin American left, national liberation movements, and certain intellectual circles as the only actor capable of limiting US intervention in the region. After its dissolution in 1991, that collective memory took the shape of nostalgia, which <a href=\"https:\/\/media.realinstitutoelcano.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/ari109-2023-malamud-nunez-rusia-en-america-latina-anyo-y-medio-despues-de-la-invasion-de-ucrania.pdf\">Moscow has sought to reactivate<\/a> and strategically instrumentalize ever since.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this way, the discursive operation Russia deployed to justify the invasion of Ukraine before Latin American audiences deliberately drew on this nostalgia. By presenting its actions as a \u201cdefensive response\u201d to NATO\u2019s expansion, Moscow reactivated an already-established narrative scheme: that of a non-Western power resisting the advance of a hegemonic West. Under this logic, Russia symbolically occupies the place the USSR held during the Cold War as a historical counterpower, and the war in Ukraine is reframed not as a territorial aggression but as one more episode in that anti-imperialist resistance. In this sense, the continuity with Cold War vocabulary is not accidental\u2014it is part of <a href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/es\/2023\/10\/19\/propaganda-rusa-la-ultima-invasion-en-america-latina\/\">Russia\u2019s communication strategy<\/a> toward the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This memory, however, operates with different nuances across the region. In Cuba, where the alliance with the USSR was for decades the regime\u2019s main guarantee of survival, the identification between Russia and the historical role of the Soviet Union carries a particularly intense emotional and institutional charge, since it is not merely a geopolitical analogy but a memory of mutual dependence. In Venezuela and Nicaragua, by contrast, the link is more ideological than historical, invoking the name of the USSR as an image of anti-imperialism that these regimes summon to legitimize their own political trajectories. In countries such as Mexico or Argentina, <a href=\"https:\/\/rsf.org\/es\/vladimir-rouvinski-las-t%C3%A1cticas-de-rt-en-america-latina-difieren-ligeramente-de-otras-regiones-del\">Soviet nostalgia operates in a more diffuse way<\/a>, mainly through left-wing intellectual and academic traditions that, during the Cold War, established theoretical or symbolic ties with the socialist world, and which in 2022 tended to process the war through categories inherited from that period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The greatest strategic value of this idea for Moscow\u2019s purposes is its ability to function without being explicitly stated. Latin American actors do not need to express sympathy for Putin or his political organization; it is enough for them to activate the scheme of a \u201cnon-Western power resisting the West\u201d for the Russian narrative to find a receptive framework. Soviet nostalgia thus functions not as a conscious ideology, but as a latent interpretive structure, one that the discourses examined in the previous sections\u2014both those of explicit support and those of active neutrality\u2014activated with varying degrees of deliberateness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-the-active-neutrality-bloc-the-mexican-and-brazilian-cases\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The \u201cActive Neutrality\u201d Bloc: The Mexican and Brazilian Cases<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The cases of Mexico and Brazil are analytically richer, precisely because they illustrate how diplomatic traditions with universalist aspirations can, under certain conditions, produce practical effects similar to those of proactive alignment. Both governments presented themselves as neutral or as mediators, but their discourse put into circulation interpretive frameworks of the conflict that coincided in substantive ways with the Russian narrative. In this sense, the difference from the explicit-support bloc lies not in the content of the framing but in its presentation: rather than supporting Russia outright, they criticized the West; rather than justifying the invasion, they equated the two sides\u2019 responsibilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Mexico, <strong>Andr\u00e9s Manuel L\u00f3pez Obrador<\/strong> explicitly <a href=\"https:\/\/diariodecuyo.com.ar\/columnasdeopinion\/Lamentable-papel-de-Mexico-y-Brasil-sobre-Ucrania-20220306-0068.html\">refused<\/a> to adopt economic sanctions against Russia, citing the principle of \u201cgood relations with all the world\u2019s governments\u201d, framing his position within the Estrada Doctrine and the tradition of non-intervention that has structured Mexican foreign policy since the 1930s. This framing, however, carried an additional ideological dimension that set it apart from mere legalism: legislators from the ruling Morena party formed a \u201cMexico-Russia Friendship Committee\u201d in Congress, at whose inaugural ceremony the Russian ambassador publicly thanked Mexico for the fact that it \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/diariodecuyo.com.ar\/columnasdeopinion\/Peligroso-doble-mensaje-de-America-latina-sobre-Ucrania-20220328-0065.html\">will never join<\/a>\u201d the sanctions. This overlap between a long-standing diplomatic principle\u2014non-interventio\u2013and gestures of political affinity toward Moscow is what characterizes the Mexican position; not simple pragmatism, but a convergence between legal tradition and ideological affinity. What matters is that this convergence did not require an explicit decision to support Russia\u2014it only took the consistent application of a pre-existing principle to produce an outcome that Moscow was able to exploit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"840\" height=\"548\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-8.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-39833\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-8.png 840w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-8-600x391.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-8-768x501.