{"id":36453,"date":"2026-04-16T12:07:00","date_gmt":"2026-04-16T09:07:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=36453"},"modified":"2026-04-16T12:09:18","modified_gmt":"2026-04-16T09:09:18","slug":"europe-gas-after-russia-southern-corridor-turkiye","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/uk\/2026\/04\/16\/europe-gas-after-russia-southern-corridor-turkiye\/","title":{"rendered":"Europe\u2019s Gas After Russia: The Southern Corridor and T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Growing Role"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\" data-icon-position=\"left\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px\" data-attachment-id=\"54104\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"true\" title=\"Download in pdf\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Download in pdf<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M10 4H4c-1.1 0-1.99.9-1.99 2L2 18c0 1.1.9 2 2 2h16c1.1 0 2-.9 2-2V8c0-1.1-.9-2-2-2h-8l-2-2z\"><\/path><\/svg><span class=\"file-size\">502 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"417\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-9-1024x417.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36455\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-9-1024x417.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-9-600x244.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-9-768x313.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-9-18x7.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-9.png 1194w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p>In recent years, competition over energy resources has taken on a new form: energy is increasingly treated not only as a commodity, but also as an instrument of political influence. Russia\u2019s full-scale war against Ukraine has been a key catalyst for this shift in Europe. It exposed how vulnerable the EU can be when a single supplier dominates its energy balance, and it accelerated European efforts to diversify gas and oil supply routes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The destruction of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/nord-stream-pipelines\/t-63277358\">Nord Stream pipeline system<\/a> further reinforced this shift, forcing European policymakers to rethink not only supply sources but also the resilience of energy infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In this context, the European Union launched a policy of phasing out Russian energy imports under the <a href=\"https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/strategy\/repowereu-phase-out-russian-energy-imports_en\">REPowerEU <\/a>framework. Yet the core change is not merely substituting one supplier for another. The more consequential shift is the transformation of dependency itself: as Russian volumes decline, <strong>the strategic weight of transit nodes, infrastructure bottlenecks, and market access rules grows.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This is where <a href=\"https:\/\/dixigroup.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/dixi_southern_gas_corridor-2.pdf\">the Southern Gas Corridor<\/a> becomes politically significant, and where <strong>T\u00fcrkiye aims to translate geography and infrastructure into long-term leverage<\/strong>. Resource-related dynamics beyond Europe, including competition over oil and over critical minerals, reinforce the same broader point: control over access and transport routes increasingly shapes foreign policy choices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This article argues that T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s rising role in Europe\u2019s gas architecture does not automatically mean a one-to-one replacement of dependencies, but it does create a new matrix of interdependence that affects the EU\u2019s bargaining position, Russia\u2019s options, and the strategic calculations of regional suppliers. Managing these risks will require clearer-eyed policy choices from European decision-makers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-eu-after-2022-what-changed-and-why-the-southern-gas-corridor-matters-beyond-volumes\"><strong>EU after 2022 \u2014 what changed, and why the Southern Gas Corridor matters beyond volumes<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>After 2022, the EU\u2019s gas strategy shifted from treating diversification as a long-term objective to treating it as a near-term security task. This did not mean that Europe could \u201cswap out\u201d Russian gas overnight. Instead, it pushed the EU to do several things at once: reduce consumption, expand LNG capacity, strengthen interconnectors, and increase pipeline imports from alternative partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That shift is visible in the numbers. Russia\u2019s share of EU pipeline gas imports <a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/infographics\/where-does-the-eu-s-gas-come-from\">fell <\/a>from over 40% in 2021 to about 11% in 2024. In 2024, the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/infographics\/where-does-the-eu-s-gas-come-from\">EU\u2019s largest gas suppliers<\/a> were Norway (91.1 billion cubic meters, bcm) and the United States (45.1 bcm), followed by Algeria (39.2 bcm), while Azerbaijan supplied 11.7 bcm (a smaller share, but still material in diversification terms). The rapid growth of LNG imports, particularly from the United States, has therefore become one of the central pillars of Europe\u2019s post-2022 diversification strategy. Politically, the EU formalized this direction under <a href=\"https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/strategy\/repowereu-phase-out-russian-energy-imports_en\">REPowerEU<\/a>, which sets out a gradual phase-out of Russian energy imports.