{"id":37766,"date":"2026-03-16T14:21:00","date_gmt":"2026-03-16T12:21:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=37766"},"modified":"2026-07-21T16:32:07","modified_gmt":"2026-07-21T13:32:07","slug":"triangulo-ee-uu-union-europea-ucrania-revitalizacion-de-la-cooperacion-transatlantica-en-materia-de-seguridad","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/uk\/2026\/03\/16\/triangulo-ee-uu-union-europea-ucrania-revitalizacion-de-la-cooperacion-transatlantica-en-materia-de-seguridad\/","title":{"rendered":"Tri\u00e1ngulo EE. UU.-Uni\u00f3n Europea-Ucrania: revitalizaci\u00f3n de la cooperaci\u00f3n transatl\u00e1ntica en materia de seguridad"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\" data-icon-position=\"left\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px\" data-attachment-id=\"54113\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"true\" title=\"Descargar\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Descargar<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M10 4H4c-1.1 0-1.99.9-1.99 2L2 18c0 1.1.9 2 2 2h16c1.1 0 2-.9 2-2V8c0-1.1-.9-2-2-2h-8l-2-2z\"><\/path><\/svg><span class=\"file-size\">33 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Los&nbsp;autores&nbsp;expresan&nbsp;su&nbsp;agradecimiento&nbsp;a&nbsp;John&nbsp;Drennan,&nbsp;Maksym&nbsp;Chebotarov&nbsp;y Maksym Skrypchenko por sus valiosos comentarios y sugerencias.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El&nbsp;presente&nbsp;informe&nbsp;ha&nbsp;sido&nbsp;elaborado&nbsp;por&nbsp;el&nbsp;Transatlantic&nbsp;Dialogue&nbsp;Center&nbsp;con&nbsp;el&nbsp;apoyo del Askold and Dir Fund, en el marco del proyecto \u00abUna sociedad civil fuerte&nbsp;en&nbsp;Ucrania:&nbsp;motor&nbsp;de&nbsp;reformas&nbsp;y&nbsp;democracia\u00bb,&nbsp;ejecutado&nbsp;por&nbsp;ISAR&nbsp;Ednannia&nbsp;y financiado por Noruega y Suecia. El contenido de esta publicaci\u00f3n es responsabilidad&nbsp;exclusiva&nbsp;del&nbsp;Transatlantic&nbsp;Dialogue&nbsp;Center&nbsp;y&nbsp;en&nbsp;ning\u00fan&nbsp;caso&nbsp;debe&nbsp;considerarse que refleja la postura oficial del Gobierno de Noruega, del Gobierno de&nbsp;Suecia o de ISAR Ednannia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-introduccion\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Introducci\u00f3n<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-las-relaciones-transatlanticas-estan-atravesando-su-prueba-mas-severa-en-decadas-impulsadas-no-solo-por-los-cambios-politicos-de-washington-sino-tambien-por-una-reorientacion-estrategica-mas-profunda-de-los-estados-unidos-debates-de-larga-data-sobre-el-reparto-de-cargas-prioridades-estrategicas-y-el-nacionalismo-economico-se-han-traducido-en-cambios-politicos-concretos-durante-el-primer-ano-del-segundo-mandato-de-donald-trump-llevando-a-los-aliados-transatlanticos-al-borde-de-guerras-comerciales-y-tensiones-militares-sin-precedentes-sobre-groenlandia\">Las relaciones transatl\u00e1nticas est\u00e1n atravesando su prueba m\u00e1s severa en d\u00e9cadas, impulsadas no&nbsp;s\u00f3lo por los cambios pol\u00edticos de Washington, sino tambi\u00e9n por una reorientaci\u00f3n estrat\u00e9gica m\u00e1s profunda de los Estados Unidos. Debates de larga data sobre el reparto de cargas, prioridades estrat\u00e9gicas,&nbsp;y&nbsp;el&nbsp;nacionalismo econ\u00f3mico&nbsp;se&nbsp;han&nbsp;traducido&nbsp;en&nbsp;cambios&nbsp;pol\u00edticos&nbsp;concretos&nbsp;durante&nbsp;el primer a\u00f1o del segundo mandato de Donald&nbsp;Trump, llevando a los aliados transatl\u00e1nticos al borde de guerras comerciales y tensiones militares sin precedentes sobre Groenlandia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La&nbsp;redirecci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;recursos&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;EE. UU.<strong><em>&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong>hacia&nbsp;la&nbsp;seguridad nacional&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;competencia&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gica con China, la reducci\u00f3n de apoyo a Ucrania, las cr\u00edticas constantes a las instituciones de la UE y a las pol\u00edticas&nbsp;internas&nbsp;europeas,&nbsp;las&nbsp;medidas&nbsp;comerciales&nbsp;proteccionistas&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;despriorizaci\u00f3n&nbsp;del liderazgo&nbsp;clim\u00e1tico&nbsp;global&nbsp;apuntan,&nbsp;en&nbsp;conjunto, una&nbsp;transformaci\u00f3n&nbsp;fundamental&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;asociaci\u00f3n&nbsp;transatl\u00e1ntica.&nbsp;Como consecuencia, los valores compartidos que en su d\u00eda sustentaron la alianza se han debilitado, haciendo que un enfoque pragm\u00e1tico de interacci\u00f3n sea cada vez m\u00e1s necesario.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Esta erosi\u00f3n del compromiso de EE. UU. ha provocado una respuesta estrat\u00e9gica por parte de&nbsp;<strong><em>la UE<\/em><\/strong>. Ante la mayor incertidumbre sobre la fiabilidad de Washington, la UE ha avanzado hacia una mayor autonom\u00eda estrat\u00e9gica, un rearme acelerado, y un papel m\u00e1s prominente en el apoyo a Ucrania. Las decisiones adoptadas en la Cumbre de la OTAN en La Haya celebrada en 2025, junto con iniciativas como&nbsp;el&nbsp;Plan&nbsp;Rearm&nbsp;Europe\/Readiness&nbsp;2030&nbsp;yla&nbsp;Prioritized&nbsp;Ukraine&nbsp;Requirements&nbsp;List&nbsp;(PURL),&nbsp;reflejan los esfuerzos de la UE por adaptarse a un entorno de seguridad cambiante ante la disminuci\u00f3n del liderazgo&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.,&nbsp;con&nbsp;un&nbsp;\u00e9nfasis&nbsp;creciente&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;reparto&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;carga&nbsp;europea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sin embargo, gran parte de la investigaci\u00f3n sobre las relaciones transatl\u00e1nticas sigue enfoc\u00e1ndolas principalmente&nbsp;como&nbsp;una&nbsp;asociaci\u00f3n&nbsp;bilateral&nbsp;EE. UU.-UE,&nbsp;pasando&nbsp;por&nbsp;alto&nbsp;el&nbsp;papel&nbsp;central&nbsp;de&nbsp;<strong><em>Ucrania&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong>en la seguridad europea y el futuro de la cooperaci\u00f3n EE. UU.-UE. La guerra ruso-ucraniana se ha convertido&nbsp;en&nbsp;una&nbsp;prueba&nbsp;de&nbsp;estr\u00e9s&nbsp;decisiva&nbsp;para&nbsp;esta&nbsp;relaci\u00f3n&nbsp;en&nbsp;evoluci\u00f3n:&nbsp;los&nbsp;esfuerzos&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU. por poner fin a la guerra r\u00e1pidamente se han estancado, los Estados miembros de la UE siguen excluidos de las negociaciones de paz que est\u00e1n en curso, mientras que Rusia contin\u00faa obstaculizando el proceso y persiguiendo una prolongada confrontaci\u00f3n con Occidente.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En este contexto, mientras Estados Unidos se est\u00e1 desvinculando&nbsp;<strong><em>estrat\u00e9gicamente&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong>de Europa, sigue siendo&nbsp;de&nbsp;vital&nbsp;inter\u00e9s&nbsp;tanto&nbsp;para&nbsp;Ucrania como para&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;el&nbsp;identificar&nbsp;oportunidades&nbsp;de&nbsp;implicaci\u00f3n&nbsp;<strong><em>t\u00e1ctica&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong>con Washington en medio de la guerra en curso con Rusia. Esto refleja una doble din\u00e1mica:&nbsp;<strong><em>A corto plazo, tanto Ucrania como la UE siguen dependiendo pol\u00edtica y materialmente de Washington, incluso mientras buscan desarrollar estrategias a largo plazo para una mayor autonom\u00eda.&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong>En t\u00e9rminos m\u00e1s&nbsp;amplios, en&nbsp;un&nbsp;entorno&nbsp;internacional&nbsp;cada&nbsp;vez&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;complejo&nbsp;y vol\u00e1til,&nbsp;los&nbsp;Estados&nbsp;Unidos,&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE,&nbsp;y Ucrania se enfrentan a una necesidad compartida de identificar pragm\u00e1ticamente los puntos en los que sus esfuerzos pueden ser coordinados o, como m\u00ednimo, alinear sus posiciones. Esta&nbsp;investigaci\u00f3n&nbsp;busca&nbsp;identificar&nbsp;dichos&nbsp;\u00e1mbitos&nbsp;y&nbsp;formular&nbsp;recomendaciones&nbsp;de&nbsp;pol\u00edtica&nbsp;para&nbsp;<strong><em>lograr una alineaci\u00f3n pragm\u00e1tica, si no una cooperaci\u00f3n plena entre aliados<\/em><\/strong>. Al analizar tanto los puntos de divergencia como las \u00e1reas de convergencia a\u00fan poco exploradas \u2014entre ellas, la lucha contra los poderes autocr\u00e1ticos,&nbsp;la&nbsp;participaci\u00f3n&nbsp;a&nbsp;escala&nbsp;mundial&nbsp;y&nbsp;el&nbsp;desarrollo&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;en&nbsp;materia&nbsp;de defensa\u2014, el documento pone de relieve las oportunidades que ofrece la colaboraci\u00f3n trilateral. De este modo, tambi\u00e9n ofrece recomendaciones para la UE y Ucrania sobre la gesti\u00f3n de las relaciones con Estados Unidos bajo la Administraci\u00f3n de Trump.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Cap\u00edtulo 1. Retos en las relaciones transatl\u00e1nticas y posiciones divergentes EE.UU.-UE-Ucrania<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"860\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/chapter_1-1024x860.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-34871\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/chapter_1-1024x860.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/chapter_1-600x504.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/chapter_1-768x645.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/chapter_1-14x12.png 14w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/chapter_1.png 1080w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El regreso de Trump a la Casa Blanca ha intensificado la crisis de confianza en las relaciones transatl\u00e1nticas,&nbsp;marcando&nbsp;un&nbsp;giro&nbsp;que&nbsp;se&nbsp;aleja de&nbsp;la&nbsp;alineaci\u00f3n&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gica&nbsp;y&nbsp;el&nbsp;multilateralismo basado en valores de las administraciones anteriores hacia un pragmatismo bilateral y&nbsp;transaccional&nbsp;bajo&nbsp;una&nbsp;renovada&nbsp;doctrina&nbsp;\u00abAmerica&nbsp;First\u00bb<sup>[1]<\/sup>&nbsp;<sup>[2]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Este&nbsp;cambio&nbsp;refleja&nbsp;una&nbsp;ret\u00f3rica&nbsp;de&nbsp;los EE. UU. cada vez m\u00e1s confrontativa, el uso de la diplomacia coercitiva y el aumento de las divergencias pol\u00edticas en cuestiones que anteriormente hab\u00edan sido \u00e1reas de estrecha coordinaci\u00f3n, sobre todo a trav\u00e9s del di\u00e1logo directo con Rusia y la creciente presi\u00f3n sobre los socios en materia de gasto en defensa, Groenlandia y las condiciones para poner fin a la guerra&nbsp;ruso-ucraniana.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A medida que las alianzas adquieren cada vez m\u00e1s la forma de acuerdos condicionales, la confianza&nbsp;y&nbsp;el&nbsp;esp\u00edritu&nbsp;de&nbsp;solidaridad&nbsp;se&nbsp;hanerosionado.&nbsp;Este&nbsp;cap\u00edtulo&nbsp;examina&nbsp;las&nbsp;\u00e1reas&nbsp;clave&nbsp;en las&nbsp;que&nbsp;han&nbsp;surgido&nbsp;estas&nbsp;posiciones&nbsp;divergentes&nbsp;entre&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.-UE-Ucrania&nbsp;surgieron&nbsp;yc\u00f3mo&nbsp;han reconfigurado las relaciones transatl\u00e1nticas contempor\u00e1neas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><u>Disoluci\u00f3n de los puntos en <\/u><\/em><i><u>com\u00fan<\/u><\/i><em><u>: derecho internacional<\/u><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>El presidente de los EE. UU., Donald Trump<\/em>, ha declarado p\u00fablicamente que su ejercicio del poder global est\u00e1 limitado primordialmente por su propia moralidad y no tanto por el Derecho Internacional<sup>[3]<\/sup>. Su pol\u00edtica exterior refleja una l\u00f3gica altamente transaccional en la que las instituciones internacionales y las normas jur\u00eddicas quedan subordinadas a los intereses a corto plazo de los EE. UU., filtrados a trav\u00e9s de las preferencias personales del presidente. Acciones unilaterales como las operaciones militares en Venezuela e Ir\u00e1n, reclamos territoriales sobre Groenlandia&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;decisi\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;retirarse&nbsp;de&nbsp;66&nbsp;organizaciones&nbsp;internacionales&nbsp;ilustran&nbsp;este&nbsp;giro<sup>[4]<\/sup>.&nbsp;El distanciamiento de Washington de los mecanismos de justicia internacional y el acercamiento del&nbsp;Presidente&nbsp;Trump&nbsp;a&nbsp;Vlad\u00edmir&nbsp;Putin&nbsp;a&nbsp;pesar&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;orden&nbsp;de detenci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;CPI,&nbsp;subrayan&nbsp;una erosi\u00f3n m\u00e1s amplia de las restricciones normativas sobre el comportamiento de las grandes&nbsp;potencias.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En respuesta a las operaciones militares de EE. UU. en Venezuela e Ir\u00e1n, los&nbsp;<em>l\u00edderes de la UE&nbsp;<\/em>han hecho&nbsp;hincapi\u00e9&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;moderaci\u00f3n&nbsp;y&nbsp;han reafirmado&nbsp;los&nbsp;principios&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;Carta&nbsp;de&nbsp;Naciones&nbsp;Unidas, incluyendo la prohibici\u00f3n del uso de la fuerza y el respeto de la integridad territorial<sup>[5]<\/sup>. Los responsables pol\u00edticos tambi\u00e9n advirtieron que la intervenci\u00f3n en Venezuela corr\u00eda el riesgo de legitimar las esferas de influencia de las grandes potencias, potencialmente alentando una asertividad&nbsp;similar&nbsp;por&nbsp;parte&nbsp;de&nbsp;China&nbsp;y&nbsp;Rusia.&nbsp;La&nbsp;opini\u00f3n&nbsp;p\u00fablica&nbsp;refleja estas&nbsp;preocupaciones:&nbsp;a principios de 2026,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">solo&nbsp;el&nbsp;16&nbsp;%&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;ciudadanos&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;consideraba&nbsp;a&nbsp;los&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;un&nbsp;aliado,<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">lo&nbsp;que&nbsp;refleja&nbsp;una&nbsp;erosi\u00f3n&nbsp;significativa&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;confianza&nbsp;en&nbsp;Washington&nbsp;y&nbsp;una&nbsp;creciente&nbsp;inquietud sobre la durabilidad de los lazos de la seguridad transatl\u00e1ntica<sup>[6]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Parad\u00f3jicamente,&nbsp;como&nbsp;pa\u00eds&nbsp;que&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;ha&nbsp;sufrido&nbsp;las&nbsp;violaciones&nbsp;del&nbsp;derecho&nbsp;internacional,<em> Ucrania&nbsp;<\/em>se&nbsp;adhiere&nbsp;estrictamente&nbsp;al&nbsp;derecho&nbsp;internacional&nbsp;humanitario&nbsp;y&nbsp;a&nbsp;las&nbsp;normas&nbsp;de&nbsp;los conflictos&nbsp;armados,&nbsp;participando&nbsp;activamente&nbsp;en&nbsp;las&nbsp;instituciones&nbsp;globales&nbsp;como&nbsp;la&nbsp;ONU&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;CPI para exigir responsabilidad por la agresi\u00f3n rusa. El presidente Zelenski ha hecho hincapi\u00e9 en la resistencia frente a las amenazas autoritarias, especialmente en su discurso en Davos<sup>[7]<\/sup>, haciendo un llamamiento a una acci\u00f3n colectiva m\u00e1s firme por parte de las democracias occidentales.&nbsp;Dentro&nbsp;de&nbsp;este&nbsp;marco,Ucrania&nbsp;ha&nbsp;planteado&nbsp;su&nbsp;respuesta&nbsp;a&nbsp;las&nbsp;acciones&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU. con cautela: respaldando los ataques contra las instalaciones nucleares iran\u00edes como una se\u00f1al contra la proliferaci\u00f3n y el apoyo a Rusia<sup>[8]<\/sup>, al tiempo que niega a reconocer la legitimidad de Nicol\u00e1s Maduro<sup>[9]<\/sup>, alineando estas posiciones con su compromiso m\u00e1s amplio con las normas&nbsp;internacionales.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"2\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><u>La seguridad <\/u><\/em><i><u>estrat\u00e9gico<\/u><\/i><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Giro geopol\u00edtico estrat\u00e9gico.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Para los&nbsp;<em>Estados Unidos<\/em>, Europa ya no es la principal prioridad estrat\u00e9gica; la defensa nacional y&nbsp;la disuasi\u00f3n de China han ocupado su lugar. En Washington, este cambio suele considerarse justificado: la provisi\u00f3n de seguridad para Europa por parte de Estados Unidos, asumiendo una parte significativa de los costes asociados, permiti\u00f3 a los Estados Europeos desarrollar sistemas de bienestar robustos. Ante el riesgo de una sobrecarga al librar dos grandes guerras simult\u00e1neamente, los EE. UU. han dado prioridad, de forma pragm\u00e1tica, al escenario que consideran m\u00e1s cr\u00edtico: el Indo-Pac\u00edfico. En este contexto,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Estados&nbsp;Unidos&nbsp;ve&nbsp;cada&nbsp;vez&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;a&nbsp;Europa&nbsp;como&nbsp;un&nbsp;actor&nbsp;d\u00e9bil, cargado&nbsp;por problemas internos e insuficientemente capaz de defenderse por s\u00ed mismo.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Para&nbsp;<em>la UE<\/em>, este cambio ha supuesto un duro golpe. Muchos europeos perciben esto como una traici\u00f3n&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;unidad&nbsp;transatl\u00e1ntica&nbsp;que&nbsp;hab\u00eda existido&nbsp;durante&nbsp;d\u00e9cadas.&nbsp;Como&nbsp;resultado,&nbsp;se&nbsp;est\u00e1n debatiendo nuevos formatos para la seguridad europea, incluyendo un Consejo de Seguridad Europeo<sup>[10]<\/sup>, un pilar europeo m\u00e1s s\u00f3lido dentro de la OTAN y la b\u00fasqueda de la autonom\u00eda estrat\u00e9gica europea<sup>[11]<\/sup>. Al mismo tiempo, algunos en Europa a\u00fan esperan un compromiso renovado&nbsp;por&nbsp;parte&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;y&nbsp;siguen&nbsp;creyendo&nbsp;que&nbsp;una&nbsp;futura&nbsp;Administraci\u00f3nestadounidense podr\u00eda&nbsp;revertir&nbsp;el&nbsp;rumbo&nbsp;actual<sup>[12]<\/sup>.&nbsp;<em>Para&nbsp;Ucrania<\/em>,&nbsp;el&nbsp;giro&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;genera&nbsp;una&nbsp;aguda&nbsp;incertidumbre estrat\u00e9gica, ya que su supervivencia depende de la cohesi\u00f3n transatl\u00e1ntica.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Percepciones divergentes de la amenaza.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Con el cambio de las prioridades estrat\u00e9gicas surgen diferentes evaluaciones de las amenazas, lo que complica la posibilidad de una visi\u00f3n transatl\u00e1ntica coherente.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Mientras que China es vista por&nbsp;<em>diferentes instituciones de EE. UU.&nbsp;<\/em>como una amenaza creciente&nbsp;o como el principal competidor econ\u00f3mico, el desaf\u00edo que plantea Rusia se minimiza cada vez&nbsp;m\u00e1s<sup>[13]<\/sup>. Mientras que la Administraci\u00f3n Biden enmarc\u00f3 a Rusia y China como parte de una&nbsp;contienda m\u00e1s amplia con potencias autoritarias, la Administraci\u00f3n Trump sostiene que ambas pueden&nbsp;desacoplarse,&nbsp;buscando atraer&nbsp;a Mosc\u00fa&nbsp;hacia&nbsp;Washington<sup>[14]<\/sup>.&nbsp;La&nbsp;Estrategia&nbsp;de&nbsp;Seguridad&nbsp;Nacional (ESN) de EE. UU. adopta una ret\u00f3rica comparativamente moderada hacia Mosc\u00fa y anima&nbsp;a&nbsp;los&nbsp;Estados&nbsp;europeos&nbsp;a&nbsp;buscar&nbsp;un&nbsp;<em>restablecimiento&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;estabilidad&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gica&nbsp;con&nbsp;Rusia<\/em><sup>[15]<\/sup><em>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Esto enfatiza cada vez m\u00e1s los puntos de divergencia con los aliados europeos. Las principales representantes de la UE, Ursula von der Leyen<sup>[16]<\/sup>&nbsp;y Kaja Kallas, se refieren a Rusia como una&nbsp;<em>amenaza existencial<\/em><sup>[17]<\/sup>. Sin embargo, las posturas de los Estados miembros difieren al respecto: Los pa\u00edses de Europa Central y Oriental (CEE), Rusia es el principal desaf\u00edo en materia de seguridad<sup>[18]<\/sup>, mientras que otros se muestran m\u00e1s reacios a considerar al Kremlin como una amenaza directa<sup>[19]<\/sup>. En comparaci\u00f3n, aunque la UE aborda las relaciones con China con m\u00e1s cautela&nbsp;que&nbsp;hace&nbsp;7\u201310&nbsp;a\u00f1os,&nbsp;sigue&nbsp;dependiendo&nbsp;de&nbsp;manera&nbsp;cr\u00edtica&nbsp;de&nbsp;China&nbsp;en&nbsp;cuanto&nbsp;a&nbsp;materias primas y tecnolog\u00edas de energ\u00eda limpia<sup>[20]<\/sup>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Trata&nbsp;a&nbsp;China&nbsp;simult\u00e1neamente&nbsp;como&nbsp;un&nbsp;socio,&nbsp;competidor&nbsp;econ\u00f3mico&nbsp;y&nbsp;un rival sist\u00e9mico<sup>[21]<\/sup>&nbsp;<sup>[22]<\/sup>,&nbsp;al&nbsp;tiempo&nbsp;que intenta&nbsp;cubrir&nbsp;los&nbsp;riesgos&nbsp;en&nbsp;las&nbsp;relaciones&nbsp;con&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU. mediante una cooperaci\u00f3n selectiva con Pek\u00edn<sup>[23]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Ucrania&nbsp;<\/em>ve a Rusia como la principal amenaza para la seguridad europea, argumentando que el Kremlin&nbsp;no&nbsp;tiene&nbsp;ninguna&nbsp;intenci\u00f3n&nbsp;de acabar&nbsp;la&nbsp;guerra&nbsp;y&nbsp;se&nbsp;est\u00e1&nbsp;preparando&nbsp;para&nbsp;una&nbsp;potencial confrontaci\u00f3n directa con la OTAN en 2029\u20132030<sup>[24]<\/sup>. El respaldo de China a Rusia mediante la evasi\u00f3n de sanciones y los bienes de doble uso refuerza a\u00fan m\u00e1s esta percepci\u00f3n de amenaza, lo&nbsp;que&nbsp;contribuye&nbsp;a&nbsp;opiniones muy&nbsp;negativas&nbsp;entre&nbsp;dos&nbsp;tercios&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;ucranianos<sup>[25]<\/sup>&nbsp;y&nbsp;convierte&nbsp;a Ucrania&nbsp;en&nbsp;uno&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;dos&nbsp;\u00fanicos&nbsp;pa\u00edses&nbsp;del&nbsp;mundo&nbsp;donde&nbsp;la&nbsp;mayor\u00eda&nbsp;de la&nbsp;poblaci\u00f3n&nbsp;(55&nbsp;%)&nbsp;ve&nbsp;a China como un adversario o rival<sup>[26]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Desajuste de ritmos en la disuasi\u00f3n transatl\u00e1ntica.&nbsp;<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El creciente desajuste entre el ritmo de la reorientaci\u00f3n estrat\u00e9gica de EE. UU. y la capacidad de Europa para asumir una mayor responsabilidad en materia de su propia seguridad constituye otro reto transatl\u00e1ntico. El esfuerzo de EE. UU. por reasignar la responsabilidad de la mayor parte de las capacidades de defensa convencional de la OTAN a los aliados europeos para 2027<sup>[27]<\/sup>&nbsp;contrasta con la lenta capacidad de rearme de Europa, lo que crea una brecha de transici\u00f3n: se espera que Europa ejerza la disuasi\u00f3n, pero a\u00fan no est\u00e1 equipada para hacerlo. El problema no es la inacci\u00f3n europea per se, sino la ausencia de un cronograma sincronizado para la transferencia de las responsabilidades de disuasi\u00f3n, lo que amenaza la credibilidad y la cohesi\u00f3n de la arquitectura de seguridad europea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"520\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-2-1024x520.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Navigating the US\u2013EU\u2013Ukraine Triangle: Revitalizing Transatlantic Security Cooperation\" class=\"wp-image-34888\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-2-1024x520.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-2-600x304.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-2-768x390.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-2-18x9.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-2.png 1080w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La actual&nbsp;<em>Administraci\u00f3n&nbsp;<\/em>de EE. UU. considera a los Estados miembros de la UE como el \u00abfree riders club\u00bb<sup>[28]<\/sup>, por haber dependido durante d\u00e9cadas de las garant\u00edas de seguridad estadounidenses aportando demasiado poco a cambio<sup>[29]<\/sup>. Washington lleva mucho tiempo presionando para que Europa asuma una mayor responsabilidad en su propia defensa convencional<sup>[30]<\/sup>&nbsp;y&nbsp;aumente&nbsp;el&nbsp;gasto&nbsp;en&nbsp;defensa,&nbsp;altiempo&nbsp;que&nbsp;se\u00f1ala&nbsp;una&nbsp;r\u00e1pida&nbsp;reducci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;su presencia&nbsp;militar&nbsp;y&nbsp;de&nbsp;sus&nbsp;implicaciones&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguridad&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;continente.&nbsp;La&nbsp;retirada&nbsp;de&nbsp;lasfuerzas de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;pa\u00edses&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;ya&nbsp;est\u00e1&nbsp;parcialmente&nbsp;en&nbsp;marcha:&nbsp;en&nbsp;octubre&nbsp;de&nbsp;2025,&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU. anunci\u00f3 una reducci\u00f3n de su presencia militar en Ruman\u00eda de aproximadamente 2000 a 1000&nbsp;efectivos.<sup>[31]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>La UE<\/em>, aunque de forma lenta y dolorosa, ha aceptado esta realidad y ha dado pasos significativos hacia el rearme, pero sus plazos no se alinean a las expectativas de EE. UU. Ha puesto en marcha importantes iniciativas de defensa e industriales: la adopci\u00f3n de nuevos marcos estrat\u00e9gicos (EDIS, EDIP)<sup>[32]<\/sup>, la introducci\u00f3n de reformas institucionales (Comisario Europeo de Espacio y Defensa)<sup>[33]<\/sup>&nbsp;y el despliegue de instrumentos financieros (Plan Rearm Europe\/Readiness 2030)<sup>[34]<\/sup>. Sin embargo, estos esfuerzos requieren tiempo, y algunas capacidades de alto nivel no pueden sustituirse, como las plataformas de ataque de largo alcance, los sistemas avanzados de lanzacohetes m\u00faltiples como el M142 HIMARS, los activos&nbsp;de defensa contra misiles bal\u00edsticos y las municiones clave.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">EE. UU. sigue siendo el principal proveedor de estos sistemas, al tiempo que expresa su preocupaci\u00f3n&nbsp;por&nbsp;que&nbsp;las nuevas&nbsp;iniciativas&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;restrinjan&nbsp;el&nbsp;acceso&nbsp;al&nbsp;mercado de las empresas estadounidenses<sup>[35]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Esto&nbsp;crea&nbsp;una&nbsp;paradoja&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;que&nbsp;se&nbsp;insta&nbsp;a&nbsp;Europa&nbsp;a&nbsp;ser&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;aut\u00f3noma, al tiempo&nbsp;que&nbsp;sigue&nbsp;dependiendo&nbsp;de&nbsp;manera&nbsp;cr\u00edtica&nbsp;de&nbsp;las capacidades&nbsp;y&nbsp;las&nbsp;exportaciones&nbsp;de defensa&nbsp;estadounidenses.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"801\" height=\"1024\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/2-2-801x1024.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-34891\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/2-2-801x1024.png 801w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/2-2-469x600.png 469w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/2-2-768x982.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/2-2-9x12.png 9w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/2-2.png 999w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 801px) 100vw, 801px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En la pr\u00e1ctica, muchas capitales europeas se enfrentan&nbsp;a&nbsp;un&nbsp;dilema&nbsp;entre&nbsp;el&nbsp;corto&nbsp;y&nbsp;el largo plazo: adquirir sistemas estadounidenses para cerrar brechas urgentes y, al mismo tiempo, desarrollar&nbsp;capacidades&nbsp;europeas&nbsp;para&nbsp;reducir&nbsp;la&nbsp;dependencia&nbsp;a&nbsp;largo&nbsp;plazo.&nbsp;En este&nbsp;contexto,&nbsp;algunos Estados miembros de la UE siguen favoreciendo a los proveedores estadounidenses, viendo estas compras como una forma de reforzar los lazos de seguridad con&nbsp;Washington<sup>[36]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La dependencia de&nbsp;<em>Ucrania&nbsp;<\/em>de la defensa&nbsp;a\u00e9rea suministrada por EE. UU. ilustra los riesgos&nbsp;de&nbsp;este&nbsp;desequilibrio.&nbsp;La capacidad&nbsp;de Kyiv para proteger infraestructuras cr\u00edticas depende en gran medida de la defensa a\u00e9rea estadounidense(en&nbsp;particular,&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;sistemas Patriot),&nbsp;lo&nbsp;que&nbsp;subraya&nbsp;la&nbsp;limitada&nbsp;capacidad de Europa para ofrecer una protecci\u00f3n comparable con unos niveles de producci\u00f3n industrial&nbsp;suficientes.&nbsp;Una&nbsp;retirada&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU. demasiado r\u00e1pida, ya sea en cuanto a presencia de tropas o a asistencia en materia de seguridad, podr\u00eda dejar a los aliados europeos expuestos durante un prolongado per\u00edodo de ajuste,&nbsp;lo&nbsp;que&nbsp;debilitar\u00eda&nbsp;la&nbsp;disuasi\u00f3n,&nbsp;erosionando&nbsp;la&nbsp;confianza&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;aliados&nbsp;y&nbsp;enviar\u00eda se\u00f1ales desestabilizadoras a Rusia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Vulnerabilidades estrat\u00e9gicas en la cooperaci\u00f3n de la industria de defensa.&nbsp;<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La cooperaci\u00f3n en materia de industria de defensa entre EE. UU., la UE y Ucrania se enfrenta a obst\u00e1culos persistentes,&nbsp;incluyendo&nbsp;los&nbsp;controles&nbsp;de&nbsp;exportaci\u00f3n&nbsp;estadounidenses,&nbsp;las&nbsp;barreras regulatorias, las preocupaciones sobre la seguridad de las instalaciones de producci\u00f3n en Ucrania y las restricciones a la transferencia de tecnolog\u00eda. Los acontecimientos pol\u00edticos de 2025 han tensado a\u00fan m\u00e1s las relaciones, erosionando la confianza y acelerando el impulso de Europa hacia una mayor autosuficiencia industrial-defensiva.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Aunque muchas&nbsp;<em>empresas estadounidenses&nbsp;<\/em>se presentan como proveedores responsables, por&nbsp;parte&nbsp;del&nbsp;Gobierno,&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;industrial transatl\u00e1ntica&nbsp;se&nbsp;ve&nbsp;limitada&nbsp;por&nbsp;el Reglamento&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;el&nbsp;Tr\u00e1fico&nbsp;Internacional&nbsp;de&nbsp;Armas&nbsp;(ITAR),&nbsp;que&nbsp;restringe&nbsp;la&nbsp;transferencia&nbsp;de&nbsp;tecnolog\u00eda relacionada&nbsp;con&nbsp;la&nbsp;defensa&nbsp;a&nbsp;personas&nbsp;no&nbsp;estadounidenses&nbsp;sin&nbsp;autorizaci\u00f3n&nbsp;e&nbsp;impone&nbsp;estrictos&nbsp;requisitos de licencia, control de datos y registro. Estas normas complican proyectos conjuntos como&nbsp;el F-35&nbsp;y&nbsp;limitan&nbsp;la&nbsp;coproducci\u00f3n. En&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;con&nbsp;Ucrania, los&nbsp;riesgos&nbsp;de seguridad&nbsp;y las&nbsp;preocupaciones&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;la&nbsp;transferencia&nbsp;de&nbsp;tecnolog\u00eda siguen&nbsp;siendo&nbsp;los&nbsp;principales&nbsp;obst\u00e1culos&nbsp;para&nbsp;establecer&nbsp;instalaciones&nbsp;de producci\u00f3n&nbsp;o&nbsp;empresas&nbsp;conjuntas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Para&nbsp;evitar&nbsp;las&nbsp;restricciones&nbsp;del&nbsp;ITAR,&nbsp;los&nbsp;productores&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa&nbsp;de&nbsp;la UE&nbsp;buscan&nbsp;cada&nbsp;vez&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;desarrollar&nbsp;sistemas&nbsp;sin&nbsp;componentes de&nbsp;origen&nbsp;estadounidense,&nbsp;a&nbsp;pesar&nbsp;de que&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE sigue&nbsp;dependiendo&nbsp;fuertemente&nbsp;de&nbsp;ellos<sup>[37]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">M\u00e1s all\u00e1 del hardware, la dependencia de Europa del software estadounidense, que requiere actualizaciones constantes y puede estar sujeto a interruptores de apagado, crea vulnerabilidades&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;disuasi\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE<sup>[38]<\/sup>.