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-8-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 840px) 100vw, 840px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Federal deputies in Mexico and the Russian ambassador to Mexico, Viktor Koronelli (left), during the inaugural session of the Mexico\u2013Russian Federation Friendship Group. Source:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.infobae.com\/america\/mexico\/2022\/03\/30\/instalacion-del-grupo-de-amistad-mexico-rusia-es-una-forma-de-sostener-la-postura-ideologica-de-amlo-especialista\/\"><em>Infobae<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The case of <strong>Lula da Silva<\/strong> in Brazil illustrates an even more complex variant of this dynamic. In April 2023, during a tour of China and the United Arab Emirates, Lula <a href=\"https:\/\/www.infobae.com\/america\/america-latina\/2023\/04\/18\/tras-sus-polemicas-declaraciones-lula-da-silva-ahora-aclaro-que-condena-la-invasion-de-rusia-a-ucrania\/\">\u0437\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u0454<\/a> that the United States should stop \u201cencouraging\u201d the war and \u201cstart talking about peace,\u201d pointing to Washington and the European Union as actors that were \u201ccontributing\u201d to the continuation of the conflict by sending weapons to Ukraine. The international reaction was revealing of the objective nature of the framing used, as the White House spokesperson accused Lula of \u201cparroting Russian and Chinese propaganda,\u201d while Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who was visiting Bras\u00edlia that same week, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.diariodecuyo.com.ar\/columnasdeopinion\/Lula-recibe-elogios-y-reproches-por-sus-opiniones-sobre-Ucrania-20230418-0072.html\">thanked<\/a> Brazil for its \u201cclear understanding of the origins of the situation\u201d. The fact that the same statement drew simultaneous condemnation from the West and praise from Moscow does not mean that Lula acted as an agent of Russian propaganda; what it does allow us to infer is that the interpretive framework he used\u2014equating the responsibility of the aggressor with that of the arms suppliers\u2014was functionally compatible with Russian interests regardless of the intent behind it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This tension between formal position and practical effect can also be seen in Brazil\u2019s behavior in multilateral forums. Bras\u00edlia condemned the invasion at the UN, but also voted in favor of an investigation into the attack on the Nord Stream pipeline, and Lula <a href=\"https:\/\/www.perfil.com\/noticias\/internacional\/tras-dias-duros-cruces-eeuu-lula-da-silva-condeno-guerra-ucrania.phtml\">suggested<\/a> that Ukraine should consider ceding Crimea as part of a negotiation. This pattern\u2014formal condemnation combined with practical equidistance\u2014reflects the tension between two traditions in Brazilian foreign policy: the multilateralism that prevents unconditional alignment, and the aspiration to Global South leadership that seeks to position Brazil above the blocs. It illustrates how pre-existing ideological frameworks, in this case the ambition for strategic autonomy, can generate, without premeditation, framings of the conflict that are more favorable to Russia than the formal UN vote would suggest. Taken together, the discourses of the \u201cactive neutrality\u201d bloc share an underlying narrative structure: NATO\u2019s expansion as the cause of the conflict, the West as a co-responsible party, and the pursuit of peace without explicit condemnation as an ethically superior position. This structure was not imported directly from Moscow, but rather activated by countries\u2019 own domestic agendas\u2014yet it turned out to be functionally convergent with Russian interests in multilateral forums. Understanding why these discourses found domestic support and did not generate greater internal political costs requires examining the media ecosystem in which they were produced and circulated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 id=\"h-disinformation-propaganda-and-the-media-construction-of-the-war\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Disinformation, Propaganda, and the Media Construction of the War<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Latin American perceptions of the war in Ukraine were not shaped solely by the diplomatic positions of governments, but were also molded by a media ecosystem in which Russian propaganda, disinformation, and digital ideological polarization operated with notable effectiveness. Analyzing this ecosystem is relevant to the central argument, because it helps us understand the mechanism through which narratives favorable to Russia found an audience beyond official circles, having drawn on pre-existing media infrastructures and already-established cultural predispositions. This section distinguishes two related but separable phenomena: disinformation operations attributable to identifiable pro-Russian actors, and ideological narratives that circulated autonomously, drawing on regional political traditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-narratives-and-media-operations-linked-to-pro-russian-actors\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Narratives and Media Operations Linked to Pro-Russian Actors<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first element to consider is the structural advantage Russian media held in the region before the war began. RT en Espa\u00f1ol was created in 2009, ahead of equivalent European channels such as DW or France 24 in Spanish, which allowed it to build <a href=\"https:\/\/media.realinstitutoelcano.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/ari109-2023-malamud-nunez-rusia-en-america-latina-anyo-y-medio-despues-de-la-invasion-de-ucrania.pdf\">consolidated audiences<\/a> before its competitors. This first-mover advantage is analytically significant, because it indicates that when the invasion broke out, RT did not have to build audiences from scratch, but simply activate distribution networks that already existed. The contrast with the limited development of European or Ukrainian media in Spanish, which did have to build a presence under urgent conditions, helps explain the informational asymmetry that characterized coverage of the conflict in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">An analysis by the Atlantic Council\u2019s Digital Forensic Research Lab found that the most frequent keyword in RT en Espa\u00f1ol\u2019s subtitles was \u201cUSA,\u201d and that its Facebook content was systematically oriented more toward the United States than toward specific Latin American countries. <a href=\"https:\/\/reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk\/es\/news\/bloqueada-en-occidente-la-propaganda-rusa-prospera-en-espanol-en-tv-y-redes-sociales\">According to researcher<\/a> Iria Puyosa, \u201cthe common thread running through RT\u2019s communication in the region is the questioning of American imperialism\u201d. This finding is key to understanding the logic of RT\u2019s penetration in the region, since its message is not primarily \u201cpro-Russian\u201d in a positive sense, but rather anti-American. This distinction matters because it considerably broadens the spectrum of potential audiences\u2014for example, in contexts where distrust of Washington cuts across the political spectrum, including progressive sectors, social movements, or critical academic circles, RT\u2019s anti-US framing can prove ideologically legible and appealing regardless of any sympathy for Russia. The war in Ukraine gave RT a new object onto which to project this pre-existing framework, and the Soviet nostalgia described in the previous section provided the historical substrate that made this message culturally recognizable. This mechanism of adoption without explicit coordination can also be observed at the academic level. Researcher Vladimir Rouvinski documents that, in universities and think tanks in Mexico and Argentina, some analysts present interpretive frameworks of the conflict aligned with official Russian discourse as their own perspective, including the use of the term \u201cspecial military operation\u201d instead of \u201cinvasion.