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"904\" height=\"354\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-10.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36456\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-10.png 904w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-10-600x235.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-10-768x301.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-10-18x7.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 904px) 100vw, 904px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Source:<\/em> <em>Bruegel<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p>In that context, <strong>the<\/strong> <strong>Southern Gas Corridor (SGC)<\/strong> is best understood not as a single \u201creplacement route,\u201d but as one component of a broader diversification mix. It is <a href=\"https:\/\/dixigroup.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/dixi_southern_gas_corridor-2.pdf\">a chain of pipelines<\/a> that brings Caspian gas westward through the South Caucasus and T\u00fcrkiye into EU markets via Greece and the Adriatic route to Italy. In simple terms, it is built from three main links:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>SCP<\/strong> (South Caucasus Pipeline \/ Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Erzurum), the first segment of the route (692 km, launched in 2007; expanded flows began in 2018).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>TANAP<\/strong> (Trans-Anatolian Pipeline), the longest part running across T\u00fcrkiye, and the corridor\u2019s core \u201cbridge\u201d into Europe.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>TAP<\/strong> (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline), the final segment delivering gas into the EU, with an initial design capacity of <strong>10 bcm per year<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1004\" height=\"330\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-11.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36457\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-11.png 1004w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-11-600x197.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-11-768x252.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-11-18x6.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1004px) 100vw, 1004px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Illustrative map of the Southern Gas Corridor. Source: Wikimedia Commons<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p>The corridor\u2019s long-term relevance also depends on production growth in Azerbaijan, which remains the primary upstream supplier through <a href=\"https:\/\/totalenergies.com\/media\/news\/press-releases\/azerbaidjan-total-vend-sa-participation-de-10-dans-shah-deniz-tpao\">the Shah Deniz field operated by SOCAR<\/a> and international partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This infrastructure matters strategically even if its volumes remain limited compared to what Russia once delivered to the EU. The corridor\u2019s value is not only \u201chow much gas it brings,\u201d but also <strong><em>what kind of option it creates.<\/em><\/strong> And what it does create is a functioning southern entry route that can reduce the leverage of any single dominant supplier, especially for parts of Southern and South-Eastern Europe where route alternatives are more constrained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At the same time, it is important not to overstate what SGC can do. Its impact <a href=\"https:\/\/greenpost.ua\/news\/pivdennyj-gazovyj-korydor-i-zelena-energetyka-yak-baku-formuye-novu-energetychnu-realnist-dlya-i87968?utm_\">depends on<\/a> upstream resource availability, expansion decisions (especially around TANAP\/TAP), and Europe\u2019s longer-term trajectory of gas demand under decarbonization policies. This is why the corridor is more plausibly seen as a <strong>stabilizing diversification layer<\/strong> rather than a standalone substitute for Russian imports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-turkiye-transit-state-vs-hub-what-changes-in-practice\"><strong>T\u00fcrkiye: transit state vs hub \u2013 what changes in practice<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>In energy debates, T\u00fcrkiye is often described as a \u201ctransit country\u201d, but Ankara\u2019s declared ambition is broader: to become a gas hub. The distinction matters. A transit state mainly earns fees for moving gas across its territory under relatively fixed arrangements. At the same time, T\u00fcrkiye already hosts one of the remaining Russian export routes to Europe through the <a href=\"https:\/\/caspiannews.com\/news-detail\/russia-increases-gas-exports-to-turkiye-as-turkstream-becomes-key-transit-route-2025-10-2-0\/\">TurkStream pipeline<\/a>, which continues to deliver gas to South-Eastern European markets. A hub, by contrast, aims to become a place where gas can be traded, stored, redirected, and priced with more flexibility, and where market design can shape regional flows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The \u201chub status\u201d in T\u00fcrkiye is not simply a technocratic energy policy goal. It is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/turkeys-gas-shift-threatens-russia-irans-last-big-european-market-2025-10-08\/\">deeply embedded<\/a> in the country\u2019s strategic and political self-perception. In official language, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.tr\/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa\">energy is framed<\/a> as part of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s