{"id":9776,"date":"2023-01-26T10:30:00","date_gmt":"2023-01-26T08:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=9776"},"modified":"2025-08-03T10:53:58","modified_gmt":"2025-08-03T07:53:58","slug":"peace-talks-why-kyiv-should-not-negotiate-ceasefire-with-moscow","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2023\/01\/26\/peace-talks-why-kyiv-should-not-negotiate-ceasefire-with-moscow\/","title":{"rendered":"Negoziati di pace: perch\u00e9 Kyiv non dovrebbe negoziare un cessate il fuoco con Mosca"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #000000\" data-attachment-id=\"18049\" data-page-id=\"8262\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Attendere, per favore\u2026\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"Scarica il PDF in inglese\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Scarica il PDF in inglese<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">589 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since the beginning of the Russian invasion at the end of February 2022, possible negotiations and peace between Russia and Ukraine have been widely discussed. This idea was prevalent in the Western media and in the political discourse of many states. In spite of most countries and their chief analysts believing that Ukraine would fall in a few days, brokering a cold peace or another &#8220;Minsk-3&#8221; seemed quite favorable \u2013 it would satisfy Russia&#8217;s needs, formalize support for Ukraine, allow Western countries to continue doing &#8220;business as usual&#8221; with Moscow, and reduce any additional costs that the West would be faced with. The successful defensive and counter-offensive operations conducted by Ukraine and the incredible resilience of Ukrainians showed that Ukraine could not only withstand Russian aggression but even make Russia pay a huge price for its war of choice. Furthermore, influential politicians and military professionals claimed that Ukraine was capable of liberating all the occupied territories of Russia, including the regions occupied before the full-scale invasion, as well as the Crimea peninsula, which did not exactly coincide with the beliefs of some world leaders, international relations scholars and analysts.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"468\" height=\"282\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-82.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9778\" style=\"width:397px;height:239px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-82.png 468w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-82-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 468px) 100vw, 468px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Negoziati tra delegazioni della Russia<\/em><br><em> e dell'Ucraina a Istanbul, 29 marzo 2022<\/em><br> <em>Cem Ozdel\/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Esiste una significativa incompatibilit\u00e0 di interessi tra le parti in guerra. Ci\u00f2 \u00e8 emerso chiaramente durante i primi tentativi di avviare colloqui di pace tra Russia e Ucraina, svoltisi in Bielorussia e poi trasferiti in Turchia. Diversi cicli di negoziati non hanno prodotto i principali risultati concreti che in Occidente si sarebbero potuti sperare. Molti sostenevano che il governo russo non fosse affatto interessato a una soluzione diplomatica, definendo i propri obiettivi come \u00absmilitarizzazione\u00bb e \u00abdenazificazione\u00bb dell'Ucraina. Nel frattempo, l'Ucraina aveva dimostrato maggiore flessibilit\u00e0 della Russia, poich\u00e9 Kyiv era pronta ad alcuni compromessi riguardo al proprio status neutrale, alla questione della lingua russa e al ritorno allo status quo esistente prima del 24 febbraio. A oggi, sembra che i due misteriosi obiettivi sopra menzionati rimangano rilevanti per l'establishment politico russo. Ci\u00f2 indica che la Russia \u00e8 ancora intenzionata a conquistare l'Ucraina con ogni mezzo: uccidendo chiunque le si opponga e distruggendo l'Ucraina insieme alla sua identit\u00e0 nazionale. Pertanto, l'Ucraina non \u00e8 disposta a firmare un altro accordo \u00abMinsk-3\u00bb, che non fornirebbe alcuna garanzia di sicurezza n\u00e9 il pieno ripristino della sovranit\u00e0 e dell'integrit\u00e0 territoriale entro i confini del 1991.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Due to the fact that Ukraine liberated parts of the territories occupied by Russia and found much evidence of its war crimes, it is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to negotiate a just peace with Russia. Moreover, no one in Ukraine supports any exchange of territories to end the conflict, which has caused countless tragedies in Ukrainian society.