&nbsp;A&nbsp;nivel&nbsp;interno,&nbsp;la&nbsp;fragmentaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;industria&nbsp;de defensa, el proteccionismo nacional y la limitada confianza entre los fabricantes siguen obstaculizando&nbsp;una&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;industrial-defensiva&nbsp;europea&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;profunda.&nbsp;Si&nbsp;bien&nbsp;la&nbsp;iniciativa SAFE&nbsp;<em>(Security Action for Europe)<\/em>, dotada con 150 000 millones de euros, tiene como objetivo ampliar la capacidad y permitir la participaci\u00f3n de Ucrania<sup>[39]<\/sup>, las empresas conjuntas con Ucrania&nbsp;siguen&nbsp;limitadas&nbsp;por preocupaciones&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;garant\u00edas&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguridad,&nbsp;propiedad&nbsp;intelectual y transferencia de tecnolog\u00eda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Ucrania&nbsp;<\/em>ha expandido r\u00e1pidamente su industria de defensa bajo la presi\u00f3n de la guerra y busca integrarse en las cadenas de suministro europeas. Sin embargo, la fiabilidad de Ucrania como socio&nbsp;industrial&nbsp;se&nbsp;ve&nbsp;limitada&nbsp;por&nbsp;riesgos de&nbsp;seguridad,&nbsp;restricciones&nbsp;parciales&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;exportaci\u00f3n&nbsp;y limitaciones&nbsp;financieras:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">se&nbsp;prev\u00e9&nbsp;que&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;financie&nbsp;s\u00f3lo&nbsp;alrededor&nbsp;del&nbsp;60&nbsp;%&nbsp;de&nbsp;su&nbsp;capacidad&nbsp;de producci\u00f3n en&nbsp;2026<sup>[40]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A pesar de los pocos ejemplos de \u00e9xito, los esfuerzos por establecer una cooperaci\u00f3n siguen siendo limitados hasta la fecha. Si bien Ucrania podr\u00eda convertirse en un importante contribuyente al rearme de Europa, su industria de defensa en r\u00e1pido crecimiento tambi\u00e9n es vista cada vez m\u00e1s por los productores de la UE como un competidor potencial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"3\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><u>Arreglo pac\u00edfico en Ucrania: puntos de vista divergentes<\/u><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Paz, pero no \u00abjusta\u00bb.&nbsp;<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">No existe una visi\u00f3n transatl\u00e1ntica unificada sobre el arreglo pac\u00edfico, el objetivo&nbsp;final&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;guerra&nbsp;o&nbsp;el&nbsp;futuro&nbsp;a&nbsp;largo&nbsp;plazo&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania.&nbsp;Lasposturas&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;Uni\u00f3n&nbsp;Europea&nbsp;y de Estados Unidos difieren notablemente tanto en sus principios como en sus visiones para poner fin a la guerra ruso-ucraniana.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La nueva Administraci\u00f3n estadounidense da prioridad a un alto el fuego r\u00e1pido y parece dispuesta a utilizar herramientas como las conversaciones directas entre los presidentes&nbsp;Trump y&nbsp;Putin&nbsp;para&nbsp;lograrlo<sup>[41]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Sin&nbsp;embargo,&nbsp;muestra&nbsp;poco&nbsp;inter\u00e9s&nbsp;en&nbsp;una&nbsp;<em>paz justa&nbsp;<\/em>o&nbsp;en&nbsp;larendici\u00f3n&nbsp;de cuentas&nbsp;de&nbsp;Rusia,&nbsp;ya&nbsp;que&nbsp;varios&nbsp;planes&nbsp;propuestos&nbsp;sugieren&nbsp;un&nbsp;retorno&nbsp;a&nbsp;las&nbsp;relaciones&nbsp;normales sin consecuencias para la agresi\u00f3n rusa<sup>[42]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El presidente Trump evita atribuir la responsabilidad de la guerra a Rusia y ejerce m\u00e1s presi\u00f3n sobre Kyiv que sobre Mosc\u00fa, al menos verbalmente. Los responsables pol\u00edticos estadounidenses retratan a los europeos como excesivamente beligerantes, critic\u00e1ndolos por carecer de iniciativas de paz coherentes y por un apoyo insuficiente a Ucrania<sup>[43]<\/sup>. Las m\u00faltiples rondas de negociaciones han dado hasta ahora pocos frutos, marcadas por la falta de una visi\u00f3n compartida para la resoluci\u00f3n pac\u00edfica de la guerra.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Por el contrario, para los principales&nbsp;<em>actores&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE<\/em>, la integridad territorial de Ucrania no&nbsp;es negociable<sup>[44]<\/sup>;&nbsp;defienden&nbsp;el&nbsp;principio&nbsp;de&nbsp;\u00abnada&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;sin&nbsp;Ucrania\u00bb<sup>[45]<\/sup>&nbsp;y&nbsp;apoyan&nbsp;el enjuiciamiento de altos cargos rusos, incluido Vlad\u00edmir Putin<sup>[46]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Al mismo tiempo, los Estados europeos siguen estando en gran medida excluidos del proceso de negociaci\u00f3n de paz y, por consiguiente, ejercen&nbsp;s\u00f3lo&nbsp;una&nbsp;influencia&nbsp;limitada&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;su&nbsp;rumbo,&nbsp;expresando&nbsp;su&nbsp;preocupaci\u00f3n por los contactos diplom\u00e1ticos unilaterales de Estados Unidos con funcionarios rusos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0448\u0430\u0445\u0438-1024x576.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-34894\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0448\u0430\u0445\u0438-1024x576.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0448\u0430\u0445\u0438-600x337.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0448\u0430\u0445\u0438-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0448\u0430\u0445\u0438-1536x864.png 1536w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0448\u0430\u0445\u0438-2048x1152.png 2048w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0448\u0430\u0445\u0438-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Ucrania&nbsp;<\/em>aboga por una paz justa y duradera, mientras participa simult\u00e1neamente en las negociaciones y coordina estrechamente con sus socios estadounidenses y europeos. Mientras que&nbsp;al&nbsp;inicio&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;guerra&nbsp;la&nbsp;mayor\u00eda&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;ucranianos&nbsp;rechazaba&nbsp;cualquier&nbsp;concesi\u00f3n territorial, las encuestas recientes muestran una apertura condicionada al compromiso<sup>[47]<\/sup>, junto con una gran sensibilidad hacia los t\u00e9rminos de un posible acuerdo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Cabe&nbsp;destacar&nbsp;que&nbsp;el&nbsp;86&nbsp;%&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;ucranianos&nbsp;espera&nbsp;otra&nbsp;invasi\u00f3n&nbsp;en&nbsp;alg\u00fan momento, incluso si se alcanza un alto el fuego<sup>[48]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A&nbsp;pesar&nbsp;del&nbsp;proceso&nbsp;de&nbsp;negociaci\u00f3n&nbsp;trilateral&nbsp;en&nbsp;curso&nbsp;entre&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.-Ucrania-Rusia<sup>[49]<\/sup>,&nbsp;no&nbsp;se&nbsp;sabe p\u00fablicamente si existe consenso sobre cuestiones como la adhesi\u00f3n de Ucrania a la OTAN, la naturaleza de las garant\u00edas de seguridad<sup>[50]<\/sup>&nbsp;y las concesiones territoriales<sup>[51]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Apoyo militar: retirada de EE. UU. y lenta implicaci\u00f3n de Europa.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Aunque el apoyo militar a Ucrania sigue siendo considerable en t\u00e9rminos globales, aunque politizado e insuficiente para que Ucrania gane la guerra, las interrupciones en la ayuda estadounidense y la implicaci\u00f3n desigual&nbsp;de&nbsp;Europa&nbsp;han&nbsp;reducido&nbsp;la&nbsp;previsibilidad&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;coherencia&nbsp;enuna&nbsp;fase&nbsp;cr\u00edtica&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;guerra.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La&nbsp;<em>visi\u00f3n de EE. UU.<\/em>: Washington ha acusado repetidamente a los pa\u00edses de la UE de prestar un apoyo insuficiente a Ucrania, incluso bajo la Administraci\u00f3n Biden. El presidente Trump&nbsp;sobreestim\u00f3&nbsp;considerablemente&nbsp;la&nbsp;contribuci\u00f3n&nbsp;estadounidense,&nbsp;afirmando&nbsp;que&nbsp;el&nbsp;apoyo&nbsp;total de EE. UU. superaba los 300 000 millones de d\u00f3lares, aunque las cifras reales&nbsp;\u2014incluida la ayuda directa, las inversiones en las propias fuerzas armadas estadounidenses y los gastos relacionados\u2014 ascendieron aproximadamente a 175 000 millones de d\u00f3lares<sup>[52]<\/sup>. Bajo su Administraci\u00f3n, se intensific\u00f3 el escepticismo hacia la ayuda<sup>[53]<\/sup>: varios programas aprobados bajo la Administraci\u00f3n anterior, incluida la Iniciativa de Asistencia de Seguridad de Ucrania&nbsp;(USAI),&nbsp;fueron&nbsp;suspendidos&nbsp;repetidamente<sup>[54]<\/sup>,&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;financiaci\u00f3n&nbsp;adicional&nbsp;se&nbsp;redujodr\u00e1sticamente:&nbsp;de 60 000 millones de d\u00f3lares en 2024 a unos 800 millones de d\u00f3lares en 2026<sup>[55]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tras\u00a0el\u00a0enfrentamiento\u00a0en\u00a0el\u00a0Despacho\u00a0Oval\u00a0entre\u00a0Trump,\u00a0el\u00a0vicepresidente\u00a0de\u00a0EE.\u00a0UU.\u00a0JD\u00a0Vance\u00a0y Zelenski\u00a0en\u00a0febrero\u00a0de\u00a02025<sup>[56]<\/sup>,\u00a0EE.\u00a0UU.suspendi\u00f3\u00a0temporalmente\u00a0el\u00a0intercambio\u00a0de\u00a0inteligencia\u00a0y\u00a0la\u00a0ayuda\u00a0militar\u00a0a\u00a0Kyiv, demostrando\u00a0que\u00a0el\u00a0apoyo\u00a0a\u00a0Ucrania\u00a0puede\u00a0utilizarse\u00a0como herramienta de\u00a0<em>presi\u00f3n pol\u00edtica<\/em>. Las interrupciones tanto en el armamento estadounidenses como en el apoyo de inteligencia contribuyeron a la p\u00e9rdida de algunos territorios ucranianos y al bombardeo generalizado de ciudades<sup>[57]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Aunque&nbsp;posteriormente&nbsp;se&nbsp;restableci\u00f3&nbsp;el&nbsp;intercambio&nbsp;de&nbsp;inteligencia&nbsp;y&nbsp;se&nbsp;reanudaron&nbsp;los&nbsp;env\u00edos, el episodio puso de manifiesto la fragilidad de las implicaciones de EE. UU. A pesar de las expresiones peri\u00f3dicas de frustraci\u00f3n por la falta de voluntad de Putin para negociar<sup>[58]<\/sup>&nbsp;<sup>[59]<\/sup>, el retorno a una asistencia directa de EE. UU. a gran escala sigue siendo poco probable, en medio de la reorientaci\u00f3n de la Administraci\u00f3n hacia el Indo-Pac\u00edfico y las preocupaciones por el agotamiento de las reservas<sup>[60]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>La perspectiva de la UE<\/em>:&nbsp;A&nbsp;principios&nbsp;de&nbsp;2025,&nbsp;la&nbsp;ayuda&nbsp;militar&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;a&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;quedaba&nbsp;rezagada respecto a la de Estados Unidos \u201452 000 millones de d\u00f3lares frente a 65 000 millones\u2014, aunque Europa proporcion\u00f3 m\u00e1s ayuda humanitaria y econ\u00f3mica<sup>[61]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Sin&nbsp;embargo,&nbsp;a&nbsp;finales&nbsp;de&nbsp;a\u00f1o,&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;aument\u00f3&nbsp;significativamente&nbsp;su&nbsp;apoyo&nbsp;militar, superando&nbsp;las&nbsp;contribuciones&nbsp;totales&nbsp;de&nbsp;Estados&nbsp;Unidos&nbsp;(70&nbsp;000&nbsp;millones&nbsp;de&nbsp;d\u00f3lares)<sup>[62]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Aunque los Estados miembros no lograron alcanzar un consenso sobre el uso de los activos&nbsp;rusos congelados, la UE ha acordado congelar indefinidamente dichos activos<sup>[63]<\/sup>&nbsp;y continuar el apoyo&nbsp;mediante&nbsp;un&nbsp;pr\u00e9stamo&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;de&nbsp;90&nbsp;000&nbsp;millones&nbsp;de&nbsp;euros&nbsp;respaldado&nbsp;por&nbsp;el margen&nbsp;de maniobra&nbsp;presupuestario<sup>[64]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Aunque&nbsp;carece&nbsp;de&nbsp;un&nbsp;fuerte&nbsp;impacto&nbsp;simb\u00f3lico,&nbsp;la&nbsp;decisi\u00f3n&nbsp;demostr\u00f3 la&nbsp;capacidad&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;<em>UE&nbsp;para avanzar&nbsp;mediante&nbsp;el&nbsp;compromiso<\/em>,&nbsp;a&nbsp;pesar&nbsp;de&nbsp;las&nbsp;posiciones&nbsp;iniciales de Hungr\u00eda y Eslovaquia<sup>[65]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Muchos en la UE dudaban de que Estados Unidos estuviera dispuesto siquiera a vender armas a Ucrania.&nbsp;Sin&nbsp;embargo,&nbsp;surgi\u00f3&nbsp;la&nbsp;iniciativa&nbsp;ad hoc&nbsp;PURL&nbsp;para&nbsp;financiar&nbsp;las&nbsp;armas&nbsp;estadounidenses destinadas&nbsp;a&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;con&nbsp;fondos&nbsp;europeos,&nbsp;con&nbsp;el&nbsp;objetivo&nbsp;de&nbsp;evitar&nbsp;nuevos&nbsp;reveses&nbsp;en&nbsp;el frente&nbsp;y satisfacer las necesidades militares m\u00e1s urgentes de Ucrania[66], aunque sin la plena participaci\u00f3n de la UE. No obstante, los Estados miembros de la UE siguen sin poder sustituir ciertas capacidades cr\u00edticas proporcionadas por EE. UU., en particular en materia de comunicaciones&nbsp;e&nbsp;inteligencia,&nbsp;debido&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;limitada&nbsp;infraestructura&nbsp;satelital<sup>[67]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Tambi\u00e9n&nbsp;persiste la incertidumbre sobre la sostenibilidad de los suministros de armas estadounidenses, en medio de preocupaciones sobre las reservas, y sobre la voluntad y la capacidad de Europa para seguir comprando armas estadounidenses al mismo nivel, en un contexto de crecientes tensiones pol\u00edticas y econ\u00f3micas con Washington.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1080\" height=\"1350\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/4-819x1024.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Navigating the US\u2013EU\u2013Ukraine Triangle: Revitalizing Transatlantic Security Cooperation\" class=\"wp-image-34896\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/4-819x1024.png 819w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/4-480x600.png 480w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/4-768x960.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/4-10x12.png 10w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/4.png 1080w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1080px) 100vw, 1080px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Garant\u00edas de seguridad: indecisi\u00f3n de Europa y limitaciones de EE. UU.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Unas garant\u00edas de seguridad cre\u00edbles son uno de los elementos fundamentales para que Ucrania participe en cualquier negociaci\u00f3n de paz. Sin embargo, no hay detalles concretos sobre el alcance de las implicaciones de EE. UU., mientras que Europa, aunque en principio se muestra m\u00e1s dispuesta, se enfrenta a cuestiones sin resolver sobre su capacidad de decisi\u00f3n y su capacidad a largo&nbsp;plazo.&nbsp;El&nbsp;desajuste&nbsp;entrelas&nbsp;expectativas&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania,&nbsp;la&nbsp;moderaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;incertidumbre&nbsp;europea&nbsp;define&nbsp;el&nbsp;actual&nbsp;dilema&nbsp;trilateral.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;<\/em>dej\u00f3&nbsp;claro&nbsp;que&nbsp;no&nbsp;ofrecer\u00e1&nbsp;garant\u00edas&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguridad&nbsp;directas&nbsp;con&nbsp;tropas&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;el&nbsp;terreno&nbsp;ni liderar\u00e1 una misi\u00f3n de imposici\u00f3n de la paz<sup>[68]<\/sup>. Aunque la Casa Blanca ha acogido con&nbsp;favorablemente&nbsp;la&nbsp;idea&nbsp;de&nbsp;una&nbsp;\u00abcoalici\u00f3n&nbsp;de voluntarios\u00bb&nbsp;liderada&nbsp;por&nbsp;Europa,&nbsp;el&nbsp;apoyo&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;sigue sin estar definido en gran medida<sup>[69][70]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Es probable que cualquier participaci\u00f3n estadounidense sea indirecta (facilitadores estrat\u00e9gicos,&nbsp;ISR, monitorizaci\u00f3n),&nbsp;dejando&nbsp;la responsabilidad&nbsp;operativa&nbsp;principalmente en manos de los socios europeos.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Al&nbsp;mismo&nbsp;tiempo,&nbsp;persiste&nbsp;la&nbsp;incertidumbre&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;si&nbsp;la&nbsp;actual&nbsp;Administraci\u00f3n&nbsp;cumplir\u00eda&nbsp;de&nbsp;forma fiable las garant\u00edas de seguridad que ofrece.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Para muchos en&nbsp;<em>Europa<\/em>, el objetivo principal de la coalici\u00f3n de voluntarios es demostrar determinaci\u00f3n&nbsp;y&nbsp;enviar&nbsp;una&nbsp;se\u00f1al&nbsp;a&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;de&nbsp;quelos&nbsp;europeos&nbsp;est\u00e1n&nbsp;preparados&nbsp;para&nbsp;asumir&nbsp;la responsabilidad&nbsp;de&nbsp;su&nbsp;propia&nbsp;seguridad<sup>[71]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Sin&nbsp;embargo,&nbsp;la&nbsp;participaci\u00f3n&nbsp;est\u00e1&nbsp;muy condicionada y&nbsp;est\u00e1&nbsp;sujeta&nbsp;a&nbsp;tres&nbsp;requisitos&nbsp;previos&nbsp;clave:&nbsp;un&nbsp;alto&nbsp;el&nbsp;fuego,&nbsp;el&nbsp;despliegue&nbsp;lejos&nbsp;de&nbsp;las&nbsp;zonas&nbsp;de combate activo y un respaldo pol\u00edtico y log\u00edstico suficiente por parte de EE. UU.<sup>[72]<\/sup>&nbsp;Cualquier despliegue requerir\u00eda adem\u00e1s equilibrar las prioridades de defensa nacional, las reservas estrat\u00e9gicas de la OTAN y la presencia de tropas en el Flanco Oriental<sup>[73]<\/sup>. Aunque se ha informado&nbsp;que&nbsp;los&nbsp;ej\u00e9rcitos franc\u00e9s,&nbsp;brit\u00e1nico&nbsp;y&nbsp;ucraniano&nbsp;han&nbsp;determinado&nbsp;las&nbsp;contribuciones&nbsp;de fuerzas, los mandatos y las estructuras de mando, estos detalles siguen siendo desconocidos para el p\u00fablico en general<sup>[74]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Para&nbsp;<em>Ucrania<\/em>,&nbsp;la&nbsp;incertidumbre&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;las&nbsp;garant\u00edas&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguridad&nbsp;sigue&nbsp;siendo&nbsp;un&nbsp;reto&nbsp;importante. El presidente Zelenski subraya constantemente que las garant\u00edas de seguridad son esenciales para disuadir una nueva agresi\u00f3n rusa y para permitir que Ucrania pueda apoyar a sus socios europeos en caso de que estos sean atacados<sup>[75]<\/sup>. La sociedad tambi\u00e9n apoya el despliegue de tropas&nbsp;aliadas&nbsp;dentro&nbsp;dela&nbsp;coalici\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;voluntarios&nbsp;en&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;(72,7&nbsp;%)<sup>[76]<\/sup>&nbsp;y&nbsp;considera&nbsp;que&nbsp;dicha participaci\u00f3n extranjera es importante para la disuasi\u00f3n. Al mismo tiempo, persisten las dudas sobre&nbsp;la&nbsp;credibilidad&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;durabilidad&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;implicaci\u00f3n&nbsp;europea&nbsp;ante&nbsp;la&nbsp;ausencia&nbsp;de&nbsp;implicaciones firmes por parte de EE. UU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"4\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><u>Econom\u00eda: costes estrat\u00e9gicos de los aranceles de EE. UU.<\/u><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cuando en 2025 Estados Unidos impuso aranceles del 20 % a los productos de la UE y amenaz\u00f3 con aumentarlos al 30 %, la Casa Blanca present\u00f3 estas medidas como necesarias para fortalecer la industria manufacturera nacional, reducir los d\u00e9ficits comerciales y garantizar la seguridad de las cadenas de suministro cr\u00edticas<sup>[77]<\/sup>. Algunos aranceles sectoriales y amenazas parec\u00edan tener motivaciones pol\u00edticas: a nivel nacional, para apoyar a las industrias que compet\u00edan con las importaciones en estados bisagra como M\u00edchigan, Wisconsin y Pensilvania<sup>[78]<\/sup>; y&nbsp;a&nbsp;nivel&nbsp;internacional,&nbsp;para&nbsp;influir&nbsp;en&nbsp;los&nbsp;socios&nbsp;europeos&nbsp;en&nbsp;relaci\u00f3n&nbsp;con&nbsp;Groenlandia<sup>[79]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">En la pr\u00e1ctica, los aranceles de 2025 no alcanzaron sus objetivos: produjeron resultados econ\u00f3micos mixtos<sup>[80]<\/sup>, generaron una fuerte oposici\u00f3n interna, con aproximadamente el 60 % de los estadounidenses considerando los aranceles ilegales<sup>[81]<\/sup>,&nbsp;y&nbsp;tensaron&nbsp;la&nbsp;confianza&nbsp;y&nbsp;la cohesi\u00f3n&nbsp;en&nbsp;las&nbsp;relaciones&nbsp;transatl\u00e1nticas<sup>[82]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Los responsables pol\u00edticos europeos consideraron que los aranceles eran desproporcionados y desestabilizadores&nbsp;para&nbsp;los&nbsp;lazos&nbsp;econ\u00f3micos&nbsp;atrav\u00e9s&nbsp;del&nbsp;Atl\u00e1ntico.&nbsp;No&nbsp;obstante,&nbsp;para&nbsp;mantener unas relaciones estables con Washington, Bruselas acept\u00f3 condiciones comerciales que de otro modo habr\u00edan sido dif\u00edciles de justificar: la mayor\u00eda de los aranceles se limitaron al 15 %, mientras&nbsp;que&nbsp;se&nbsp;mantuvieron&nbsp;aranceles&nbsp;de l50&nbsp;%&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;el&nbsp;acero,&nbsp;el&nbsp;aluminio&nbsp;y&nbsp;el&nbsp;cobre<sup>[83]<\/sup>&nbsp;<sup>[84]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Aunque&nbsp;el&nbsp;acuerdo&nbsp;redujo&nbsp;la&nbsp;incertidumbre&nbsp;inmediata,&nbsp;puso&nbsp;de&nbsp;relieve&nbsp;la&nbsp;politizaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;pol\u00edtica&nbsp;econ\u00f3mica de EE. UU. y revel\u00f3 la vulnerabilidad de la UE ante la coacci\u00f3n econ\u00f3mica mientras siga&nbsp;dependiendo&nbsp;de&nbsp;Estados&nbsp;Unidos&nbsp;en&nbsp;materia&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguridad.&nbsp;En&nbsp;este contexto,&nbsp;la&nbsp;sentencia&nbsp;del Tribunal Supremo que declara ilegales la mayor\u00eda de los aranceles de 2025 proporciona a la UE una&nbsp;base&nbsp;jur\u00eddica y&nbsp;pol\u00edtica&nbsp;para&nbsp;reevaluar&nbsp;o&nbsp;suspender&nbsp;la&nbsp;aplicaci\u00f3n&nbsp;del&nbsp;acuerdo<sup>[85]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"649\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/5-2-1024x649.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-34899\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/5-2-1024x649.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/5-2-600x381.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/5-2-768x487.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/5-2-18x12.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/5-2.png 1080w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"5\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><u>El futuro de la EU y la OTAN <\/u><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong><strong>Respaldar&nbsp;el&nbsp;poder&nbsp;europeo,&nbsp;limitar&nbsp;la&nbsp;influencia&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE.<\/strong><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Las&nbsp;cr\u00edticas&nbsp;persistentes&nbsp;del&nbsp;presidente Trump, sus esfuerzos por socavar la legitimidad pol\u00edtica de la UE y los desaf\u00edos a sus normas democr\u00e1ticas est\u00e1n erosionando la relaci\u00f3n de larga data y basada en la confianza entre Washington y Bruselas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>La&nbsp;Administraci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU<\/em>.&nbsp;presenta&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;como&nbsp;responsable&nbsp;del&nbsp;supuesto&nbsp;desv\u00edo&nbsp;de Europa<sup>[86]<\/sup>, del \u00abborrado de la civilizaci\u00f3n\u00bb y de la \u00aberosi\u00f3n de las identidades nacionales\u00bb&nbsp;<sup>[87]<\/sup>. Estas narrativas, que se repiten en discursos oficiales y en la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional de EE. UU., reflejan una postura de confrontaci\u00f3n hacia Bruselas. Las tensiones se ven reforzadas&nbsp;por&nbsp;la&nbsp;posici\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;como&nbsp;unpoderoso&nbsp;actor&nbsp;regulador&nbsp;que&nbsp;se&nbsp;resiste&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;presi\u00f3n externa. Las disputas sobre la regulaci\u00f3n digital ilustran esta din\u00e1mica: el Secretario de Estado de EE. UU., Marco Rubio, calific\u00f3 las sanciones de la UE a Elon Musk por violar las normas europeas como un ataque a las empresas tecnol\u00f3gicas estadounidenses y, por extensi\u00f3n, al pueblo&nbsp;estadounidense<sup>[88]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Para&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE<\/em>,&nbsp;este&nbsp;enfoque&nbsp;pone&nbsp;de&nbsp;manifiesto&nbsp;una&nbsp;creciente&nbsp;asimetr\u00eda&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;relaci\u00f3n&nbsp;transatl\u00e1ntica. Si bien los Estados europeos individuales pueden ser vulnerables a la presi\u00f3n bilateral, el poder regulador&nbsp;y&nbsp;econ\u00f3mico&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;Uni\u00f3n&nbsp;la&nbsp;convierte&nbsp;en&nbsp;un&nbsp;blanco&nbsp;frecuente&nbsp;de&nbsp;ataques pol\u00edticos.&nbsp;Esa ret\u00f3rica&nbsp;corre&nbsp;el&nbsp;riesgo&nbsp;de&nbsp;erosionar&nbsp;la&nbsp;confianza,&nbsp;complicar&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;en&nbsp;distintos&nbsp;\u00e1mbitos pol\u00edticos y envalentonar a los partidos euroesc\u00e9pticos de extrema izquierda y extrema derecha para debilitar a la UE desde dentro.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Para Ucrania<\/em>, la aspiraci\u00f3n a la adhesi\u00f3n a la UE sigue siendo la piedra angular de su pol\u00edtica exterior. La UE unida tambi\u00e9n es uno de los principales defensores de Kyiv para la ayuda financiera&nbsp;y&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguridad&nbsp;dentro&nbsp;de&nbsp;Europa.&nbsp;Por&nbsp;lo&nbsp;tanto,&nbsp;los&nbsp;esfuerzos&nbsp;que&nbsp;socavan&nbsp;la autoridad pol\u00edtica de la UE son inaceptables para Ucrania.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Ampliaci\u00f3n vetada y adhesi\u00f3n acelerada.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A pesar de los avances de Ucrania en las reformas de integraci\u00f3n en la UE y de las valoraciones positivas de la Comisi\u00f3n Europea<sup>[89]<\/sup>, los obst\u00e1culos pol\u00edticos siguen bloqueando la adhesi\u00f3n. El veto de Hungr\u00eda ha impedido la apertura de los bloques de negociaci\u00f3n<sup>[90]<\/sup>, lo que ha paralizado la ampliaci\u00f3n y dejando en descubierto una debilidad estructural en la toma de decisiones de la UE. Al mismo tiempo, no existe consenso sobre la adhesi\u00f3n por v\u00eda r\u00e1pida de Ucrania, respaldada por EE. UU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Desde la perspectiva estadounidense<\/em>, el veto de Hungr\u00eda refuerza la percepci\u00f3n de debilidad y fragilidad de la UE.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Estados Unidos respalda la integraci\u00f3n de Ucrania en la UE y considera que una adhesi\u00f3n acelerada \u2014con plazos ambiciosos y, a juicio de algunos, realistas, como 2027\u2014 es una de las principales prioridades para poner fin a la guerra y trasladar la responsabilidad a la UE&nbsp;<sup>[91]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sin&nbsp;embargo,&nbsp;este&nbsp;apoyo&nbsp;suele&nbsp;enmarcarse&nbsp;desde&nbsp;una&nbsp;perspectiva&nbsp;politizada,&nbsp;lo&nbsp;que&nbsp;refleja&nbsp;una comprensi\u00f3n limitada por parte de Estados Unidos de la ampliaci\u00f3n de la UE: no como un proceso&nbsp;impulsado&nbsp;por&nbsp;las&nbsp;reformas,&nbsp;sino&nbsp;como&nbsp;una&nbsp;negociaci\u00f3n&nbsp;que&nbsp;puede&nbsp;acelerarse mediante el regateo o la presi\u00f3n sobre la UE. Esta desconexi\u00f3n socava la confianza de EE. UU. en la capacidad de la UE para actuar como un actor geopol\u00edtico aut\u00f3nomo dispuesto a compartir&nbsp;riesgos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">La&nbsp;frustraci\u00f3n&nbsp;dentro&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;por&nbsp;el&nbsp;uso&nbsp;del&nbsp;veto&nbsp;por&nbsp;parte&nbsp;de&nbsp;Hungr\u00eda&nbsp;va&nbsp;en&nbsp;aumento, pero no se han tomado medidas decisivas para salir del punto muerto, como pasar de&nbsp;la unanimidad a la votaci\u00f3n por mayor\u00eda cualificada.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Esta inacci\u00f3n refleja la renuencia de algunos Estados miembros a buscar una soluci\u00f3n estructural&nbsp;a&nbsp;largo&nbsp;plazo,&nbsp;optando&nbsp;en&nbsp;su&nbsp;lugar&nbsp;por gestionar&nbsp;el&nbsp;problema&nbsp;mediante&nbsp;el&nbsp;adelanto&nbsp;de fases y soluciones procedimentales provisionales. La dependencia prolongada de tales t\u00e1cticas corre&nbsp;el&nbsp;riesgo&nbsp;de&nbsp;normalizar&nbsp;el&nbsp;uso&nbsp;del&nbsp;veto&nbsp;como&nbsp;arma&nbsp;y&nbsp;debilitar&nbsp;el&nbsp;proceso&nbsp;de&nbsp;ampliaci\u00f3n<sup>[92]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Al mismo tiempo, aunque la Comisi\u00f3n Europea ha propuesto ideas como la \u00abampliaci\u00f3n inversa\u00bb o la&nbsp;integraci\u00f3n&nbsp;gradual&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania<sup>[93]<\/sup>,&nbsp;los&nbsp;Estados&nbsp;miembros,&nbsp;incluidosFrancia&nbsp;y&nbsp;Alemania,&nbsp;siguen mostr\u00e1ndose esc\u00e9pticos ante una adhesi\u00f3n por la v\u00eda r\u00e1pida<sup>[94]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Para Ucrania<\/em>, el bloqueo continuado de la apertura de los bloques de negociaci\u00f3n es profundamente desestabilizador. Kyiv busca negociaciones formales como reconocimiento del progreso de las reformas y como se\u00f1al de la implicaci\u00f3n de la UE. Los retrasos prolongados corren el riesgo de erosionar el apoyo interno a las reformas, alimentar el euroescepticismo y socavar&nbsp;el&nbsp;impulso&nbsp;de&nbsp;la ampliaci\u00f3n&nbsp;en&nbsp;un&nbsp;momento&nbsp;cr\u00edtico&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;trayectoria&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;hacia&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Kyiv&nbsp;considera&nbsp;la&nbsp;adhesi\u00f3n&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;como&nbsp;una&nbsp;importante&nbsp;garant\u00eda&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguridad&nbsp;\u00abblanda\u00bb.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Con&nbsp;este&nbsp;fin,&nbsp;el&nbsp;presidente&nbsp;Volod\u00edmir&nbsp;Zelenski&nbsp;sostiene&nbsp;que&nbsp;la&nbsp;adhesi\u00f3n&nbsp;es&nbsp;viable&nbsp;en&nbsp;un&nbsp;escenario de&nbsp;v\u00eda&nbsp;r\u00e1pida&nbsp;y deber\u00eda&nbsp;estar&nbsp;vinculada&nbsp;a una&nbsp;fecha&nbsp;clara&nbsp;en&nbsp;cualquier&nbsp;acuerdo,&nbsp;poniendo&nbsp;fin&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;guerra<sup>[95]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"501\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0434\u0456\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0430_\u0437_\u043d\u0430\u0434\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043c-1024x501.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Navigating the US\u2013EU\u2013Ukraine Triangle: Revitalizing Transatlantic Security Cooperation\" class=\"wp-image-34901\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0434\u0456\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0430_\u0437_\u043d\u0430\u0434\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043c-1024x501.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0434\u0456\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0430_\u0437_\u043d\u0430\u0434\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043c-600x293.