{"id":37042,"date":"2026-06-11T12:51:34","date_gmt":"2026-06-11T09:51:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=37042"},"modified":"2026-07-04T12:02:54","modified_gmt":"2026-07-04T09:02:54","slug":"from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/","title":{"rendered":"Da beneficiaria di aiuti a fornitrice di sicurezza: il ruolo emergente dell\u2019Ucraina in Medio Oriente"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\" data-icon-position=\"left\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px\" data-attachment-id=\"55893\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"true\" title=\"Scarica il PDF in inglese\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Scarica il PDF in inglese<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M10 4H4c-1.1 0-1.99.9-1.99 2L2 18c0 1.1.9 2 2 2h16c1.1 0 2-.9 2-2V8c0-1.1-.9-2-2-2h-8l-2-2z\"><\/path><\/svg><span class=\"file-size\">635 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"417\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1-1024x417.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37044\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1-1024x417.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1-600x244.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1-768x313.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1-18x7.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1.png 1194w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For much of the past year, Ukraine&#8217;s position appeared constrained. Russia was sustaining grinding pressure along the front line, Western attention was fragmenting, and Washington was pressing Kyiv toward a settlement on unfavorable terms. The joint US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/List_of_attacks_during_the_2026_Iran_war#Operations_Roaring_Lion_and_Epic_Fury\">avviata il 28 febbraio 2026<\/a> nell\u2019ambito delle operazioni Epic Fury e Roaring Lion, ha sconvolto quella dinamica in modi che nessuna delle due parti aveva pienamente previsto.<br>Within weeks, a country that had been told it held &#8220;no cards&#8221; was being asked by Gulf monarchies, European capitals, and the United States military itself to share drone interception technology and deploy its specialists to the Middle East. Ukraine&#8217;s Deputy Foreign Minister Marianna Betsa summarised the shift plainly: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/ukraine-iran-war-807d697d?st=k9QenW&amp;reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink\">&#8220;There is a transition from seeing Ukraine only as a recipient of aid, a consumer of security, to seeing it as a contributor to security.&#8221;<\/a> Questa transizione \u00e8 reale. La questione pi\u00f9 importante \u00e8 se l\u2019Ucraina possa sfruttarla sistematicamente ed evitare le trappole diplomatiche che l\u2019accompagnano.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This paper argues that Ukraine&#8217;s new leverage in the Middle East is grounded in a genuine and non-replicable military-technological advantage, but that converting battlefield credibility into lasting geopolitical agency requires a strategic discipline that Kyiv has not always demonstrated in the region.&nbsp;<br><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-context-what-happened-in-iran\"><strong>Contesto: cosa \u00e8 accaduto in Iran<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-group is-nowrap is-layout-flex wp-container-core-group-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-group-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group is-nowrap is-layout-flex wp-container-core-group-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-group-is-layout-flex\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes targeting Iran&#8217;s nuclear program, missile production infrastructure, and senior military leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran&#8217;s response included ballistic missile barrages against Israel, sustained drone attacks on US military facilities across the Gulf, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/economy\/2026\/3\/3\/shutdown-of-hormuz-strait-raises-fears-of-soaring-oil-prices\">la chiusura dello stretto di Hormuz<\/a> da parte del Corpo delle Guardie della Rivoluzione Islamica il 2 marzo.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"536\" height=\"658\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-17.