&nbsp; According to a poll run by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in December, <strong>l'85% degli intervistati<\/strong> across the country believe that even though the war may last longer and Ukraine&#8217;s independence may be threatened, <strong>l'Ucraina non dovrebbe rinunciare ad alcuno dei suoi territori in nessuna circostanza<\/strong>. The vital interests of the parties are diametrically opposite, making diplomatic compromise nearly impossible. Yet, some positive results emerged from the negotiations, such as the release of some prisoners of war and the unblocking of Ukraine&#8217;s Black Sea ports to allow grain exports to be restored in order to address the food crisis caused by the invasion. But again, this was only possible because Russia had an interest. For example, Russia claimed it was facing problems exporting agricultural products and mineral fertilizers because of sanctions. Moscow uses any diplomatic initiative to make tradeoffs in order to lift certain sanctions that harm the Russian economy. Ukrainian analysts sometimes refer to this as <strong>&#8220;a strategy of small compromises&#8221;<\/strong> che la Russia adotta per mantenere relazioni con l'Occidente e ottenerne concessioni, cos\u00ec da poter proclamare la vittoria davanti al proprio pubblico interno. In altre parole, la Russia pu\u00f2 affermare di essere ancora una grande potenza e che le altre principali potenze debbano tenere conto della sua posizione.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Il dibattito sui negoziati di pace e l'errata percezione delle intenzioni russe<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After the all-out war broke out, calls for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine were made by various actors. \u201cGive diplomacy a chance\u201d is probably the most commonly used phrase that leads one to believe that all conflicts are resolved by diplomatic means. Probably. This is, however, not the case in this war. Sometimes, these calls were formulated in the way that the West should exert pressure on Ukraine and make it negotiate with Russia. Furthermore, such proposals were made by US military leadership or members of Joe Biden&#8217;s administration, which received a lot of criticism. For instance, General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is the US\u2019s highest-ranking military officer, during several forums suggested that Ukraine\u2019s successful operations on the ground created a <em>&#8220;window of opportunity&#8221;<\/em> per avviare negoziati con la Russia da una posizione di forza. Ha inoltre osservato che riusciva difficilmente a immaginare che l'Ucraina potesse sconfiggere la Russia durante la stagione invernale. Un'altra illusione, ampiamente ripresa dalla stampa e dai politici, \u00e8 che l'inverno renda difficile condurre operazioni militari e sconfiggere il nemico. Gli Stati Uniti, per esempio, non hanno combattuto una campagna invernale dalla guerra di Corea, mentre l'Ucraina ha acquisito esperienza nel combattimento invernale dall'invasione russa del 2014. A seconda delle condizioni meteorologiche, l'efficacia militare pu\u00f2 peggiorare o migliorare. Pertanto, non dovrebbero essere usate come mezzo per <strong>fare pressione sull'Ucraina affinch\u00e9 negozi<\/strong>. The only fact that Milley advocated for negotiations makes it surprising. Being a member of the US military, he should be familiar with this and should understand Russia&#8217;s true intentions in this war as he receives all necessary intelligence.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"393\" height=\"230\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-83.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9779\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-83.png 393w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-83-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 393px) 100vw, 393px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Un nuovo scandalo che coinvolge Elon Musk illustra ancora una volta il livello di incomprensione e di errata percezione della Russia in Occidente. Musk ha proposto condizioni inaccettabili per la composizione del conflitto: nuove elezioni nei territori occupati prima del 24 febbraio nelle regioni di Luhansk e Donetsk, il riconoscimento della Crimea come parte della Russia, la garanzia delle forniture idriche alla penisola e la neutralit\u00e0 dell'Ucraina. Agli ucraini \u00e8 apparso come la proposta di una rinnovata <strong>politica di appeasement<\/strong> that would not end the war but only encourage the aggressor to annex more territories. The case of Elon Musk\u2019s tweets also demonstrates that the West is still under the influence of Russian propaganda. It might seem that Musk has nothing to do with international politics, though his stance became a climax point of what was discussed by many political analysts since the start of the invasion. Such an attitude unites those under the influence of the Russian legacy of being a great nuclear power, the interests of which should be considered first in the decision-making process. Moreover, it highlights that many in the West tend to forget about the historical lessons that the world was supposed to learn after the end of World War II. It is not even surprising that the only country that openly supported Musk\u2019s \u201cpeace plan\u201d was Russia and its propagandists. Furthermore, Pope Francis urged Ukraine&#8217;s President Volodymyr Zelenskyi to engage in serious negotiations with Russia and that &#8220;all actors in international life and political leaders should do everything possible to end this conflict&#8221;, preventing &#8220;a dangerous escalation.