\u201d His central <a href=\"https:\/\/rsf.org\/es\/vladimir-rouvinski-las-t%C3%A1cticas-de-rt-en-america-latina-difieren-ligeramente-de-otras-regiones-del\">observation<\/a> is that \u201ctheir narratives change when Moscow\u2019s narratives change\u201d. This phenomenon, documented especially in Mexico and Argentina\u2014two of the countries with the strongest academic traditions of Latin American critical thought\u2014does not necessarily mean these actors are conscious agents of Russian propaganda. It suggests, rather, that the interpretive framework Moscow projects\u2014anti-imperialism, multipolarity\u2014is sufficiently consistent with pre-existing intellectual traditions to be adopted without critical friction, which makes it a more persistent channel of influence than direct propaganda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-group is-nowrap is-layout-flex wp-container-core-group-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-group-is-layout-flex\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The intensity of these operations was greater in countries with closer political affinity to Moscow, but their geographic reach was regional. According to a 2023 report by the United States Institute of Peace, Russian disinformation campaigns in Latin America intensified significantly after the invasions of 2014 and 2022. Nicaragua emerged as an extreme and qualitatively distinct case compared to the others, since, unlike Mexico or Brazil, where influence operated mainly through autonomous intermediaries, in Nicaragua the pro-Russian media infrastructure is directly intertwined with political power. Media outlets linked to Daniel Ortega\u2019s family circle, such as JP+, accumulated more than 800,000 YouTube subscribers with an editorial shift that coincided with the start of the invasion, while Telesur, with greater regional reach, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.divergentes.com\/nicaragua-el-hub-de-la-propaganda-rusa-en-centroamerica\/\">systematically aligned<\/a> its coverage with the Russian narrative. This blurring of the line between media and power is analytically significant because it erases the boundary between external and internal disinformation\u2014in these contexts, Russian propaganda does not need to penetrate from outside because it already operates from within, through media structures controlled by domestic allies.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-media-text is-stacked-on-mobile\" style=\"grid-template-columns:65% auto\"><figure class=\"wp-block-media-text__media\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"618\" height=\"582\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-9.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-39834 size-full\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-9.png 618w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-9-13x12.png 13w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-9-600x565.png 600w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 618px) 100vw, 618px\" \/><\/figure><div class=\"wp-block-media-text__content\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">An element that further complicates this picture is that disinformation did not require direct Russian state media to circulate effectively. An analysis by the Brookings Institution showed that seven of the fifteen most retweeted accounts in the information ecosystem studied were <a href=\"https:\/\/www.martinoticias.com\/a\/bloqueada-en-occidente-la-propaganda-rusa-prospera-en-espa%C3%B1ol-en-tv-y-redes-sociales-\/354690.html\">independent Spanish-language influencers<\/a> with no formal affiliation to RT or Sputnik. Pro-Russian narrative frameworks had been internalized by autonomous actors to a degree sufficient to be reproduced without explicit coordination with Moscow. Propaganda that can dispense with its own distribution channels is, in a sense, more robust and harder to counter than propaganda that depends on identifiable sources.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-the-zelensky-deepfake-and-ai-driven-disinformation\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The Zelensky Deepfake and AI-Driven Disinformation<\/strong> <\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The war in Ukraine also marked a turning point in the use of artificial intelligence for wartime disinformation purposes. On March 16, 2022, three weeks after the invasion began, an AI-generated video <a href=\"https:\/\/www.vozdeamerica.com\/a\/como-se-ha-usado-la-inteligencia-artificial-para-desinformar-sobre-la-guerra-entre-rusia-y-ucrania\/7330061.html\">circulated<\/a> showing President Zelensky asking his soldiers to lay down their arms. The material was distributed through pro-Russian Telegram channels and was briefly published on the Ukraine 24 website, which reported a cyberattack. Experts described it as <a href=\"https:\/\/es.euronews.com\/my-europe\/2022\/08\/25\/guerra-de-ucrania-cinco-de-los-posts-de-desinformacion-y-afirmaciones-falsas-mas-virales\">the first deepfake<\/a> \u201cused intentionally and in a widely deceptive manner\u201d in an armed conflict. The analytical significance of this case does not lie in the video\u2019s persuasiveness\u2014it was debunked relatively quickly\u2014but rather in the element of uncertainty it introduced: from that moment on, the possibility that any official image or statement could be fabricated became embedded in public debate, with effects potentially more lasting than the false content itself. A study by University College Cork that analyzed nearly 5,000 tweets about deepfakes during the first seven months of 2022 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.agenciasinc.es\/Noticias\/Los-deepfakes-como-arma-de-desinformacion-y-propaganda-en-tiempos-de-guerra\">concluded<\/a> that they were being used systematically to sustain conspiracy theories and erode trust in mainstream media, an effect that transcends the content of any single piece and affects overall trust in information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Latin America, this type of content found favorable conditions for reception wherever the official framing of the conflict already produced ambiguity. The ATAFIMI project <a href=\"https:\/\/verificado.com.mx\/desinformacion-transfronteriza-informe-2025\/\">documented<\/a> that two AI-generated TikTok videos, both concerning Ukrainian conscripts, surpassed three million views in Mexico without any platform warning labels. The fact that Mexico is the case with the greatest documented reach in the region is no minor detail, since it is one of the countries where the government\u2019s position already produced an equidistant framing of the conflict. This suggests a synergy between official political discourse and the disinformation ecosystem: in contexts where the government does not identify a clear aggressor, content