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37071\" style=\"aspect-ratio:0.8145852627579492;width:403px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-17.png 536w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-17-489x600.png 489w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-17-10x12.png 10w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 536px) 100vw, 536px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Fonte: <a href=\"https:\/\/l.facebook.com\/l.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fnyti.ms%2F4unOGjB%3Ffbclid%3DIwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAYnJpZBExWUZHZDY4SW5ybVhyVDhneHNydGMGYXBwX2lkEDIyMjAzOTE3ODgyMDA4OTIAAR531TIKpzPoaj63es7NzeDB_iaYQePHPmckzOvywzMampOyu82EqXzfQnKjCQ_aem_iwOQuXXwwz9pQVFAmFwfcQ&amp;h=AUDPQcwaT2kIaZa3cMlSd1G7Dd3e_9ePkg5bI19WT-tG_yiWajAcQPtcehju73cqXcCfX0Ck6VRuWYeFCeXDbl72OETSYAZVA0rFjFrdV6BlDZ0TlGARChcOtU82k1xAdojI1Nxxbews0dNl&amp;__tn__=-UK*F&amp;c%5b0%5d=AUCEUEnLp-5bDCwOFtodoN7CLiByB-CHc1wBYm9qfEp_uSgrE4R-dSHhdJz_R_lF0roUapTxRKGY3yLTfHT1xuGPWravmIV_Q5sBZ4bseRw9Q-M42LKAnE8L0prGUrpOLJo6D5VawSjMYxBcaakQswEyd1D2JMLzcNI1FZtWvHzZrDMhtf_o0L0QUlzcQoc\">The New York Times<\/a><\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La portata era senza precedenti nella memoria recente. L\u2019Iran ha impiegato droni d\u2019attacco della serie Shahed contro obiettivi in Arabia Saudita, Qatar, Giordania ed Emirati Arabi Uniti \u2014 gli stessi sistemi che forniva alla Russia da anni e che le forze russe facevano piovere sulle citt\u00e0 ucraine. Gli Stati Uniti e i loro partner del Golfo, impegnati a difendere basi e infrastrutture, hanno scoperto rapidamente che l\u2019architettura di intercettazione esistente era al contempo troppo costosa e insufficientemente preparata a una saturazione di massa di droni. Secondo quanto riferito, il segretario alla Difesa statunitense Pete Hegseth e il presidente dei Capi di Stato Maggiore Riuniti, generale Dan Caine, hanno riconosciuto in un briefing a porte chiuse che <a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/03\/04\/politics\/us-air-defenses-iran-attack-drones-challenge\">i droni iraniani si stavano rivelando pi\u00f9 problematici del previsto<\/a>, e che le difese aeree convenzionali degli Stati Uniti non potevano intercettarli tutti.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019asimmetria dei costi era netta. Produrre un singolo drone Shahed costa all\u2019incirca tra $20,000 e $50,000. Un intercettore PAC-3 Patriot costa oltre $13.5 milioni. L\u2019enorme quantit\u00e0 di missili Patriot impiegata nei primi giorni delle ostilit\u00e0 nel Golfo ha sorpreso gli osservatori: funzionari ucraini hanno osservato che, secondo le informazioni disponibili, il totale avrebbe superato quello dei missili lanciati dalla stessa Kyiv nell\u2019arco di quattro anni di difesa contro i missili balistici russi. Gli Stati del Golfo hanno iniziato a cercare con urgenza una soluzione pi\u00f9 economica, scalabile e collaudata sul piano operativo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-the-double-burden-risks-ukraine-did-not-choose\"><strong>Il doppio fardello: rischi che l\u2019Ucraina non ha scelto<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Before assessing Ukraine&#8217;s gains, it is necessary to acknowledge the very real costs the Iran conflict has imposed on Kyiv.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-group is-nowrap is-layout-flex wp-container-core-group-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-group-is-layout-flex\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019impatto pi\u00f9 immediato \u00e8 stato sull\u2019attenzione. Come nella precedente crisi mediorientale, la guerra contro l\u2019Ucraina \u00e8 uscita dalle prime pagine e dalle agende urgenti dei leader occidentali. Questo conta pi\u00f9 di quanto possa apparire: la visibilit\u00e0 costante nelle capitali occidentali \u00e8 ci\u00f2 che alimenta l\u2019azione legislativa, le decisioni di spesa d\u2019emergenza e la volont\u00e0 politica di mantenere le sanzioni. Tutti e tre sono diventati pi\u00f9 difficili da sostenere quando un importante collo di bottiglia petrolifero era sotto il fuoco iraniano e le monarchie del Golfo chiamavano Washington chiedendo aiuto.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I mercati energetici hanno aggravato il problema. La chiusura dello stretto di Hormuz <a href=\"https:\/\/atlasinstitute.org\/the-strait-that-moves-the-market-the-2026-strait-of-hormuz-crisis-and-the-anatomy-of-a-global-energy-shock\/\">ha fatto aumentare bruscamente i prezzi del petrolio nel giro di pochi giorni<\/a> of the first strikes, with market projections quickly pointing toward $100 per barrel and beyond if the disruption persisted. For Russia, this was an unearned windfall: Moscow&#8217;s 2026 budget had been built on conservative oil price assumptions, and any sustained elevation of Urals crude prices translates directly into billions in additional revenues available to fund the war. The energy shock also provided political cover for countries like Hungary and Slovakia to resist tightening sanctions on Russian LNG, with some capitals arguing that European energy security demanded greater flexibility with Russian supply.