&#8221; This once again shows a low understanding of the conflict and the situation on the ground. Therefore, such calls only play in the hands of Russia and create a false perception about Ukraine which \u201cdoes not want peace and rejects any proposal of this type\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il 24 ottobre, un gruppo di democratici progressisti ha inviato una lettera a Joe Biden chiedendogli di cercare urgentemente possibilit\u00e0 di <strong>stabilire un cessate il fuoco<\/strong> in Ukraine. They also asked him to start negotiations with Russia. It was based on fears of a Russian nuclear attack and the outbreak of World War III. After facing strong criticism, the letter was retracted the next day. The letter was sent several weeks after Russia started shelling Ukraine\u2019s energy and critical infrastructure, causing a dire humanitarian crisis. The appeal of these Congress members sent a troubling signal, which doubted the support efforts that the US and other allies have already provided to Ukraine and highlighted another threat: possible interference of Russia in US domestic politics. For instance, Russia might use various influential political figures within the US in order to push the agenda of a &#8220;diplomatic solution\u201d that would benefit only Russia. There is a possibility that the RF could try to take advantage of it to further destabilize the US by sowing discord and tension between political parties. In such a way Russia would get a divided US that is facing difficulties agreeing on military assistance and other types of aid to Ukraine. By promoting the talks\u2019 agenda, Russia would achieve a frozen conflict and have time to regroup and prepare for a new invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It seems that the numerous calls to negotiate with Moscow, articles in journals and newspapers, and the analyses provided by the Western expert and scientific communities highlight another major issue &#8211; many in the West still <strong>guardare l\u2019Ucraina attraverso la lente della Russia<\/strong>. It is indeed a boiling issue since it limits the scope of research, resulting in misperceptions of both countries. Such a problem is especially evident in Western research institutions where experts on Russia and Eurasia believe they are very well aware of Ukraine, simply because they studied Russia or lived there. As a matter of fact, many researchers look at Ukraine from Russia&#8217;s perspective, as a major power in the post-Soviet region, whose interests are above the interests of all the other neighboring countries. It actually plays into Russia&#8217;s vision of sovereignty that dates back to the 19th-century absolutist interpretation. Specifically, it regards the use of force against neighbors as a vital means corresponding to the status of a great power. Furthermore, many in academia still believe that Ukraine belongs to Russia\u2019s \u201cborderlands\u201d or to the \u201csphere of privileged interests\u201d as once declared by Dmitry Medvedev, derived from the Cold War competition between the US and the Soviet Union. By acknowledging this and simultaneously disregarding Ukraine as a sovereign nation, analysis of Ukraine as something inextricably linked to Russia undermines the possibility of understanding the Kremlin&#8217;s motivations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this respect, it is noteworthy to quote Andreas Umland, political scientist and analyst of the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, who said that Russian leadership engages in aggression after they know that it will result in a victory. Russia\u2019s victories in Moldova, Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine (in 2014) did not dampen Moscow&#8217;s appetites. In contrast to popular belief, Russia was preparing for other military operations. That is why it is dangerous to misperceive Russian intentions, as any potential gain or victory will lead to another wave of aggression until Russia is stopped.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Senza esagerare, la Russia pu\u00f2 essere fermata solo con la forza, non attraverso negoziati diplomatici, come molti tendono a credere. Anzich\u00e9 cercare controargomentazioni sul perch\u00e9 l\u2019Ucraina non dovrebbe vincere, la Russia non dovrebbe perdere o sia necessario salvare la faccia a Putin, l\u2019Occidente dovrebbe svolgere un lavoro sistematico per spiegare perch\u00e9 la vittoria dell\u2019Ucraina sia cos\u00ec importante non solo per l\u2019Ucraina, ma per il mondo intero. Questo lavoro richiederebbe un\u2019approfondita <strong>revisione del comportamento della Russia nei diversi conflitti<\/strong>. The role of history cannot be underestimated in current realities, as Russian conduct is largely determined by historical precedents. Each time the West shows weakness toward Russia, Moscow is not afraid to use any means, including military ones. As part of this discussion, Ukraine&#8217;s foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba suggested that the West should &#8220;better prepare for Russian defeat already now, instead of trying to explain why Ukraine cannot or should not win.