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0434\u0456\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0430_\u0437_\u043d\u0430\u0434\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043c-768x376.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0434\u0456\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0430_\u0437_\u043d\u0430\u0434\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043c-1536x751.png 1536w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0434\u0456\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0430_\u0437_\u043d\u0430\u0434\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043c-2048x1002.png 2048w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/\u0434\u0456\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0430_\u0437_\u043d\u0430\u0434\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043c-18x9.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Considerando\u00a0a\u00a0cada\u00a0uno\u00a0de\u00a0los\u00a0actuales\u00a0pa\u00edses\u00a0candidatos\u00a0y\u00a0posibles\u00a0candidatos\u00a0a\u00a0la\u00a0adhesi\u00f3n\u00a0a\u00a0la\u00a0UE,\u00a0\u00bfestar\u00eda usted\u00a0a\u00a0favor\u00a0o\u00a0en\u00a0contra\u00a0de\u00a0que\u00a0se\u00a0incorporen\u00a0a\u00a0la\u00a0UE\u00a0una\u00a0vez\u00a0hayan\u00a0cumplido\u00a0todas\u00a0las\u00a0condiciones\u00a0de\u00a0adhesi\u00f3n \u2014Ucrania\u00a0(%)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Erosi\u00f3n de la OTAN.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Las crecientes tensiones transatl\u00e1nticas est\u00e1n quebrando a la OTAN, la encarnaci\u00f3n institucional central de d\u00e9cadas de cooperaci\u00f3n transatl\u00e1ntica. Aunque los europeos siguen dependiendo en gran medida de Estados Unidos, especialmente del paraguas nuclear, los efectivos militares y las bases militares, las fricciones pol\u00edticas socavan directamente la cohesi\u00f3n de la alianza.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La&nbsp;<em>Administraci\u00f3n de EE. UU.&nbsp;<\/em>ha hecho hincapi\u00e9 en el papel central de Estados Unidos en la OTAN para&nbsp;justificar&nbsp;la&nbsp;reestructuraci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;laAlianza&nbsp;en&nbsp;torno&nbsp;a&nbsp;las&nbsp;prioridades&nbsp;del&nbsp;presidente,&nbsp;en&nbsp;lugar del consenso colectivo<sup>[95]<\/sup>, y ha presentado la presi\u00f3n ejercida sobre los aliados en materia de gasto en defensa como una medida que ha \u00absalvado a la OTAN\u00bb. Este enfoque va m\u00e1s all\u00e1 del&nbsp;reparto&nbsp;de&nbsp;cargas:&nbsp;la&nbsp;ret\u00f3rica&nbsp;sobre la&nbsp;incorporaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;Groenlandia&nbsp;a&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.<sup>[96]<\/sup>&nbsp;socava&nbsp;el&nbsp;respeto&nbsp;por&nbsp;la&nbsp;soberan\u00eda&nbsp;estatal,&nbsp;y&nbsp;las&nbsp;amenazas&nbsp;de&nbsp;aranceles&nbsp;indican&nbsp;la&nbsp;voluntad&nbsp;de ejercer&nbsp;presi\u00f3n&nbsp;sobre los aliados<sup>[97]<\/sup>. Al mismo tiempo, Washington persigue la \u00abOTAN 3.0\u00bb, trasladando la responsabilidad principal de la defensa convencional a Europa, mientras concentra los recursos estadounidenses&nbsp;en&nbsp;otros&nbsp;frentes<sup>[98]<\/sup>.&nbsp;As\u00ed,&nbsp;a&nbsp;principios&nbsp;de&nbsp;2026,&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU. transfiri\u00f3&nbsp;tres&nbsp;Comandos de Fuerzas Conjuntas al control europeo<sup>[99]<\/sup>, al tiempo que asumi\u00f3 el mando de las fuerzas mar\u00edtimas&nbsp;(MARCOM)<sup>[100]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En respuesta a la presi\u00f3n de EE. UU., la mayor\u00eda de los miembros\u00a0<em>europeos\u00a0de\u00a0la\u00a0OTAN\u00a0<\/em>cumplieron el objetivo de gasto en defensa del 2 % del PIB para La Cumbre de la OTAN de La Haya\u00a0de\u00a02025\u00a0y\u00a0aceptaron\u00a0un\u00a0nuevo\u00a0objetivo\u00a0de\u00a0referencia\u00a0del\u00a05\u00a0%\u00a0para\u00a02035<sup>[101]<\/sup>. Sin\u00a0embargo,\u00a0la\u00a0aplicaci\u00f3n\u00a0de\u00a0este\u00a0\u00faltimo\u00a0ser\u00eda\u00a0un\u00a0reto.\u00a0Si\u00a0bien\u00a0la\u00a0UE\u00a0se\u00a0ha\u00a0adaptado\u00a0ret\u00f3rica\u00a0y\u00a0financieramente,\u00a0la\u00a0presi\u00f3n de EE. UU. sobre Groenlandia se ha convertido en un impacto pol\u00edtico, lo que ha desencadenado una preocupaci\u00f3n m\u00e1s profunda sobre la fiabilidad de la alianza. Al mismo\u00a0tiempo,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">una \u00abOTAN europea\u00bb sigue siendo estructuralmente dif\u00edcil sin cambios importantes en la estructura de la alianza: el Comandante Supremo Aliado en Europa (SACEUR) es siempre estadounidense, y Estados Unidos preside de forma permanente el Grupo de Planificaci\u00f3n Nuclear de la OTAN.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Esto pone de relieve la dependencia de Europa del liderazgo de EE. UU., incluso cuando la confianza en ese liderazgo se erosiona.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>La&nbsp;futura&nbsp;adhesi\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;<\/em>sigue&nbsp;siendo&nbsp;un&nbsp;punto&nbsp;de&nbsp;divergencia&nbsp;dentro&nbsp;de&nbsp;la Alianza. La Cumbre de la OTAN de 2023 en Vilna consolid\u00f3 la prospectiva de acceso de Ucrania<sup>[103]<\/sup>,&nbsp;pero&nbsp;el&nbsp;panorama&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gico&nbsp;cambi\u00f3&nbsp;bajo&nbsp;el&nbsp;mandato&nbsp;de&nbsp;Donald&nbsp;Trump.&nbsp;Aunque las implicaciones colectivas anteriores de la Alianza no se revocaron formalmente, Washington se\u00f1al\u00f3 que la adhesi\u00f3n de Ucrania est\u00e1 fuera de la discusi\u00f3n<sup>[104]<\/sup>, con propuestas que, seg\u00fan se informa,&nbsp;exige&nbsp;a&nbsp;Kyiv&nbsp;que&nbsp;renuncie&nbsp;a&nbsp;sus&nbsp;ambiciones&nbsp;de&nbsp;adhesi\u00f3n<sup>[105]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Kyiv&nbsp;sigue considerando&nbsp;la adhesi\u00f3n&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;como&nbsp;su&nbsp;garant\u00eda&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguridad&nbsp;preferida&nbsp;a&nbsp;largo&nbsp;plazo,&nbsp;reconociendo&nbsp;que&nbsp;la adhesi\u00f3n&nbsp;no&nbsp;puede producirse&nbsp;mientras&nbsp;haya&nbsp;hostilidades&nbsp;activas,&nbsp;pero&nbsp;con&nbsp;la&nbsp;esperanza&nbsp;de&nbsp;que la ventana se vuelva a abrir a medida que evolucionen las circunstancias pol\u00edticas<sup>[106]<\/sup>. En este contexto,&nbsp;la&nbsp;mayor\u00eda&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;aliados&nbsp;europeos&nbsp;defienden&nbsp;el&nbsp;principio&nbsp;de&nbsp;puertas&nbsp;abiertas&nbsp;y&nbsp;apoyan la eventual adhesi\u00f3n de Ucrania, aunque persisten algunas excepciones, tanto expresadas abiertamente como t\u00e1citas<sup>[107]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-capitulo-2-ambitos-de-alineamiento-estrategico-en-el-marco-de-seguridad-ue-ee-uu-ucrania\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Cap\u00edtulo 2. \u00c1mbitos de alineamiento estrat\u00e9gico en el marco de seguridad UE-EE. UU.-Ucrania<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"786\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/6-1-1024x786.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Navigating the US\u2013EU\u2013Ukraine Triangle: Revitalizing Transatlantic Security Cooperation\" class=\"wp-image-34903\" style=\"aspect-ratio:1.3035887487875848;width:545px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/6-1-1024x786.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/6-1-600x460.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/6-1-768x589.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/6-1-16x12.png 16w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/6-1.png 1065w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La competitividad empresarial, China y el \u00c1rtico parecen figurar entre las prioridades fundamentales&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;actualpol\u00edtica&nbsp;exterior&nbsp;y&nbsp;econ\u00f3mica&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;Para&nbsp;Europa,&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n pragm\u00e1tica con Washington en estos y otros \u00e1mbitos similares ofrece una v\u00eda viable para estabilizar unas relaciones transatl\u00e1nticas cada vez m\u00e1s fr\u00e1giles, en un momento en que la alineaci\u00f3n basada en valores ha perdido gran parte de su fuerza movilizadora. Este cap\u00edtulo examina&nbsp;diversos&nbsp;\u00e1mbitos&nbsp;pol\u00edticos&nbsp;concretos&nbsp;en&nbsp;los&nbsp;que&nbsp;los&nbsp;intereses&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.,&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;y&nbsp;Ucrania siguen convergiendo. Tambi\u00e9n eval\u00faa c\u00f3mo la cooperaci\u00f3n en estos \u00e1mbitos puede reforzar la coordinaci\u00f3n transatl\u00e1ntica a pesar de la actual turbulencia geopol\u00edtica.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"1\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><u>Una resoluci\u00f3n justa de la guerra ruso-ucraniana<\/u><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Estados Unidos, la UE y Ucrania cuentan con una base s\u00f3lida para alcanzar un consenso y poner fin a la guerra ruso-ucraniana en condiciones justas y sostenibles, de modo que Ucrania sea capaz de defenderse y conserve la capacidad de tomar la iniciativa t\u00e1ctica en el campo de&nbsp;batalla.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Aunque la actual Administraci\u00f3n de EE. UU. parece dar prioridad a un r\u00e1pido acuerdo de paz antes de las elecciones de medio mandato, una paz justa y duradera se ajusta, de hecho, a los intereses estrat\u00e9gicos tanto de EE. UU. como de la UE<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">y posiciona al presidente Donald Trump como un pacificador cre\u00edble, que puso fin a la mayor guerra europea desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Adem\u00e1s, el creciente reconocimiento en algunos sectores de la comunidad pol\u00edtica estadounidense de que los acuerdos comerciales con Rusia ser\u00edan en gran medida vac\u00edos<sup>[108]<\/sup>&nbsp;<sup>[109]<\/sup>&nbsp;sugiere que la paz deber\u00eda enmarcarse como un imperativo estrat\u00e9gico m\u00e1s que como un acuerdo transaccional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En la pr\u00e1ctica, sigue existiendo un espacio limitado para la\u00a0<em>participaci\u00f3n europea en las negociaciones trilaterales de paz EE. UU.-Ucrania-Rusia<\/em>, aunque sigue siendo restringido. La coordinaci\u00f3n\u00a0de\u00a0Ucrania\u00a0con\u00a0sus\u00a0socios\u00a0europeos,\u00a0as\u00ed\u00a0como\u00a0la\u00a0comunicaci\u00f3n\u00a0conjunta\u00a0con\u00a0el\u00a0presidente\u00a0Trump tras\u00a0el\u00a0incidente\u00a0del\u00a0Despacho\u00a0Oval\u00a0en\u00a0marzo\u00a0de\u00a02025, demuestra\u00a0el\u00a0potencial\u00a0de\u00a0una\u00a0interlocuci\u00f3n\u00a0trilateral\u00a0indirecta.\u00a0El documento\u00a0de\u00a0posici\u00f3n\u00a0recientemente\u00a0elaborado\u00a0por\u00a0la\u00a0UE sobre las concesiones que Rusia deber\u00eda hacer en las conversaciones diplom\u00e1ticas en curso\u00a0con Ucrania es ambicioso<sup>[110]<\/sup>. Sin embargo, es razonable que la UE y Ucrania articulen\u00a0conjuntamente\u00a0sus\u00a0posiciones\u00a0sobre\u00a0la futura\u00a0integraci\u00f3n\u00a0de\u00a0Ucrania\u00a0en\u00a0la\u00a0UE,\u00a0especialmente\u00a0a\u00a0la\u00a0luz\u00a0del\u00a0\u00abplan\u00a0de\u00a0paz\u00a0de\u00a020\u00a0puntos\u00bb\u00a0de\u00a0Estados\u00a0Unidos\u00a0y\u00a0Rusia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A\u00a0pesar\u00a0de\u00a0las\u00a0diferencias\u00a0respecto\u00a0a\u00a0los\u00a0detalles\u00a0exactos\u00a0de\u00a0la\u00a0participaci\u00f3n\u00a0de\u00a0las\u00a0partes,\u00a0tanto los EE. UU. como los pa\u00edses de la UE reconocen la necesidad de proporcionar a Ucrania s\u00f3lidas\u00a0<em>garant\u00edas\u00a0de\u00a0seguridad\u00a0o\u00a0protocolos<\/em> para evitar que se repita la agresi\u00f3n rusa<sup>[111]<\/sup>\u00a0<sup>[112]<\/sup>. Incluso si Estados Unidos se abstiene de desplegar tropas, podr\u00eda apoyar la coalici\u00f3n de voluntarios a trav\u00e9s de facilitadores estrat\u00e9gicos como el intercambio de inteligencia, los servicios de mantenimiento, reparaci\u00f3n y revisi\u00f3n (MRO), el transporte a\u00e9reo y la log\u00edstica integral, entre otros.\u00a0Washington tambi\u00e9n\u00a0ha\u00a0expresado\u00a0su\u00a0disposici\u00f3n\u00a0a\u00a0proporcionar\u00a0una\u00a0fuerza\u00a0limitada\u00a0para supervisar\u00a0y\u00a0verificar\u00a0un posible\u00a0alto\u00a0el\u00a0fuego\u00a0y\u00a0a\u00a0profundizar\u00a0la\u00a0cooperaci\u00f3n\u00a0bilateral\u00a0con\u00a0Ucrania en\u00a0el\u00a0per\u00edodo\u00a0de\u00a0posguerra<sup>[113]<\/sup>.\u00a0Tal implicaci\u00f3n\u00a0beneficia\u00a0tanto\u00a0a\u00a0los\u00a0intereses\u00a0de\u00a0EE.\u00a0UU.\u00a0como\u00a0a los de la UE, al contribuir a la consolidaci\u00f3n de Ucrania como un Estado con capacidades de disuasi\u00f3n cre\u00edbles y efectivas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dado que la ayuda militar de EE. UU. a Ucrania se ha reducido en gran medida, la&nbsp;<em>iniciativa PURL&nbsp;<\/em>sigue siendo un modelo funcional para la cooperaci\u00f3n entre la UE y Estados Unidos. Para la UE, la adquisici\u00f3n de suministros de EE. UU. para Ucrania sigue siendo inevitable, ya que las capacidades&nbsp;clave&nbsp;solo&nbsp;est\u00e1n&nbsp;disponibles&nbsp;a&nbsp;trav\u00e9s&nbsp;de&nbsp;fabricantes&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.,&nbsp;y&nbsp;es&nbsp;poco&nbsp;probable que Europa alcance la autosuficiencia industrial en materia de defensa durante al menos 5\u201310&nbsp;a\u00f1os.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Al mismo tiempo, el PURL promueve los intereses de EE. UU. al mantener a Europa como un mercado&nbsp;clave&nbsp;de&nbsp;exportaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa, reforzando&nbsp;un&nbsp;modelo&nbsp;tangible&nbsp;de&nbsp;reparto&nbsp;de&nbsp;cargas&nbsp;y alinearse con el \u00e9nfasis de La Estrategia de transferencia de armas \u00abAmerica First\u00bb (AFATS) en apoyar a los socios que invierten en su propia seguridad y desempe\u00f1an un papel cr\u00edtico en la planificaci\u00f3n estadounidense<sup>[114]<\/sup>. El respaldo interno tambi\u00e9n sigue siendo significativo:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">la aprobaci\u00f3n p\u00fablica del suministro de armas estadounidenses a Ucrania alcanz\u00f3 el&nbsp;64 % en 2025, nueve puntos porcentuales m\u00e1s que en 2024<sup>[115]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Para&nbsp;reforzar&nbsp;el&nbsp;programa,&nbsp;la&nbsp;participaci\u00f3n&nbsp;podr\u00eda&nbsp;ampliarse&nbsp;y&nbsp;pasar&nbsp;de&nbsp;paquetes&nbsp;de&nbsp;emergencia a un marco de suministro a largo plazo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Los activos rusos congelados&nbsp;<\/em>representan otra \u00e1rea potencial de cooperaci\u00f3n futura, aunque el&nbsp;apoyo pol\u00edtico sigue siendo limitado. La propuesta inicial de asignar activos congelados ha sido&nbsp;sustituida&nbsp;parcialmente&nbsp;por&nbsp;un&nbsp;pr\u00e9stamo&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;de&nbsp;90&nbsp;000&nbsp;millones&nbsp;de&nbsp;euros&nbsp;aUcrania.&nbsp;Sin embargo, si se transfieren aproximadamente entre 180 000 y 200 000 millones de euros en&nbsp;activos&nbsp;custodiados&nbsp;por&nbsp;Euroclear&nbsp;dela&nbsp;jurisdicci\u00f3n&nbsp;belga&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE,&nbsp;la&nbsp;cuesti\u00f3n&nbsp;podr\u00eda&nbsp;volver&nbsp;a&nbsp;aparecer&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;agenda&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE<sup>[116]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Aunque&nbsp;la&nbsp;Administraci\u00f3n&nbsp;Trump&nbsp;se&nbsp;haopuesto&nbsp;al&nbsp;uso&nbsp;de&nbsp;los activos, el Congreso de EE. UU. ha presentado la Ley de Implementaci\u00f3n del REPO de 2025,&nbsp;que solicita la transferencia a Ucrania de unos 5000 millones de d\u00f3lares en activos rusos congelados&nbsp;en&nbsp;los&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;cada&nbsp;90&nbsp;d\u00edas<sup>[117]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Los socios tambi\u00e9n podr\u00edan adoptar un enfoque m\u00e1s asertivo para desarticular la flota en la sombra de Rusia, lo que limitar\u00eda los ingresos que financian el esfuerzo b\u00e9lico de Mosc\u00fa y abordar\u00eda riesgos de seguridad m\u00e1s amplios: seg\u00fan se ha informado que la flota ha apoyado actividades h\u00edbridas que amenazan infraestructuras mar\u00edtimas cr\u00edticas, incluidos los cables de comunicaci\u00f3n submarinos<sup>[118]<\/sup>. Las medidas anteriores han resultado insuficientes para degradar significativamente la capacidad operativa de estas flotas<sup>[119]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Para cerrar esta brecha es necesario mejorar el monitoreo, como integrando la supervisi\u00f3n del registro de buques en el marco del GAFI<sup>[120]<\/sup>o aplicando medidas de cumplimiento&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;rigurosas&nbsp;por&nbsp;parte&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE,&nbsp;emulando&nbsp;las&nbsp;operaciones&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU. frente a Venezuela<sup>[121]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cualquier campa\u00f1a de este tipo deber\u00eda ser integral, en lugar de selectiva, y centrarse en las redes log\u00edsticas en su conjunto para limitar la cooperaci\u00f3n a largo plazo entre los Estados&nbsp;sancionados.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>La&nbsp;reconstrucci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;<\/em>supone&nbsp;una&nbsp;oportunidad&nbsp;de&nbsp;inversi\u00f3n&nbsp;a&nbsp;largo&nbsp;plazo&nbsp;tanto&nbsp;para&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;como&nbsp;para&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;Se&nbsp;calcula&nbsp;que&nbsp;las necesidades&nbsp;de&nbsp;recuperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;oscilar\u00e1n&nbsp;entre&nbsp;587&nbsp;700&nbsp;millones<sup>[122]<\/sup>&nbsp;y&nbsp;1&nbsp;bill\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;d\u00f3lares<sup>[123]<\/sup>&nbsp;durante&nbsp;la&nbsp;pr\u00f3xima&nbsp;d\u00e9cada.&nbsp;La reconstrucci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;los puertos,&nbsp;ferrocarriles&nbsp;y&nbsp;carreteras&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;integrar\u00eda&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;profundamente&nbsp;las&nbsp;redes&nbsp;log\u00edsticas ucranianas&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;y convertir\u00eda&nbsp;a&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;en&nbsp;un&nbsp;centro&nbsp;log\u00edstico&nbsp;de&nbsp;Europa&nbsp;del&nbsp;Este<sup>[124]<\/sup>,&nbsp;creando&nbsp;nuevas oportunidades de negocio para EE. UU. al facilitar la entrada de las empresas&nbsp;estadounidenses&nbsp;en&nbsp;las&nbsp;cadenas&nbsp;de&nbsp;valor&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE<sup>[125]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Una&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;pr\u00f3spera&nbsp;y&nbsp;resiliente&nbsp;reforzar\u00eda la seguridad regional y profundizar\u00eda los lazos econ\u00f3micos transatl\u00e1nticos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"2\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><u>Contrarrestar la alineaci\u00f3n autoritaria&nbsp;<\/u><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tanto la UE como EE. UU. reconocen los crecientes riesgos sociopol\u00edticos y de seguridad asociados a la alineaci\u00f3n emergente entre China, Rusia, Ir\u00e1n y Corea del Norte, que se percibe ampliamente&nbsp;como&nbsp;un&nbsp;eje&nbsp;desestabilizador&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;orden&nbsp;internacional&nbsp;actual<sup>[126]<\/sup>.&nbsp;La&nbsp;guerra ruso-ucraniana&nbsp;ilustra&nbsp;esta&nbsp;din\u00e1mica:&nbsp;China,&nbsp;Corea&nbsp;del&nbsp;Norte&nbsp;e&nbsp;Ir\u00e1n&nbsp;no&nbsp;solo&nbsp;est\u00e1n&nbsp;apoyando&nbsp;la&nbsp;agresi\u00f3n de&nbsp;Rusia,&nbsp;sino&nbsp;que&nbsp;tambi\u00e9n&nbsp;est\u00e1n utilizando&nbsp;la&nbsp;guerra&nbsp;para&nbsp;poner&nbsp;a&nbsp;prueba&nbsp;y&nbsp;mejorar&nbsp;sus&nbsp;propias capacidades industrial-militar, incluidos los programas nucleares, y para asegurarse beneficios econ\u00f3micos y tecnol\u00f3gicos relacionados. En este contexto, los socios transatl\u00e1nticos se enfrentan&nbsp;a&nbsp;una&nbsp;necesidad creciente&nbsp;de&nbsp;desarrollar&nbsp;estrategias&nbsp;coordinadas&nbsp;para&nbsp;disuadir,&nbsp;limitar y responder a las actividades de China, Ir\u00e1n y Corea del Norte.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Gestionar&nbsp;la&nbsp;competencia&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gica&nbsp;con&nbsp;China<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A&nbsp;pesar&nbsp;de&nbsp;las&nbsp;diferentes&nbsp;percepciones&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;amenaza,&nbsp;tanto&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;como&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;se&nbsp;enfrentan&nbsp;a un&nbsp;desaf\u00edo&nbsp;tangible&nbsp;por&nbsp;parte&nbsp;de&nbsp;China,&nbsp;al menos&nbsp;a&nbsp;trav\u00e9s&nbsp;de&nbsp;su&nbsp;creciente&nbsp;alineamiento&nbsp;con&nbsp;Rusia. La cooperaci\u00f3n entre Mosc\u00fa y Pek\u00edn est\u00e1 impulsada por un objetivo ideol\u00f3gico compartido: contrarrestar&nbsp;la&nbsp;influencia&nbsp;occidental<sup>[127]<\/sup>.&nbsp;A&nbsp;trav\u00e9s&nbsp;de&nbsp;esta&nbsp;alianza,&nbsp;China&nbsp;est\u00e1&nbsp;adquiriendo&nbsp;nuevos conocimientos&nbsp;en&nbsp;t\u00e1cticas&nbsp;de combate<sup>[128]<\/sup>,&nbsp;al&nbsp;tiempo&nbsp;que&nbsp;act\u00faa&nbsp;como&nbsp;un&nbsp;facilitador&nbsp;decisivo&nbsp;de&nbsp;la guerra de Rusia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Seg\u00fan los informes, la Rep\u00fablica Popular China es responsable de aproximadamente el 80 % de la elusi\u00f3n de sanciones<sup>[129]<\/sup>,<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">facilit\u00e1ndola mediante la reexportaci\u00f3n de tecnolog\u00eda occidental, sustitutos nacionales e infraestructuras alternativas de transporte y pago que atraen a otros Estados autoritarios<sup>[130]<\/sup>. Estos&nbsp;aspectos&nbsp;hacen&nbsp;que&nbsp;una&nbsp;coordinaci\u00f3n&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;estrecha&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.-UE-Ucrania&nbsp;en&nbsp;relaci\u00f3n&nbsp;con China sea tanto urgente como necesaria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La UE y EE. UU. persiguen el objetivo de&nbsp;<em>salvaguardar&nbsp;las&nbsp;tecnolog\u00edas&nbsp;cr\u00edticas&nbsp;y&nbsp;de&nbsp;doble&nbsp;uso<\/em>, con&nbsp;el fin de impedir su transferencia, especialmente cuando dichas tecnolog\u00edas podr\u00edan apoyar el esfuerzo&nbsp;b\u00e9lico&nbsp;de&nbsp;Rusia&nbsp;o&nbsp;una&nbsp;posible&nbsp;campa\u00f1a&nbsp;militar&nbsp;china&nbsp;contra&nbsp;Taiw\u00e1n<sup>[131]<\/sup>. Sin&nbsp;embargo,&nbsp;las&nbsp;brechas de coordinaci\u00f3n entre aliados permiten a Pek\u00edn y Mosc\u00fa explotar las debilidades regulatorias y de aplicaci\u00f3n de la ley en Occidente. Abordar estas brechas requiere una&nbsp;convergencia&nbsp;de&nbsp;pol\u00edticas&nbsp;a&nbsp;ambos&nbsp;lados&nbsp;del&nbsp;Atl\u00e1ntico.&nbsp;Estados&nbsp;Unidos&nbsp;deber\u00eda empezar&nbsp;a&nbsp;tratar a&nbsp;Rusia&nbsp;y&nbsp;China&nbsp;como&nbsp;actores&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gicos&nbsp;cada&nbsp;vez&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;integrados,&nbsp;mientras&nbsp;que&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;deber\u00eda adaptar&nbsp;su enfoque siguiendo&nbsp;la&nbsp;pr\u00e1ctica&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;de&nbsp;incluir&nbsp;en&nbsp;listas&nbsp;negras&nbsp;a&nbsp;las&nbsp;empresas&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa&nbsp;y&nbsp;vigilancia&nbsp;vinculadas&nbsp;a&nbsp;China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"558\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/7-3-1024x558.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-34907\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/7-3-1024x558.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/7-3-600x327.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/7-3-768x418.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/7-3-18x10.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/7-3.png 1065w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dichas medidas no deber\u00edan limitarse a los paquetes de sanciones contra Rusia, sino integrarse en&nbsp;la&nbsp;estrategia&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;amplia&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;<em>UE&nbsp;para reducir&nbsp;el&nbsp;riesgo&nbsp;frente&nbsp;a&nbsp;China<\/em><sup>[132]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Tambi\u00e9n&nbsp;es&nbsp;de inter\u00e9s com\u00fan coordinar las medidas financieras entre las instituciones de EE. UU. y la UE para impedir que los intermediarios con sede en China accedan a los canales del d\u00f3lar y el euro utilizados para ayudar a eludir las sanciones<sup>[133]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Estados Unidos y la UE tambi\u00e9n deber\u00edan sincronizar continuamente las&nbsp;actualizaciones de las listas de control de productos de doble uso, en estrecha coordinaci\u00f3n con Ucrania, que desempe\u00f1a un papel fundamental en la identificaci\u00f3n de componentes occidentales utilizados en los sistemas de armas rusos (por ejemplo, piezas de drones, m\u00e1quinas herramienta, tecnolog\u00edas)<sup>[134]<\/sup>. Sobre esta base, deber\u00eda elaborarse una lista transatl\u00e1ntica armonizada&nbsp;de&nbsp;entidades&nbsp;\u00abprohibidas&nbsp;para&nbsp;la&nbsp;exportaci\u00f3n\u00bb,&nbsp;que&nbsp;incluya&nbsp;filiales&nbsp;e&nbsp;intermediarios conocidos, con el fin de reducir las zonas grises en las que las entidades restringidas en una jurisdicci\u00f3n&nbsp;siguen&nbsp;siendo&nbsp;accesibles&nbsp;en&nbsp;otra<sup>[135]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Si&nbsp;bien&nbsp;es&nbsp;imposible&nbsp;lograr&nbsp;un&nbsp;bloqueo perfecto, la interrupci\u00f3n selectiva de nodos y rutas clave puede ralentizar significativamente tanto la militarizaci\u00f3n de China como el esfuerzo b\u00e9lico de Rusia<sup>[136]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Abordar&nbsp;las&nbsp;amenazas&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ir\u00e1n&nbsp;y&nbsp;Corea&nbsp;del&nbsp;Norte<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Las&nbsp;ambiciones&nbsp;militares&nbsp;y&nbsp;nucleares&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ir\u00e1n&nbsp;y&nbsp;Corea&nbsp;del&nbsp;Norte&nbsp;amenazan&nbsp;los&nbsp;intereses&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE. UU. y de sus aliados en Oriente Medio, mientras que su apoyo a la agresi\u00f3n de Rusia representa un riesgo directo para la seguridad de Europa. Corea del Norte suministra munici\u00f3n y misiles a Rusia y ha desplegado, seg\u00fan las estimaciones, unos 15 000 efectivos militares<sup>[137]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ir\u00e1n&nbsp;ha&nbsp;transferido&nbsp;drones&nbsp;Shahed-107<sup>[138]<\/sup>&nbsp;y&nbsp;Shahed-136<sup>[139]<\/sup>,&nbsp;que&nbsp;desempe\u00f1an&nbsp;un&nbsp;papel&nbsp;crucial&nbsp;en los&nbsp;ataques&nbsp;de&nbsp;Rusia&nbsp;contra&nbsp;ciudades ucranianas&nbsp;e&nbsp;infraestructuras&nbsp;civiles&nbsp;cr\u00edticas<sup>[140]<\/sup>.&nbsp;El&nbsp;peligro que&nbsp;representan&nbsp;Ir\u00e1n&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;RPDC&nbsp;es&nbsp;reconocido&nbsp;tanto&nbsp;por&nbsp;la&nbsp;Estrategia&nbsp;de&nbsp;DefensaNacional&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE. UU.<sup>[141]<\/sup>&nbsp;como&nbsp;por&nbsp;las&nbsp;Conclusiones&nbsp;del&nbsp;Consejo&nbsp;Europeo<sup>[142]<\/sup>,&nbsp;pero&nbsp;es&nbsp;posible&nbsp;articular&nbsp;una estrategia&nbsp;coordinada&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;eficaz&nbsp;para&nbsp;contenerlos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Una&nbsp;posible&nbsp;medida&nbsp;para&nbsp;mitigar&nbsp;esta&nbsp;amenaza&nbsp;es&nbsp;<em>mejorar&nbsp;el&nbsp;intercambio&nbsp;de&nbsp;inteligencia&nbsp;<\/em>entre&nbsp;aliados,&nbsp;en&nbsp;particular&nbsp;el&nbsp;intercambio&nbsp;de&nbsp;datos obtenidos&nbsp;por&nbsp;sat\u00e9lite&nbsp;para&nbsp;evaluar&nbsp;las&nbsp;capacidades militares y de producci\u00f3n de los adversarios. Esto deber\u00eda complementarse con una&nbsp;<em>coordinaci\u00f3n&nbsp;m\u00e1s estrecha de las sanciones secundarias dirigidas a los intermediarios&nbsp;<\/em>de terceros pa\u00edses implicados&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;adquisici\u00f3n&nbsp;y transferencia&nbsp;de&nbsp;componentes&nbsp;electr\u00f3nicos&nbsp;de&nbsp;doble&nbsp;uso&nbsp;esenciales&nbsp;para&nbsp;la&nbsp;producci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;drones&nbsp;rusos&nbsp;y&nbsp;de&nbsp;sistemas&nbsp;de&nbsp;misiles&nbsp;iran\u00edes&nbsp;y de&nbsp;RPDC.&nbsp;Los EE. UU., la UE y Ucrania tambi\u00e9n deber\u00edan priorizar la&nbsp;<em>desarticulaci\u00f3n de las cadenas de suministro il\u00edcitas&nbsp;y&nbsp;las&nbsp;flotas&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;sombra&nbsp;<\/em>que facilitan&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;entre&nbsp;los&nbsp;actores&nbsp;revisionistas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"3\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><u>Actuar a escala global<\/u><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">La cooperaci\u00f3n entre Estados Unidos y la Uni\u00f3n Europea va m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de la responsabilidad de Estados Unidos en materia de disuasi\u00f3n europea. Se trata de una relaci\u00f3n de dependencia mutua:<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">los&nbsp;bienes&nbsp;europeos&nbsp;son&nbsp;parte&nbsp;integral&nbsp;de&nbsp;las&nbsp;cadenas&nbsp;de&nbsp;suministro&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.,&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;es&nbsp;el&nbsp;mayor socio comercial de Estados Unidos<sup>[143]<\/sup>&nbsp;y posee aproximadamente el 24 % del mercado de bonos del Tesoro estadounidense<sup>[144]<\/sup>. Los Estados europeos llevan mucho tiempo apoyando el&nbsp;liderazgo&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;sistema&nbsp;internacional,&nbsp;entre&nbsp;otras&nbsp;cosas&nbsp;mediante&nbsp;la&nbsp;participaci\u00f3n&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;guerra&nbsp;contra&nbsp;el&nbsp;terrorismo,&nbsp;la alineaci\u00f3n&nbsp;con&nbsp;los&nbsp;reg\u00edmenes&nbsp;de&nbsp;sanciones&nbsp;liderados&nbsp;por&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;y la cooperaci\u00f3n en la gesti\u00f3n de crisis globales.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">M\u00e1s all\u00e1 de la alineaci\u00f3n diplom\u00e1tica y econ\u00f3mica, los Estados miembros de la UE tambi\u00e9n han apoyado&nbsp;hist\u00f3ricamente&nbsp;los&nbsp;objetivos estrat\u00e9gicos&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;Indo-Pac\u00edfico,&nbsp;Oriente&nbsp;Medio&nbsp;y&nbsp;\u00c1frica&nbsp;al&nbsp;<em>acoger&nbsp;infraestructuras&nbsp;militares&nbsp;estadounidenses<\/em>.