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Hormuz crisis also forced the United States to effectively relax sanctions on Russian oil exports in order to help stabilize global energy markets. This partially offset the impact of Ukraine&#8217;s own sustained campaign targeting Russian oil export infrastructure on the Baltic coast, which had reportedly <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/the-iran-conflict-is-becoming-a-russia-ukraine-proxy-war\">aveva ridotto di circa il 40% la capacit\u00e0 di trasporto marittimo del petrolio russo.<\/a> Ukraine&#8217;s intelligence-driven strikes on Russian port infrastructure represent one of the most effective economic pressure campaigns of the war; the energy shock has blunted that edge, at least temporarily.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"820\" height=\"535\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-18.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37074\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-18.png 820w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-18-600x391.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-18-768x501.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-18-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 820px) 100vw, 820px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019aspetto pi\u00f9 critico per il campo di battaglia \u00e8 che la campagna iraniana ha consumato le scorte statunitensi di munizioni di precisione, in particolare missili per batterie Patriot, che coincidono direttamente con ci\u00f2 di cui l\u2019Ucraina ha bisogno. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/national-security\/2026\/05\/11\/us-ukraine-trump-weapons-purl\/\">Entro maggio 2026, gli alleati europei segnalavano una crescente preoccupazione per il programma PURL<\/a> (Priority Ukraine Requirements List), through which allied funds purchase US weapons for Ukraine. Some European capitals have become more hesitant to contribute, with one official noting that &#8220;trust is eroding&#8221; as the Iran conflict generates uncertainty about delivery timelines. To be clear, PURL transfers have not been formally halted \u2014 but the delays are real, the pipeline is under stress, and the structural competition for US defense industrial capacity between Ukraine, the Iran theatre, and Pacific contingency planning is not going away.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-russia-s-strategic-gamble-and-its-limits\"><strong>Russia&#8217;s Strategic Gamble and Its Limits<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia has pursued a dual advantage from the Iran conflict: benefiting economically from elevated oil prices and using the US distraction to stabilize its military position. Russian forces maintained their aerial campaign against Ukraine without interruption throughout the opening weeks of the Iran operation, launching heavy mixed-strike packages against Ukrainian energy infrastructure \u2014 a signal that Moscow saw no reason to show restraint while Western eyes were elsewhere. Ukraine&#8217;s available electricity-generating capacity, <a href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2026\/03\/05\/ukraines-wartime-energy-destruction-governance-and-the-european-pivot\/\">gi\u00e0 ridotta di quasi il 58%<\/a> rispetto ai livelli pre-invasione, a circa 14 GW entro gennaio 2026, ha continuato a essere presa di mira senza tregua.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Yet Russia&#8217;s position contains a significant structural contradiction. Iran has been Moscow&#8217;s most important military-industrial partner, supplying the Shahed drones that became the backbone of Russia&#8217;s long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. When the US and Israel struck Iran, Russia chose to protect its own interests rather than those of its ally. Moscow offered only a muted diplomatic <a href=\"https:\/\/www.themoscowtimes.com\/2025\/06\/22\/russia-condemns-irresponsible-us-strikes-on-iran-a89526\">condanna <\/a>of the strikes and provided no meaningful military support to Tehran. This restraint was arguably more damaging to Russia&#8217;s credibility than an open conflict with the West would have been: it demonstrated that Moscow&#8217;s security commitments are conditional and ultimately self-interested.