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>La partecipazione della Russia ai colloqui di pace: gli Accordi di Khasavyurt e i negoziati di Minsk<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When one approaches Russia\u2019s behavior during various conflicts, it is possible to trace a common pattern or strategy that Russia sticks to. Russia has been involved in numerous military actions and negotiation processes in the post-Soviet space and beyond. My suggestion is to focus on two examples &#8211; the Khasavyurt Accords signed as a result of The First Chechen War, and the Minsk negotiations during Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine in 2014-2015. The ending of The First Chechen War demonstrates that even if you manage to reach a diplomatic agreement with Russia, <strong>Mosca vi si atterr\u00e0 solo se corrisponder\u00e0 ai propri interessi<\/strong>. Russia, as demonstrated in the case of Chechnya, attempts to achieve an agreement that can be interpreted in a variety of ways through the use of unclear language. During the first Chechen campaign, Russia hoped to suppress the political party of Dzhokhar Dudayev, who sought to gain independence for Chechnya. As long as previous Russian attempts to remove Dudayev failed, Moscow started drafting plans for military intervention, which was supposed to be conducted in a blitzkrieg manner. However, despite Russian hopes for a quick siege, the campaign lasted for almost two years. This is because the Russians could not find a way to fight the guerrilla warfare tactics of the Chechens. Even considering Russia\u2019s advantage in manpower, weaponry, and air superiority, the Russian military faced severe casualties, which triggered a political and socio-economic crisis within the country. There were also heavy casualties among the civilian population &#8211; estimates suggest that Chechens lost around 100,000 civilians, mostly during Russia&#8217;s assault on Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. It was the demoralized Russian forces, and the Russian population&#8217;s opposition to a long-term conflict, that made Russia and President Yeltsin pursue negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"215\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84-1024x215.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9780\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84-1024x215.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84-600x126.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84-768x161.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84-18x4.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84.png 1049w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Prima guerra cecena. Immagini della capitale cecena Grozny dopo gli intensi bombardamenti russi.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the first Chechen campaign, Russia discovered that its military had not been ready to fight against the Chechens. The war exposed the weaknesses of the Russian army and no one in the Kremlin denied that it should be reformed. Representatives of Russia and Chechnya signed the Khasavyurt agreement in 1996. According to the agreement, the conflict between Russia and Chechnya should have been resolved through political means. A deadline was set for withdrawing federal troops from Chechnya. Also, Russia was to provide assistance for the restoration of the Republic&#8217;s social and economic structure. Experts note, however, that the agreement did not explain how the parties planned to address the root cause of the conflict \u2013 Chechen aspirations for independence. Observers claim that even the wording of the agreement was vague, leaving Russia some flexibility for maneuvering in the future. Others mentioned that Russia recognized the independent Chechen Republic by signing the Khasavyurt accord. In spite of this, experts in international law argue, referring in the document to the parties acting according to international law does not mean independence is recognized. Also pertinent to mention is the fact that the outcome of the First Chechen War also divided Russian society and the army. For instance, some of the Russian generals said that \u201ctheir victory was stolen\u201d and they were not presented with a final chance to defeat the guerrillas. Russia\u2019s ultra-patriots called the Khasavyurt accord to be &#8220;capitulatory&#8221; and &#8220;treacherous&#8221; for Russia. This, in its turn, paved the way for <strong>sentimenti revanscisti<\/strong> all\u2019interno della societ\u00e0 russa e tra le \u00e9lite politiche russe, che pretendevano una vittoria, sulla quale si fonda la loro legittimit\u00e0.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"412\" height=\"281\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-85.