role as a <em>central<\/em> or <em>pivotal<\/em> state between regions, and as a tool for strengthening strategic autonomy. This framing appears consistently in government narratives about diversifying routes and resources, contributing to regional energy security, and positioning T\u00fcrkiye as a trade center in energy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This matters because it means T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s hub ambition is tied to foreign-policy posture, not only infrastructure. Control over energy routes is treated as a way to reinforce T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s relevance in relations with the EU, Russia, and Middle Eastern partners, and as a channel to expand diplomatic space even when other political tracks are strained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-where-leverage-could-realistically-come-from\"><strong><em>Where leverage could realistically come from <\/em><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s potential influence is unlikely to look like blunt energy coercion. That would be economically costly for Ankara and politically risky given its dependence on European trade and investment. Instead, if the hub vision advances, leverage would more plausibly emerge through <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cedigaz.org\/turkiyes-balancing-act-between-pipelines-and-lng-in-a-re-shaped-european-gas-landscape\/\"><strong>calibrated, structural mechanisms<\/strong><\/a>, such as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Capacity and access questions<\/strong><strong>: <\/strong>who can book capacity, under what terms, and how transparent and predictable those rules are during tight market conditions.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Infrastructure sequencing<\/strong>: which upgrades get prioritized (interconnectors, compressor capacity, storage) and how quickly expansion projects move from political signaling to implementation.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Crisis flexibility<\/strong>: in periods of shocks, the ability to redirect marginal volumes can matter disproportionately, especially for South-Eastern Europe, where alternatives can be more limited than in North-Western EU markets.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Regulatory alignment as a bargaining space<\/strong>: if T\u00fcrkiye wants its hub model to be taken seriously by European buyers, discussions on market governance, transparency, and compliance with EU norms can become part of the wider political dialogue.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>At the same time, hub status is not achieved through geography alone. It requires credible market rules, sufficient liquidity and storage, and predictability for companies that would rely on T\u00fcrkiye as a commercial platform. Without those elements, T\u00fcrkiye risks remaining an important corridor but not a true market-maker.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-why-this-matters-for-the-eu-now\"><strong><em>Why this matters for the EU now<\/em><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>For the EU, this is not a binary choice between \u201cRussia\u201d and \u201cT\u00fcrkiye.\u201d But it does highlight a strategic issue: as Europe reduces dependence on a dominant supplier, exposure can shift toward transit and hub nodes. That is a different type of risk. It can be managed, but it requires deliberate diversification policy design, including maintaining multiple routes (LNG and pipelines), investing in cross-border resilience, and avoiding over-concentration in any single corridor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Russia is unlikely to be \u201cpushed out\u201d of Europe\u2019s broader gas equation overnight, but a stronger Southern Gas Corridor and a more LNG-heavy market can gradually narrow Moscow\u2019s room for maneuver. As the EU\u2019s import portfolio becomes more diversified, Russia\u2019s ability to leverage supply concentration for political or pricing influence tends to weaken, especially in South-Eastern Europe, where alternative routes gain relevance. At the same time, Russia may seek to preserve its position through competitive pricing, contractual flexibility, and by focusing on markets where alternatives remain structurally limited. Or, more radically, by bribing certain key decision-makers, as we are seeing in some Eastern European countries. The net effect is therefore more likely to be a constraint on Russia\u2019s unilateral leverage rather than a rapid elimination of Russian relevance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-the-lng-factor-turkiye-s-flexibility-tool-and-why-market-shocks-make-it-more-relevant\"><strong>The LNG factor: T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s flexibility tool (and why market shocks make it more relevant)<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>A central pillar of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s hub ambition is flexibility, and in gas markets, flexibility is increasingly associated with LNG. Compared to pipelines, LNG can be redirected faster, sourced from a wider pool of exporters, and used to respond to short-term price and supply shocks. This is one reason Ankara has <a href=\"https:\/\/www.osw.waw.pl\/en\/publikacje\/osw-commentary\/2023-03-10\/turkeys-dream-a-hub-ankaras-wartime-gas-policy?\">invested heavily<\/a> in expanding regasification capacity and in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.trade.gov\/knowledge-product\/turkey-oil-and-gas-equipment-lng-and-lng-terminals-upstream-downstream?\">building a portfolio<\/a> that combines pipeline inflows with LNG options.