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1008\" height=\"442\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-14.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37057\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-14.png 1008w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-14-600x263.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-14-768x337.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-14-18x8.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1008px) 100vw, 1008px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>A meeting between Iran&#8217;s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Tehran on July 19, 2022. Source: Getty Images<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The failure to shield Iran carries costs beyond the bilateral relationship. CSTO and SCO, Russia&#8217;s main institutional tools for projecting security influence across Eurasia, have been further revealed as declaratory rather than operational. Central Asian elites, observing the Iran episode carefully, are drawing their own conclusions about <a href=\"https:\/\/uames.org.ua\/stratehichni-reaktsii-ta-heopolitychni-naslidky-dlia-derzhav-tsentralnoi-azii-v-konteksti-vijny-v-irani-berezen-2026-r\/\">the reliability of Moscow&#8217;s security umbrella<\/a>. This reinforces a longer-term erosion of Russian regional influence that began with the fall of Assad&#8217;s Syria in late 2024. For Ukraine, this dynamic creates both an opportunity and a responsibility: the space vacating around Russia&#8217;s regional credibility is available to fill, but only if Kyiv builds lasting relationships rather than simply transactional ones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Vale inoltre la pena notare ci\u00f2 che la Russia ha ottenuto dal conflitto oltre alle entrate petrolifere. Secondo l\u2019intelligence ucraina, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kyivpost.com\/analysis\/74346\">satelliti russi hanno fornito immagini delle principali installazioni militari statunitensi nella regione del Golfo<\/a> \u2014 including facilities in Qatar and Saudi Arabia \u2014 before those same facilities were struck by Iran. This opportunistic intelligence-sharing with Tehran, if confirmed, further entrenches the Kremlin&#8217;s role as a destabilizing actor in the region and positions the Iran conflict explicitly as another front in the broader Russia-Ukraine confrontation. In one of the CFR\u2019s opinion pieces, it was described bluntly <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/the-iran-conflict-is-becoming-a-russia-ukraine-proxy-war\">come una guerra per procura <\/a>in which Ukraine arms and advises Gulf states while Russia assists Iran. That framing has traction in Washington, but it also requires Ukraine to manage perceptions carefully \u2014 being seen as a belligerent party in a wider regional conflict could complicate Kyiv&#8217;s diplomatic standing with states that prefer to avoid entanglement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-ukraine-s-comparative-advantage-what-nobody-else-has\"><strong>Ukraine&#8217;s Comparative Advantage: What Nobody Else Has<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"> However, Ukraine&#8217;s current offer to the Middle East is not merely a matter of diplomatic goodwill. It represents a genuine and, crucially, non-replicable military-technological asset. European partners can buy drone hardware. They can test Ukrainian systems on their own ranges. They can fund production lines. But what no partner can quickly replicate is the operational experience embedded in Ukrainian military culture, the live-data ecosystem that powers Ukrainian software, or the speed of innovation that four years of high-intensity war has generated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Questo valore non replicabile si riflette in capacit\u00e0 specifiche. I suoi droni intercettori \u2014 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/the-iran-conflict-is-becoming-a-russia-ukraine-proxy-war\">alcuni prodotti a soli $1,000\u2013$2,000 per unit\u00e0 <\/a>\u2014 sono prodotti progettati appositamente, frutto di una continua iterazione sul campo di battaglia, costruiti da team di ingegneri che ricevono feedback di combattimento in tempo reale e aggiornano i progetti nel giro di giorni. La piattaforma di gestione del campo di battaglia Delta, che fonde dati dei droni, sensori acustici, immagini satellitari e intelligence segnalata dai soldati in un unico quadro operativo, \u00e8 stata descritta dal segretario dell\u2019Esercito statunitense Daniel Driscoll <a href=\"https:\/\/nymag.com\/intelligencer\/article\/ukraine-russia-war-drones-iran.html\">as &#8220;absolutely incredible&#8221;<\/a> e superiore ai sistemi statunitensi comparabili. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/livecoverage\/us-israel-iran-war-2026\/card\/saudi-aramco-in-talks-to-buy-ukrainian-drones-to-protect-oil-fields-OeOLvO58Rgo4tDqV7e4q\">Saudi Aramco, the world&#8217;s largest oil company, entered negotiations to acquire Ukrainian interceptor drones to protect its oil fields <\/a>\u2014 non perch\u00e9 l\u2019Ucraina sia il fornitore pi\u00f9 economico, ma perch\u00e9 \u00e8 l\u2019unico con comprovate prestazioni operative contro la precisa minaccia cui quei giacimenti sono esposti.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1008\" height=\"462\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-15.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37058\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-15.png 1008w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-15-600x275.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-15-768x352.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-15-18x8.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1008px) 100vw, 1008px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>La Russia ha lanciato migliaia di droni Shahed di progettazione iraniana contro citt\u00e0 in tutta l\u2019Ucraina. Fonte: <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/clyv10dre79o\"><em>BBC<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le forze ucraine stanno attualmente <a href=\"https:\/\/help.hvylya.net\/uk\/327092-wsj-voyna-v-irane-neozhidanno-prevratila-ukrainu-iz-problemy-v-reshenie\">raggiungendo un tasso di intercettazione del 97%<\/a> against Shahed drones \u2014 the same Shaheds now threatening Gulf infrastructure. They reached that rate through a systematic, multi-layered approach combining electronic warfare jamming, acoustic detection networks, mobile gun teams, and interceptor drones operating as a coordinated ecosystem. That ecosystem is best understood not as a product but as a doctrine \u2014 one built from experience that cannot be downloaded or licensed. When Zelenskyi&#8217;s adviser Oleksandr Kamyshin noted that he was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/ukraine-iran-war-807d697d?st=k9QenW&amp;reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink\">&#8220;surprised anyone started an attack on Iran without first having a solution against Shaheds for themselves or their allies,&#8221;<\/a> l\u2019osservazione era pi\u00f9 una genuina intuizione strategica che una provocazione: l\u2019Ucraina era l\u2019unico Paese ad aver risolto questo specifico problema su vasta scala, in condizioni di combattimento reali, contro un avversario che adattava continuamente le proprie tattiche.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Altrettanto importante \u00e8 la rapidit\u00e0 dell\u2019innovazione militare ucraina. Il processo che porta le indicazioni dal fronte al tavolo di progettazione richiede settimane, talvolta giorni. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/media-telecom\/russian-tv-shows-teenagers-worlds-biggest-drone-factory-making-arms-hit-ukraine-2025-07-21\/\">Le forze russe hanno potenziato significativamente la loro flotta di Shahed dal 2022<\/a> \u2014 varianti pi\u00f9 grandi, veloci e a propulsione a getto compaiono oggi regolarmente accanto ai modelli originali turboelica, e i sistemi di contrasto ucraini si sono adattati parallelamente.<strong>Questo ciclo di adattamento in una guerra reale \u00e8 esattamente ci\u00f2 che gli Stati del Golfo non possono ottenere dai grandi produttori occidentali della difesa, che operano secondo tempistiche di approvvigionamento standard misurate in anni. <\/strong>A country can purchase a Ukrainian interceptor drone; it cannot purchase the institutional knowledge of the unit that developed it in response to last month&#8217;s Russian modifications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il significato pi\u00f9 ampio va oltre ogni singola piattaforma. <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2026\/04\/ukraine-russia-war-changing-warfare-practice-military-strategy\">Ukraine has effectively pioneered what Carnegie&#8217;s Andriy Zagorodnyuk calls &#8220;affordable precise mass&#8221;<\/a> \u2014 a model in which precision at scale is no longer the exclusive property of expensive state-level weapons programs. Drone units in Ukraine now account for