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9781\" style=\"width:398px;height:271px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-85.png 412w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-85-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 412px) 100vw, 412px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Il presidente della Federazione Russa B. Eltsin e il presidente<\/em><br><em> della Repubblica Cecena di Ichkeria <\/em><br><em>A. Maskhadov a Mosca, 12 maggio 1997<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Because of this, the Khasavyurt accord is a clear example of how Russia keeps trying to reach its goals after it loses. Moscow tries to gain victory by fixing its previous mistakes, organizing better plans for military operations and reorganizing its military forces. Russia also changed its communication strategy and prioritized information warfare. In effect, Russian propagandists described The Second Chechen War as a different war, emphasizing the &#8220;terrorist nature of the Chechen threat&#8221;. They continued to mention apartment bombings in Moscow and other cities, which many researchers claim is the work of the FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) in order to justify a new war. And Russian society gradually changed its opinion on the Chechen War. 65% of respondents to a public opinion poll stated they support keeping Chechnya in Russia through all means, including military ones. Using the case of the First Chechen War to link to current events, one could find interesting comments by Russian propagandist Zakhar Prilepin. In an argument with Olga Skabeeva, another top Russian propagandist, he argued that Russia would not achieve its goals by shelling Ukraine&#8217;s infrastructure. Instead, Moscow has to negotiate with Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Moreover, Prilepin went further and openly said that Russia had to <strong>costringere l\u2019Ucraina a negoziare con la Russia<\/strong>. Questo perch\u00e9 Mosca sar\u00e0 impegnata a raggruppare le forze e, alla fine, sar\u00e0 comunque pronta a concludere la guerra con un\u2019offensiva militare. Inoltre, senza alcuna esitazione, afferm\u00f2 che <strong>la Russia ha bisogno di \u201cun nuovo Khasavyurt\u201d<\/strong>, which is of course going to be a shame for Russia but will only be of a temporary character for Moscow. Russia&#8217;s true intentions cannot be explained by taking the words of Russia&#8217;s propaganda seriously. Even so, given the fact that Russia&#8217;s TV propaganda shows are often staged, one might logically assume that they were ordered by the Kremlin to convey the message that Russia needs negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"447\" height=\"276\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-86.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9782\" style=\"width:383px;height:236px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-86.png 447w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-86-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 447px) 100vw, 447px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Il secondo incontro in formato Normandia a Milano il <\/em><br><em>17 ottobre 2014.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is crucial to track the outcome of the Minsk negotiations &#8211; back in 2014-2015, when Ukraine was forced to negotiate with Russia in light of the failures on the battlefield. In reality, Ukraine negotiated with Russia under pressure, which came not only from the Kremlin but also from partners of Ukraine &#8211; Germany and France, who acted as mediators during the conflict. In the first attempt to establish peace, the Trilateral Contact Group, which consisted of representatives from Ukraine, the OSCE, and Russia, drew the Minsk Protocol. The representatives of the so-called \u201cDPR\u201d and \u201cLPR\u201d were also among the signatories. The protocol failed to produce any results because Russia-led mercenaries continued to breach the ceasefire agreement and launched an offensive operation on Donetsk Airport. Moreover, a few days before the Protocol was signed, Ukrainian forces were encircled during the Battle for Ilovaysk, which became one of the most tragic chapters in the history of the Russian invasion. Before that, Ukrainian troops liberated one town after another. However, regular forces of the Russian army crossed the border on August 23 and 24, shifting the balance and creating unfavorable conditions for Ukrainian forces on the ground. Since Ukrainian troops were encircled, the Russian side proposed opening a humanitarian corridor, which was then ruthlessly shelled by the Russian army. The estimated number of casualties ranges, however, according to the preliminary investigation, Ukraine lost 366 killed and 429 wounded soldiers, 128 were captured and 158 were missing. The only episode of Ilovaysk indicates what Russia\u2019s guarantees really mean in practice.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"443\" height=\"296\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-87.