&nbsp;M\u00e1s&nbsp;de&nbsp;cuarenta bases&nbsp;militares&nbsp;de EE. UU. est\u00e1n ubicadas en toda Europa, proporcionando plataformas cr\u00edticas para el despliegue avanzado,&nbsp;la&nbsp;inteligencia&nbsp;y&nbsp;las&nbsp;operaciones de&nbsp;proyecci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;poder<sup>[145]<\/sup>&nbsp;<sup>[146]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Los&nbsp;Estados&nbsp;miembros&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;y&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;act\u00faan&nbsp;con&nbsp;frecuencia&nbsp;como&nbsp;<em>socios&nbsp;fundamentales&nbsp;para&nbsp;impulsar&nbsp;las iniciativas de EE. UU. en el seno de las organizaciones internacionales&nbsp;<\/em>y en apoyo de la visi\u00f3n&nbsp;estadounidense de un \u00abIndo-Pac\u00edfico libre y abierto\u00bb<sup>[147]<\/sup>. Varios pa\u00edses europeos participan en ejercicios militares liderados por EE. UU. en la regi\u00f3n, incluidos&nbsp;<em>Talisman Sabre y RIMPAC.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Existen formas viables de mejorar dicha cooperaci\u00f3n y extenderla a otras regiones. Bajo el liderazgo de la OTAN, operaciones como&nbsp;<em>Baltic Sentry<\/em>, puesta en marcha en respuesta a&nbsp;m\u00faltiples&nbsp;incidentes&nbsp;de&nbsp;sabotaje&nbsp;submarino&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;norte&nbsp;de&nbsp;Europa,&nbsp;y&nbsp;Eastern&nbsp;Sentry,&nbsp;iniciada&nbsp;tras una importante incursi\u00f3n de drones rusos en el espacio a\u00e9reo polaco, han demostrado su eficacia operativa.&nbsp;<em>Ampliar y replicar estas pr\u00e1cticas&nbsp;<\/em>en otras regiones estrat\u00e9gicamente sensibles&nbsp;facilita&nbsp;un&nbsp;reparto&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;equitativo&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;riesgos&nbsp;dentro&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;Alianza&nbsp;y&nbsp;reforzar\u00eda&nbsp;la disuasi\u00f3n&nbsp;colectiva.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Convertir&nbsp;el&nbsp;\u00c1rtico&nbsp;en&nbsp;una&nbsp;ventaja&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gica<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El&nbsp;\u00c1rtico&nbsp;es&nbsp;crucial&nbsp;tanto&nbsp;para&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;como&nbsp;para&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;debido&nbsp;a&nbsp;su&nbsp;relevancia&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gica&nbsp;militar, el acceso a los recursos naturales y las rutas mar\u00edtimas emergentes, como la Ruta del Mar del Norte.&nbsp;Adem\u00e1s,&nbsp;la&nbsp;importancia&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;regi\u00f3n&nbsp;se&nbsp;ve&nbsp;acentuada&nbsp;por&nbsp;las&nbsp;actividades&nbsp;de&nbsp;Rusia&nbsp;y China que&nbsp;amenazan&nbsp;los&nbsp;intereses&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE:&nbsp;la&nbsp;militarizaci\u00f3n&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;explotaci\u00f3n&nbsp;industrial&nbsp;de Rusia&nbsp;siguen&nbsp;contribuyendo&nbsp;a&nbsp;financiar&nbsp;su&nbsp;guerra&nbsp;contra&nbsp;Ucrania<sup>[148]<\/sup>&nbsp;y&nbsp;plantean&nbsp;riesgos medioambientales<sup>[149]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Adem\u00e1s,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">las inversiones de China en rutas mar\u00edtimas, puertos y sat\u00e9lites del \u00c1rtico, respaldadas&nbsp;por&nbsp;la&nbsp;\u00abRuta&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;Seda&nbsp;Polar\u00bb&nbsp;y las&nbsp;maniobras&nbsp;militares&nbsp;conjuntas entre China y Rusia, desaf\u00edan la influencia transatl\u00e1ntica en la regi\u00f3n<sup>[150]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Por&nbsp;lo&nbsp;tanto,&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;entre&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.,&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;y&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;es&nbsp;esencial&nbsp;para&nbsp;abordar&nbsp;estos&nbsp;retos&nbsp;y existen bases sobre c\u00f3mo profundizarla.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En primer lugar,&nbsp;<em>la&nbsp;<\/em><em>cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;<\/em><em>debe partir de los&nbsp;<\/em><em>logros existentes&nbsp;<\/em><em>y ampliarlos<\/em>. La OTAN ya ha incrementado su actividad en la regi\u00f3n a trav\u00e9s de la misi\u00f3n Arctic Sentry, unificando las actividades&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;y&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;aliados&nbsp;en&nbsp;una&nbsp;sola<sup>[151]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Adem\u00e1s, EE. UU., Canad\u00e1 y Finlandia firmaron el Pacto ICE<sup>[152]<\/sup>, destinado a <em>multiplicar\u00a0la\u00a0capacidad\u00a0de\u00a0fabricaci\u00f3n\u00a0de\u00a0rompehielos polares<\/em> y\u00a0las\u00a0capacidades\u00a0relacionadas.\u00a0El\u00a0siguiente\u00a0paso\u00a0es\u00a0su\u00a0puesta\u00a0en\u00a0marcha\u00a0operativa<sup>[153]<\/sup>. Aunque\u00a0Rusia\u00a0cuenta\u00a0actualmente\u00a0con la\u00a0mayor\u00a0flota de rompehielos del mundo<sup>[154]<\/sup>, el acuerdo podr\u00eda reducir esta brecha y permitir una presencia m\u00e1s persistente de la OTAN en la regi\u00f3n<sup>[155]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-columns is-layout-flex wp-container-core-columns-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-columns-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-column is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\">\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"966\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/9-1024x966.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Navigating the US\u2013EU\u2013Ukraine Triangle: Revitalizing Transatlantic Security Cooperation\" class=\"wp-image-34908\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/9-1024x966.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/9-600x566.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/9-768x725.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/9-13x12.png 13w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/9.png 1080w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-column is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\">\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"1007\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/8-1024x1007.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Navigating the US\u2013EU\u2013Ukraine Triangle: Revitalizing Transatlantic Security Cooperation\" class=\"wp-image-34909\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/8-1024x1007.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/8-600x590.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/8-768x755.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/8-12x12.png 12w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/8.png 1080w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Esto se alinea con el enfoque \u00e1rtico de la UE basado en la colaboraci\u00f3n<sup>[156]<\/sup>&nbsp;y permitir\u00eda a Washington reforzar su posici\u00f3n en el Alto Norte al compartir riesgos y responsabilidades con&nbsp;los aliados europeos. Ucrania podr\u00eda ser un subcontratista potencial para las piezas no esenciales&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;rompehielos&nbsp;tras&nbsp;la&nbsp;guerra,&nbsp;siempre&nbsp;que&nbsp;se&nbsp;destinen&nbsp;fondos&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;restauraci\u00f3n&nbsp;de la f\u00e1brica Energomashspetsstal, da\u00f1ada por el ataque con misiles ruso en la regi\u00f3n de&nbsp;Donetsk<sup>[157]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En segundo lugar, la cooperaci\u00f3n puede profundizarse en medio de un entorno de seguridad&nbsp;cambiante:&nbsp;la&nbsp;l\u00ednea&nbsp;de&nbsp;frente&nbsp;extendida&nbsp;de&nbsp;laOTAN,&nbsp;el&nbsp;creciente&nbsp;papel&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gico&nbsp;de&nbsp;Groenlandia&nbsp;y las consecuencias de la guerra ruso-ucraniana.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La&nbsp;adhesi\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;Suecia&nbsp;y&nbsp;Finlandia&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;permite&nbsp;un&nbsp;<em>enfoque&nbsp;de&nbsp;fortaleza&nbsp;subregional<\/em><sup>[158]<\/sup>&nbsp;en&nbsp;el \u00c1rtico europeo basado en la disuasi\u00f3n coordinada de la UE-EE. UU. La cooperaci\u00f3n podr\u00eda centrarse en construir una&nbsp;<em>presencia avanzada lista para el combate<\/em>, reforzar las estructuras regionales&nbsp;de&nbsp;mando&nbsp;y&nbsp;control,&nbsp;mejorar&nbsp;la&nbsp;movilidad&nbsp;militar&nbsp;y&nbsp;las&nbsp;rutas&nbsp;de&nbsp;refuerzo,&nbsp;e&nbsp;<em>integrar nuevas&nbsp;fuerzas&nbsp;europeas&nbsp;bajo&nbsp;una clara&nbsp;divisi\u00f3n&nbsp;del&nbsp;trabajo&nbsp;basada&nbsp;en&nbsp;funciones&nbsp;y&nbsp;alineada&nbsp;con&nbsp;los planes&nbsp;regionales&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN<\/em>.&nbsp;Esta&nbsp;coordinaci\u00f3n,&nbsp;respaldada&nbsp;porrefuerzos&nbsp;de&nbsp;alta&nbsp;disponibilidad de&nbsp;aliados&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;retaguardia,&nbsp;generar\u00e1&nbsp;una&nbsp;disuasi\u00f3n&nbsp;agregada&nbsp;al&nbsp;obligar&nbsp;a&nbsp;Rusia&nbsp;a&nbsp;dispersar&nbsp;recursos por los distintos frentes de operaciones, reforzando as\u00ed la estabilidad euroatl\u00e1ntica en&nbsp;su&nbsp;conjunto.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Adem\u00e1s,&nbsp;Groenlandia&nbsp;desempe\u00f1a&nbsp;un&nbsp;papel&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gico&nbsp;para&nbsp;el&nbsp;potencial&nbsp;sistema&nbsp;estadounidense \u00abGolden&nbsp;Dome\u00bb&nbsp;como&nbsp;posible&nbsp;<em>vanguardia&nbsp;para&nbsp;sensores&nbsp;de&nbsp;alerta&nbsp;de&nbsp;misiles,&nbsp;sistemas&nbsp;de observaci\u00f3n y capacidades de interceptaci\u00f3n<\/em>. El fortalecimiento de la disuasi\u00f3n requiere, por lo tanto, una acci\u00f3n coordinada entre Estados Unidos y Europa en el marco de la OTAN<sup>[159]<\/sup>,&nbsp;partiendo&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;esfuerzos&nbsp;de&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;\u00e1rtica&nbsp;existentes&nbsp;establecidos&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;Alto&nbsp;Norte&nbsp;tras&nbsp;la&nbsp;Segunda Guerra Mundial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">La iniciativa \u00abGolden Dome\u00bb de Trump<sup>[160]<\/sup>&nbsp;podr\u00eda mejorar la disuasi\u00f3n transatl\u00e1ntica tanto&nbsp;para&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;como&nbsp;para&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE,&nbsp;siempre que&nbsp;se&nbsp;lleve&nbsp;a&nbsp;cabo&nbsp;en&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;y&nbsp;no&nbsp;en competencia con Europa.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Al mismo tiempo, el ataque de Ucrania contra los bombarderos estrat\u00e9gicos rusos en la base a\u00e9rea de Olenya durante la Operaci\u00f3n \u00abTelara\u00f1a\u00bb<sup>[161]<\/sup>, las operaciones cibern\u00e9ticas contra la Armada&nbsp;rusa<sup>[162]<\/sup>&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;resistencia&nbsp;ucraniana&nbsp;sostenida&nbsp;han&nbsp;<em>degradado&nbsp;a\u00fan&nbsp;m\u00e1s la&nbsp;capacidad&nbsp;de Rusia&nbsp;para&nbsp;proyectar&nbsp;su&nbsp;poder&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;\u00c1rtico<\/em>,&nbsp;socavando&nbsp;los&nbsp;planes&nbsp;de&nbsp;responder&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;ampliaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de la OTAN hacia el norte mediante la expansi\u00f3n de sus brigadas \u00e1rticas<sup>[163]<\/sup>. Esto otorga simult\u00e1neamente a Occidente el tiempo y la oportunidad de adaptarse a los retos futuros y demostrar la necesidad de la cooperaci\u00f3n militar con Ucrania, ya que tiene una influencia estrat\u00e9gica m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de la guerra.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Reconfigurar&nbsp;el&nbsp;equilibrio de&nbsp;poder en&nbsp;el&nbsp;mar Negro<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El&nbsp;mar&nbsp;Negro&nbsp;es&nbsp;una&nbsp;prioridad&nbsp;compartida&nbsp;de&nbsp;UE-EE.&nbsp;UU.-Ucrania&nbsp;en&nbsp;materia&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguridad, comercio, conectividad y resiliencia energ\u00e9tica.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">La regi\u00f3n funciona como un corredor de conectividad fundamental que une Europa,&nbsp;Oriente Medio, Asia Central y el Mediterr\u00e1neo.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Facilita las exportaciones agr\u00edcolas esenciales para la seguridad alimentaria mundial y sirve como ruta de tr\u00e1nsito para el petr\u00f3leo y el gas, con el potencial de integrar en el futuro los mercados energ\u00e9ticos europeos y de Asia Central. Adem\u00e1s, el mar Negro contiene importantes reservas&nbsp;de&nbsp;gas&nbsp;en&nbsp;alta&nbsp;mar,&nbsp;lo&nbsp;que&nbsp;lo&nbsp;convierte&nbsp;en&nbsp;un&nbsp;elemento&nbsp;central&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;esfuerzos&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE y EE. UU. por diversificar el suministro energ\u00e9tico m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de Rusia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"574\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/10-1024x574.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Navigating the US\u2013EU\u2013Ukraine Triangle: Revitalizing Transatlantic Security Cooperation\" class=\"wp-image-34911\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/10-1024x574.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/10-600x336.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/10-768x430.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/10-18x10.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/10.png 1080w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Esta&nbsp;importancia&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gica&nbsp;se&nbsp;ha&nbsp;traducido&nbsp;en&nbsp;una&nbsp;creciente&nbsp;atenci\u00f3n&nbsp;institucional&nbsp;por&nbsp;parte&nbsp;de los&nbsp;actores&nbsp;occidentales.&nbsp;En&nbsp;mayo&nbsp;de&nbsp;2025,la&nbsp;Comisi\u00f3n&nbsp;Europea&nbsp;lanz\u00f3&nbsp;su&nbsp;primera&nbsp;estrategia&nbsp;para el Mar Negro<sup>[164]<\/sup>. Estados Unidos se ha involucrado a trav\u00e9s de audiencias en el Congreso sobre el futuro de la estrategia de EE. UU. para el Mar Negro en septiembre de 2025 y la Ley de Seguridad&nbsp;del&nbsp;Mar&nbsp;Negro&nbsp;de2023<sup>[165]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Los&nbsp;aliados&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;afirmaron&nbsp;la&nbsp;importancia&nbsp;central&nbsp;de la&nbsp;regi\u00f3n&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;Cumbre&nbsp;de&nbsp;Vilna&nbsp;de&nbsp;julio&nbsp;de&nbsp;2023<sup>[166]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sin embargo, la agresi\u00f3n militar rusa supone una amenaza significativa para estos intereses comunes de Europa y Estados Unidos, al convertir el territorio ocupado de Ucrania en una base militar gigante para controlar las rutas comerciales y proyectar su poder en el C\u00e1ucaso, los Balcanes y Oriente Medio, as\u00ed como la&nbsp;<em>creciente presencia econ\u00f3mica e infraestructural de China<\/em>,&nbsp;incluido&nbsp;el&nbsp;desarrollo&nbsp;del puerto&nbsp;de&nbsp;Anaklia&nbsp;en&nbsp;Georgia&nbsp;como&nbsp;parte&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;Iniciativa&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;Franja&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;Ruta<sup>[167]<\/sup>.&nbsp;En&nbsp;este&nbsp;contexto,&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE,&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;y&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;pueden profundizar&nbsp;su&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;en&nbsp;varias \u00e1reas&nbsp;prioritarias.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En primer lugar, la seguridad mar\u00edtima, en particular el\u00a0<em>desminado<\/em>, representa una prioridad inmediata.\u00a0Desde\u00a02014,\u00a0Rusia\u00a0ha\u00a0recurrido\u00a0a una\u00a0estrategia\u00a0de\u00a0bloqueo\u00a0en\u00a0dos\u00a0fases:\u00a0declarar \u00abinseguras\u00bb amplias zonas mar\u00edtimas y disuadir a la navegaci\u00f3n neutral mediante el uso de minas\u00a0marinas,\u00a0el\u00a0aumento\u00a0de\u00a0los\u00a0costes\u00a0de\u00a0los seguros\u00a0y\u00a0ataques\u00a0recurrentes<sup>[168]<\/sup>.\u00a0Los\u00a0esfuerzos conjuntos\u00a0con\u00a0el\u00a0Centro\u00a0de\u00a0Transporte\u00a0Mar\u00edtimo\u00a0de\u00a0la\u00a0OTAN,\u00a0las\u00a0oficinas\u00a0hidrogr\u00e1ficas nacionales e iniciativas como el grupo de Fuerza de Medidas contra las Minas en el Mar Negro (MCM),\u00a0liderado\u00a0por\u00a0Turqu\u00eda,\u00a0Ruman\u00eda\u00a0y Bulgaria,\u00a0ya\u00a0han\u00a0demostrado\u00a0su\u00a0eficacia\u00a0a\u00a0la\u00a0hora\u00a0de\u00a0garantizar\u00a0la\u00a0seguridad alimentaria mundial<sup>[169]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Estas&nbsp;iniciativas&nbsp;podr\u00edan&nbsp;ampliarse&nbsp;para&nbsp;incluir&nbsp;plataformas&nbsp;de&nbsp;reconocimiento&nbsp;estadounidenses,&nbsp;como los drones MQ-9 Reaper, y la participaci\u00f3n de Ucrania en el marco trilateral. Dicha cooperaci\u00f3n ayudar\u00eda a garantizar una&nbsp;<em>navegaci\u00f3n libre y segura en el per\u00edodo de posguerra.<\/em><em><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En segundo lugar,&nbsp;<em>la seguridad energ\u00e9tica&nbsp;<\/em>constituye otro pilar cr\u00edtico para la colaboraci\u00f3n&nbsp;trilateral.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Los&nbsp;esfuerzos&nbsp;coordinados&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;inversi\u00f3n&nbsp;extranjera&nbsp;en&nbsp;las&nbsp;reservas&nbsp;offshore&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ruman\u00eda, Bulgaria&nbsp;y&nbsp;Turqu\u00eda<sup>[170]<\/sup>&nbsp;podr\u00edan&nbsp;impulsar&nbsp;las econom\u00edas&nbsp;regionales&nbsp;y&nbsp;desplazar&nbsp;el&nbsp;gas&nbsp;ruso de los mercados de la UE<sup>[171]<\/sup>, en l\u00ednea con los intereses estrat\u00e9gicos de EE. UU.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En&nbsp;este&nbsp;contexto&nbsp;regional,&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;ha&nbsp;comenzado&nbsp;a&nbsp;importar&nbsp;gas&nbsp;natural&nbsp;licuado&nbsp;estadounidense (1000 millones de metros c\u00fabicos en 2026<sup>[172]<\/sup>) y propone desarrollar una terminal de GNL en Odesa<sup>[173]<\/sup>,&nbsp;al&nbsp;tiempo&nbsp;que&nbsp;ofrece&nbsp;activos&nbsp;energ\u00e9ticos&nbsp;al&nbsp;fondo&nbsp;de&nbsp;inversi\u00f3n&nbsp;para&nbsp;la reconstrucci\u00f3n de EE. UU.-Ucrania en el marco del Pacto de Recursos de EE. UU.<sup>[174]<\/sup>&nbsp;Sin embargo, las vastas reservas ucranianas de gas en el mar Negro \u2014que podr\u00edan superar los dos billones de metros c\u00fabicos<sup>[175]<\/sup>\u2014 siguen siendo en gran medida inaccesibles debido a la ocupaci\u00f3n rusa y a la militarizaci\u00f3n de las plataformas marinas capturadas<sup>[176]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Es necesaria una cooperaci\u00f3n regional m\u00e1s amplia en materia de seguridad, que podr\u00eda profundizarse a trav\u00e9s de un&nbsp;<em>marco integrado UE-OTAN<\/em>. El Centro de Seguridad Mar\u00edtima del Mar Negro, recientemente propuesto por la Comisi\u00f3n Europea<sup>[177]<\/sup>, ten\u00eda como objetivo mejorar el intercambio de inteligencia, reforzar la cooperaci\u00f3n entre los guardacostas y supervisar infraestructuras cr\u00edticas como cables submarinos, gasoductos y parques e\u00f3licos. Incluir a Ucrania&nbsp;y&nbsp;Turqu\u00eda&nbsp;en&nbsp;esta&nbsp;iniciativa&nbsp;permitir\u00eda&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;incorporar&nbsp;las&nbsp;innovaciones&nbsp;navales de&nbsp;Kyiv y su experiencia en inteligencia de guerra, al tiempo que reforzar\u00eda la disuasi\u00f3n frente a la agresi\u00f3n rusa y fortalecer\u00eda la cooperaci\u00f3n UE-OTAN<sup>[178]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Como&nbsp;complemento&nbsp;a&nbsp;estos&nbsp;esfuerzos,&nbsp;<em>la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;puede&nbsp;mejorar&nbsp;la&nbsp;movilidad&nbsp;militar&nbsp;en&nbsp;toda&nbsp;la regi\u00f3n mediante la auditor\u00eda de infraestructuras clave en Ruman\u00eda y Bulgaria<\/em>, garantizando el despliegue&nbsp;r\u00e1pido&nbsp;de&nbsp;fuerzas&nbsp;y&nbsp;equipos&nbsp;durante&nbsp;contingencias.&nbsp;<em>Una&nbsp;presencia naval&nbsp;continua&nbsp;de&nbsp;la OTAN&nbsp;durante&nbsp;los&nbsp;365&nbsp;d\u00edas&nbsp;del&nbsp;a\u00f1o&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;mar&nbsp;Negro&nbsp;y&nbsp;unos&nbsp;ejercicios&nbsp;navales&nbsp;conjuntos&nbsp;m\u00e1s frecuentes<\/em>, reforzar\u00edan&nbsp;a\u00fan&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;la&nbsp;disuasi\u00f3n&nbsp;y&nbsp;demostrar\u00edan&nbsp;la&nbsp;implicaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;Aliados&nbsp;con&nbsp;la seguridad regional<sup>[179]<\/sup>. En el per\u00edodo de posguerra, Ucrania podr\u00eda ser un socio clave en el entrenamiento de las fuerzas navales occidentales debido a la experiencia operativa de la&nbsp;Armada ucraniana y al legado de los ejercicios Sea Breeze<sup>[180]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finalmente, el Mar Negro ha surgido como un caso de estudio exitoso en la aplicaci\u00f3n de una estrategia&nbsp;asim\u00e9trica.&nbsp;La&nbsp;campa\u00f1a&nbsp;naval&nbsp;deUcrania<sup>[181]<\/sup>,&nbsp;que&nbsp;incluye&nbsp;la&nbsp;eliminaci\u00f3n&nbsp;del&nbsp;30&nbsp;%&nbsp;de&nbsp;la Flota del Mar Negro de Rusia y el hundimiento de su buque insignia \u00abMoskva\u00bb proporciona lecciones valiosas sobre la proyecci\u00f3n de poder utilizando tecnolog\u00eda asequible y escalable, como drones mar\u00edtimos y misiles de base terrestre (por ejemplo, el Neptune), ampliando dr\u00e1sticamente los rangos de defensa costera<sup>[182]<\/sup>. Al compartir estos conocimientos, EE. UU., la OTAN y los socios regionales pueden acelerar la integraci\u00f3n de tecnolog\u00edas no tripuladas en la planificaci\u00f3n naval general<sup>[183]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En particular, la colaboraci\u00f3n con Ucrania proporcionar\u00eda a Washington ventajas operativas y tecnol\u00f3gicas para potenciales conflictos en el Indo-Pac\u00edfico, respaldando la \u00abestrategia Hellscape\u00bb en la que drones de bajo coste forman un escudo aut\u00f3nomo y letal contra una amenaza anfibia hacia Taiw\u00e1n<sup>[184]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"4\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><u>Fortalecimiento de la cooperaci\u00f3n en materias primas cr\u00edticas<\/u><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En 2023, China fue el principal productor de 29 de los 50 minerales cr\u00edticos incluidos en la lista de minerales cr\u00edticos de 2022<sup>[185]<\/sup>. La Uni\u00f3n Europea y los Estados Unidos consideran que la resiliencia de la cadena de suministro es un componente fundamental para hacer frente a los retos estrat\u00e9gicos que plantea China, ya que sus controles coercitivos a la exportaci\u00f3n de materias primas cr\u00edticas constituyen un arma geoecon\u00f3mica potencial que deja al descubierto las dependencias estrat\u00e9gicas y la vulnerabilidad industrial<sup>[186]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En febrero de 2026, Estados Unidos puso en marcha el Foro sobre el Compromiso Geoestrat\u00e9gico&nbsp;en&nbsp;materia&nbsp;de&nbsp;Recursos&nbsp;Naturales&nbsp;(FORGE),que&nbsp;reuni\u00f3&nbsp;a&nbsp;54&nbsp;representantes,&nbsp;entre ellos Ucrania<sup>[187]<\/sup>&nbsp;y la Comisi\u00f3n Europea<sup>[188]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Este es el ejemplo m\u00e1s claro de que, a pesar de los casos de pol\u00edticas no cooperativas por parte de EE. UU., el sector de los minerales cr\u00edticos sigue siendo un desaf\u00edo estrat\u00e9gico compartido<sup>[189]<\/sup>&nbsp;y, para superarlo, es necesario pasar de la competencia a una mayor cooperaci\u00f3n.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Algunas&nbsp;de&nbsp;las&nbsp;posibles&nbsp;opciones&nbsp;de&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;en&nbsp;este&nbsp;\u00e1mbito&nbsp;son&nbsp;la&nbsp;<em>armonizaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;los est\u00e1ndares<\/em><sup>[190]<\/sup>&nbsp;<em>y la coordinaci\u00f3n de la expansi\u00f3n industrial en Europa para ampliar la capacidad de procesamiento&nbsp;fuera&nbsp;de&nbsp;China&nbsp;y&nbsp;asegurar&nbsp;el&nbsp;abastecimiento&nbsp;transatl\u00e1ntico&nbsp;para industrias&nbsp;clave<\/em>.&nbsp;Con este fin, tambi\u00e9n es vital establecer un mecanismo de cofinanciaci\u00f3n entre la Corporaci\u00f3n&nbsp;Financiera de Desarrollo Internacional de los Estados Unidos y el Banco Europeo de&nbsp;Inversiones<sup>[191]<\/sup>&nbsp;para apoyar proyectos que reduzcan el riesgo de la&nbsp;<em>miner\u00eda, el procesamiento y el&nbsp;reciclaje&nbsp;en&nbsp;terceros&nbsp;pa\u00edses<\/em>,&nbsp;y&nbsp;para&nbsp;atraer&nbsp;capital&nbsp;privado.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.-UE&nbsp;en&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;puede&nbsp;ser&nbsp;un&nbsp;primer&nbsp;paso&nbsp;para&nbsp;armonizar&nbsp;las&nbsp;pol\u00edticas&nbsp;de la UE y EE. UU. en materia de suministro de recursos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Ucrania posee yacimientos de 22 de los 50 minerales designados como cr\u00edticos por el Gobierno de EE. UU. y de 25 de los 34 minerales que figuran en la lista de materias primas cr\u00edticas de la Uni\u00f3n Europea<sup>[192]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El acuerdo bilateral firmado en abril de 2025 otorga a Estados Unidos acceso privilegiado<sup>[193]<\/sup>&nbsp;a los minerales cr\u00edticos de Ucrania y constituye la base para la cooperaci\u00f3n con Ucrania bajo la Administraci\u00f3n Trump. Desde 2021, Ucrania tambi\u00e9n es socio oficial de la&nbsp;<em>UE&nbsp;<\/em>en materia de materias primas cr\u00edticas en virtud de un memorando de Entendimiento<sup>[194]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Los&nbsp;recursos&nbsp;minerales&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;tienen&nbsp;un&nbsp;valor&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gico&nbsp;para&nbsp;Europa,&nbsp;especialmente&nbsp;dada la&nbsp;escasez&nbsp;de&nbsp;yacimientos&nbsp;nacionales&nbsp;de&nbsp;laUE.&nbsp;Adem\u00e1s,&nbsp;la&nbsp;capacidad&nbsp;relativamente&nbsp;limitada&nbsp;de Europa para diversificar sus destinos de exportaci\u00f3n hace que las reservas de Ucrania sean a\u00fan m\u00e1s&nbsp;significativas<sup>[195]<\/sup>.&nbsp;La&nbsp;UE&nbsp;posee&nbsp;ventajas&nbsp;estructurales&nbsp;como&nbsp;la&nbsp;proximidad&nbsp;geogr\u00e1fica,&nbsp;redes&nbsp;log\u00edsticas&nbsp;y&nbsp;comerciales establecidas,&nbsp;y&nbsp;marcos&nbsp;regulatorios&nbsp;capaces&nbsp;de&nbsp;<em>integrar&nbsp;a&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;tanto en&nbsp;los&nbsp;mercados&nbsp;europeos&nbsp;como&nbsp;en&nbsp;los&nbsp;estadounidenses<\/em>.&nbsp;Un enfoque&nbsp;coordinado&nbsp;permitir\u00eda&nbsp;a&nbsp;ambos socios compartir los riesgos y los costes asociados al desarrollo del sector extractivo de Ucrania, al&nbsp;tiempo&nbsp;que&nbsp;se&nbsp;refuerzan&nbsp;las&nbsp;garant\u00edas&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguridad&nbsp;e&nbsp;inversi\u00f3n&nbsp;para&nbsp;Kyiv.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"5\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><u>Refuerzo del nexo de seguridad UE-OTAN<\/u><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Aunque la UE no pretende ni puede sustituir a la OTAN<sup>[196]<\/sup>, dada la falta de un mando militar unificado,&nbsp;de&nbsp;capacidad&nbsp;de&nbsp;vigilancia&nbsp;y&nbsp;de disuasi\u00f3n&nbsp;nuclear,&nbsp;s\u00ed&nbsp;puede&nbsp;reforzar&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;con la&nbsp;Alianza&nbsp;y&nbsp;con&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;para&nbsp;convertir&nbsp;a&nbsp;Europa&nbsp;en&nbsp;un&nbsp;actor&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;s\u00f3lido&nbsp;en&nbsp;materia&nbsp;de seguridad. Desde la invasi\u00f3n a gran escala de Ucrania por parte de Rusia, la cooperaci\u00f3n UE-OTAN se ha intensificado&nbsp;significativamente.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Este&nbsp;progreso&nbsp;se&nbsp;refleja&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;tercera&nbsp;Declaraci\u00f3n&nbsp;Conjunta&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;UE-OTAN,&nbsp;siete Di\u00e1logos Estructurados y la Coordinaci\u00f3n de Estados Mayores UE-OTAN sobre Ucrania<sup>[197]<\/sup>.&nbsp;Paralelamente,&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;pr\u00e1ctica&nbsp;se&nbsp;ha&nbsp;ampliado&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;ciberdefensa,&nbsp;la&nbsp;movilidad&nbsp;militar&nbsp;y la&nbsp;protecci\u00f3n de infraestructuras cr\u00edticas<sup>[198]<\/sup>. La UE tambi\u00e9n moviliz\u00f3 fondos a trav\u00e9s del mecanismo SAFE y la activaci\u00f3n de la cl\u00e1usula nacional de escape para apoyar el cumplimiento de los objetivos clave de capacidad de la OTAN<sup>[199]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"738\" height=\"710\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/image.jpeg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37793\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/image.jpeg 738w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/image-600x577.jpeg 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/image-12x12.jpeg 12w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 738px) 100vw, 738px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Partiendo de estos avances, nuevas medidas podr\u00edan fortalecer la cooperaci\u00f3n UE-OTAN y mejorar&nbsp;la&nbsp;interoperabilidad.&nbsp;La&nbsp;UE&nbsp;podr\u00eda&nbsp;utilizar su&nbsp;poder&nbsp;regulador&nbsp;y&nbsp;sus&nbsp;incentivos&nbsp;financieros para&nbsp;<em>acelerar&nbsp;la&nbsp;implementaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;las&nbsp;normas&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;en&nbsp;materia&nbsp;de equipamiento<\/em>,&nbsp;por ejemplo,&nbsp;tanques,&nbsp;as\u00ed&nbsp;como&nbsp;las&nbsp;pruebas&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;certificaci\u00f3n&nbsp;conjuntas&nbsp;a&nbsp;nivel&nbsp;europeo&nbsp;para&nbsp;mejorar la&nbsp;interoperabilidad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Esta&nbsp;necesidad&nbsp;ha&nbsp;quedado&nbsp;subrayada&nbsp;con&nbsp;la&nbsp;guerra&nbsp;ruso-ucraniana,&nbsp;que&nbsp;expuso&nbsp;las interpretaciones inconsistentes de las normas de la OTAN sobre munici\u00f3n<sup>[200]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Un mejor intercambio de&nbsp;<em>informaci\u00f3n y de inteligencia<\/em>, mediante el abordaje de las persistentes limitaciones&nbsp;entre&nbsp;Grecia&nbsp;y&nbsp;Turqu\u00eda, reforzar\u00eda&nbsp;significativamente&nbsp;el&nbsp;conocimiento&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;situaci\u00f3n y la coordinaci\u00f3n de pol\u00edticas. A nivel operativo, recurrir a las&nbsp;<em>estructuras de mando de la OTAN&nbsp;<\/em>en virtud del acuerdo \u00abBerl\u00edn Plus\u00bb para futuras crisis ajenas a la OTAN, en lugar de crear una cadena de mando europea separada, ayudar\u00eda a fomentar la confianza y a evitar duplicidades&nbsp;innecesarias<sup>[201]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">M\u00e1s&nbsp;all\u00e1&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;bilateral&nbsp;UE-OTAN,&nbsp;tambi\u00e9n&nbsp;es&nbsp;posible&nbsp;una&nbsp;implicaci\u00f3n&nbsp;trilateral&nbsp;m\u00e1s profundo&nbsp;con&nbsp;Ucrania.&nbsp;Dada&nbsp;la&nbsp;falta&nbsp;de apoyo&nbsp;de&nbsp;Washington&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;adhesi\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;a corto plazo, acelerar la integraci\u00f3n de Ucrania en la UE e introducir&nbsp;<em>di\u00e1logos trilaterales estructurados UE-OTAN-Ucrania&nbsp;<\/em>podr\u00eda, mientras tanto, acercar a Ucrania a las estructuras de&nbsp;defensa&nbsp;europeas&nbsp;y&nbsp;mejorar&nbsp;la interoperabilidad<sup>[202]<\/sup>.