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1008\" height=\"446\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-13.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36461\" style=\"aspect-ratio:2.2601530311948204;width:772px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-13.png 1008w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-13-600x265.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-13-768x340.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image-13-18x8.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1008px) 100vw, 1008px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Image: MINVAL.POLITIKA<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p>From T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s perspective, LNG serves three overlapping functions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>First, it is a supply-security hedge. By expanding LNG access, T\u00fcrkiye reduces its reliance on a small number of pipeline suppliers and rigid long-term contractual structures. In political terms, this diversification supports Ankara\u2019s broader strategy of <strong>maximizing room for maneuver<\/strong> \u2013 a theme that runs through official statements about energy security, route diversification, and T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s goal of becoming <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.tr\/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa\">a regional energy trade center<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Second, LNG is a hub-enabling instrument. A hub is not only about geography; it is about the ability to balance flows and manage uncertainty. LNG infrastructure helps T\u00fcrkiye position itself not merely as a corridor for fixed volumes, but as a platform that can (at least at the margin) combine different sources and adjust to changes in demand, seasonal conditions, or disruptions elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Third, LNG can <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/in-depth-research-reports\/report\/an-introduction-to-regional-perspectives-on-climate-change-gulf-cooperation-council-and-turkey\">strengthen T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s relevance<\/a> for South-Eastern Europe, where alternatives may be more constrained than in North-Western Europe and where marginal volumes can matter in crisis situations. In practice, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s value proposition here is not that it can \u201creplace\u201d EU supplies, but that it can potentially contribute to regional balancing when markets tighten.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This matters because gas markets remain sensitive to abrupt shocks. Unexpected security escalations, such as military operations that raise uncertainty in the wider Middle East, can amplify concerns about supply reliability and trigger price volatility, even when physical disruptions are limited. In periods like these, the market tends to place a premium on flexibility and optionality. That dynamic does not automatically benefit any single actor, but it makes countries with diversified entry points, regasification capacity, and storage options <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iea.org\/countries\/turkey\">more strategically relevant<\/a> than they appear during calm periods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-what-could-constrain-turkiye-s-hub-ambition\"><strong>What could constrain T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s hub ambition?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Even with strong geography and infrastructure, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s transition from \u201ccorridor\u201d to \u201chub\u201d is not guaranteed. A hub model requires sustained investment, predictable governance, and enough commercial confidence to attract trading activity. Several constraints could therefore slow or reshape Ankara\u2019s plans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-1-domestic-economic-pressures-and-investment-capacity\"><strong>1) Domestic economic pressures and investment capacity<\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>Hub-building is capital-intensive. Expanding storage, upgrading networks, improving interconnectors, and maintaining LNG capacity all require steady financing. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s broader economic headwinds can complicate this in two ways:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Cost of capital and currency risk<\/strong> can make large infrastructure upgrades more expensive and less predictable.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Domestic affordability and demand management<\/strong> can pull policy attention toward short-term stabilization rather than long-horizon market reforms.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>This does not mean T\u00fcrkiye cannot advance its hub agenda. It does mean that the pace and scale of that agenda may depend on whether Ankara can mobilize investment without creating additional macroeconomic strain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-2-security-shocks-and-regional-instability-including-sudden-market-scarcity\"><strong>2) Security shocks and regional instability (including sudden market scarcity)<\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s \u201cflexibility narrative\u201d tends to become more attractive during crises, but crises also increase operational and political risk. Sudden escalations in the wider Middle East, such as U.S. military action against Iran or comparable developments that heighten uncertainty, can tighten markets and drive volatility. In such moments, the market often prices in <em>scarcity risk<\/em>, even before physical disruptions materialize.