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9783\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-87.png 443w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-87-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 443px) 100vw, 443px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Commemorazione dei soldati ucraini uccisi <\/em><br><em>nelle battaglie per Debaltseve nella citt\u00e0 di <\/em><br><em>Lutsk, 18 febbraio 2021<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nonostante il cessate il fuoco concordato nel Protocollo di Minsk, i russi continuarono a bombardare e ad avanzare nel territorio ucraino. Riuscirono a conquistare l\u2019aeroporto di Donetsk dopo che le truppe ucraine lo avevano difeso per 242 giorni. Alla fine di gennaio 2015, il Protocollo di Minsk era completamente fallito, poich\u00e9 la Russia non lo prendeva sul serio. La necessit\u00e0 di condurre un altro ciclo di negoziati fu innescata da un\u2019altra battaglia per la citt\u00e0 strategicamente importante di Debaltseve. La citt\u00e0 si trova a un nodo stradale e ferroviario. Sebbene Ucraina, Russia, Germania e Francia avessero tenuto colloqui il 12 febbraio e firmato un accordo, le forze russe continuarono a bombardare e a condurre un assalto contro Debaltseve. Ci\u00f2 provoc\u00f2 gravi perdite tra i soldati ucraini. Sembrava che la Russia stesse deliberatamente ritardando la firma del documento per aumentare il proprio potere negoziale e ottenere risultati migliori, semplicemente impadronendosi di altri territori. Pertanto, la versione finale degli accordi di Minsk fu fortemente influenzata dai combattimenti sul terreno. Minsk-2 fu dunque il risultato di un disaccordo assoluto tra Russia e Ucraina. La sequenza delle azioni per l\u2019attuazione dell\u2019accordo fu uno dei principali ostacoli. L\u2019Ucraina chiedeva garanzie di sicurezza prima di procedere all\u2019attuazione della parte politica dell\u2019accordo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\">In effetti, le disposizioni degli accordi di Minsk avrebbero portato alla perdita della sovranit\u00e0 ucraina attraverso la federalizzazione. Ci\u00f2 avrebbe reso le regioni reintegrate di Donetsk e Luhansk un ostacolo alla conduzione di una politica estera realmente indipendente. Avrebbero avuto il diritto di veto su qualsiasi tentativo di aderire alla NATO e all\u2019UE. Si potrebbe sostenere che l\u2019Ucraina abbia tratto beneficio dall\u2019accordo, poich\u00e9 le ha permesso di fermare i principali combattimenti e le ha dato il tempo di ricostruire esercito ed economia. Ma anche la Russia ne ha tratto vantaggio: ha avuto l\u2019opportunit\u00e0 di aggravare la situazione in Ucraina ogni volta che voleva imporre la propria agenda, senza preoccuparsi troppo della sua reputazione. Ecco perch\u00e9 il cessate il fuoco veniva di solito violato: la Russia non ritirava le armi pesanti e i sistemi di artiglieria secondo l\u2019accordo. I rapporti dell\u2019OSCE indicavano spesso violazioni del cessate il fuoco centinaia o persino migliaia di volte al giorno. Sostengo inoltre che i negoziati di Minsk furono utilizzati principalmente dalla Russia per pianificare un\u2019invasione su vasta scala e verificare la reazione dell\u2019Occidente collettivo. Di conseguenza, l\u2019accordo di Minsk fu concepito, nella sua essenza, in modo tale da non poter risolvere il conflitto.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Generally speaking, Ukraine was humiliated by the Minsk agreements, which did nothing but brought more casualties. OHCHR in one of its reports mentioned that the total number of estimated casualties in Ukraine from April 2014 to December 2021 was between 51 000 and 54 000. Approximately 14 000 to 15 000 people were killed in this war, and the rest were injured. Moreover, Russia claimed that it was not a party to the conflict, which further hindered the implementation of any agreement in practice. After Volodymyr Zelenskyi became President of Ukraine, Moscow expected Ukraine to accept every condition it might have for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Zelenskyi&#8217;s background and inexperience in politics made the Kremlin think that the flexible position of the newly elected Ukrainian President would work for Moscow. However, Russian demands could not have been satisfied, as it would have meant losing Ukraine&#8217;s sovereignty, which was unacceptable. Hence, after the Normandy Four high-level talks in 2019, it was clear that Russia\u2019s hopes to coerce Zelenskyi to accept Russian demands failed. There is a problem that Moscow still does not grasp when it comes to its assessment of Ukraine. No matter who is the President of Ukraine, he or she would never accept Russian conditions because of the position of a vibrant civil society. The issue of negotiations with Russia is extremely sensitive to the Ukrainian people. Any attempts to negotiate with Russia would face strong resistance from society and end up in the collapse of the government. Even President Zelenskyi himself was frequently criticized for his inconsistent take on Russia after he was elected. At that time, he believed it was possible to negotiate a just peace with the Kremlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Considering Russia&#8217;s plans for Ukraine, it is pretty clear that Moscow was not interested in a peaceful settlement, given the fact that the Russian-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have been passportized. Russian official sources themselves claimed they issued more than 720 000 passports to inhabitants of the so-called \u201cDPR\u201d and \u201cLPR\u201d, which is a striking violation of international law and Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is the different interpretations of sovereignty by Ukraine and Russia that are at the center of any potential peace talks between Ukraine and Russia. Therefore, a just peace deal is unlikely to be achieved unless Moscow changes its position, which stayed the same since 2014-2015.