that humanizes or discredits the Ukrainian military encounters less cultural resistance and less willingness toward critical scrutiny among audiences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Adding to this picture was the migration of disinformation to messaging platforms following European sanctions on RT and Sputnik. A network of Telegram channels <a href=\"https:\/\/fundaciongabo.org\/es\/recursos\/relatorias\/relatoria-del-taller-desentranar-la-complejidad-periodismo-ante-la-cobertura-de\">distributed<\/a> nearly 84,000 messages in Spanish that mixed false content with real news. This deliberate blending tactic is analytically significant, because it turns disinformation into a matter of cost: readers who want to distinguish true from false must invest more time and critical capacity in each piece of content, which the specialized literature calls \u201cfact fatigue,\u201d leading many users to opt for the narrative that best fits their prior predispositions. This mechanism systematically favors already-established interpretive frameworks, among which Latin American anti-imperialism holds a central place. In addition, a study published in the journal <em>ICONO 14<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/icono14.net\/files\/articles\/1943-ES\/index.html\">\u043f\u0456\u0434\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0434\u0438\u0432<\/a> that the most widely used strategy during the first months of the conflict was <em>false context<\/em>\u2014real images recontextualized with misleading descriptions\u2014with a peak in production during the first two weeks of the invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Anti-NATO Narratives and Digital Ideological Polarization<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Alongside disinformation based on fabricated facts or recontextualized images, Latin American perceptions of the conflict were shaped by interpretive frameworks that oversimplified the war\u2019s geopolitical context. The most widespread of these is the anti-NATO narrative, which attributes the cause of the conflict exclusively to Western expansion eastward into Europe. Unlike factual disinformation, this type of narrative does not operate through invented facts but through <em>causal simplification<\/em>: it takes a real and legitimate debate within the international relations literature\u2014the role of NATO\u2019s expansion in Europe\u2019s security architecture\u2014and turns it into the sole explanation for the conflict, sidelining other variables such as Ukrainian sovereignty as an autonomous factor, Russia\u2019s history of aggression prior to 2022 (from Chechnya and Georgia to the annexation of Crimea in 2014), and the legal obligations arising from international law. The result is a causal structure that transforms a territorial invasion into a symmetrical geopolitical dispute in which both sides bear equal responsibility. That this narrative found greater traction in Latin America than in other regions is not surprising, considering that it draws on the same ideological substrate as Soviet nostalgia\u2014namely, the representation of the West, and of NATO as its military arm, as a structural threat rather than as a guarantee of collective security. According to <a href=\"https:\/\/reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk\/es\/news\/bloqueada-en-occidente-la-propaganda-rusa-prospera-en-espanol-en-tv-y-redes-sociales\">the Reuters Institute<\/a>, the war \u201ccreated fertile ground for the spread of these narratives\u201d in the Spanish-speaking world. Julio Montes, co-founder of Maldita.es, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.martinoticias.com\/a\/bloqueada-en-occidente-la-propaganda-rusa-prospera-en-espa%C3%B1ol-en-tv-y-redes-sociales-\/354690.html\">describes<\/a> the mechanism precisely: \u201cthe consumer of RT or Sputnik is already a consumer who has come in and consumes that content because they have already been persuaded of certain narratives\u201d. Pro-Russian disinformation did not create the ideological predispositions of its Latin American audiences\u2014it exploited them. Historical regional anti-imperialism, distrust of NATO as an instrument of Washington, and the memory of the Soviet role as a counterweight were the substrate on which Russian narratives found fertile ground. What the Ukraine conflict did was update and reactivate that substrate, not build it from nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The contrast with Uruguay\u2019s response helps verify this argument by way of counterexample. Uruguay was the only country in the region that actively worked to counter disinformation about the war, through public communication mechanisms that explicitly distinguished the government\u2019s position from pro-Russian narratives. That Uruguay was the exception is no coincidence, largely because it is the country with the weakest tradition of anti-imperialism as a domestic political culture, with the greatest ideological distance from the Bolivarian bloc, and without the memory of Soviet dependency that characterizes Cuba. This contrast suggests that the institutional passivity of other countries toward disinformation was not simply negligence, but was shaped by the same ideological frameworks that facilitated the penetration of pro-Russian narratives in the first place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The combined result of political discourses, pro-Russian media infrastructure, and digital ideological polarization was the construction of a perception of the conflict in which the invasion was frequently framed as just another episode in a dispute between great powers, with responsibilities portrayed as symmetrical or even reversed relative to those established under international law. This construction was not identical or equally intense across all countries, but it did shape the space of what was politically possible for governments in the region within the multilateral forums examined in the previous section\u2014the absence of explicit condemnation proved less domestically costly in contexts where the dominant public narrative did not identify a clear aggressor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is precisely in light of this powerful propaganda machinery sustained by the Kremlin that it becomes necessary to examine what the material and institutional reality of Putin\u2019s regime actually is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 id=\"h-present-day-russia-and-the-ussr-from-apparent-continuity-to-structural-rupture\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Present-Day Russia and the USSR: From Apparent Continuity to Structural Rupture<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Within contemporary political debate, a tendency has taken hold\u2014especially visible in certain sectors of the left\u2014to equate today\u2019s Russian Federation with the Soviet Union. This equivalence tends to rest on two elements: territorial inheritance and the idea of a historical-political continuity between the two states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This analysis focuses