&nbsp;En&nbsp;un&nbsp;contexto&nbsp;de&nbsp;posguerra,&nbsp;el&nbsp;ej\u00e9rcito&nbsp;ucraniano,&nbsp;probado&nbsp;en&nbsp;combate,&nbsp;tambi\u00e9n&nbsp;podr\u00eda&nbsp;actuar&nbsp;como&nbsp;<em>instructor en ejercicios militares de la UE y la OTAN<\/em>.&nbsp;En&nbsp;t\u00e9rminos&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;generales,<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">la experiencia de combate ucraniana adquirida a trav\u00e9s de la EUMAM, la NSATU y la JATEC podr\u00eda integrarse sistem\u00e1ticamente en los programas europeos de formaci\u00f3n para soldados y reservistas.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La necesidad de estas medidas queda patente en los ejercicios militares Hedgehog 2025, que revelaron deficiencias sustanciales en la preparaci\u00f3n de la OTAN para la guerra electr\u00f3nica y a\u00e9rea no tripulada moderna en comparaci\u00f3n con las unidades ucranianas curtidas en el campo de&nbsp;batalla<sup>[203]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"6\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><u>Profundizaci\u00f3n de la cooperaci\u00f3n de las industrias de defensa<\/u><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Ucrania como banco de pruebas.&nbsp;<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Desde&nbsp;2022,&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;se&nbsp;ha&nbsp;convertido&nbsp;en&nbsp;un&nbsp;campo&nbsp;de&nbsp;pruebas para&nbsp;una&nbsp;gran&nbsp;variedad&nbsp;de&nbsp;sistemas&nbsp;occidentales.&nbsp;En&nbsp;el&nbsp;verano&nbsp;de&nbsp;2025,&nbsp;Kyiv institucionaliz\u00f3&nbsp;este proceso y puso en marcha la iniciativa \u00abTest in Ukraine\u00bb, que, seg\u00fan el Gobierno ucraniano, ofrece a las empresas extranjeras una oportunidad \u00fanica para evaluar sus sistemas en condiciones&nbsp;similares&nbsp;a&nbsp;las&nbsp;de&nbsp;combate,&nbsp;junto&nbsp;a&nbsp;unidades&nbsp;con&nbsp;amplia experiencia&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;campo&nbsp;de&nbsp;batalla<sup>[204]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Este&nbsp;modelo&nbsp;proporciona&nbsp;retroalimentaci\u00f3n&nbsp;operativa&nbsp;directa&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;militares,&nbsp;lo&nbsp;que&nbsp;permite&nbsp;un r\u00e1pido perfeccionamiento de las tecnolog\u00edas y su adaptaci\u00f3n a las demandas pr\u00e1cticas de la guerra&nbsp;moderna.&nbsp;Cuarenta&nbsp;y&nbsp;cinco&nbsp;empresas&nbsp;internacionales&nbsp;ya&nbsp;se&nbsp;han&nbsp;sumado&nbsp;ala&nbsp;iniciativa<sup>[205]<\/sup>, y una participaci\u00f3n m\u00e1s amplia mejorar\u00eda a\u00fan m\u00e1s la capacidad de Occidente para adaptarse a los modos de guerra en constante evoluci\u00f3n, contribuyendo as\u00ed a la resiliencia de Ucrania, as\u00ed como a las capacidades de disuasi\u00f3n de sus socios.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Coproducci\u00f3n con Ucrania<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Seg\u00fan el Consejo de Defensa y Seguridad Nacional de Ucrania, la capacidad&nbsp;de&nbsp;producci\u00f3n&nbsp;potencial&nbsp;del&nbsp;pa\u00eds&nbsp;alcanzar\u00e1&nbsp;los&nbsp;50&nbsp;000&nbsp;millones de&nbsp;d\u00f3lares&nbsp;en&nbsp;2026<sup>[206]<\/sup>. Sin&nbsp;embargo,&nbsp;el&nbsp;propio&nbsp;presupuesto&nbsp;estatal&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;para&nbsp;2026&nbsp;destina&nbsp;aproximadamente&nbsp;entre 15 000 y 17 000 millones de d\u00f3lares<sup>[207]<\/sup>&nbsp;a la adquisici\u00f3n de armas y equipos, lo que deja sin financiaci\u00f3n a m\u00e1s del 50 % de la capacidad total de producci\u00f3n de defensa de Ucrania<sup>[208]<\/sup>. A pesar de las numerosas preocupaciones que suscita a las empresas occidentales la idea de&nbsp;venir a&nbsp;coproducir&nbsp;con&nbsp;los&nbsp;ucranianos,&nbsp;los&nbsp;beneficios&nbsp;de&nbsp;tal&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;siguen&nbsp;siendo&nbsp;m\u00faltiples, y existen numerosos mecanismos para llevarla a cabo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Para los&nbsp;<em>Estados miembros de la UE<\/em>, la producci\u00f3n conjunta de armas con Ucrania ofrece una&nbsp;forma&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguir&nbsp;el&nbsp;ritmo&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;r\u00e1pida adaptaci\u00f3n&nbsp;tecnol\u00f3gica&nbsp;de&nbsp;Rusia,&nbsp;al&nbsp;tiempo&nbsp;que&nbsp;fortalece&nbsp;la resiliencia&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;credibilidad&nbsp;de&nbsp;Europa&nbsp;como&nbsp;socio&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;reparto&nbsp;de&nbsp;la carga.&nbsp;M\u00e1s&nbsp;de&nbsp;25 empresas&nbsp;occidentales&nbsp;ya&nbsp;participan&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;producci\u00f3n&nbsp;o&nbsp;modernizaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;armas&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;marco&nbsp;de la&nbsp;iniciativa&nbsp;<em>Build&nbsp;inUkraine<sup>[209]<\/sup><\/em>,&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;posible&nbsp;participaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;en&nbsp;proyectos&nbsp;financiados&nbsp;por SAFE podr\u00eda garantizar financiaci\u00f3n adicional. A principios de 2026, Ucrania y Alemania han puesto en marcha instalaciones conjuntas de producci\u00f3n de drones<sup>[210]<\/sup>, con acuerdos respectivos firmados con Finlandia, Dinamarca y Letonia<sup>[211]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">A medio plazo, las adquisiciones a Ucrania podr\u00edan ofrecer a los pa\u00edses de la UE una forma rentable de acelerar el rearme, al tiempo que se mantiene el gasto interno en&nbsp;bienestar<sup>[212]<\/sup>.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La cooperaci\u00f3n con&nbsp;<em>Estados Unidos&nbsp;<\/em>se centra actualmente en ampliar la&nbsp;<em>producci\u00f3n de munici\u00f3n de artiller\u00eda<\/em><sup>[213]<\/sup>, pero Ucrania podr\u00eda convertirse en un socio a largo plazo en&nbsp;<em>tecnolog\u00edas de defensa avanzadas<\/em>.&nbsp;El&nbsp;presidente&nbsp;Trump&nbsp;y&nbsp;el&nbsp;Secretario&nbsp;del&nbsp;Ej\u00e9rcito&nbsp;Driscoll&nbsp;han expresado&nbsp;su&nbsp;inter\u00e9s&nbsp;en&nbsp;ampliar&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;producci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;drones,&nbsp;incluido&nbsp;un&nbsp;acuerdo&nbsp;de&nbsp;posguerra para intercambiar UAV ucranianos por sistemas de EE. UU.<sup>[214]<\/sup>&nbsp;Esta intenci\u00f3n estrat\u00e9gica ya se refleja&nbsp;en&nbsp;las&nbsp;iniciativas&nbsp;de&nbsp;obtenci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;Dos&nbsp;empresas ucranianas&nbsp;fueron&nbsp;invitadas&nbsp;por&nbsp;el Departamento&nbsp;de&nbsp;Guerra&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;a&nbsp;unirse&nbsp;a&nbsp;Drone&nbsp;Dominance,&nbsp;un&nbsp;programa&nbsp;de&nbsp;1000&nbsp;millones de d\u00f3lares&nbsp;para&nbsp;adquirir&nbsp;peque\u00f1os&nbsp;drones&nbsp;letales&nbsp;en&nbsp;2026-2027,&nbsp;lo&nbsp;que&nbsp;subraya&nbsp;el&nbsp;reconocimiento de&nbsp;las&nbsp;capacidades&nbsp;tecnol\u00f3gicas&nbsp;y&nbsp;la experiencia&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;campo&nbsp;de&nbsp;batalla&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania<sup>[215]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Lecciones aprendidas de Ucrania y construcci\u00f3n de una defensa a\u00e9rea europea<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ucrania ha demostrado&nbsp;un&nbsp;crecimiento&nbsp;sin&nbsp;precedentes&nbsp;en&nbsp;su&nbsp;base&nbsp;industrial&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa:&nbsp;de&nbsp;una&nbsp;capacidad de producci\u00f3n de 1000 millones de d\u00f3lares en 2021 a 50 000 millones en 2026. La capacidad de escalar&nbsp;r\u00e1pidamente&nbsp;es&nbsp;la&nbsp;habilidad&nbsp;que&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;necesitan&nbsp;los&nbsp;socios&nbsp;europeos en&nbsp;un&nbsp;momento&nbsp;en&nbsp;el que&nbsp;deben&nbsp;pasar&nbsp;r\u00e1pidamente&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;dependencia&nbsp;de&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;autosuficiencia.&nbsp;La&nbsp;colaboraci\u00f3n tambi\u00e9n es posible en el \u00e1mbito del desarrollo de tecnolog\u00eda militar, donde Ucrania ofrece soluciones innovadoras y rentables, as\u00ed como una gran adaptabilidad a las necesidades cambiantes del campo de batalla.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;ya&nbsp;est\u00e1&nbsp;aprendiendo&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;marco&nbsp;de&nbsp;JATEC&nbsp;en&nbsp;materia&nbsp;de&nbsp;planificaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;la guerra, doctrinas y entrenamiento.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-verse\">Sin&nbsp;embargo,&nbsp;la&nbsp;colaboraci\u00f3n&nbsp;con&nbsp;Kyiv&nbsp;tambi\u00e9n&nbsp;podr\u00eda&nbsp;ayudar&nbsp;a&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;a&nbsp;definir&nbsp;futuros&nbsp;planes de capacidades y doctrinas, dada la enorme experiencia de combate de Ucrania.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Por&nbsp;ejemplo,&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;puede&nbsp;contribuir&nbsp;de&nbsp;manera&nbsp;significativa&nbsp;al&nbsp;desarrollo&nbsp;de&nbsp;las&nbsp;capacidades&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa&nbsp;occidentales&nbsp;mediante&nbsp;la introducci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;nuevas&nbsp;tecnolog\u00edas&nbsp;y&nbsp;el&nbsp;perfeccionamiento&nbsp;de su uso operativo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La violaci\u00f3n del espacio a\u00e9reo polaco y rumano por drones rusos en 2025<sup>[216]<\/sup>&nbsp;y los ataques de Ir\u00e1n&nbsp;en&nbsp;2026&nbsp;contra&nbsp;los&nbsp;pa\u00edses&nbsp;del&nbsp;Golfo<sup>[217]<\/sup>han&nbsp;demostrado&nbsp;que,&nbsp;aunque&nbsp;los&nbsp;sistemas&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa a\u00e9rea&nbsp;contempor\u00e1neos&nbsp;siguen&nbsp;siendo&nbsp;tecnol\u00f3gicamente&nbsp;avanzados,&nbsp;no&nbsp;siempre&nbsp;son rentables&nbsp;en condiciones de combate reales<sup>[218]<\/sup>.&nbsp;<em>La&nbsp;arquitectura&nbsp;h\u00edbrida&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa&nbsp;a\u00e9rea&nbsp;<\/em>de Ucrania, que combina sistemas de la era sovi\u00e9tica, occidentales y aut\u00f3ctonos, demuestra c\u00f3mo los Estados pueden adaptarse para proteger su espacio a\u00e9reo en una guerra de alta intensidad. Ofrece lecciones&nbsp;para&nbsp;el&nbsp;flanco&nbsp;oriental&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;y&nbsp;oportunidades&nbsp;para&nbsp;la&nbsp;diplomacia&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa&nbsp;con terceros pa\u00edses que buscan soluciones rentables econ\u00f3micamente<sup>[219]<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El desarrollo conjunto de\u00a0<em>drones interceptores ucranianos<\/em>, que ya est\u00e1 en marcha en el Reino Unido<sup>[220]<\/sup>,\u00a0podr\u00eda\u00a0servir\u00a0de\u00a0anclaje\u00a0para\u00a0unaarquitectura\u00a0de\u00a0defensa\u00a0de\u00a0drones\u00a0europea\u00a0m\u00e1s\u00a0amplia, no obstante, contrarrestar la amenaza en evoluci\u00f3n de Rusia requerir\u00e1 la expansi\u00f3n a m\u00e1s Estados europeos, una producci\u00f3n a escala y una doctrina probada en el frente. Integrar a\u00a0Ucrania\u00a0en\u00a0iniciativas como\u00a0el\u00a0<em>MuroAnti\u00a0Drones\u00a0y\u00a0la\u00a0Iniciativa\u00a0Europea\u00a0de\u00a0Protecci\u00f3n\u00a0del\u00a0Cielo\u00a0(ESSI)\u00a0<\/em>acelerar\u00eda\u00a0la\u00a0adaptaci\u00f3n<sup>[221]<\/sup>, reducir\u00eda\u00a0los\u00a0costes\u00a0de\u00a0obtenci\u00f3n\u00a0y acelerar\u00eda\u00a0el despliegue\u00a0de\u00a0tecnolog\u00edas anti drones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La experiencia operativa de Ucrania en Defensa a\u00e9rea de corto alcance (SHORAD), fusi\u00f3n de sensores, guerra electr\u00f3nica y sistemas contra-UAS aportar\u00eda una experiencia t\u00e9cnica cr\u00edtica y agilidad institucional, ayudando a convertir los esfuerzos nacionales fragmentados en un sistema&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa&nbsp;a\u00e9rea&nbsp;y&nbsp;de&nbsp;drones&nbsp;europeo&nbsp;resiliente,&nbsp;interoperable&nbsp;y&nbsp;por&nbsp;capas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-recomendaciones\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Recomendaciones<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>1. Comunicaci\u00f3n con la administraci\u00f3n Trump<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Ucrania y la UE deber\u00edan adoptar un&nbsp;<em>enfoque transaccional&nbsp;<\/em>a la hora de interactuar con la Administraci\u00f3n&nbsp;Trump.&nbsp;La&nbsp;UE&nbsp;cuenta&nbsp;con&nbsp;los recursos&nbsp;financieros,&nbsp;la&nbsp;infraestructura&nbsp;y&nbsp;la fortaleza&nbsp;log\u00edstica&nbsp;necesaria&nbsp;para&nbsp;garantizar&nbsp;que&nbsp;los&nbsp;acuerdos&nbsp;con&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;sean&nbsp;mutuamente beneficiosos. Ucrania puede aprovechar sus tecnolog\u00edas probadas en el campo de batalla, en&nbsp;particular&nbsp;la&nbsp;producci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;drones,&nbsp;para&nbsp;asegurar&nbsp;una&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;a&nbsp;largo&nbsp;plazo&nbsp;yalinear sus necesidades de seguridad con los intereses estrat\u00e9gicos de EE. UU.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La UE deber\u00eda aprovechar el&nbsp;<em>liderazgo de los Estados miembros&nbsp;<\/em>como canal principal para interactuar&nbsp;con&nbsp;la&nbsp;Administraci\u00f3n&nbsp;Trump,&nbsp;ya que&nbsp;los&nbsp;gobiernos&nbsp;nacionales&nbsp;suelen comunicarse con Washington de forma m\u00e1s eficaz que las instituciones de la UE. La interacci\u00f3n tambi\u00e9n deber\u00eda&nbsp;<em>dirigirse al nivel m\u00e1s alto posible<\/em>, ya que la mayor\u00eda de las&nbsp;decisiones&nbsp;las&nbsp;toma&nbsp;el&nbsp;propio&nbsp;presidente&nbsp;y&nbsp;su&nbsp;c\u00edrculo&nbsp;\u00edntimo&nbsp;de&nbsp;asesores.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Ucrania&nbsp;deber\u00eda&nbsp;profundizar&nbsp;la&nbsp;coordinaci\u00f3n&nbsp;con&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;para&nbsp;<em>reforzar&nbsp;su&nbsp;posici\u00f3n&nbsp;negociadora<\/em>,&nbsp;especialmente&nbsp;en&nbsp;lo&nbsp;que&nbsp;respecta&nbsp;a&nbsp;las cl\u00e1usulas&nbsp;del&nbsp;acuerdo&nbsp;de&nbsp;paz&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;la&nbsp;integraci\u00f3n&nbsp;de Ucrania en la UE. Una mayor alineaci\u00f3n con los socios europeos impedir\u00eda que la Administraci\u00f3n de EE. UU. aprovechara la posici\u00f3n aislada de Ucrania para acelerar una resoluci\u00f3n injusta de la guerra.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Los responsables de la toma de decisiones de la UE y de Ucrania deber\u00edan seguir equilibrando&nbsp;la&nbsp;contenci\u00f3n&nbsp;al&nbsp;responder&nbsp;a&nbsp;provocaciones y&nbsp;al&nbsp;considerar&nbsp;concesiones&nbsp;con acciones audaces, impulsadas por iniciativas, orientadas a moldear la relaci\u00f3n con Washington, incluida la aplicaci\u00f3n de una presi\u00f3n econ\u00f3mica calibrada a trav\u00e9s de los instrumentos comerciales y econ\u00f3micos de la UE.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>2. Fortalecimiento de Ucrania<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>La&nbsp;UE&nbsp;y&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;deber\u00edan&nbsp;garantizar&nbsp;que&nbsp;las&nbsp;<em>garant\u00edas&nbsp;de&nbsp;seguridad&nbsp;posguerra&nbsp;para&nbsp;Ucrania sean&nbsp;lo&nbsp;suficientemente&nbsp;robustas&nbsp;<\/em>tanto&nbsp;para disuadir&nbsp;una&nbsp;nueva&nbsp;agresi\u00f3n&nbsp;como&nbsp;para tranquilizar&nbsp;a&nbsp;los&nbsp;inversores&nbsp;extranjeros.&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;podr\u00eda&nbsp;respaldar&nbsp;la&nbsp;coalici\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;voluntarios con&nbsp;facilitadores&nbsp;clave,&nbsp;supervisar&nbsp;y verificar&nbsp;un&nbsp;alto&nbsp;el&nbsp;fuego&nbsp;para&nbsp;reforzar&nbsp;la&nbsp;capacidad&nbsp;de disuasi\u00f3n&nbsp;a&nbsp;largo&nbsp;plazo&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;en&nbsp;beneficio&nbsp;del&nbsp;inter\u00e9s&nbsp;com\u00fan&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.-UE.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La UE deber\u00eda dar&nbsp;<em>prioridad a la prestaci\u00f3n de asistencia militar a Ucrania&nbsp;<\/em>sobre el almacenamiento&nbsp;de&nbsp;reservas,&nbsp;ya&nbsp;que&nbsp;los&nbsp;r\u00e1pidos cambios&nbsp;tecnol\u00f3gicos&nbsp;pueden&nbsp;dejar obsoleto el equipo almacenado, al tiempo que sigue adquiriendo los sistemas estadounidenses que Ucrania necesita de forma inmediata y que los pa\u00edses de la UE a\u00fan no pueden&nbsp;sustituir.&nbsp;Con&nbsp;este&nbsp;fin,&nbsp;la&nbsp;iniciativa&nbsp;PURL&nbsp;deber\u00eda&nbsp;reforzarse,&nbsp;a&nbsp;pesar&nbsp;de&nbsp;las&nbsp;tensiones pol\u00edticas,&nbsp;ampliando&nbsp;la&nbsp;participaci\u00f3n&nbsp;europea&nbsp;y&nbsp;pasando&nbsp;de&nbsp;paquetes&nbsp;de&nbsp;emergencia&nbsp;a&nbsp;corto plazo&nbsp;a&nbsp;un&nbsp;marco&nbsp;de&nbsp;suministro&nbsp;a&nbsp;largo plazo.&nbsp;Para&nbsp;aprovechar&nbsp;los&nbsp;activos&nbsp;rusos&nbsp;congelados, los activos custodiados en Euroclear podr\u00edan transferirse a la jurisdicci\u00f3n de la UE, y se recomienda&nbsp;a&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;que&nbsp;adopte&nbsp;la&nbsp;Ley&nbsp;de&nbsp;Implementaci\u00f3n&nbsp;del&nbsp;REPO.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Deber\u00eda&nbsp;desarrollarse&nbsp;una&nbsp;<em>cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;estrecha&nbsp;en&nbsp;materia&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa&nbsp;entre&nbsp;las empresas&nbsp;ucranianas&nbsp;y&nbsp;europeas<\/em>,&nbsp;en particular&nbsp;mediante&nbsp;pruebas&nbsp;en&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;producci\u00f3n conjunta de armamento tanto en los pa\u00edses europeos, garantizando la seguridad, como en Ucrania,&nbsp;garantizando&nbsp;la rentabilidad&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;relevancia&nbsp;operativa.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La&nbsp;UE&nbsp;deber\u00eda&nbsp;garantizar&nbsp;un&nbsp;p<em>roceso&nbsp;de&nbsp;adhesi\u00f3n&nbsp;justo&nbsp;y&nbsp;cre\u00edble&nbsp;para&nbsp;Ucrania<\/em>.&nbsp;Esto&nbsp;incluye evitar&nbsp;que&nbsp;se&nbsp;utilice&nbsp;el&nbsp;derecho&nbsp;de veto&nbsp;como&nbsp;arma,&nbsp;ya&nbsp;sea&nbsp;mediante&nbsp;una&nbsp;reforma institucional del sistema de votaci\u00f3n o la suspensi\u00f3n de los derechos de voto de los Estados miembros que incumplan de forma persistente los principios de la UE.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La&nbsp;UE&nbsp;debe&nbsp;introducir&nbsp;<em>di\u00e1logos&nbsp;estructurados&nbsp;trilaterales&nbsp;UE-OTAN-Ucrania&nbsp;<\/em>para&nbsp;acercar&nbsp;a Ucrania&nbsp;a&nbsp;las&nbsp;estructuras&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa occidentales&nbsp;y&nbsp;mejorar&nbsp;la&nbsp;interoperabilidad.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>3. Hacia la autonom\u00eda de seguridad europea<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>La UE deber\u00eda basarse en las iniciativas existentes de&nbsp;<em>desarrollo conjunto de armamento<\/em>, como SAFE, y ampliar los&nbsp;<em>programas de adquisici\u00f3n conjunta&nbsp;<\/em>en el nuevo presupuesto de la UE. Deber\u00eda priorizarse la creaci\u00f3n de un&nbsp;<em>mercado europeo de adquisiciones de defensa&nbsp;<\/em>genuinamente integrado, junto con una mayor inversi\u00f3n en capacidades de disuasi\u00f3n, incluidos&nbsp;los&nbsp;sistemas&nbsp;de&nbsp;ataque&nbsp;de&nbsp;largo&nbsp;alcance&nbsp;y&nbsp;las&nbsp;tecnolog\u00edas&nbsp;de&nbsp;misiles.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Se recomienda a la UE que utilice su poder regulador y sus incentivos financieros para acelerar&nbsp;la&nbsp;aplicaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;las&nbsp;normas&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN en&nbsp;<em>materia&nbsp;de&nbsp;equipamiento<\/em>,&nbsp;as\u00ed&nbsp;como&nbsp;las pruebas&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;certificaciones&nbsp;europeas&nbsp;conjuntas,&nbsp;con&nbsp;el&nbsp;fin&nbsp;de&nbsp;mejorar&nbsp;la&nbsp;interoperabilidad.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Para&nbsp;reducir&nbsp;la&nbsp;dependencia&nbsp;excesiva&nbsp;de&nbsp;Estados&nbsp;Unidos,&nbsp;las&nbsp;<em>cadenas&nbsp;de&nbsp;suministro&nbsp;de&nbsp;armas&nbsp;deber\u00edan descentralizarse&nbsp;<\/em>mediante el fortalecimiento de la cooperaci\u00f3n industrial-defensiva con&nbsp;socios&nbsp;tecnol\u00f3gicamente&nbsp;avanzados&nbsp;como&nbsp;el&nbsp;Reino&nbsp;Unido,&nbsp;Canad\u00e1&nbsp;y&nbsp;Corea&nbsp;del&nbsp;Sur.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Para&nbsp;<em>limitar la dependencia industrial a largo plazo de China<\/em>, los miembros de la UE deber\u00edan evitar&nbsp;la&nbsp;cooperaci\u00f3n&nbsp;con&nbsp;empresas chinas,&nbsp;en&nbsp;particular&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;\u00e1mbito&nbsp;de&nbsp;los semiconductores, los chips avanzados y el procesamiento de materias primas cr\u00edticas y tecnolog\u00edas relacionadas con la defensa.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La UE deber\u00eda&nbsp;<em>institucionalizar la experiencia de combate de Ucrania&nbsp;<\/em>integrando al personal&nbsp;ucraniano como instructores en los ejercicios de la UE y la OTAN e integrando las lecciones aprendidas a trav\u00e9s de EUMAM, NSATU y JATEC en el entrenamiento europeo para sus soldados y reservistas. Ucrania tambi\u00e9n deber\u00eda incluirse formalmente en programas como el&nbsp;Muro&nbsp;Anti&nbsp;Drones&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;Iniciativa&nbsp;Europea&nbsp;de&nbsp;Protecci\u00f3n&nbsp;del&nbsp;Cielo.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>4. Respuesta conjunta a las amenazas globales<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Los EE. UU. y la UE deber\u00edan desarrollar una&nbsp;<em>estrategia coordinada a largo plazo para contrarrestar&nbsp;las&nbsp;flotas&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;sombra<\/em>,&nbsp;con&nbsp;el&nbsp;fin&nbsp;delimitar&nbsp;su&nbsp;papel&nbsp;en&nbsp;la&nbsp;financiaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;Rusia, Corea&nbsp;del&nbsp;Norte&nbsp;e&nbsp;Ir\u00e1n,&nbsp;ya&nbsp;sea&nbsp;mediante&nbsp;una&nbsp;mayor&nbsp;supervisi\u00f3n&nbsp;por&nbsp;parte&nbsp;del&nbsp;GAFI&nbsp;o&nbsp;mediante acciones m\u00e1s sistem\u00e1ticas y contundentes contra los buques y las redes log\u00edsticas.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La&nbsp;creciente&nbsp;alineaci\u00f3n&nbsp;estrat\u00e9gica&nbsp;entre&nbsp;Rusia,&nbsp;China,&nbsp;Corea&nbsp;del&nbsp;Norte&nbsp;e&nbsp;Ir\u00e1n&nbsp;refuerza&nbsp;la necesidad&nbsp;de&nbsp;una&nbsp;<em>coordinaci\u00f3n&nbsp;m\u00e1s&nbsp;estrecha&nbsp;delas&nbsp;sanciones&nbsp;entre&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE-EE.&nbsp;UU.<\/em>,&nbsp;dirigida&nbsp;a los intermediarios de terceros pa\u00edses implicados en la adquisici\u00f3n y transferencia de componentes de doble uso.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Estados Unidos y la Uni\u00f3n Europea deber\u00edan adoptar un enfoque m\u00e1s firme y coordinado&nbsp;para&nbsp;<em>restringir&nbsp;las&nbsp;exportaciones&nbsp;de&nbsp;bienes de&nbsp;doble&nbsp;uso&nbsp;a&nbsp;China<\/em>,&nbsp;sincronizando continuamente la lista de los bienes de doble uso en coordinaci\u00f3n con Ucrania, incluyendo conjuntamente&nbsp;en&nbsp;una&nbsp;lista&nbsp;negra&nbsp;a&nbsp;las empresas&nbsp;de&nbsp;defensa&nbsp;y&nbsp;vigilancia&nbsp;vinculadas&nbsp;a&nbsp;China y&nbsp;alineando&nbsp;las&nbsp;sanciones&nbsp;financieras&nbsp;para&nbsp;bloquear&nbsp;el&nbsp;acceso&nbsp;de&nbsp;intermediarios&nbsp;con sede&nbsp;en China a los canales financieros en d\u00f3lares y euros.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Los&nbsp;Estados&nbsp;miembros&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;deber\u00edan&nbsp;asumir&nbsp;una&nbsp;mayor&nbsp;responsabilidad&nbsp;para&nbsp;<em>disuadir&nbsp;a&nbsp;Rusia&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;\u00c1rtico&nbsp;<\/em>mediante&nbsp;la&nbsp;construcci\u00f3n&nbsp;de una&nbsp;presencia&nbsp;avanzada&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;lista&nbsp;para el combate, el fortalecimiento del mando y control regional y la movilidad militar, y la integraci\u00f3n de nuevas fuerzas europeas bajo una clara divisi\u00f3n del trabajo alineada con los planes regionales de la OTAN.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La&nbsp;UE&nbsp;y&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;podr\u00edan&nbsp;reforzar&nbsp;la&nbsp;seguridad&nbsp;del&nbsp;Mar&nbsp;Negro&nbsp;integrando&nbsp;a&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;y&nbsp;Turqu\u00eda&nbsp;en el&nbsp;<em>Centro&nbsp;de&nbsp;Seguridad&nbsp;Mar\u00edtima&nbsp;del&nbsp;MarNegro&nbsp;<\/em>de la UE, al tiempo que se llevan a cabo auditor\u00edas&nbsp;dirigidas&nbsp;por&nbsp;la&nbsp;OTAN&nbsp;sobre&nbsp;las&nbsp;<em>infraestructuras&nbsp;cr\u00edticas&nbsp;<\/em>en&nbsp;Ruman\u00eda&nbsp;y&nbsp;Bulgaria&nbsp;para mejorar la movilidad militar y el despliegue r\u00e1pido de fuerzas. La navegaci\u00f3n en la&nbsp;posguerra podr\u00eda garantizarse mediante&nbsp;<em>ejercicios navales de la OTAN y esfuerzos de desminado ampliados<\/em>, incluyendo plataformas de reconocimiento de EE. UU. y la&nbsp;participaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;grupo&nbsp;de&nbsp;Fuerza&nbsp;deMedidas&nbsp;contra&nbsp;las&nbsp;Minas&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;Mar&nbsp;Negro&nbsp;(MCM).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>5. Negociaci\u00f3n transatl\u00e1ntica<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Los responsables pol\u00edticos europeos deber\u00edan garantizar que los recursos energ\u00e9ticos rusos&nbsp;no&nbsp;vuelvan&nbsp;a&nbsp;entrar&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;mercado&nbsp;europeo&nbsp;una vez&nbsp;finalizada&nbsp;la&nbsp;guerra&nbsp;entre&nbsp;Rusia&nbsp;y&nbsp;Ucrania, por ejemplo, invirtiendo en el desarrollo de las reservas de gas mar\u00edtimas en aguas ucranianas,&nbsp;rumanas,&nbsp;b\u00falgaras&nbsp;y&nbsp;turcas,&nbsp;y fomentando&nbsp;las&nbsp;inversiones&nbsp;estadounidenses&nbsp;en&nbsp;la expansi\u00f3n,&nbsp;tras&nbsp;la&nbsp;guerra,&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;infraestructura&nbsp;de&nbsp;GNL&nbsp;a&nbsp;lo&nbsp;largo&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;costa&nbsp;del&nbsp;marNegro.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Los&nbsp;pa\u00edses&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE&nbsp;y&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;deber\u00edan&nbsp;cooperar&nbsp;en&nbsp;construir&nbsp;sus&nbsp;<em>capacidades&nbsp;\u00e1rticas<\/em> mediante&nbsp;la&nbsp;ampliaci\u00f3n&nbsp;de&nbsp;las&nbsp;cadenas&nbsp;de&nbsp;suministro&nbsp;de&nbsp;rompehielos&nbsp;polares&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;marco del Pacto ICE, e integrar a Ucrania como posible subcontratista de componentes no esenciales mediante la asignaci\u00f3n de fondos espec\u00edficos para restaurar las instalaciones da\u00f1adas de Energomashspetsstal tras la guerra.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La&nbsp;UE&nbsp;y&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;deber\u00edan&nbsp;adoptar&nbsp;un&nbsp;enfoque&nbsp;coordinado&nbsp;para&nbsp;<em>integrar&nbsp;los&nbsp;minerales&nbsp;cr\u00edticos&nbsp;de&nbsp;Ucrania&nbsp;en&nbsp;las&nbsp;cadenas&nbsp;desuministro&nbsp;europeas&nbsp;y&nbsp;transatl\u00e1nticas.&nbsp;<\/em>Aprovechando&nbsp;la proximidad&nbsp;geogr\u00e1fica&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;UE,&nbsp;sus&nbsp;corredores&nbsp;de&nbsp;transporte&nbsp;y&nbsp;su&nbsp;marco&nbsp;regulatorio,&nbsp;ambos socios&nbsp;deber\u00edan&nbsp;cofinanciar&nbsp;y&nbsp;compartir&nbsp;los riesgos&nbsp;en&nbsp;el&nbsp;desarrollo&nbsp;de&nbsp;la&nbsp;capacidad&nbsp;minera&nbsp;y de procesamiento de Ucrania para atraer capital privado.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La&nbsp;UE&nbsp;y&nbsp;EE.&nbsp;UU.&nbsp;deber\u00edan&nbsp;establecer&nbsp;<em>est\u00e1ndares&nbsp;comunes&nbsp;y&nbsp;vinculantes&nbsp;para&nbsp;las&nbsp;materias primas&nbsp;cr\u00edticas&nbsp;<\/em>y&nbsp;ampliar&nbsp;conjuntamente&nbsp;la&nbsp;capacidad&nbsp;de procesamiento&nbsp;fuera&nbsp;de&nbsp;China&nbsp;en Europa,&nbsp;al&nbsp;tiempo&nbsp;que&nbsp;crean&nbsp;una&nbsp;herramienta&nbsp;de&nbsp;cofinanciaci\u00f3n&nbsp;compartida&nbsp;para&nbsp;reducir&nbsp;los riesgos&nbsp;de&nbsp;los&nbsp;proyectos&nbsp;de miner\u00eda,&nbsp;procesamiento&nbsp;y&nbsp;reciclaje&nbsp;en&nbsp;terceros&nbsp;pa\u00edses&nbsp;y&nbsp;atraer&nbsp;la inversi\u00f3n&nbsp;privada.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"724\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/12-1024x724.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Navigating the US\u2013EU\u2013Ukraine Triangle: Revitalizing Transatlantic Security Cooperation\" class=\"wp-image-34912\" style=\"aspect-ratio:1.4144018521929016;width:475px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/12-1024x724.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/12-600x424.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/12-768x543.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/12-18x12.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/12.png 1080w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-referencias\" class=\"wp-block-heading\">Referencias<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref1\" id=\"_ftn1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a> Everts, S., Spatafora, G., &amp; Ekman, A. (Eds.). (2025, October 15). Low trust: navigating transatlantic relations under Trump 2.0 (Chaillot Paper No. 182). European Union Institute for Security Studies. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/publications\/chaillot-papers\/low-trust\">https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/publications\/chaillot-papers\/low-trust<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref2\" id=\"_ftn2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a> Chebotarov M., Mandzii A.-M. (2025, November 7). Ukraine\u2019s Long War: Changing Strategies and Great Power Competition. Transatlantic Dialogue Center. <a href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2025\/11\/07\/ukraines-long-war-changing-strategies-and-great-power-competition\/#h-from-multilateralism-to-america-first-the-u-s-foreign-policy-shift\">https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2025\/11\/07\/ukraines-long-war-changing-strategies-and-great-power-competition\/#h-from-multilateralism-to-america-first-the-u-s-foreign-policy-shift<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref3\" id=\"_ftn3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a> Sanger, D. E., Pager, T., Rogers, K., &amp; Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2026, January 10). Trump addresses Venezuela, Greenland and presidential power in New York Times interview. The New York Times. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/01\/08\/us\/politics\/trump-interview-power-morality.html\">https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/01\/08\/us\/politics\/trump-interview-power-morality.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref4\" id=\"_ftn4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a> The White House. (2026, January 7). Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Withdraws the United States from International Organizations that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2026\/01\/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withdraws-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states\/\">https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2026\/01\/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withdraws-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref5\" id=\"_ftn5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a> Hayden, J. (2026, January 3). EU urges respect for international law after US capture of Maduro. POLITICO. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-kallas-urges-respect-international-law-after-us-capture-maduro\/\">https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-kallas-urges-respect-international-law-after-us-capture-maduro\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref6\" id=\"_ftn6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a> Ash T. G., Krastev I., Leonard M. (2026, January 15). How Trump is making China great again\u2014and what it means for Europe. ECFR. <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/how-trump-is-making-china-great-again-and-what-it-means-for-europe\/\">https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/how-trump-is-making-china-great-again-and-what-it-means-for-europe\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref7\" id=\"_ftn7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a> World Economic Forum. (2026, January 22). Special address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine [Video].<a href=\"https:\/\/www.weforum.org\/meetings\/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2026\/sessions\/special-address-by-volodymyr-zelenskyy-president-of-ukraine-3bf6955e08\/\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.weforum.org\/meetings\/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2026\/sessions\/special-address-by-volodymyr-zelenskyy-president-of-ukraine-3bf6955e08\/\">https:\/\/www.weforum.org\/meetings\/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2026\/sessions\/special-address-by-volodymyr-zelenskyy-president-of-ukraine-3bf6955e08\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref8\" id=\"_ftn8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a> Bondarieva, K., &amp; Tyshchenko, K. (2025, June 22). Ukraine\u2019s Foreign Ministry comments on US strikes on Iran: Iran\u2019s nuclear programme must be terminated. Ukrainska Pravda. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2025\/06\/22\/7518239\/\">https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2025\/06\/22\/7518239\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref9\" id=\"_ftn9\"><sup>[9]<\/sup><\/a> Petrenko, R. (2026, January 3). Ukraine reiterates Maduro\u2019s illegitimacy after US operation. Ukrainska Pravda. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2026\/01\/03\/8014485\/\">https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2026\/01\/03\/8014485\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref10\" id=\"_ftn10\"><sup>[10]<\/sup><\/a> European Commission. (2026, January 10). Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the Folk och F\u00f6rsvar National Conference 2026: \u201cEurope under pressure\u201d.<a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/speech_26_69?utm_source=chatgpt.com\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/speech_26_69?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/speech_26_69<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref11\" id=\"_ftn11\"><sup>[11]<\/sup><\/a> Anghel, S. E., &amp; Damen, M. (2025, March 12). The future European security architecture: Dilemmas for EU strategic autonomy (PE 765.785). European Parliamentary Research Service.<a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/thinktank\/en\/document\/EPRS_STU(2025)765785\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/thinktank\/en\/document\/EPRS_STU(2025)765785\">https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/thinktank\/en\/document\/EPRS_STU(2025)765785<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref12\" id=\"_ftn12\"><sup>[12]<\/sup><\/a> Ministry of National Defence. (2025, May 27). Polish-American alliance is the foundation of our security. Gov.pl. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gov.pl\/web\/national-defence\/polish-american-alliance-is-the-foundation-of-our-security\">https:\/\/www.gov.pl\/web\/national-defence\/polish-american-alliance-is-the-foundation-of-our-security<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref13\" id=\"_ftn13\"><sup>[13]<\/sup><\/a> Jcookson. (2025, May 6). Is China or Russia the bigger threat to the United States? There\u2019s a clear answer. &#8211; Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/new-atlanticist\/is-china-or-russia-the-bigger-threat-to-the-united-states-theres-a-clear-answer\/\">https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/new-atlanticist\/is-china-or-russia-the-bigger-threat-to-the-united-states-theres-a-clear-answer\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref14\" id=\"_ftn14\"><sup>[14]<\/sup><\/a> Brattberg, E. (2025, November 6). The impact of evolving threat perceptions on the Transatlantic Alliance. Royal United Services Institute.<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/insights-papers\/impact-evolving-threat-perceptions-transatlantic-alliance\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/insights-papers\/impact-evolving-threat-perceptions-transatlantic-alliance\">https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/insights-papers\/impact-evolving-threat-perceptions-transatlantic-alliance<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref15\" id=\"_ftn15\"><sup>[15]<\/sup><\/a> The White House. (2025, November). 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States of America.<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref16\" id=\"_ftn16\"><sup>[16]<\/sup><\/a> Rankin, J. (2025, March 19). \u2018As real as it can get\u2019: EU to loan \u20ac150bn for European defence from invasion. The Guardian. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2025\/mar\/19\/eu-loans-scheme-europe-defence-invasion-russia-ukraine\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2025\/mar\/19\/eu-loans-scheme-europe-defence-invasion-russia-ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref17\" id=\"_ftn17\"><sup>[17]<\/sup><\/a> European External Action Service. (2025, January 22). Defence: Speech by High Representative\/Vice-President Kaja Kallas at the annual conference European Defence Agency. European Union External Action. Retrieved February 26, 2026, from <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/defence-speech-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-annual-conference-european-defence_en\">https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/defence-speech-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-annual-conference-european-defence_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref18\" id=\"_ftn18\"><sup>[18]<\/sup><\/a> Piotrowski, M. A. (2025, April 9). Baltic and Nordic states assess the Russian military threat (Bulletin No. 45 [2546]). The Polish Institute of International Affairs.<a href=\"https:\/\/www.pism.pl\/publications\/baltic-and-nordic-states-assess-the-russian-military-threat\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.pism.pl\/publications\/baltic-and-nordic-states-assess-the-russian-military-threat\">https:\/\/www.pism.pl\/publications\/baltic-and-nordic-states-assess-the-russian-military-threat<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref19\" id=\"_ftn19\"><sup>[19]<\/sup><\/a> Dmytriieva, D. (2025, November 16). Orb\u00e1n calls fears of Russian attack on EU or NATO ridiculous. RBC-Ukraine.<a href=\"https:\/\/newsukraine.rbc.ua\/news\/orb-n-calls-fears-of-russian-attack-on-eu-1763301674.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/newsukraine.rbc.ua\/news\/orb-n-calls-fears-of-russian-attack-on-eu-1763301674.html\">https:\/\/newsukraine.rbc.ua\/news\/orb-n-calls-fears-of-russian-attack-on-eu-1763301674.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref20\" id=\"_ftn20\"><sup>[20]<\/sup><\/a> Carney, S. (2025, December 10). Europe\u2019s strategic dependence on China \u2013 GIS Reports. GIS Reports. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gisreportsonline.com\/r\/europe-dependence-on-china\/\">https:\/\/www.gisreportsonline.com\/r\/europe-dependence-on-china\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref21\" id=\"_ftn21\"><sup>[21]<\/sup><\/a> European Commission. (2019, March 12). EU-China \u2013 A strategic outlook: Commission and HR\/VP contribution to the European Council (21-22 March 2019) (JOIN\/2019\/5 final).<a href=\"https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/publications\/eu-china-strategic-outlook-commission-and-hrvp-contribution-european-council-21-22-march-2019_en\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/publications\/eu-china-strategic-outlook-commission-and-hrvp-contribution-european-council-21-22-march-2019_en\">https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/publications\/eu-china-strategic-outlook-commission-and-hrvp-contribution-european-council-21-22-march-2019_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref22\" id=\"_ftn22\"><sup>[22]<\/sup><\/a> Liboreiro, J. (2025, June 21). Ursula von der Leyen\u2019s return as China hawk shuts down talk of diplomatic reset. Euronews. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euronews.com\/my-europe\/2025\/06\/21\/ursula-von-der-leyens-return-as-china-hawk-shuts-down-talk-of-diplomatic-reset\">https:\/\/www.euronews.com\/my-europe\/2025\/06\/21\/ursula-von-der-leyens-return-as-china-hawk-shuts-down-talk-of-diplomatic-reset<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref23\" id=\"_ftn23\"><sup>[23]<\/sup><\/a> NBC News. (2025, May 21). German leader Friedrich Merz hails China ties, seeks \u2018reset\u2019 with Beijing. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/world\/asia\/german-leader-friedrich-merz-hails-china-ties-seeks-reset-beijing-rcna260759\">https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/world\/asia\/german-leader-friedrich-merz-hails-china-ties-seeks-reset-beijing-rcna260759<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref24\" id=\"_ftn24\"><sup>[24]<\/sup><\/a> Litnarovych, V. (2025, November 13). Zelenskyy warns Russia preparing for \u201cBig war\u201d in Europe by 2030. UNITED24 Media. <a href=\"https:\/\/united24media.com\/latest-news\/zelenskyy-warns-russia-preparing-for-big-war-in-europe-by-2030-13384\">https:\/\/united24media.com\/latest-news\/zelenskyy-warns-russia-preparing-for-big-war-in-europe-by-2030-13384<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref25\" id=\"_ftn25\"><sup>[25]<\/sup><\/a> Razumkov Centre. (2024, October 31). Support among citizens for Ukraine\u2019s accession to the EU and NATO. Attitude to foreign countries. Attitude to peace talks (September, 2024). <a href=\"https:\/\/razumkov.org.ua\/en\/research-areas\/surveys\/support-among-citizens-for-ukraine-s-accession-to-the-eu-and-nato-attitude-to-foreign-countries-attitude-to-peace-talks-september-2024\">https:\/\/razumkov.org.ua\/en\/research-areas\/surveys\/support-among-citizens-for-ukraine-s-accession-to-the-eu-and-nato-attitude-to-foreign-countries-attitude-to-peace-talks-september-2024<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref26\" id=\"_ftn26\"><sup>[26]<\/sup><\/a> Ash T. G., Krastev I., Leonard M. (2026, January 15). How Trump is making China great again\u2014and what it means for Europe. ECFR. <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/how-trump-is-making-china-great-again-and-what-it-means-for-europe\/\">https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/how-trump-is-making-china-great-again-and-what-it-means-for-europe\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref27\" id=\"_ftn27\"><sup>[27]<\/sup><\/a> Slattery, G., &amp; Pamuk, H. (2025, December 6). Exclusive: US sets 2027 deadline for Europe-led NATO defense, officials say. Reuters. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/us-sets-2027-deadline-europe-led-nato-defense-officials-say-2025-12-05\/\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/us-sets-2027-deadline-europe-led-nato-defense-officials-say-2025-12-05\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref28\" id=\"_ftn28\"><sup>[28]<\/sup><\/a> Keate, N. (2025, July 18). Germany\u2019s Merz admits Europe has been a \u2018free-rider\u2019 on US defense. POLITICO. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/europe-free-rider-us-defense-germany-friedrich-merz-donald-trump-nato\/\">https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/europe-free-rider-us-defense-germany-friedrich-merz-donald-trump-nato\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref29\" id=\"_ftn29\"><sup>[29]<\/sup><\/a> Huminski, J. C. (2025, June 9). Hague Summit Series: Trump and the rebalancing of NATO (Brief 1). International Centre for Defence and Security.<a href=\"https:\/\/icds.ee\/en\/hague-summit-series-trump-and-the-rebalancing-of-nato\/\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/icds.ee\/en\/hague-summit-series-trump-and-the-rebalancing-of-nato\/\">https:\/\/icds.ee\/en\/hague-summit-series-trump-and-the-rebalancing-of-nato\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref30\" id=\"_ftn30\"><sup>[30]<\/sup><\/a> U.S. Department of Defense. (2026, January 23). 2026 National defense strategy (Publication No. 2003864773) [PDF]. <a href=\"https:\/\/media.defense.gov\/2026\/Jan\/23\/2003864773\/-1\/-1\/0\/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF\">https:\/\/media.defense.gov\/2026\/Jan\/23\/2003864773\/-1\/-1\/0\/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref31\" id=\"_ftn31\"><sup>[31]<\/sup><\/a> Roth, A. (2025, October 29). US military to reduce number of troops in Romania as start of European drawdown. The Guardian.<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2025\/oct\/29\/military-troops-romania?utm_source=chatgpt.com\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2025\/oct\/29\/military-troops-romania?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2025\/oct\/29\/military-troops-romania<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref32\" id=\"_ftn32\"><sup>[32]<\/sup><\/a> European Commission. (2024). EDIS: Our common European Defence Industrial Strategy.<a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\">https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref33\" id=\"_ftn33\"><sup>[33]<\/sup><\/a> European Commission. (n.d.). Andrius Kubilius: Commissioner for Defence and Space. <a href=\"https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/about\/organisation\/college-commissioners\/andrius-kubilius_en\">https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/about\/organisation\/college-commissioners\/andrius-kubilius_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref34\" id=\"_ftn34\"><sup>[34]<\/sup><\/a> European Commission. (2025, December 23). White Paper on European defence readiness 2030.<a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/white-paper-european-defence-readiness-2030_en\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/white-paper-european-defence-readiness-2030_en\">https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/white-paper-european-defence-readiness-2030_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref35\" id=\"_ftn35\"><sup>[35]<\/sup><\/a> Puzder, A., &amp; Whitaker, M. (2026, February 23). Why US-EU defense industrial cooperation matters more than ever. POLITICO. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/why-us-eu-defense-industrial-cooperation-matters-more-than-ever\/\">https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/why-us-eu-defense-industrial-cooperation-matters-more-than-ever\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref36\" id=\"_ftn36\"><sup>[36]<\/sup><\/a> Ciolan, I. M., Moyer J. C. (2025, May 9). Navigating Uncertainty: Where Are EU\u2013US Relations Headed? European View 24 (1): 42\u201351. <a href=\"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/10.1177\/17816858251339297\">https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/10.1177\/17816858251339297<\/a>&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref37\" id=\"_ftn37\"><sup>[37]<\/sup><\/a> Mejino-L\u00f3pez, J., &amp; Wolff, G. B. (2025, October 13). Europe&#8217;s dependence on US foreign military sales and what to do about it (Policy Brief 27\/2025). Bruegel.<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bruegel.org\/policy-brief\/europes-dependence-us-foreign-military-sales-and-what-do-about-it\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bruegel.org\/policy-brief\/europes-dependence-us-foreign-military-sales-and-what-do-about-it\">https:\/\/www.bruegel.org\/policy-brief\/europes-dependence-us-foreign-military-sales-and-what-do-about-it<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref38\" id=\"_ftn38\"><sup>[38]<\/sup><\/a> Desmarais, A. (2025, March 13). Can the US turn off European weapons? Experts weigh in on \u201ckill switch\u201d fears. Euronews. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euronews.com\/next\/2025\/03\/13\/can-the-us-turn-off-european-weapons-experts-weigh-in-on-kill-switch-fears\">https:\/\/www.euronews.com\/next\/2025\/03\/13\/can-the-us-turn-off-european-weapons-experts-weigh-in-on-kill-switch-fears<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref39\" id=\"_ftn39\"><sup>[39]<\/sup><\/a> European Commission. (2025, May 27). SAFE: Security Action for Europe.<a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/safe-security-action-europe_en\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/safe-security-action-europe_en\">https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/safe-security-action-europe_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref40\" id=\"_ftn40\"><sup>[40]<\/sup><\/a> Spaliek, M. (2025, June 24). The potential of the Ukrainian defense industry exceeds $40 billion, but there is not enough funding \u2013 Zelensky. LIGA.net. <a href=\"https:\/\/news.liga.net\/en\/politics\/news\/the-potential-of-the-ukrainian-defense-industry-exceeds-40-billion-but-there-is-not-enough-funding-zelensky\">https:\/\/news.liga.net\/en\/politics\/news\/the-potential-of-the-ukrainian-defense-industry-exceeds-40-billion-but-there-is-not-enough-funding-zelensky<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref41\" id=\"_ftn41\"><sup>[41]<\/sup><\/a> Doherty, E. (2025, August 16). Zelenskyy to meet with Trump after Putin talks end without a ceasefire. CNBC. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2025\/08\/16\/trump-putin-russia-ukraine-zelensky-.html\">https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2025\/08\/16\/trump-putin-russia-ukraine-zelensky-.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref42\" id=\"_ftn42\"><sup>[42]<\/sup><\/a> Nakashima, E. (2025, April 23). Trump administration unwinds efforts to investigate Russian war crimes. The Washington Post. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/national-security\/2025\/04\/22\/trump-russia-war-crimes-intelligence-ukraine\/\">https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/national-security\/2025\/04\/22\/trump-russia-war-crimes-intelligence-ukraine\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref43\" id=\"_ftn43\"><sup>[43]<\/sup><\/a> Burns, A. (2025, September 12). Trump thrashes European leaders in wide-ranging interview: \u2018I think they\u2019re weak.\u2019 POLITICO. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2025\/12\/09\/trump-dasha-burns-interview-europe-immigration-ukraine-00682016?utm_content=topic\/politics&amp;utm_source=flipboard\">https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2025\/12\/09\/trump-dasha-burns-interview-europe-immigration-ukraine-00682016?utm_content=topic\/politics&amp;utm_source=flipboard<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref44\" id=\"_ftn44\"><sup>[44]<\/sup><\/a> European Council. (2025, August 12). Statement by European Union leaders on Ukraine [Press release].<a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2025\/08\/12\/statement-by-european-union-leaders-on-ukraine\/\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2025\/08\/12\/statement-by-european-union-leaders-on-ukraine\/\">https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2025\/08\/12\/statement-by-european-union-leaders-on-ukraine\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref45\" id=\"_ftn45\"><sup>[45]<\/sup><\/a> ERR News &amp; ERR News, ERR. (2025, August 11). Baltics, Nordics pledge &#8216;unwavering support&#8217; for Ukraine&#8217;s territorial integrity. ERR. <a href=\"https:\/\/news.err.ee\/1609767831\/baltics-nordics-pledge-unwavering-support-for-ukraine-s-territorial-integrity\">https:\/\/news.err.ee\/1609767831\/baltics-nordics-pledge-unwavering-support-for-ukraine-s-territorial-integrity<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref46\" id=\"_ftn46\"><sup>[46]<\/sup><\/a> Perun, A., &amp; Smilianets, V. (2025, May 9). Europe throws support behind Ukraine special tribunal to prosecute Russia. Reuters. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europe-throws-support-behind-ukraine-special-tribunal-prosecute-russia-2025-05-09\/\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europe-throws-support-behind-ukraine-special-tribunal-prosecute-russia-2025-05-09\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref47\" id=\"_ftn47\"><sup>[47]<\/sup><\/a> Fornusek, M. (2025, January 15). Number of Ukrainians open to territorial concessions rises to 38%, poll shows. The Kyiv Independent. <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/38-percent-ukrainians-territorial-concessions\/\">https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/38-percent-ukrainians-territorial-concessions\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref48\" id=\"_ftn48\"><sup>[48]<\/sup><\/a> New Europe Center (2025, December 15). Foreign policy and security. Opinions of Ukrainian Society\u20132025. <a href=\"https:\/\/neweurope.org.ua\/en\/analytics\/zovnishnya-polityka-i-bezpeka-nastroyi-ukrayinskogo-suspilstva-2025\/\">https:\/\/neweurope.org.ua\/en\/analytics\/zovnishnya-polityka-i-bezpeka-nastroyi-ukrayinskogo-suspilstva-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref49\" id=\"_ftn49\"><sup>[49]<\/sup><\/a> Hallam, M., Burke, K., &amp; Connor, R. (2026, February 4). Ukraine\u2019s top negotiator says trilateral talks \u201cproductive.\u201d dw.com. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/ukraines-top-negotiator-says-trilateral-talks-productive\/live-75792446\">https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/ukraines-top-negotiator-says-trilateral-talks-productive\/live-75792446<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref50\" id=\"_ftn50\"><sup>[50]<\/sup><\/a> McLeary, P., &amp; Detsch, J. (2025, November 26). Allies worry US demands Ukraine deal before security guarantees. POLITICO. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2025\/11\/26\/us-demands-peace-deal-before-security-guarantees-for-ukraine-00670210\">https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2025\/11\/26\/us-demands-peace-deal-before-security-guarantees-for-ukraine-00670210<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref51\" id=\"_ftn51\"><sup>[51]<\/sup><\/a> The White House. (2025, November 25). President Trump Gaggles with Press on Air Force One, Nov. 25, 2025 [Video]. YouTube. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=2K8V3xqC9Gc\">https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=2K8V3xqC9Gc<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref52\" id=\"_ftn52\"><sup>[52]<\/sup><\/a> Dale, D. (2025, August 18). Fact check: Trump repeats false Ukraine aid figure while sitting with Zelensky. CNN. <a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/08\/18\/politics\/ukraine-aid-trump-zelensky-fact-check\">https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/08\/18\/politics\/ukraine-aid-trump-zelensky-fact-check<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref53\" id=\"_ftn53\"><sup>[53]<\/sup><\/a> Madhani, A., Miller, Z., &amp; Mascaro, L. (2025, March 4). Trump hits \u201cpause\u201d on US aid to Ukraine after Oval Office blowout with Zelenskyy | AP News. AP News. <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/trump-zelenskyy-russia-ukraine-a15a459c9a3a393d040478ebbe250a9e\">https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/trump-zelenskyy-russia-ukraine-a15a459c9a3a393d040478ebbe250a9e<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref54\" id=\"_ftn54\"><sup>[54]<\/sup><\/a>Cancian, M. F., &amp; Park, C. H. (2025, July 22). Trump sends weapons to Ukraine: By the numbers. CSIS. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/trump-sends-weapons-ukraine-numbers\">https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/trump-sends-weapons-ukraine-numbers<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref55\" id=\"_ftn55\"><sup>[55]<\/sup><\/a> Allied Defense Act of 2025, S. 1071, 119th Cong. (2025).<a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/bill\/119th-congress\/senate-bill\/1071\/text\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/bill\/119th-congress\/senate-bill\/1071\/text\">https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/bill\/119th-congress\/senate-bill\/1071\/text<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref56\" id=\"_ftn56\"><sup>[56]<\/sup><\/a> Faguy, A. (2025, March 5). US pauses intelligence sharing with Ukraine. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/cwygxvvrd8do\">https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/cwygxvvrd8do<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref57\" id=\"_ftn57\"><sup>[57]<\/sup><\/a> Shuster, S. (2025, March 7). \u201cHundreds of dead\u201d: Inside the fallout from Trump\u2019s Ukraine intel pause. TIME. <a href=\"https:\/\/time.com\/7265679\/satellites-front-failing-hundreds-dead-fallout-trump-ukraine-aid-pause\/\">https:\/\/time.com\/7265679\/satellites-front-failing-hundreds-dead-fallout-trump-ukraine-aid-pause\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref58\" id=\"_ftn58\"><sup>[58]<\/sup><\/a> Hodunova, K. (2025, September 18). \u201cHe let me down\u201d \u2014 Trump again expresses frustration over Putin\u2019s refusal to end war in Ukraine. The Kyiv Independent. <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/he-let-me-down-trump-again-expresses-frustration-over-putins-refusal-to-end-war-in-ukraine\/\">https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/he-let-me-down-trump-again-expresses-frustration-over-putins-refusal-to-end-war-in-ukraine\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref59\" id=\"_ftn59\"><sup>[59]<\/sup><\/a> Sabbagh, D. (2025, March 31). Donald Trump says he is \u2018very angry\u2019 with Vladimir Putin over Ukraine. The Guardian. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2025\/mar\/30\/donald-trump-angry-vladimir-putin-ukraine-nbc\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2025\/mar\/30\/donald-trump-angry-vladimir-putin-ukraine-nbc<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref60\" id=\"_ftn60\"><sup>[60]<\/sup><\/a> Lowell, H. (2025, July 9). US only has 25% of all Patriot missile interceptors needed for Pentagon\u2019s military plans. The Guardian. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2025\/jul\/08\/us-pentagon-military-plans-patriot-missile-interceptor\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2025\/jul\/08\/us-pentagon-military-plans-patriot-missile-interceptor<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref61\" id=\"_ftn61\"><sup>[61]<\/sup><\/a> Fakhurdinova, M. (2026, January 15). Wartime assistance to Ukraine: the successes, failures, and future prospects of US and EU support models. CEPA. <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/wartime-assistance-to-ukraine-the-successes-failures-and-future-prospects-of-us-and-eu-support-models\/\">https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/wartime-assistance-to-ukraine-the-successes-failures-and-future-prospects-of-us-and-eu-support-models\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref62\" id=\"_ftn62\"><sup>[62]<\/sup><\/a> The European External Action Service (EEAS). (2025, December). EU assistance to Ukraine.<a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/sites\/default\/files\/2025\/documents\/EUDEL%20WAS%20Two-Pager%20on%20EU%20Assistance%20to%20Ukraine%20%28December%29.pdf\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/sites\/default\/files\/2025\/documents\/EUDEL%20WAS%20Two-Pager%20on%20EU%20Assistance%20to%20Ukraine%20%28December%29.pdf\">https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/sites\/default\/files\/2025\/documents\/EUDEL%20WAS%20Two-Pager%20on%20EU%20Assistance%20to%20Ukraine%20%28December%29.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref63\" id=\"_ftn63\"><sup>[63]<\/sup><\/a> Rankin, J. (2025, December 12). EU to freeze \u20ac210bn in Russian assets indefinitely. The Guardian. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2025\/dec\/12\/eu-to-freeze-210bn-in-russian-assets-indefinitely\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2025\/dec\/12\/eu-to-freeze-210bn-in-russian-assets-indefinitely<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref64\" id=\"_ftn64\"><sup>[64]<\/sup><\/a> European Council. (2025, December 19). European Council conclusions, 18 December 2025 [Press release].<a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2025\/12\/19\/european-council-conclusions-18-december-2025\/\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2025\/12\/19\/european-council-conclusions-18-december-2025\/\">https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2025\/12\/19\/european-council-conclusions-18-december-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref65\" id=\"_ftn65\"><sup>[65]<\/sup><\/a> European Policy Centre. (2025, December 19). EPC experts react: EU Council summit conclusions.<a href=\"https:\/\/www.epc.eu\/publication\/epc-experts-react-eu-council-summit-conclusions\/\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.epc.eu\/publication\/epc-experts-react-eu-council-summit-conclusions\/\">https:\/\/www.epc.eu\/publication\/epc-experts-react-eu-council-summit-conclusions\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref66\" id=\"_ftn66\"><sup>[66]<\/sup><\/a> Bereziuk, O. (2025, September 17). The first PURL aid packages will include missiles for Patriot and HIMARS systems. Babel. <a href=\"https:\/\/babel.ua\/en\/news\/121498-the-first-purl-aid-packages-will-include-missiles-for-patriot-and-himars-systems\">https:\/\/babel.ua\/en\/news\/121498-the-first-purl-aid-packages-will-include-missiles-for-patriot-and-himars-systems<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref67\" id=\"_ftn67\"><sup>[67]<\/sup><\/a> Scazzieri, L. (2025, June 11). Plugging the gap: How Europe can keep Ukraine supplied with the means to defend itself (EUISS Brief No. 14). European Union Institute for Security Studies.<a href=\"https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/publications\/briefs\/plugging-gap-how-europe-can-keep-ukraine-supplied-means-defend-itself?utm_source=chatgpt.com\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/publications\/briefs\/plugging-gap-how-europe-can-keep-ukraine-supplied-means-defend-itself?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/publications\/briefs\/plugging-gap-how-europe-can-keep-ukraine-supplied-means-defend-itself<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref68\" id=\"_ftn68\"><sup>[68]<\/sup><\/a> BBC News. (2025, August 19). Trump rules out sending US troops to Ukraine as part of security guarantees. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/live\/cz93ve1p952t\">https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/live\/cz93ve1p952t<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref69\" id=\"_ftn69\"><sup>[69]<\/sup><\/a> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2026, February 3). Press conference by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine [Transcript].