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tentare di negoziare la pace con la Russia, allora come oggi, \u00e8 un grave errore da parte dei partner internazionali dell\u2019Ucraina. Per questo, l\u2019esperienza di Germania e Francia dovrebbe servire da esempio a tutto l\u2019Occidente. Fare pressione sull\u2019Ucraina affinch\u00e9 negozi con la Russia, come avvenne sotto la guida di Angela Merkel e Fran\u00e7ois Hollande, servir\u00e0 soltanto gli interessi russi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ucraina e Russia sono lontane dai negoziati<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I due casi sopra menzionati mostrano che la Russia usa i negoziati per nascondere le sue reali intenzioni. Il caso della guerra cecena e degli Accordi di Khasavyurt dimostra che, anche se si raggiunge un accordo con la Russia, Mosca lo rispetter\u00e0 solo finch\u00e9 le sar\u00e0 vantaggioso. Nonostante una grave crisi politica ed economica, la popolazione russa non dimentica le perdite passate e continuer\u00e0 a esigere vittorie dai propri leader, influenzata dalla propaganda russa. I crescenti sentimenti revisionisti possono portare a un nuovo tentativo di vincere una guerra.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As a result of the Minsk negotiations, it is possible to observe Russia&#8217;s attitude toward Ukraine. We see that the Minsk agreement in fact exposed the points of disagreement between the two countries. It had no success at all since Russia had not shown any flexibility or willingness to compromise. Instead, Moscow used the agreement to put pressure on Ukraine, create tensions and sow discord within the country, divide people and prepare the ground for a full-scale invasion. The root cause of the impossibility of negotiating a just peace with Moscow is that Russia does not recognize Ukraine as a sovereign nation. Furthermore, Kyrylo Budanov, the Ukrainian intelligence chief, stated that 82% of Russians support hostilities in Ukraine. That is a crucial factor to consider since many in the West believe this is only Putin\u2019s war. However, we must admit that Ukraine fights not only the Russian regime but also the Russian people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Therefore, instead of seeking negotiations that would only provide Russia with an opportunity to regroup, it is vital to continue supporting Ukraine by providing the necessary military equipment. During the winter, another crucial step is strengthening the resilience of Ukraine&#8217;s energy and critical infrastructure. <strong>I negoziati con Mosca, ora, non farebbero altro che rimandare un\u2019altra guerra.<\/strong> Va riconosciuto che i precedenti tentativi di placare la Russia non hanno funzionato e hanno soltanto accresciuto le sue mire. Chiedere ora all\u2019Ucraina di negoziare \u00e8 simile a chiedere a Winston Churchill di negoziare con Adolf Hitler durante la Battaglia d\u2019Inghilterra. La mobilitazione in Russia segnala che Mosca non intende rinunciare all\u2019idea di conquistare l\u2019intera Ucraina. Avviando un\u2019invasione su vasta scala, Vladimir Putin e la Russia hanno scelto un gioco a somma zero. Dopo aver subito diverse gravi sconfitte, la Russia non ha cambiato posizione. Al contrario, il Cremlino desidera prolungare la guerra per riconquistare l\u2019iniziativa, sullo sfondo dei bombardamenti contro le infrastrutture critiche e dell\u2019uso dell\u2019inverno come arma. Inoltre, Mosca sta cercando di fare tutto il possibile per ritardare le forniture di aiuti militari occidentali all\u2019Ucraina e tenta di mobilitare pi\u00f9 persone per combattere in Ucraina. Il costo di proseguire la guerra \u00e8 diventato relativamente basso, poich\u00e9 la probabilit\u00e0 di vincere supera le potenziali perdite per entrambe le parti. Per l\u2019Ucraina, \u00e8 un\u2019opportunit\u00e0 per riconquistare tutti i territori occupati. La Russia potrebbe sperare di ottenere qualche vittoria da offrire al proprio pubblico interno e di dimostrare all\u2019Occidente di essere ancora capace di combattere. Ancor pi\u00f9, per Putin proseguire la guerra \u00e8 una questione di vita o di morte, sia politica sia fisica. Per questo la questione dei negoziati non \u00e8 sul tavolo in questo momento.