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For Europe, this can cut both ways:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>It increases the value of diversified access points, including LNG and southern routes.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>It also highlights that reliance on complex, multi-jurisdictional corridors comes with exposure to wider regional security dynamics.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>For T\u00fcrkiye, recurring shocks can reinforce the argument for hub relevance, but they can also raise concerns among European buyers about predictability and risk premiums.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-3-eu-market-governance-and-trust-as-a-strategic-asset\"><strong>3) EU market governance and \u201ctrust\u201d as a strategic asset<\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>If T\u00fcrkiye wants to be seen as a hub for European consumers rather than merely a transit route, the EU will implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) look for <strong>predictability, transparency, and rule-based access<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, the limiting factor is not only physical capacity. It is also whether T\u00fcrkiye can offer the kind of governance environment that European companies and regulators regard as reliable. If EU stakeholders perceive the market as opaque or overly politicized, they may treat T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s system as a useful corridor in emergencies, but hesitate to treat it as a long-term commercial platform.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-4-the-eu-s-own-hedging-strategy-avoiding-overconcentration\"><strong>4) The EU\u2019s own hedging strategy: avoiding \u201coverconcentration.\u201d<\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p>From the EU perspective, diversification away from Russia is not meant to create a new single point of dependence elsewhere. Europe\u2019s approach increasingly resembles a portfolio strategy: LNG, multiple pipeline suppliers, demand reduction, and interconnectors. That approach naturally limits how dominant any one corridor, including the southern route through T\u00fcrkiye, can become.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This is one reason T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s hub role is more likely to expand as a <strong>regional balancing option<\/strong> (especially for South-Eastern Europe) than as a central replacement pillar for the EU as a whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-conclusion\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s ambition to become a gas hub should be understood as a political-economic strategy, not only an infrastructure project. As the EU reduces reliance on Russian gas, the strategic center of gravity gradually shifts toward a more complex system where <strong>routes, flexibility, and governance<\/strong> matter alongside supply volumes.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Importantly, T\u00fcrkiye is not starting from zero. In recent years, Ankara has made tangible progress in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.tr\/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa\">building hub-adjacent capabilities.<\/a> These developments do not automatically translate into decisive political leverage over the EU, but they do increase T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s relevance in Europe\u2019s energy-security calculations, especially during periods of market stress, when flexibility and optionality become more valuable than in normal conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For Europe, this matters in two ways. First, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s growing capacity to balance pipeline inflows and LNG options can support diversification and improve resilience, particularly for South-Eastern Europe, where route alternatives are often more constrained. Second, it reinforces a broader reality of the post-2022 energy landscape: Europe may reduce dependence on a single dominant supplier while facing a wider set of challenges related to transit nodes, infrastructure bottlenecks, and non-EU governance frameworks. The likely outcome is not a simple \u201creplacement\u201d of one dependency with another, but a new matrix of interdependence that requires deliberate risk management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For European policymakers, the key challenge will therefore be to design an energy architecture that remains resilient not only to supplier pressure but also to potential leverage emerging from transit hubs and infrastructure bottlenecks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p><strong><em>The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in the papers published on this site belong solely to the authors and not necessarily to the Transatlantic Dialogue Center, its committees, or its affiliated organizations. The papers are intended to stimulate dialogue and discussion and do not represent official policy positions of the Transatlantic Dialogue Center or any other organizations with which the authors may be associated.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In recent years, competition over energy resources has taken on a new form: energy is increasingly treated not only as a commodity, but also as an instrument of political influence. Russia\u2019s full-scale war against Ukraine has been a key catalyst for this shift in Europe. 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