on three dimensions in this regard: political doctrine, the role of religion, and the economic model. Together, these clearly show that Putin\u2019s Russia does not extend the Soviet project, but rather reconfigures it along a post-Soviet, nationalist-conservative, and authoritarian-capitalist logic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-from-revolutionary-universalism-to-putinism\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>From Revolutionary Universalism to Putinism<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A decisive rupture is found in the very nature of the political project. The Soviet Union <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/late-stage-putinism-the-war-in-ukraine-and-russias-shifting-ideology\/\">justified<\/a> its existence through a Marxist-Leninist ideology with universal aspirations, by definition internationalist and oriented toward a global historical transformation. Its legitimacy rested on the promise of abolishing social classes, overcoming capitalism, and expanding socialism beyond its borders. Although Soviet practice was full of contradictions, its language of legitimation still pointed to a universalist horizon: history was leading toward a higher order, one that the USSR, through socialism, aspired to bring to humanity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Contemporary Russia, by contrast, is not organized around a universal emancipatory promise, but around a <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/late-stage-putinism-the-war-in-ukraine-and-russias-shifting-ideology\/\">conservative national-state logic<\/a>. Kremlin discourse has increasingly shifted toward the idea of Russia as a \u201ccivilization-state,\u201d a particular historical community that must defend its sovereignty, its cultural uniqueness, and its sphere of influence against the West. Within this framework, categories such as the Russkiy mir, or \u201cRussian world,\u201d serve a function of symbolic and geopolitical cohesion: they do not call for world revolution, but for the preservation of an expanded\u2014and supposedly threatened\u2014national identity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This shift is crucial because it changes the type of political subject the regime seeks to mobilize. The USSR spoke in the name of class and of humanity\u2019s historical future; Putin\u2019s Russia speaks in the name of the nation, tradition, and the survival of its own order. This is not a mere change in rhetoric, but a shift in the very form of power\u2019s legitimacy. In this sense, Putinism does not seek to abolish the existing order to build a new universal one; rather, it seeks to restore authority, discipline, and hierarchy in the name of sovereignty and of a historical continuity selectively constructed by the Kremlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-the-use-of-faith-as-legitimation\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The Use of Faith as Legitimation<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Another structural break appears in the place occupied by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2024\/2\/9\/far-from-harmless-patriarch-kirill-backs-putins-war-but-at-what-cost\">religion<\/a>. For much of its trajectory, the USSR defined itself as an officially atheist state, and waged systematic campaigns against religious institutions, ecclesiastical hierarchies, and the public influence of faith. This policy was not merely a cultural trait of the regime, but part of a broader project of subordinating <a href=\"https:\/\/bakuresearchinstitute.org\/en\/the-campaign-against-religion-and-the-promotion-of-atheism-in-the-soviet-union\/\">all symbolic authority to the socialist state<\/a>. Soviet atheism sought to build a secular modernity in which religion would cease to compete with the party as a source of meaning, truth, and legitimacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Present-day Russia operates in the opposite direction. The Russian Orthodox Church has been reincorporated into the core of national identity and plays a significant role in legitimizing political power. More than a purely religious actor, it functions as moral and ideological support for the regime, helping translate state authority into terms of tradition, historical continuity, and shared \u201ctraditional\u201d values. In this way, religion no longer appears as a force to be eradicated, but becomes a useful resource for cohering society, disciplining behavior, and promoting conservatism by differentiating Russia from a West portrayed as decadent or morally corrupt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The political significance of this shift should not be underestimated. In the USSR, religion was seen as an obstacle to building the new order. Today, religion operates as a tool for sacralizing the political order. Where the Soviet project sought to replace faith with socialist rationality, the current regime reintroduces it as a mechanism of legitimation and moral cohesion within public discourse. The difference is not one of degree, but of historical meaning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-from-a-centralized-economy-to-oligarchic-capitalism\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>From a Centralized Economy to Oligarchic Capitalism<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The economic difference is decisive. The Soviet system rested on the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, centralized planning, and state control over prices, wages, industrial output, and the distribution of goods. That model was not oriented toward maximizing private profitability, but toward organizing the economy around political objectives set by the state, with bureaucratic centralization being a constitutive feature of the Soviet system. Present-day Russia, by contrast, operates within a capitalist market structure, albeit one heavily shaped by political power and forms of state intervention in strategic sectors. Private property is central, capital accumulation follows profit-driven logics, and the weight of business groups is decisive. However, what distinguishes the current regime is that this accumulation does not take place in a fully autonomous market, but in an environment where access to power, political loyalty, and presidential protection are fundamental structural factors. This is why the terms oligarchic capitalism or patrimonial capitalism are frequently used, rather than simple free-market capitalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Strategic sectors such as energy, infrastructure, or the defense industry remain under strong state control, but this control is not equivalent to socialist planning. Rather, it expresses a combination of political authority, rent extraction, and the subordination of key economic actors. As a result, Russia\u2019s economic structure does not extend the Soviet experience\u2014it replaces it with an authoritarian capitalist order marked by strong wealth concentration and a high degree of dependence on political power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Taken together, these three transformations clearly show that the contemporary Russian Federation is a capitalist, nationalist, and conservative state, with authoritarian traits and an instrumental use of religion and geopolitical power. Although it retains certain symbolic references to the Soviet past, its political doctrine, institutional structure, and economic model bear no resemblance whatsoever to the USSR\u2019s socialist project. Precisely for this reason, the relevant question is not whether the two regimes are equivalent, but why certain actors continue to interpret them, to a greater or lesser extent, as if they were.