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Furthermore, the partners of Ukraine should be ready to increase support amid reports of a new potential invasion of the territory of Ukraine from Belarus. As NATO&#8217;s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg rightly mentioned, it is Ukraine that has to decide when to start negotiations and what kind of conditions. He also emphasized that <em>&#8220;if you want an outcome of those negotiations, which ensures that Ukraine prevails as a sovereign, independent nation, we need to provide military support to Ukraine&#8221;.<\/em> Alla luce del fatto che questa guerra ha un\u2019importanza esistenziale per l\u2019Ucraina, ritengo opportuno citare le parole di Golda Meir: <em>\u201cIf we lose a war, that&#8217;s the end forever \u2014 and we disappear from the earth. If one fails to understand this, then one fails to understand obstinacy. <strong>Intendiamo restare vivi. I nostri vicini vogliono vederci morti. Non \u00e8 una questione che lasci molto spazio al compromesso<\/strong>.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La convinzione che tutte le guerre finiscano per via diplomatica \u00e8 lontana dalla realt\u00e0, e numerose guerre sono state combattute fino alla loro conclusione sul campo di battaglia. \u00c8 certo che qualsiasi accordo ipotetico prevederebbe un cessate il fuoco che potrebbe comportare una repressione ancora maggiore ai danni di milioni di ucraini nei territori occupati. Gli esempi di Bucha, Irpin, Hostomel, Izium, Mariupol e di molte altre citt\u00e0 parlano da soli. La Russia violerebbe comunque l\u2019accordo, come avvenne nel contesto dell\u2019accordo di Minsk, perch\u00e9 a Mosca semplicemente non interessano i costi reputazionali. Inoltre, i russi non saranno disposti a ritirarsi dai territori gi\u00e0 occupati finch\u00e9 essi resteranno strategicamente importanti per Mosca, al fine di mantenere una testa di ponte per future operazioni offensive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As a final note, Volodymyr Zelenskyi outlined the key demands of Ukraine in order to open negotiations with Russia: withdrawal of Russian troops, return of Ukraine&#8217;s occupied lands, compensation for war damage, and prosecution for war crimes. It is the only way to achieve a just and sustainable peace. The collective West must now support the position of the Ukrainian President and give up the fantasy of changing reality where Ukraine is not strong enough and Russia is still able to prevail. The Ukrainian forces have retaken the strategic initiative in this war. Ukraine\u2019s negotiating power will only increase amid the continuing progress in liberating its territories. As Kaja Kallas, Estonian PM stressed, there is no need to push for premature peace now. Unless Russia abandons its goal of conquering new territory in Ukraine, peace talks have a slim chance of achieving anything. History shows that appeasement strengthens and encourages aggressors and that aggression can only be stopped by force. Russia has not achieved any of its goals since declaring war. Kherson, the only regional center it managed to seize after the 24th of February, has already been lost. Finally, the latest study conducted by the Sociological group \u201cRating\u201d at the request of the Transatlantic Dialogue Center revealed that victory in the war is the liberation of all Ukrainian territories, including Crimea and temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions \u2013 the opinion is supported by 85% of Ukrainian respondents. Prior to commencing any negotiations with Russia, the opinion of Ukrainian society must be considered. The Ukrainian people are ready to fight till victory, despite the shelling of energy infrastructure and constant blackouts across the country. The will of the people must be respected, and observers and politicians from the West must halt their unrealistic calls for negotiations immediately. The push for negotiations will only demoralize Ukrainian soldiers and Ukrainian civil society, leading to a misperception about the intentions of the collective West in this war. Ukraine is not planning to give up no matter how desperate Russia is to win some time by promoting negotiations.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Since the beginning of the Russian invasion at the end of February 2022, possible negotiations and peace between Russia and Ukraine have been widely discussed. This idea was prevalent in the Western media and in the political discourse of many states. In spite of most countries and their chief analysts believing that Ukraine would fall [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":9799,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13],"tags":[],"topic":[93,84,86,92],"class_list":["post-9776","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","topic-geopolitics","topic-russia","topic-ukraine","topic-war"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Why Kyiv Should Reject a Premature Ceasefire | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This analysis explains why a ceasefire under current conditions could benefit Russia and the risks of pressuring Kyiv into premature negotiations.\" \/>\n<meta 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