over 80% of Russian battlefield casualties despite representing only 20% of the force&#8217;s personnel. The doctrinal and industrial model behind that ratio is what Gulf partners are purchasing access to, even if they do not always articulate it in those terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Entro marzo 2026, circa <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/ukrainealert\/iran-war-highlights-ukraines-rapid-rise-to-drone-superpower-status\/\">200 specialisti ucraini erano schierati in Medio Oriente<\/a>, lavorando con Arabia Saudita, Qatar, Emirati Arabi Uniti, Bahrein, Giordania, Kuwait e forze statunitensi per migliorare la difesa aerea dagli attacchi con droni iraniani. <a href=\"https:\/\/explainer.ua\/shho-pokazav-pershyj-misyats-vijny-v-irani-golovni-naslidky\/\">L\u2019Ucraina ha firmato un accordo di cooperazione nella difesa con l\u2019Arabia Saudita il 27 marzo e un partenariato decennale nella difesa e nella tecnologia con il Qatar il 28 marzo<\/a>. Questi accordi includono non solo vendite di equipaggiamenti, ma anche impianti di produzione congiunti, formazione del personale, trasferimento di conoscenze e un quadro condiviso per lo sviluppo tecnologico a lungo termine. Gli Stati Uniti e gli Stati del Golfo hanno inoltre <a href=\"https:\/\/militarnyi.com\/uk\/news\/ssha-ta-katar-obgovoryuyut-z-ukrayinoyu-prydbannya-akustychnyh-system-dlya-vyyavlennya-shahed\/\">avviato negoziati per acquisire sistemi ucraini di rilevamento acustico<\/a> per identificare l\u2019avvicinamento dei droni \u2014 una tecnologia che l\u2019Ucraina ha sviluppato per necessit\u00e0 operativa e perfezionato in migliaia di intercettazioni reali.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-the-ukraine-middle-east-axis-opportunity-and-accumulated-baggage\"><strong>L\u2019asse Ucraina\u2013Medio Oriente: opportunit\u00e0 e peso del passato<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The political architecture of Ukraine&#8217;s Middle East engagement is considerably more complicated than a straightforward technology transaction. To understand why, it is worth looking back at how Ukraine managed \u2014 and mismanaged \u2014 its regional positioning during the Gaza crisis of 2023\u20132024, because the lessons from that episode are directly relevant to the current moment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When Hamas attacked Israel in October 2023, Ukraine&#8217;s initial response was immediate and unequivocal support for Israel. This was driven by a mixture of genuine solidarity, domestic political sentiment (<a href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/publications\/the-difficulties-of-ukrainian-policy-towards-the-war-in-the-gaza-strip\/\">i sondaggi dell\u2019epoca mostravano che quasi il 70% degli ucraini simpatizzava con Israele<\/a>), e dal calcolo strategico che allinearsi a Israele potesse attrarre parte dell\u2019ondata senza precedenti di sostegno occidentale seguita all\u2019attacco di Hamas. Il presidente Zelenskyi tracci\u00f2 espliciti paralleli tra l\u2019attacco di Hamas e Bucha e cerc\u00f2 di presentare Ucraina e Israele come due democrazie in lotta contro lo stesso asse di violenza autoritaria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That calculation backfired. Arab states, which had been warming toward Ukraine through 2023 \u2014 Saudi Arabia&#8217;s Foreign Minister had visited Kyiv in February of that year, and Zelenskyi had spoken at the Arab League summit in Jeddah in May \u2014 <a href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2024\/02\/15\/the-difficulties-of-ukrainian-policy-towards-the-war-in-the-gaza-strip\/\">si raffreddarono bruscamente. Rappresentanti di Arabia Saudita, Emirati Arabi Uniti, Qatar e Bahrein erano assenti dalla terza riunione sulla formula di pace ucraina a Malta, alla fine di ottobre 2023<\/a>. Ukraine&#8217;s one-sided framing played into a narrative, actively amplified by Russian propaganda, that the West was hypocritical in its concern for Ukrainian civilians while indifferent to Palestinian ones. In the Global South, where the Palestinian issue is a significant marker of political identity, Ukraine&#8217;s positioning actively weakened its standing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The episode illustrated a structural tension in Ukraine&#8217;s Middle East diplomacy that has not disappeared. Qatar is simultaneously Ukraine&#8217;s most strategically important Arab partner, which routinely facilitates prisoner exchanges, helps return deported children, and positions itself as a potential energy alternative to Russian LNG for Europe \u2014 