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 id=\"h-why-do-we-talk-about-continuity-an-approach-to-interpretive-frameworks-on-the-left\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Why Do We Talk About Continuity? An Approach to Interpretive Frameworks on the Left<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As has been argued throughout this article, Latin America and the Caribbean do not have \u201cthe left\u201d as a uniform bloc, but rather multiple traditions, sensibilities, and interpretive repertoires that can only approximately be grouped under that label. In this sense, the equation between Putin\u2019s capitalist, conservative Russia and the defunct Soviet Union rarely appears explicitly stated in official documents from left-wing sectors. Instead, it survives as a set of shared historical frameworks operating at the social level, present in electoral political culture, grassroots activism, sympathetic opinion spaces, and, occasionally, in the rhetoric of certain leaderships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On this premise, at least four interpretive currents can be identified that help explain why part of the political spectrum continues to view Russia through a Soviet lens. These are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they tend to coexist and reinforce one another within the same coalitions, combined according to circumstance and each actor\u2019s position toward the United States, the Cold War, or contemporary geopolitical disputes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"1\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Soviet nostalgia.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Russia as geopolitical heir.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Pro-Russian anti-imperialism.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Direct identification.<br><br><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-soviet-nostalgia\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Soviet Nostalgia<\/strong> <\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This can be understood as a deep emotional, ideological, and historical bond with the Soviet Union. Its weight is explained by the fact that, for broad sectors of the left (those who lived through the Cold War or were politically formed under its narrative), the USSR represents an indelible s<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-32650024\">ymbol of the socialist ideal, of logistical support for liberation movements<\/a>, and of the financing of revolutions and political processes in the region. Soviet memory, therefore, is not exhausted by nostalgia for a vanished state, but condenses an image of power, discipline, and historical possibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This nostalgia is intentionally fed by the Kremlin\u2019s own communications apparatus. By strategically deploying Soviet aesthetics\u2014such as the display of red flags with the hammer and sickle at Victory Day parades or the exaltation of the \u201cGreat Patriotic War\u201d\u2014the Russian government appeals to the affective memory of the international left. For example, in 2024, Victory Day functioned as <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/ukraine-war-putin-is-using-russian-children-to-promote-his-version-of-history-on-victory-day-228329\">a politically charged symbolic event<\/a>.&nbsp; Through it, the Kremlin not only commemorated the defeat of Nazism in 1945, but also sought to connect that Soviet victory with Putin\u2019s Russia and with the war in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For these sectors, support for Russia is not always an endorsement of its current oligarchic economic model, but rather an act of historical loyalty toward the power that was key to their struggles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-russia-as-geopolitical-heir\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Russia as Geopolitical Heir<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This position is more pragmatic. It recognizes that Russia is no longer socialist, but validates it as heir to Soviet geopolitical weight. It stems from the fact that the USSR was, for decades, a real counterweight to American hegemony, and that after its collapse in the 1990s, a unipolar order took hold. Within this framework, Russia\u2019s resurgence opened up, for certain political sectors, the possibility of envisioning a new multipolar order, in which Russia\u2019s military capacity, its veto power at the UN, and its willingness to challenge the Western security architecture carry weight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this sense, Putin\u2019s conservative domestic policies fade into the background compared to Moscow\u2019s strategic usefulness as a counterweight or check on the United States (or the West) and its allies. This logic is evident when considering the relationship between Russia and certain Latin American governments seeking to counter US pressure. In this regard, Cuba and Venezuela have maintained ties with Moscow not out of ideological affinity with Putinism, but because of its capacity to offer energy, military, and diplomatic support in contexts of isolation or sanctions. As a concrete example, in November 2024, Russia and Venezuela <a href=\"https:\/\/www.themoscowtimes.com\/2024\/11\/08\/russia-signs-security-energy-deals-with-venezuela-a86944\">signed<\/a> cooperation agreements on security and <a href=\"https:\/\/boereport.com\/2024\/07\/22\/russia-discusses-building-oil-refinery-in-cuba-tass-says\/\">energy<\/a>, reinforcing a relationship defined less by socialism than by the need for survival in the current geopolitical environment.