<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/news-and-events\/events\/transcripts\/2026\/02\/03\/press-conference-by-nato-secretary-general-mark-rutte-with-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy-of-ukraine?selectedLocale=\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/news-and-events\/events\/transcripts\/2026\/02\/03\/press-conference-by-nato-secretary-general-mark-rutte-with-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy-of-ukraine?selectedLocale=\">https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/news-and-events\/events\/transcripts\/2026\/02\/03\/press-conference-by-nato-secretary-general-mark-rutte-with-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy-of-ukraine?selectedLocale=<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref70\" id=\"_ftn70\"><sup>[70]<\/sup><\/a> Francis, E. (2025, September 4). Encouraged by Trump, Europeans agree to send troops to secure postwar Ukraine. The Washington Post. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/2025\/09\/04\/europe-us-ukraine-security-guarantees-air-support\/\">https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/2025\/09\/04\/europe-us-ukraine-security-guarantees-air-support\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref71\" id=\"_ftn71\"><sup>[71]<\/sup><\/a> Karlsrud, J., &amp; Reykers, Y. (2025, December 1). Coalition of the willing for Ukraine: A multinational force in the making (Policy Brief No. 26\/2025). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nupi.no\/en\/publications\/cristin-pub\/coalition-of-the-willing-for-ukraine-a-multinational-force-in-the-making\">https:\/\/www.nupi.no\/en\/publications\/cristin-pub\/coalition-of-the-willing-for-ukraine-a-multinational-force-in-the-making<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref72\" id=\"_ftn72\"><sup>[72]<\/sup><\/a> Ebert, N., &amp; Major, C. (2025, May). Coalition of the willing (Report). German Marshall Fund of the United States. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gmfus.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2025-05\/Coalition%20of%20the%20Willing.pdf\">https:\/\/www.gmfus.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2025-05\/Coalition%20of%20the%20Willing.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref73\" id=\"_ftn73\"><sup>[73]<\/sup><\/a> Karlsrud, J., &amp; Reykers, Y. (2025, December 1). Coalition of the willing for Ukraine: A multinational force in the making (Policy Brief No. 26\/2025). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nupi.no\/en\/publications\/cristin-pub\/coalition-of-the-willing-for-ukraine-a-multinational-force-in-the-making\">https:\/\/www.nupi.no\/en\/publications\/cristin-pub\/coalition-of-the-willing-for-ukraine-a-multinational-force-in-the-making<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref74\" id=\"_ftn74\"><sup>[74]<\/sup><\/a>&nbsp; President of Ukraine.&nbsp; (2026, January 6). Importantly, the Coalition Now Has Substantive Documents in Place: A Joint Declaration by All Coalition Countries, and a Trilateral Declaration by France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. President of Ukraine. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/en\/news\/vazhlivo-sho-sogodni-ye-gruntovni-dokumenti-koaliciyi-ohochi-102317\">https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/en\/news\/vazhlivo-sho-sogodni-ye-gruntovni-dokumenti-koaliciyi-ohochi-102317<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref75\" id=\"_ftn75\"><sup>[75]<\/sup><\/a> President of Ukraine. (2026, February 24) Today We Must Be Just as Determined and Strong as We Were When the Invasion Began \u2013 Address by the President of Ukraine to the European Parliament. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/en\/news\/sogodni-mi-mayemo-buti-takimi-zh-rishuchimi-ta-silnimi-yak-i-103045\">https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/en\/news\/sogodni-mi-mayemo-buti-takimi-zh-rishuchimi-ta-silnimi-yak-i-103045<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref76\" id=\"_ftn76\"><sup>[76]<\/sup><\/a> New Europe Center. (2025, December 15). Foreign policy and security: Opinions of Ukrainian society\u20132025.<a href=\"https:\/\/neweurope.org.ua\/en\/analytics\/zovnishnya-polityka-i-bezpeka-nastroyi-ukrayinskogo-suspilstva-2025\/\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/neweurope.org.ua\/en\/analytics\/zovnishnya-polityka-i-bezpeka-nastroyi-ukrayinskogo-suspilstva-2025\/\">https:\/\/neweurope.org.ua\/en\/analytics\/zovnishnya-polityka-i-bezpeka-nastroyi-ukrayinskogo-suspilstva-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref77\" id=\"_ftn77\"><sup>[77]<\/sup><\/a> The White House. (2025, April, 2). Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Declares National Emergency to Increase our Competitive Edge, Protect our Sovereignty, and Strengthen our National and Economic Security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/04\/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-declares-national-emergency-to-increase-our-competitive-edge-protect-our-sovereignty-and-strengthen-our-national-and-economic-security\">https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/04\/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-declares-national-emergency-to-increase-our-competitive-edge-protect-our-sovereignty-and-strengthen-our-national-and-economic-security<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref78\" id=\"_ftn78\"><sup>[78]<\/sup><\/a> J\u00e4ger, M. (2025, October 15). Trump\u2019s America: An economic challenge for the EU. Internationale Politik Quarterly.<a href=\"https:\/\/ip-quarterly.com\/en\/trumps-america-economic-challenge-eu?utm_source=chatgpt.com\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/ip-quarterly.com\/en\/trumps-america-economic-challenge-eu?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/ip-quarterly.com\/en\/trumps-america-economic-challenge-eu<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref79\" id=\"_ftn79\"><sup>[79]<\/sup><\/a> Mackintosh, T. (2026, January 20). Trump says he will \u201c100%\u201d carry out Greenland tariffs threat, as EU vows to protect its interests. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c4g5345ylk0o\">https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c4g5345ylk0o<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref80\" id=\"_ftn80\"><sup>[80]<\/sup><\/a> Kiel Institute for the World Economy. (2025, April 3). New US tariffs hit the US itself hardest [News].<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kielinstitut.de\/publications\/news\/new-us-tariffs-hit-the-us-itself-hardest\/\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.kielinstitut.de\/publications\/news\/new-us-tariffs-hit-the-us-itself-hardest\/\">https:\/\/www.kielinstitut.de\/publications\/news\/new-us-tariffs-hit-the-us-itself-hardest\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref81\" id=\"_ftn81\"><sup>[81]<\/sup><\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/today.yougov.com\/people\/david-montgomery\">Montgomery<\/a>, D. (2026, February 21). Most Americans approve of the Supreme Court striking down Trump&#8217;s tariffs. YouGov. <a href=\"https:\/\/today.yougov.com\/politics\/articles\/54148-most-americans-approve-of-the-supreme-court-striking-down-trumps-tariffs\">https:\/\/today.yougov.com\/politics\/articles\/54148-most-americans-approve-of-the-supreme-court-striking-down-trumps-tariffs<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref82\" id=\"_ftn82\"><sup>[82]<\/sup><\/a> European Parliament. (2025). US tariffs: Economic, financial and monetary repercussions (PE 764.382) [In-depth analysis]. Directorate-General for Economy, Transformation and Industry.<a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/RegData\/etudes\/IDAN\/2025\/764382\/ECTI_IDA(2025)764382_EN.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/RegData\/etudes\/IDAN\/2025\/764382\/ECTI_IDA(2025)764382_EN.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/RegData\/etudes\/IDAN\/2025\/764382\/ECTI_IDA(2025)764382_EN.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref83\" id=\"_ftn83\"><sup>[83]<\/sup><\/a> Steinberg, F. (2025, July 30). The U.S.\u2013EU trade deal: Geopolitical victory and economic uncertainty for the United States. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/us-eu-trade-deal-geopolitical-victory-and-economic-uncertainty-united-states\">https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/us-eu-trade-deal-geopolitical-victory-and-economic-uncertainty-united-states<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref84\" id=\"_ftn84\"><sup>[84]<\/sup><\/a> The White House. 2025. \u201cFact Sheet: The United States and European Union Reach Massive Trade Deal.\u201d July 28, 2025. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/07\/fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-european-union-reach-massive-trade-deal\/\">https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/07\/fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-european-union-reach-massive-trade-deal\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref85\" id=\"_ftn85\"><sup>[85]<\/sup><\/a> Folkman V. and Hernandez I. (2026, February 23) EU should strike now that Trump tariffs have been defeated by Supreme Court. EPC. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.epc.eu\/publication\/eu-should-strike-now-trump-tariffs-have-been-defeated-by-supreme-court\/\">https:\/\/www.epc.eu\/publication\/eu-should-strike-now-trump-tariffs-have-been-defeated-by-supreme-court\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref86\" id=\"_ftn86\"><sup>[86]<\/sup><\/a> Mehta, K. (2025, December 9). Trump says EU going in \u201cbad direction\u201d after X fine. dw.com. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/trump-says-eu-going-in-bad-direction-after-x-fine\/a-75071046\">https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/trump-says-eu-going-in-bad-direction-after-x-fine\/a-75071046<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref87\" id=\"_ftn87\"><sup>[87]<\/sup><\/a> The White House. (2025, December). National Security Strategy 2025. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf\">https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref88\" id=\"_ftn88\"><sup>[88]<\/sup><\/a> Rubio, M. [@SecRubio]. (2025, December 5). The European Commission\u2019s $140 million fine isn\u2019t just an attack on @X, it\u2019s an attack on all American tech platforms and the American people by foreign governments [X post]. X. <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/SecRubio\/status\/1996974377003319667?s=20\">https:\/\/x.com\/SecRubio\/status\/1996974377003319667?s=20<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref89\" id=\"_ftn89\"><sup>[89]<\/sup><\/a> European Commission. (2025, November 4). 2025 Enlargement Package shows progress towards EU membership for key enlargement partners. <a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ip_25_2584\">https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ip_25_2584<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref90\" id=\"_ftn90\"><sup>[90]<\/sup><\/a> Solodkyy, S. (2025, June 25). Hungary\u2019s veto and the future of Ukraine\u2019s EU accession. New Europe Center. <a href=\"https:\/\/neweurope.org.ua\/en\/analytics\/en-hungary-s-veto-and-the-future-of-ukraine-s-eu-accession\/\">https:\/\/neweurope.org.ua\/en\/analytics\/en-hungary-s-veto-and-the-future-of-ukraine-s-eu-accession\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref91\" id=\"_ftn91\"><sup>[91]<\/sup><\/a> Financial Times. (2025, December 12). Ukraine would join EU by 2027 under draft peace proposal, FT reports. Financial Times. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/e50481a3-161c-4002-83e4-cae0be12799e?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/e50481a3-161c-4002-83e4-cae0be12799e<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref92\" id=\"_ftn92\"><sup>[92]<\/sup><\/a> Landsbergis, G. (2025, February 11). Suspend Hungary\u2019s voting rights to save the EU\u2019s credibility. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/europe\/strategic-europe\/2025\/02\/suspend-hungarys-voting-rights-to-save-the-eus-credibility?lang=en\">https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/europe\/strategic-europe\/2025\/02\/suspend-hungarys-voting-rights-to-save-the-eus-credibility?lang=en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref93\" id=\"_ftn93\"><sup>[93]<\/sup><\/a> Sheftalovich, Z. (2026, February, 10). 5 steps to get Ukraine into the EU in 2027. Politico. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/5-steps-ukraine-eu-membership-2027\/\">https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/5-steps-ukraine-eu-membership-2027\/<\/a>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref94\" id=\"_ftn94\"><sup>[94]<\/sup><\/a> Bayer, L., Gray, A., &amp; Flynn, D. (2026, March 3). European capitals push back as Ukraine seeks fast-track EU membership. Reuters. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/european-capitals-push-back-ukraine-seeks-fast-track-eu-membership-2026-03-03\/\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/european-capitals-push-back-ukraine-seeks-fast-track-eu-membership-2026-03-03\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref95\" id=\"_ftn95\"><sup>[95]<\/sup><\/a> European Pravda. (2026, January 30). Zelenskyy outlines fast-track path to Ukraine\u2019s EU accession. European Pravda. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eurointegration.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2026\/01\/30\/7230129\/\">https:\/\/www.eurointegration.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2026\/01\/30\/7230129\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref96\" id=\"_ftn96\"><sup>[96]<\/sup><\/a> Kube, C., Lee, C. E., &amp; Tsirkin, J. (2025, March 6). Trump considering major NATO policy shift. NBC News. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/politics\/national-security\/trump-considering-major-nato-policy-shift-rcna195089\">https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/politics\/national-security\/trump-considering-major-nato-policy-shift-rcna195089<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref97\" id=\"_ftn97\"><sup>[97]<\/sup><\/a> Niemann, D., &amp; Superville, D. (2026, January 16). Trump says he may punish countries with tariffs over Greenland | AP News. AP News. <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/denmark-greenland-us-trump-tariffs-c8c17c89cbc4ca9819eb728102d0a2b3\">https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/denmark-greenland-us-trump-tariffs-c8c17c89cbc4ca9819eb728102d0a2b3<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref98\" id=\"_ftn98\"><sup>[98]<\/sup><\/a> Breuninger, K., &amp; Fountain, L. (2026, January 18). Trump says 8 European nations face tariffs rising to 25% if Greenland isn\u2019t sold to the U.S. CNBC. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2026\/01\/17\/trump-greenland-tariffs-nato.html\">https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2026\/01\/17\/trump-greenland-tariffs-nato.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref99\" id=\"_ftn99\"><sup>[99]<\/sup><\/a> U.S. Department of War. (2026, February 12). Remarks by Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby at the NAT. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.war.gov\/News\/Speeches\/Speech\/Article\/4404801\/remarks-by-under-secretary-of-war-for-policy-elbridge-colby-at-the-nato-defense\/\">https:\/\/www.war.gov\/News\/Speeches\/Speech\/Article\/4404801\/remarks-by-under-secretary-of-war-for-policy-elbridge-colby-at-the-nato-defense\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref100\" id=\"_ftn100\"><sup>[100]<\/sup><\/a> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2026, February 6). European Allies to take on new leadership roles in NATO\u2019s command structure. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/news-and-events\/articles\/news\/2026\/02\/06\/european-allies-to-take-on-new-leadership-roles-in-natos-command-structure\">https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/news-and-events\/articles\/news\/2026\/02\/06\/european-allies-to-take-on-new-leadership-roles-in-natos-command-structure<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref101\" id=\"_ftn101\"><sup>[101]<\/sup><\/a> Fauroux, M., &amp; Lettre, L. (2026, February 12). NATO: Washington cedes commands of Naples and Norfolk to Europeans &#8211; 09\/02\/2026 &#8211;&nbsp; LA LETTRE. La Lettre. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.lalettre.fr\/fr\/politique_executif\/2026\/02\/09\/nato-washington-cedes-commands-of-naples-and-norfolk-to-europeans,110624271-fac\">https:\/\/www.lalettre.fr\/fr\/politique_executif\/2026\/02\/09\/nato-washington-cedes-commands-of-naples-and-norfolk-to-europeans,110624271-fac<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref102\" id=\"_ftn102\"><sup>[102]<\/sup><\/a> NATO concludes historic summit in The Hague. (2025, June 27). <em>NATO<\/em>. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/news-and-events\/articles\/news\/2025\/06\/27\/nato-concludes-historic-summit-in-the-hague?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/news-and-events\/articles\/news\/2025\/06\/27\/nato-concludes-historic-summit-in-the-hague<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref103\" id=\"_ftn103\"><sup>[103]<\/sup><\/a> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2023, July 11). Vilnius Summit Communiqu\u00e9. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/about-us\/official-texts-and-resources\/official-texts\/2023\/07\/11\/vilnius-summit-communique\">https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/about-us\/official-texts-and-resources\/official-texts\/2023\/07\/11\/vilnius-summit-communique<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref104\" id=\"_ftn104\"><sup>[104]<\/sup><\/a> Armstrong, K. (2025, August 18). \u201cNo going into Nato by Ukraine,\u201d says Trump as Zelensky prepares for White House talks. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/cm21j1ve817o\">https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/cm21j1ve817o<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref105\" id=\"_ftn105\"><sup>[105]<\/sup><\/a> The Guardian.&nbsp; (2025, November 21). Ukraine banned from Nato, Russia readmitted to the G8 and territory ceded: what\u2019s in Trump\u2019s draft plan. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2025\/nov\/21\/trump-ukraine-peace-plan-zelenskyy-territory-ceded-nato-russia-g8\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2025\/nov\/21\/trump-ukraine-peace-plan-zelenskyy-territory-ceded-nato-russia-g8<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref106\" id=\"_ftn106\"><sup>[106]<\/sup><\/a> Official Website of the President of Ukraine. (2022, September 30). We are taking our decisive step by signing Ukraine\u2019s application for accelerated accession to NATO [Press release]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/en\/news\/mi-robimo-svij-viznachalnij-krok-pidpisuyuchi-zayavku-ukrayi-78173\">https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/en\/news\/mi-robimo-svij-viznachalnij-krok-pidpisuyuchi-zayavku-ukrayi-78173<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref107\" id=\"_ftn107\"><sup>[107]<\/sup><\/a> Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Europe et des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res. (2025, 12 June). Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom plus the EU High Representative (12.06.25). France Diplomacy &#8211; Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.diplomatie.gouv.fr\/en\/country-files\/ukraine\/news\/article\/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-france-germany-italy-poland-spain\">https:\/\/www.diplomatie.gouv.fr\/en\/country-files\/ukraine\/news\/article\/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-france-germany-italy-poland-spain<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref108\" id=\"_ftn108\"><sup>[108]<\/sup><\/a> Hlushchenko, O. (2025, December 21). Senator Graham supports giving Ukraine Tomahawk missiles if Putin says \u201cno\u201d to peace deal. Ukrainska Pravda. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2025\/12\/22\/8012901\/\">https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2025\/12\/22\/8012901\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref109\" id=\"_ftn109\"><sup>[109]<\/sup><\/a> Zengerle, P. (2026, February 18). US senators in Ukraine call for pressure on Russia, not just talks. Reuters. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/us-senators-ukraine-call-pressure-russia-not-just-talks-2026-02-18\/\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/us-senators-ukraine-call-pressure-russia-not-just-talks-2026-02-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref110\" id=\"_ftn110\"><sup>[110]<\/sup><\/a> Jozwiak, R. (2026, February 17). Wider Europe briefing: Ukraine\u2019s 2027 EU dream and what Brussels wants from Moscow. RadioFreeEurope\/RadioLiberty. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rferl.org\/a\/wider-europe-jozwiak-ukraine-eu-moscow\/33680375.html\">https:\/\/www.rferl.org\/a\/wider-europe-jozwiak-ukraine-eu-moscow\/33680375.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref111\" id=\"_ftn111\"><sup>[111]<\/sup><\/a> Birnbaum, M., Brady, K., &amp; Stern, D. L. (2025, December 16). U.S. offers Ukraine security guarantee in bid to strike peace deal. The Washington Post. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/politics\/2025\/12\/15\/us-ukraine-security-guarantees\/\">https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/politics\/2025\/12\/15\/us-ukraine-security-guarantees\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref112\" id=\"_ftn112\"><sup>[112]<\/sup><\/a> The Guardian. (2026, January 7). Ukraine war briefing: US backs European ceasefire security guarantees for first time. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/jan\/07\/ukraine-war-briefing-us-backs-european-ceasefire-security-guarantees-for-first-time\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/jan\/07\/ukraine-war-briefing-us-backs-european-ceasefire-security-guarantees-for-first-time<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref113\" id=\"_ftn113\"><sup>[113]<\/sup><\/a> Irish, J. (2026, January 7). US backs security guarantees for Ukraine at summit of Kyiv\u2019s allies in Paris. Reuters. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/us-backs-security-guarantees-ukraine-summit-kyivs-allies-paris-2026-01-06\/\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/us-backs-security-guarantees-ukraine-summit-kyivs-allies-paris-2026-01-06\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref114\" id=\"_ftn114\"><sup>[114]<\/sup><\/a> The White House. (2026, February 6). Establishing an America First arms transfer strategy. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2026\/02\/establishing-an-america-first-arms-transfer-strategy\/\">https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2026\/02\/establishing-an-america-first-arms-transfer-strategy\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref115\" id=\"_ftn115\"><sup>[115]<\/sup><\/a> The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation &amp; Institute. (2025, November.). 2025 Reagan National Defense Survey. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reaganfoundation.org\/reagan-institute\/centers\/peace-through-strength\/survey\/2025-reagan-national-defense-survey\">https:\/\/www.reaganfoundation.org\/reagan-institute\/centers\/peace-through-strength\/survey\/2025-reagan-national-defense-survey<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref116\" id=\"_ftn116\"><sup>[116]<\/sup><\/a> Dixon, H., Buchheit, L., &amp; Singh, D. (2026, February 16). EU should move Russian account out of Belgium to gain strategic options. European Policy Centre. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.epc.eu\/publication\/eu-should-move-russian-account-out-of-belgium-to-gain-strategic-options\/\">https:\/\/www.epc.eu\/publication\/eu-should-move-russian-account-out-of-belgium-to-gain-strategic-options\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref117\" id=\"_ftn117\"><sup>[117]<\/sup><\/a> S.2918 &#8211; 119th Congress (2025-2026): REPO Implementation Act of 2025. (2025, October 30). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/bill\/119th-congress\/senate-bill\/2918\">https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/bill\/119th-congress\/senate-bill\/2918<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref118\" id=\"_ftn118\"><sup>[118]<\/sup><\/a> Budginaite-Froehly, J. (2026, January 22). The US is taking action against Russia\u2019s shadow fleet. In the Baltic Sea, Europe should follow suit. Atlantic Council. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/dispatches\/the-us-is-taking-action-against-russias-shadow-fleet-in-the-baltic-sea-europe-should-follow-suit\/\">https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/dispatches\/the-us-is-taking-action-against-russias-shadow-fleet-in-the-baltic-sea-europe-should-follow-suit\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref119\" id=\"_ftn119\"><sup>[119]<\/sup><\/a> Dodonov, B., Hilgenstock, B., Kravtsev, A., Pavytska, Y., &amp; Shapoval, N. (2025). Russian oil tracker: December 2025 (Report). KSE Institute.<a href=\"https:\/\/sanctions.kse.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/ROT_DEC25.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com\"> <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/sanctions.kse.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/ROT_DEC25.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">https:\/\/sanctions.kse.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/ROT_DEC25.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref120\" id=\"_ftn120\"><sup>[120]<\/sup><\/a> Saiz Erausquin, G., &amp; Keatinge, T. (2025, September 2). Countering shadow fleet activity through flag state reform. Royal United Services Institute. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/insights-papers\/countering-shadow-fleet-activity-through-flag-state-reform\">https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/insights-papers\/countering-shadow-fleet-activity-through-flag-state-reform<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref121\" id=\"_ftn121\"><sup>[121]<\/sup><\/a> Matza, M. (2026, February 15). 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Ukraine&#8217;s reconstruction estimated at $1 trillion &#8211; Shmygal. dw.com. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/uk\/vidbudova-ukraini-ocinuetsa-v-1-triljon-smigal-na-urc2025\/a-73228911\">https:\/\/www.dw.com\/uk\/vidbudova-ukraini-ocinuetsa-v-1-triljon-smigal-na-urc2025\/a-73228911<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref124\" id=\"_ftn124\"><sup>[124]<\/sup><\/a> European Commission. (2025, November 13). EU steps up support for Ukraine\u2019s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation and opens new opportunities. <a href=\"https:\/\/enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/news\/eu-steps-support-ukraines-recovery-reconstruction-and-modernisation-and-opens-new-opportunities-2025-11-13_en\">https:\/\/enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/news\/eu-steps-support-ukraines-recovery-reconstruction-and-modernisation-and-opens-new-opportunities-2025-11-13_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref125\" id=\"_ftn125\"><sup>[125]<\/sup><\/a> Ekol Logistics. (n.d.). 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US\u2013EU economic ties show why neither side can decouple. dw.com. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/useu-economic-ties-show-why-neither-side-can-decouple\/a-75610955\">https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/useu-economic-ties-show-why-neither-side-can-decouple\/a-75610955<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref144\" id=\"_ftn144\"><sup>[144]<\/sup><\/a> Gupta, K. (2026, January 23). Debunking the \u201cSell-America\u201d trade: Why Europe\u2019s move could fall short. <a href=\"https:\/\/privatebank.jpmorgan.com\/latam\/en\/insights\/markets-and-investing\/tmt\/debunking-the-sell-america-trade-why-europes-move-could-fall-short\">https:\/\/privatebank.jpmorgan.com\/latam\/en\/insights\/markets-and-investing\/tmt\/debunking-the-sell-america-trade-why-europes-move-could-fall-short<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref145\" id=\"_ftn145\"><sup>[145]<\/sup><\/a> Tanghe, M. (2025, April 21). Going, going . . .? the US base network in Europe. CEPA. <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/going-going-the-us-base-network-in-europe\/\">https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/going-going-the-us-base-network-in-europe\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref146\" id=\"_ftn146\"><sup>[146]<\/sup><\/a> Carlough, M., Harris, B., &amp; McGowan, A. (2025, February 27). Where are U.S. forces deployed in Europe? Council on Foreign Relations. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref147\" id=\"_ftn147\"><sup>[147]<\/sup><\/a> U.S. Department of State. (2025). A free and open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a shared vision. U.S. Department of State. <a href=\"https:\/\/2021-2025.state.gov\/a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-advancing-a-shared-vision\/\">https:\/\/2021-2025.state.gov\/a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-advancing-a-shared-vision\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref148\" id=\"_ftn148\"><sup>[148]<\/sup><\/a> Greenpeace Belgium. (2025). The LNG trap: Europe\u2019s fossil gas dependence on Russia and the United States. Greenpeace Belgium. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/static\/planet4-belgium-stateless\/2025\/09\/0c135a20-greenpeace-belgium_ru-us-lng-trap.pdf\">https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/static\/planet4-belgium-stateless\/2025\/09\/0c135a20-greenpeace-belgium_ru-us-lng-trap.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref149\" id=\"_ftn149\"><sup>[149]<\/sup><\/a> S\u00f6nmez, D. (2025, April 11). Russia\u2019s changing Arctic policy: from economic ambitions to military dominance. The Loop. <a href=\"https:\/\/theloop.ecpr.eu\/russias-changing-arctic-policy-from-economic-ambitions-to-military-dominance\/\">https:\/\/theloop.ecpr.eu\/russias-changing-arctic-policy-from-economic-ambitions-to-military-dominance\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref150\" id=\"_ftn150\"><sup>[150]<\/sup><\/a> European Union Institute for Security Studies. (2025). The northern frosts: The EU should contain and unpower Russia in the Arctic. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/publications\/analysis\/northern-frosts-eu-should-contain-and-unpower-russia-arctic\">https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/publications\/analysis\/northern-frosts-eu-should-contain-and-unpower-russia-arctic<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref151\" id=\"_ftn151\"><sup>[151]<\/sup><\/a> NATO. (2026, February 11). 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Joint statement on signing of \u201cICE Pact\u201d MOU between the United States, Canada, and Finland. <a href=\"https:\/\/fi.usembassy.gov\/joint-statement-on-signing-of-ice-pact-memorandum\/\">https:\/\/fi.usembassy.gov\/joint-statement-on-signing-of-ice-pact-memorandum\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref153\" id=\"_ftn153\"><sup>[153]<\/sup><\/a> Hooper, C. (2025, January 11). The ICE pact and new icebreakers offers Trump quick wins. Forbes. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/craighooper\/2025\/01\/10\/the-ice-pact-and-new-icebreakers-offers-trump-quick-wins\/\">https:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/craighooper\/2025\/01\/10\/the-ice-pact-and-new-icebreakers-offers-trump-quick-wins\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref154\" id=\"_ftn154\"><sup>[154]<\/sup><\/a> Skarvelis, T. (2025, August 6). Arctic Icebreaker Fleets: The Great Gap. Atlas Institute for International Affairs. <a href=\"https:\/\/atlasinstitute.org\/arctic-icebreaker-fleets-the-great-gap\/\">https:\/\/atlasinstitute.org\/arctic-icebreaker-fleets-the-great-gap\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref155\" id=\"_ftn155\"><sup>[155]<\/sup><\/a> Slivinski, L. (2025). How the United States Can Overcome Icebreaker Construction Woes and Grow the Maritime Industrial Base. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/how-united-states-can-overcome-icebreaker-construction-woes-and-grow-maritime-industrial\">https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/how-united-states-can-overcome-icebreaker-construction-woes-and-grow-maritime-industrial<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref156\" id=\"_ftn156\"><sup>[156]<\/sup><\/a> European External Action Service. (2026, February 3). Arctic state of affairs: Keynote speech by HR\/VP Kaja Kallas at the 2026 Arctic Frontiers Conference. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/arctic-state-affairs-keynote-speech-hrvp-kaja-kallas-2026-arctic-frontiers-conference_en\">https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/arctic-state-affairs-keynote-speech-hrvp-kaja-kallas-2026-arctic-frontiers-conference_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref157\" id=\"_ftn157\"><sup>[157]<\/sup><\/a>Gerasimenko, V. (n.d.). Can EMSS resume operations in Kramatorsk: the company on challenges and prospects. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kramatorskpost.com\/ci-moze-emss-vidnoviti-robotu-v-kramatorsku-pidprijemstvo-pro-vikliki-ta-perspektivi_88328\">https:\/\/www.kramatorskpost.com\/ci-moze-emss-vidnoviti-robotu-v-kramatorsku-pidprijemstvo-pro-vikliki-ta-perspektivi_88328<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref158\" id=\"_ftn158\"><sup>[158]<\/sup><\/a> Pesu, M., S\u00e4rkk\u00e4, I., &amp; Linnainm\u00e4ki, J. (2025, December). NATO\u2019s extended frontline: Towards subregional strongholds and aggregated deterrence (FIIA Briefing Paper No. 426). Finnish Institute of International Affairs. <a href=\"https:\/\/fiia.fi\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/BP426_NATOs-extended-frontline.pdf\">https:\/\/fiia.fi\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/BP426_NATOs-extended-frontline.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref159\" id=\"_ftn159\"><sup>[159]<\/sup><\/a> Loss, R. 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Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth statement on Golden Dome for America. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.war.gov\/News\/Releases\/Release\/Article\/4193417\/secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-statement-on-golden-dome-for-america\/\">https:\/\/www.war.gov\/News\/Releases\/Release\/Article\/4193417\/secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-statement-on-golden-dome-for-america\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref161\" id=\"_ftn161\"><sup>[161]<\/sup><\/a> &nbsp;Kottasov\u00e1, I., Butenko, V., Vlasova, S., Cotovio, V., Vetch, F., Brennan, E., Brown, B., Mezzofiore, G., McCluskey, M., Regan, H., Lister, T., Zeris, H., Robinson, L., &amp; Schmitz, A. (2025, June 4). New footage reveals the impact of Ukraine\u2019s audacious drone attack on Russian air bases. CNN. <a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/06\/02\/europe\/inside-ukraine-drone-attack-russian-air-bases-latam-intl\">https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/06\/02\/europe\/inside-ukraine-drone-attack-russian-air-bases-latam-intl<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref162\" id=\"_ftn162\"><sup>[162]<\/sup><\/a> Cookman, L. (2025, August 3). Ukraine hacks Russian submarine key to Moscow\u2019s Arctic expansion. The Times. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thetimes.com\/world\/russia-ukraine-war\/article\/ukraine-hacks-russian-submarine-as-moscow-expands-arctic-presence-2tmwc8dn5\">https:\/\/www.thetimes.com\/world\/russia-ukraine-war\/article\/ukraine-hacks-russian-submarine-as-moscow-expands-arctic-presence-2tmwc8dn5<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref163\" id=\"_ftn163\"><sup>[163]<\/sup><\/a> Wall, C., &amp; Wegge, N. (2024). The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war\">https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref164\" id=\"_ftn164\"><sup>[164]<\/sup><\/a> New EU strategy for secure, prosperous and resilient Black Sea region. (2025, May 28). Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood. <a href=\"https:\/\/enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/news\/new-eu-strategy-secure-prosperous-and-resilient-black-sea-region-2025-05-28_en\">https:\/\/enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/news\/new-eu-strategy-secure-prosperous-and-resilient-black-sea-region-2025-05-28_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref165\" id=\"_ftn165\"><sup>[165]<\/sup><\/a>Boyse, M. (2025, September 30). The future of United States Black Sea strategy (Prepared statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate). U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.foreign.senate.gov\/download\/10\/01\/2025\/093025_boyse_testimonypdf\">https:\/\/www.foreign.senate.gov\/download\/10\/01\/2025\/093025_boyse_testimonypdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref166\" id=\"_ftn166\"><sup>[166]<\/sup><\/a> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2023, July 11). Vilnius Summit Communiqu\u00e9. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/about-us\/official-texts-and-resources\/official-texts\/2023\/07\/11\/vilnius-summit-communique\">https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/about-us\/official-texts-and-resources\/official-texts\/2023\/07\/11\/vilnius-summit-communique<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref167\" id=\"_ftn167\"><sup>[167]<\/sup><\/a>Pup, A. (2025, September 25). An EU security base on the Black Sea. CEPA. <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/an-eu-security-base-on-the-black-sea\/\">https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/an-eu-security-base-on-the-black-sea\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref168\" id=\"_ftn168\"><sup>[168]<\/sup><\/a> Snake Island Institute. (2025, October 10). The Black Sea\u2019s asymmetric blueprint (Report). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.snakeisland.org\/reports\/68e5709c540bf2aab76cec85\">https:\/\/www.snakeisland.org\/reports\/68e5709c540bf2aab76cec85<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref169\" id=\"_ftn169\"><sup>[169]<\/sup><\/a> Khimiak, A. (2023). The sea of mines: How will the Black Sea mine demining operation affect the region\u2019s security? Ukraine Crisis Media Center. <a href=\"https:\/\/uacrisis.org\/en\/the-sea-of-mines\">https:\/\/uacrisis.org\/en\/the-sea-of-mines<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref170\" id=\"_ftn170\"><sup>[170]<\/sup><\/a> Atlantic Council. (2025, November 6). A new Black Sea natural gas project could be a game changer for the region \u2014 and a challenge for Putin. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/turkeysource\/a-new-black-sea-natural-gas-project-could-be-a-game-changer-for-the-region-and-a-challenge-for-putin\/\">https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/turkeysource\/a-new-black-sea-natural-gas-project-could-be-a-game-changer-for-the-region-and-a-challenge-for-putin\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref171\" id=\"_ftn171\"><sup>[171]<\/sup><\/a> Boyse, M. (2025, September 30). The future of United States Black Sea strategy (Testimony). Hudson Institute. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hudson.org\/foreign-policy\/future-united-states-black-sea-strategy-matthew-boyse\">https:\/\/www.hudson.org\/foreign-policy\/future-united-states-black-sea-strategy-matthew-boyse<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref172\" id=\"_ftn172\"><sup>[172]<\/sup><\/a> Zaikova, A. (2026, February 4). Ukraine received the first shipment of liquefied gas from the United States in 2026. Babel. <a href=\"https:\/\/babel.ua\/en\/news\/124730-ukraine-received-the-first-shipment-of-liquefied-gas-from-the-united-states-in-2026\">https:\/\/babel.ua\/en\/news\/124730-ukraine-received-the-first-shipment-of-liquefied-gas-from-the-united-states-in-2026<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref173\" id=\"_ftn173\"><sup>[173]<\/sup><\/a> Culverwell, D. (2025, October 20). Kyiv, Washington discuss energy projects as Europe moves to end Russian gas imports. The Kyiv Independent. <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/american-companies-eyeing-up-ukraines-energy-opportunities-says-zelensky\/\">https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/american-companies-eyeing-up-ukraines-energy-opportunities-says-zelensky\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref174\" id=\"_ftn174\"><sup>[174]<\/sup><\/a> Krasnolutska, D. (2025, September 25). Ukraine pitches first energy projects under US Resources Pact. Bloomberg.com. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2025-09-25\/ukraine-pitches-first-energy-projects-under-us-resources-pact\">https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2025-09-25\/ukraine-pitches-first-energy-projects-under-us-resources-pact<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref175\" id=\"_ftn175\"><sup>[175]<\/sup><\/a> NATO Parliamentary Assembly. (2023). 2023 Black Sea security report (Report No. 020 DSCFC). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato-pa.int\/document\/2023-black-sea-security-report-lancaster-020-dscfc\">https:\/\/www.nato-pa.int\/document\/2023-black-sea-security-report-lancaster-020-dscfc<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref176\" id=\"_ftn176\"><sup>[176]<\/sup><\/a> Boyse, M. (2025, September 30). The future of United States Black Sea strategy (Testimony). Hudson Institute. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hudson.org\/foreign-policy\/future-united-states-black-sea-strategy-matthew-boyse\">https:\/\/www.hudson.org\/foreign-policy\/future-united-states-black-sea-strategy-matthew-boyse<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref177\" id=\"_ftn177\"><sup>[177]<\/sup><\/a> European External Action Service. (2025, May 28). 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(2023). 2023 Black Sea security report (Report No. 020 DSCFC). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato-pa.int\/document\/2023-black-sea-security-report-lancaster-020-dscfc\">https:\/\/www.nato-pa.int\/document\/2023-black-sea-security-report-lancaster-020-dscfc<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref180\" id=\"_ftn180\"><sup>[180]<\/sup><\/a> Militarnyi. (2022, Summer). Sea Breeze 2022 exercise takes place in the Black Sea. <a href=\"https:\/\/militarnyi.com\/en\/news\/sea-breeze-2022-exercise-takes-place-in-black-sea\/\">https:\/\/militarnyi.com\/en\/news\/sea-breeze-2022-exercise-takes-place-in-black-sea\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref181\" id=\"_ftn181\"><sup>[181]<\/sup><\/a> &nbsp;Sutton, H. I. (2024, August 20). Uncrewed platforms have been critical to Ukraine\u2019s success in the Black Sea. Royal United Services Institute. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/uncrewed-platforms-have-been-critical-ukraines-success-black-sea\">https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/uncrewed-platforms-have-been-critical-ukraines-success-black-sea<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref182\" id=\"_ftn182\"><sup>[182]<\/sup><\/a> Parker, J. (2024, October 11). The Black Sea battle: Learning the right maritime lessons from Ukraine. The Interpreter; Lowy Institute. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/black-sea-battle-learning-right-maritime-lessons-ukraine\">https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/black-sea-battle-learning-right-maritime-lessons-ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref183\" id=\"_ftn183\"><sup>[183]<\/sup><\/a> &nbsp;Snake Island Institute. (2025, October 10). 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Congress.gov. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/R48005\">https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/R48005<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref186\" id=\"_ftn186\"><sup>[186]<\/sup><\/a> Teer, J. (2025, October 9). Beyond Trump: Xi\u2019s price wars and weaponisation of critical raw materials. European Union Institute for Security Studies. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/publications\/commentary\/beyond-trump-xis-price-wars-and-weaponisation-critical-raw-materials\">https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/publications\/commentary\/beyond-trump-xis-price-wars-and-weaponisation-critical-raw-materials<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref187\" id=\"_ftn187\"><sup>[187]<\/sup><\/a> Stefanishyn AO [@stefanishynao]. (2025, January 10). [Tweet]. X (Formerly Twitter). <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/stefanishynao\/status\/2019204644610707844?s=46\">https:\/\/x.com\/stefanishynao\/status\/2019204644610707844?s=46<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref188\" id=\"_ftn188\"><sup>[188]<\/sup><\/a> 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial &#8211; United States Department of State. (2026, February 5). United States Department of State. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.state.gov\/releases\/office-of-the-spokesperson\/2026\/02\/2026-critical-minerals-ministerial\">https:\/\/www.state.gov\/releases\/office-of-the-spokesperson\/2026\/02\/2026-critical-minerals-ministerial<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref189\" id=\"_ftn189\"><sup>[189]<\/sup><\/a> Blakemore R. &amp; Harmoon A. (2026, February 12). US critical minerals policy goes collaborative with FORGE &#8211; Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/dispatches\/us-critical-minerals-policy-goes-collaborative-with-forge\/\">https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/dispatches\/us-critical-minerals-policy-goes-collaborative-with-forge\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref190\" id=\"_ftn190\"><sup>[190]<\/sup><\/a> Demarais, A. (2026, February 5). Calling Paris and Washington: Three areas for G7-G20 collaboration in 2026. European Council on Foreign Relations. <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/article\/calling-paris-and-washington-three-areas-for-g7-g20-collaboration-in-2026\/\">https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/article\/calling-paris-and-washington-three-areas-for-g7-g20-collaboration-in-2026\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref191\" id=\"_ftn191\"><sup>[191]<\/sup><\/a> Feh\u00e9r, Z., &amp; Zeneli, V. (2025, November 10). Recommendations for coordinating US-EU policy. Atlantic Council. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/in-depth-research-reports\/report\/recommendations-for-coordinating-us-eu-policy\/\">https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/in-depth-research-reports\/report\/recommendations-for-coordinating-us-eu-policy\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref192\" id=\"_ftn192\"><sup>[192]<\/sup><\/a> Sheftalovich, Z., Melkozerova, V., &amp; Dettmer, J. (2025, February 4). The high price of peace: Trump\u2019s plan to trade Ukraine\u2019s minerals for a deal. Politico. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/donald-trump-ukraine-mineral-riches-greenland-plan-deal-olaf-scholz-democracy\/\">https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/donald-trump-ukraine-mineral-riches-greenland-plan-deal-olaf-scholz-democracy\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref193\" id=\"_ftn193\"><sup>[193]<\/sup><\/a> Markiewicz, P., &amp; Pastucha, T. (2025, May 21). US and Ukraine agree revised minerals deal (PISM Bulletin No. 59). PISM \u2013 Polish Institute of International Affairs. <a href=\"https:\/\/pism.pl\/publications\/us-and-ukraine-agree-revised-minerals-deal\">https:\/\/pism.pl\/publications\/us-and-ukraine-agree-revised-minerals-deal<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref194\" id=\"_ftn194\"><sup>[194]<\/sup><\/a> European Commission. (2021, July 13). EU and Ukraine kick-start strategic partnership on raw materials. <a href=\"https:\/\/single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu\/news\/eu-and-ukraine-kick-start-strategic-partnership-raw-materials-2021-07-13_en\">https:\/\/single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu\/news\/eu-and-ukraine-kick-start-strategic-partnership-raw-materials-2021-07-13_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref195\" id=\"_ftn195\"><sup>[195]<\/sup><\/a> Minakov, M. (2025, April 22). Ukraine\u2019s not-so-critical mineral deposits. 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Foreign Policy Council \u201cUkrainian Prism.\u201d <a href=\"https:\/\/prismua.org\/en\/english-the-role-of-ukraine-in-shaping-eu-nato-cooperation-on-defence-capabilities\/\">https:\/\/prismua.org\/en\/english-the-role-of-ukraine-in-shaping-eu-nato-cooperation-on-defence-capabilities\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref198\" id=\"_ftn198\"><sup>[198]<\/sup><\/a> Clapp, S. (2025, June 24). EU\u2013NATO cooperation. Epthinktank.European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) <a href=\"https:\/\/epthinktank.eu\/2025\/06\/24\/eu-nato-cooperation\/\">https:\/\/epthinktank.eu\/2025\/06\/24\/eu-nato-cooperation\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref199\" id=\"_ftn199\"><sup>[199]<\/sup><\/a> European Commission. (2025, December 23). White paper for European defence \u2013 Readiness 2030. <a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/white-paper-european-defence-readiness-2030_en\">https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/white-paper-european-defence-readiness-2030_en<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref200\" id=\"_ftn200\"><sup>[200]<\/sup><\/a> Taylor, P. (2024, November 4). Time for a new deal between the EU and NATO. European Policy Centre. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.epc.eu\/publication\/new-deal-EU-NATO\/\">https:\/\/www.epc.eu\/publication\/new-deal-EU-NATO\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref201\" id=\"_ftn201\"><sup>[201]<\/sup><\/a> NATO. (2025, June 20). Relations with the European Union. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/what-we-do\/partnerships-and-cooperation\/relations-with-the-european-union\">https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/what-we-do\/partnerships-and-cooperation\/relations-with-the-european-union<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref202\" id=\"_ftn202\"><sup>[202]<\/sup><\/a> Maksak, H. (2025, April 1). The role of Ukraine in shaping EU-NATO cooperation on defence capabilities. Foreign Policy Council \u201cUkrainian Prism.\u201d <a href=\"https:\/\/prismua.org\/en\/english-the-role-of-ukraine-in-shaping-eu-nato-cooperation-on-defence-capabilities\/\">https:\/\/prismua.org\/en\/english-the-role-of-ukraine-in-shaping-eu-nato-cooperation-on-defence-capabilities\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref203\" id=\"_ftn203\"><sup>[203]<\/sup><\/a> Melchior, J. K. (2026, February 18). NATO has seen the future and is unprepared. The Wall Street Journal. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/opinion\/nato-has-seen-the-future-and-is-unprepared-887eaf0f\">https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/opinion\/nato-has-seen-the-future-and-is-unprepared-887eaf0f<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref204\" id=\"_ftn204\"><sup>[204]<\/sup><\/a> Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine. (2025, July 18). \u0417\u0430\u043f\u0443\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0454\u043c\u043e \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0443 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0442\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0456\u0439 \u0441\u0432\u0456\u0442\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0445 defense-tech \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0456\u0439 [We launch a platform for testing technologies of global defense-tech companies]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kmu.gov.ua\/en\/news\/mintsyfry-zapuskaiemo-platformu-dlia-testuvannia-tekhnolohii-svitovykh-defense-tech-kompanii\">https:\/\/www.kmu.gov.ua\/en\/news\/mintsyfry-zapuskaiemo-platformu-dlia-testuvannia-tekhnolohii-svitovykh-defense-tech-kompanii<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref205\" id=\"_ftn205\"><sup>[205]<\/sup><\/a> Howe, B. (2025, August 15). &#8216;Test in Ukraine&#8217; initiative attracts 45 international companies. DSEI. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dsei.co.uk\/news\/test-ukraine-initiative-attracts-45-international-companies\">https:\/\/www.dsei.co.uk\/news\/test-ukraine-initiative-attracts-45-international-companies<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref206\" id=\"_ftn206\"><sup>[206]<\/sup><\/a> Miroshnychenko, B. (2026, January 4). Engineers, missile strikes and high technology: can Ukraine produce more weapons in 2026? Ukrainska Pravda. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/articles\/2026\/01\/04\/8014603\/\">https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/articles\/2026\/01\/04\/8014603\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref207\" id=\"_ftn207\"><sup>[207]<\/sup><\/a> Ministry of Finance of Ukraine. (2025, December 4). Budget 2026: 100% of domestic revenues directed to national defence. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kmu.gov.ua\/en\/news\/biudzhet-2026-100-dokhodiv-na-oboronu-krainy\">https:\/\/www.kmu.gov.ua\/en\/news\/biudzhet-2026-100-dokhodiv-na-oboronu-krainy<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref208\" id=\"_ftn208\"><sup>[208]<\/sup><\/a> Spaliek, M. (2025, June 24). The potential of the Ukrainian defense industry exceeds $40 billion, but there is not enough funding \u2013 Zelensky. LIGA.net. <a href=\"https:\/\/news.liga.net\/en\/politics\/news\/the-potential-of-the-ukrainian-defense-industry-exceeds-40-billion-but-there-is-not-enough-funding-zelensky\">https:\/\/news.liga.net\/en\/politics\/news\/the-potential-of-the-ukrainian-defense-industry-exceeds-40-billion-but-there-is-not-enough-funding-zelensky<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref209\" id=\"_ftn209\"><sup>[209]<\/sup><\/a> Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. (2025, October 22). Build in Ukraine: Build in Ukraine: An initiative driving the localization of international companies in Ukraine. <a href=\"https:\/\/mod.gov.ua\/news\/build-in-ukraine-inicziativa-yaka-spriyaye-lokalizacziyi-mizhnarodnih-kompanij-v-ukrayini\">https:\/\/mod.gov.ua\/news\/build-in-ukraine-inicziativa-yaka-spriyaye-lokalizacziyi-mizhnarodnih-kompanij-v-ukrayini<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref210\" id=\"_ftn210\"><sup>[210]<\/sup><\/a> Office of the President of Ukraine. (2026, February 13). In Munich, the President met with the leadership and employees of the first Ukrainian-German joint drone production venture. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/en\/news\/u-myunheni-prezident-zustrivsya-z-kerivnictvom-i-pracivnikam-102805\">https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/en\/news\/u-myunheni-prezident-zustrivsya-z-kerivnictvom-i-pracivnikam-102805<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref211\" id=\"_ftn211\"><sup>[211]<\/sup><\/a> ArmyInform. (2026, February 26). The President announces drone-production agreements with Finland, Denmark, and Latvia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"https:\/\/armyinform.com.ua\/en\/2026\/02\/26\/the-president-announces-drone-production-agreements-with-finland-denmark-and-latvia\">https:\/\/armyinform.com.ua\/en\/2026\/02\/26\/the-president-announces-drone-production-agreements-with-finland-denmark-and-latvia<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref212\" id=\"_ftn212\"><sup>[212]<\/sup><\/a> Kirkegaard, J. (2025, March 12). Ukraine: European democracy\u2019s affordable arsenal. Bruegel. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bruegel.org\/policy-brief\/ukraine-european-democracys-affordable-arsenal\">https:\/\/www.bruegel.org\/policy-brief\/ukraine-european-democracys-affordable-arsenal<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref213\" id=\"_ftn213\"><sup>[213]<\/sup><\/a> Interfax-Ukraine. (2024, July 29). US Special Representative: There are already 4-5 agreements with Ukraine on the production of various types of ammunition and the provision of services. Interfax-Ukraine. <a href=\"https:\/\/interfax.com.ua\/news\/general\/1003489.html\">https:\/\/interfax.com.ua\/news\/general\/1003489.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref214\" id=\"_ftn214\"><sup>[214]<\/sup><\/a> Watson, S. (2025, October 17). What is Ukraine\u2019s \u2018Drone mega deal\u2019 with the US? Kyiv Post. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kyivpost.com\/post\/62382\">https:\/\/www.kyivpost.com\/post\/62382<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a id=\"_ftn215\" href=\"#_ftnref215\"><sup>[215]<\/sup><\/a> U.S. Department of War. (2026, February 3). War Department Announces Vendors Invited to Compete in Phase I of the. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.war.gov\/News\/Releases\/Release\/Article\/4396462\/war-department-announces-vendors-invited-to-compete-in-phase-i-of-the-drone-dom\/\">https:\/\/www.war.gov\/News\/Releases\/Release\/Article\/4396462\/war-department-announces-vendors-invited-to-compete-in-phase-i-of-the-drone-dom\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a id=\"_ftn216\" href=\"#_ftnref216\"><sup>[216]<\/sup><\/a> Sabbagh, D. (2025, November 25). Nato scrambles jets as Russian drones make deepest incursion into Romania. The Guardian. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2025\/nov\/25\/nato-scrambles-jets-russian-drones-deepest-incursion-romania\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2025\/nov\/25\/nato-scrambles-jets-russian-drones-deepest-incursion-romania<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a id=\"_ftn217\" href=\"#_ftnref217\"><sup>[217]<\/sup><\/a> Gardner, F. (2026, March 1). Allies of US in the Gulf bear brunt of Iran attacks. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c1jk922dgjgo\">https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c1jk922dgjgo<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref218\" id=\"_ftn218\"><sup>[218]<\/sup><\/a> Charlish, A., Kelly, L., &amp; Erling, B. (2025, September 11). Poland downs drones in its airspace, becoming first NATO member to fire during war in Ukraine. Reuters. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/poland-downs-drones-its-airspace-becoming-first-nato-member-fire-during-war-2025-09-10\/\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/poland-downs-drones-its-airspace-becoming-first-nato-member-fire-during-war-2025-09-10\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref219\" id=\"_ftn219\"><sup>[219]<\/sup><\/a> Di Mizio, G., &amp; Gjerstad, M. (2025, February 24). Ukraine\u2019s ground-based air defence: Evolution, resilience and pressure. International Institute for Strategic Studies. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/military-balance\/2025\/02\/ukraines-ground-based-air-defence-evolution-resilience-and-pressure\/\">https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/military-balance\/2025\/02\/ukraines-ground-based-air-defence-evolution-resilience-and-pressure\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a id=\"_ftn220\" href=\"#_ftnref220\"><sup>[220]<\/sup><\/a> Militarnyi. (2025, September 28). Ukrainian interceptor drones will become the basis of the European \u201cDrone Wall\u201d. <a href=\"https:\/\/militarnyi.com\/en\/news\/ukrainian-interceptor-drones-will-become-the-basis-of-the-european-drone-wall\/\">https:\/\/militarnyi.com\/en\/news\/ukrainian-interceptor-drones-will-become-the-basis-of-the-european-drone-wall\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a id=\"_ftn221\" href=\"#_ftnref221\"><sup>[221]<\/sup><\/a> Davlikanova, E., &amp; Orobets, L. (2025, December 4). A drone wall without Ukraine? A barricade lacking bricks. CEPA. <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/a-drone-wall-without-ukraine-a-barricade-lacking-bricks\/\">https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/a-drone-wall-without-ukraine-a-barricade-lacking-bricks\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El&nbsp;presente&nbsp;informe&nbsp;ha&nbsp;sido&nbsp;elaborado&nbsp;por&nbsp;el&nbsp;Transatlantic&nbsp;Dialogue&nbsp;Center&nbsp;con&nbsp;el&nbsp;apoyo del Askold and Dir Fund, en el marco del proyecto \u00abUna sociedad civil fuerte&nbsp;en&nbsp;Ucrania:&nbsp;motor&nbsp;de&nbsp;reformas&nbsp;y&nbsp;democracia\u00bb,&nbsp;ejecutado&nbsp;por&nbsp;ISAR&nbsp;Ednannia&nbsp;y financiado por Noruega y Suecia. El contenido de esta publicaci\u00f3n es responsabilidad&nbsp;exclusiva&nbsp;del&nbsp;Transatlantic&nbsp;Dialogue&nbsp;Center&nbsp;y&nbsp;en&nbsp;ning\u00fan&nbsp;caso&nbsp;debe&nbsp;considerarse que refleja la postura oficial del Gobierno de Noruega, del Gobierno de&nbsp;Suecia o de ISAR Ednannia.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Los&nbsp;autores&nbsp;expresan&nbsp;su&nbsp;agradecimiento&nbsp;a&nbsp;John&nbsp;Drennan,&nbsp;Maksym&nbsp;Chebotarov&nbsp;y Maksym Skrypchenko por sus valiosos comentarios y sugerencias. El&nbsp;presente&nbsp;informe&nbsp;ha&nbsp;sido&nbsp;elaborado&nbsp;por&nbsp;el&nbsp;Transatlantic&nbsp;Dialogue&nbsp;Center&nbsp;con&nbsp;el&nbsp;apoyo del Askold and Dir Fund, en el marco del proyecto \u00abUna sociedad civil fuerte&nbsp;en&nbsp;Ucrania:&nbsp;motor&nbsp;de&nbsp;reformas&nbsp;y&nbsp;democracia\u00bb,&nbsp;ejecutado&nbsp;por&nbsp;ISAR&nbsp;Ednannia&nbsp;y financiado por Noruega y Suecia. El contenido de esta publicaci\u00f3n es responsabilidad&nbsp;exclusiva&nbsp;del&nbsp;Transatlantic&nbsp;Dialogue&nbsp;Center&nbsp;y&nbsp;en&nbsp;ning\u00fan&nbsp;caso&nbsp;debe&nbsp;considerarse que refleja la postura oficial del Gobierno de Noruega, del Gobierno de&nbsp;Suecia o de ISAR Ednannia. Introducci\u00f3n Las relaciones [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":37844,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[79,55],"tags":[],"topic":[91,110,87,86,95],"class_list":["post-37766","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eu-ukraine-partnership-program-esp-reports-handbooks","category-esp-reports-handbooks","topic-eu","topic-nato","topic-security","topic-ukraine","topic-usa"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Tri\u00e1ngulo EE. UU.-Uni\u00f3n Europea-Ucrania: revitalizaci\u00f3n de la cooperaci\u00f3n transatl\u00e1ntica en materia de seguridad - Transatlantic Dialogue Center<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"C\u00f3mo \u00abTrump 2.0\u00bb est\u00e1 redefiniendo las relaciones transatl\u00e1nticas, y en qu\u00e9 \u00e1mbitos Estados Unidos, la UE y Ucrania a\u00fan pueden coordinarse en materia de seguridad, industria, China, el \u00c1rtico y el Mar Negro.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/uk\/2026\/03\/16\/triangulo-ee-uu-union-europea-ucrania-revitalizacion-de-la-cooperacion-transatlantica-en-materia-de-seguridad\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"uk_UA\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Tri\u00e1ngulo EE. 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