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-pro-russian-anti-imperialism\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Pro-Russian Anti-Imperialism<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Within this interpretive framework, the world is divided in binary terms between the forces of Western imperialism (the United States, the European Union, and NATO) and those who resist it. This reactive logic conditions support for the Russian Federation as support given out of opposition, not out of positive endorsement of its social or political model. Russia is defended and assimilated into the imagery of resistance once embodied by the USSR simply because it faces the same adversaries, even though it does so from a different historical position and with a completely different state structure. This stance helps explain a recurring paradox: certain left-wing movements, by reading international politics almost exclusively through the lens of confrontation with the United States, end up justifying or minimizing Kremlin practices that they would otherwise denounce without hesitation. Thus, the repression of sexual minorities, restrictions on dissent, the tightening of control over public life, and the consolidation of an official moral conservatism are relativized or directly subordinated to the geopolitical priority of confronting the West. The problem is not only ethical but also analytical: when every Kremlin action is interpreted as a legitimate response to Western power, the ability to distinguish between anti-hegemonic resistance and internal authoritarianism disappears. Within this same logic, extractivism, the militarized centralization of the economy, and the subordination of society to state power fade into the background. Anti-imperialism, in this way, ceases to function as a critique of power and becomes a grammar of alignment that produces a form of selective blindness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This logic allows pro-Russian anti-imperialism to continue to find in Moscow a figure of resistance, even though the actual content of the Russian regime is capitalist, nationalist, and authoritarian, and bears no substantive relation to the Soviet project.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-direct-identification\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Direct Identification<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This minority view identifies and understands contemporary Russia as being the very same USSR\u2014not as its equivalent or successor, but as an almost literal continuity. This category is not usually present within governing coalitions of the modern left, but is instead concentrated in sectors of more orthodox and heavily ideologized communist militancy. There, history seems to be read through frozen Cold War categories, producing a mimicry between contemporary actors and those of the 20th century.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Within this reading, the Kremlin\u2019s confrontation with the West is interpreted as a continuation of the class struggle or of Soviet international expansion. Even narratives such as the supposed \u201cdenazification\u201d of Ukraine are presented as analogous to the 1945 victory, erasing the differences between the historical anti-fascist war and present-day Russian foreign policy. For these sectors, any criticism of Moscow is automatically dismissed as pro-imperialist propaganda, without engaging with the underlying capitalist and imperial nature of the Russian state itself today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The problem with this identification is not only analytical but also political. By superimposing Russia onto the USSR, the mutation of the Russian regime is completely erased. Rather than reading the present, a closed historical framework is projected onto it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-memory-and-pragmatism\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Memory and Pragmatism<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In light of the above, it is interesting to note how contemporary Russia is able to draw on all these interpretations to its advantage simultaneously. The reason is not that Moscow remains Soviet, but that its politics of symbols, its confrontation with the West, and its selective reuse of historical memory allow it to move between different interpretive frameworks without being confined to any single one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In countries such as Cuba or Venezuela, these categories intertwine in complex ways. While government leaderships operate under the pragmatics of pro-Russian anti-imperialism and geopolitical continuity\u2014signing oil or military agreements to survive American isolation\u2014grassroots militants and the state communications apparatus often draw on Soviet nostalgia or even direct identification to lend these transactional alliances an epic, revolutionary sheen. It is at this intersection between geopolitical necessity and historical memory that the mirage of continuity survives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 id=\"h-conclusion\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>\u0412\u0438\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0438<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The analysis of historical background, diplomatic forums, and media narratives presented in this article demonstrates that Latin America\u2019s response to the war in Ukraine is neither an accident nor a simple pragmatic reaction. On the contrary, the conflict has functioned as a catalyst that exposes the deep roots of the region\u2019s political culture. The way Latin America decodes the contemporary international scene is shaped and determined by the memories of the 20th century: foreign interventions, economic asymmetry, and support for dictatorships. This history built a structural distrust of Western powers that, to this day, continues to act as an essential axis within public debate and the conduct of foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Understanding this historical foundation is key to explaining why the region did not act as a unified bloc in response to the invasion. In its attempt to balance respect for international law with its own strategic interests, Latin American states displayed profound fragmentation. The spectrum ranges from support for authoritarian regimes that see in Moscow a political and material lifeline, to the diplomatic condemnation of countries seeking to protect their economies by avoiding sanctions. A particularly interesting point is the \u201cactive neutrality\u201d stance adopted by powers such as Brazil or Mexico. Although it stems from a legitimate effort to maintain autonomy and avoid subordination to the agendas of the North, in practice this doctrine of non-intervention ends up producing an asymmetric equivalence that dilutes the responsibilities between the aggressor state and the invaded state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is precisely on this pre-existing discursive foundation that the Russian media and diplomatic ecosystem managed to operate with great effectiveness. The success of disinformation and of platforms such as RT or Sputnik in the region did not consist of creating sympathy for Russia from scratch. Their real skill lay in instrumentalizing classic Latin American anti-imperialism. By focusing the origin of the war almost exclusively on NATO\u2019s expansion and the role of the West, the Kremlin\u2019s official narrative fit perfectly into interpretive schemes already established among local political sectors. In doing so, they managed to transform an invasion that violates the most basic principles of territorial sovereignty into a geopolitical narrative in which Russia assumes, in distorted fashion, the historical role of a defensive power, or one opposed to American hegemonism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This narrative framework reveals the greatest analytical and ideological contradiction exposed in this article: the paradox running through various sectors of the Latin American left. As detailed in the demystification of Putinism\u2019s political doctrine, the tendency to view the contemporary Russian Federation through the lens of the extinct Soviet Union rests on no material or institutional affinity whatsoever. It is based, rather, on emotional loyalties frozen in time and on a utilitarian use of historical memory. By establishing opposition to the United States as the sole absolute measure of geopolitical validity, part of Latin American anti-imperialism loses its analytical focus and becomes a reactive stance that omits crucial elements from its field of vision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Under this binary reading of the world, the real characteristics of the current Russian state remain a blind spot. It obscures the fact that this is a regime grounded in oligarchic capitalism, of a nationalist-conservative and strongly authoritarian character\u2014elements that represent a total break from the ideals of redistribution and equality of the socialist project. The problem with reading the present using only Cold War categories is that it eliminates the capacity to distinguish: it conflates what could be a necessary and critical stance toward the asymmetries of the Western order with the validation of an expansionist imperial project driven by another global power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ultimately, Latin America\u2019s perceptions of Russian aggression against Ukraine show that the region continues to process 21st-century conflicts through the maps of the last century. The interest in maintaining an independent margin of maneuver, and in not automatically aligning with the dictates of the West, remains a vital pillar of the Latin American diplomatic tradition. However, the contemporary challenge left by this crisis is to make that defense of sovereignty consistent across all fronts. The goal is not to renounce critical thinking toward traditional centers of power, but to ensure that the desire for autonomy does not turn into a rhetorical argument that, whether out of historical affinity or rejection of the United States, ends up tolerating the transgressions of new actors on the global stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>\u041f\u043e\u0433\u043b\u044f\u0434\u0438, \u0434\u0443\u043c\u043a\u0438 \u0442\u0430 \u043e\u0446\u0456\u043d\u043a\u0438, \u0432\u0438\u0441\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0456 \u0432 \u043c\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0456\u0430\u043b\u0430\u0445, \u043e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0456\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u043d\u0430 \u0446\u044c\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0441\u0430\u0439\u0442\u0456, \u043d\u0430\u043b\u0435\u0436\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0432\u0438\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u043d\u043e \u0457\u0445\u043d\u0456\u043c \u0430\u0432\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430\u043c \u0456 \u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0431\u043e\u0432\u2019\u044f\u0437\u043a\u043e\u0432\u043e \u0432\u0456\u0434\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0430\u044e\u0442\u044c \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0438\u0446\u0456\u044e Transatlantic Dialogue Center, \u0439\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0456\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0456\u0432 \u0447\u0438 \u0430\u0444\u0456\u043b\u0456\u0439\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0456\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0439. \u0426\u0456 \u043c\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0456\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u043c\u0430\u044e\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430 \u043c\u0435\u0442\u0456 \u0441\u0442\u0438\u043c\u0443\u043b\u044e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0438 \u0434\u0456\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0433 \u0456 \u0434\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0443\u0441\u0456\u044e \u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0435 \u0432\u0456\u0434\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0430\u044e\u0442\u044c \u043e\u0444\u0456\u0446\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0456 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0456\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0456 \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0438\u0446\u0456\u0457 Transatlantic Dialogue Center \u0430\u0431\u043e \u0431\u0443\u0434\u044c-\u044f\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0456\u043d\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0456\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0439, \u0437 \u044f\u043a\u0438\u043c\u0438 \u0430\u0432\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0443\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0443\u0442\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u2019\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0456.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ideological currents continue to play a central role in Latin American political life. In the region, political identities are shaped not only by economic programs or electoral preferences, but also by historical memories, collective experiences, and narratives rooted in ideas of sovereignty, social justice, anti-imperialism, and relations with the United States. This historical and ideological [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":24,"featured_media":39839,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,57],"tags":[],"topic":[99,116,113,84,86,92],"class_list":["post-39825","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-en-analyses","category-eng-latin-america-caribbean","topic-disinformation","topic-hybrid-warfare","topic-latin-america","topic-russia","topic-ukraine","topic-war"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Ideology and Narrative: How Political Currents in Latin America Shape Perceptions of Russia&#039;s War Against Ukraine - Transatlantic Dialogue Center<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Explore how ideology, anti-imperialism, Soviet nostalgia, Russian propaganda, and active neutrality shape Latin American perceptions of Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/uk\/2026\/09\/10\/latin-america-perceptions-ukraine-war\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"uk_UA\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Ideology and Narrative: How Political Currents in Latin America Shape Perceptions of Russia&#039;s War Against Ukraine\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center (TDC) is a non-governmental and non-partisan think tank that provides high-quality policy advice to private and public clients. 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