and a country whose foreign policy includes active support for Islamist movements that Israel regards as adversaries. Kyiv eventually adjusted its position, emphasizing compliance with international humanitarian law by all parties and reaffirming recognition of both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. But the damage had been real, and the underlying tension between maintaining Arab partnerships and not alienating Israel remains structurally unresolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In 2026, that tension is still present, and arguably more complex. Ukraine&#8217;s Middle East itinerary in March <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kyivpost.com\/analysis\/74346\">escludeva in particolare Gerusalemme<\/a>. Zelenskyi&#8217;s absence from Israel raised questions in Israeli policy circles, with some analysts arguing that Israel had missed earlier opportunities to deepen cooperation with Ukraine and that the relationship was now paying the price for years of studied neutrality. Israel has not supplied Ukraine with lethal weapons, citing, among other reasons, concerns that Israeli systems could be captured and transferred to Iran and Syria. That concern has not diminished; if anything, the deepened Russia-Iran military relationship makes it more acute.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1008\" height=\"444\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-16.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37059\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-16.png 1008w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-16-600x264.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-16-768x338.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-16-18x8.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1008px) 100vw, 1008px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Il presidente ucraino Volodymyr Zelenskyi ha incontrato il presidente degli Emirati Arabi Uniti Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Fonte: Ufficio del Presidente<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Israel&#8217;s complex position vis-\u00e0-vis Russia remains a complicating factor. Despite Russia&#8217;s active assistance to Iran during the conflict, Israeli-Russian channels have not been formally severed. Moscow retains leverage over Israeli interests in Syria, and Jerusalem continues to calculate its relationship with the Kremlin in terms of regional security rather than ideological alignment. Ukraine needs to account for this dynamic rather than assume that the Iran conflict has automatically transformed Israel into a straightforward partner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At the same time, there are real opportunities in the current configuration that did not exist two years ago. The Iran conflict has shifted the Gulf states&#8217; threat perception in ways that create genuine alignment with Ukrainian interests. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar now face the drone threat in an immediate, visceral way that transforms their relationship with Ukrainian expertise from academic curiosity into operational necessity. <a href=\"https:\/\/militarnyi.com\/uk\/news\/ukrayina-otrymala-zapyt-vid-ssha\/\">Ukraine&#8217;s offer of acoustic detection systems, interceptor drones, and EW expertise<\/a> \u00e8 una risposta a una minaccia condivisa, proveniente da avversari comuni. \u00c8 una base per il partenariato molto pi\u00f9 solida della cornice di solidariet\u00e0 umanitaria del 2022\u20132023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/news\/2026\/03\/02\/8023538\/\">L\u2019Ucraina ha inoltre prospettato di subordinare la propria assistenza tecnica agli Stati del Golfo all\u2019uso della loro influenza sulla Russia a favore di un quadro di cessate il fuoco.<\/a> This is a creative use of newfound leverage, and it reflects a more sophisticated regional strategy than Kyiv was deploying eighteen months ago. But it also carries risks: conditioning security cooperation on diplomatic outcomes can make Ukraine appear to be instrumentalizing partners rather than building genuine alliances, and Gulf states have their own complex relationships with Moscow that they will not easily sacrifice on Ukraine&#8217;s behalf.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\" id=\"h-conclusion\"><strong>Conclusione<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ukraine&#8217;s emergence as a security provider in the Middle East is real, consequential, and grounded in an actual comparative advantage rather than diplomatic positioning alone. The Iran conflict exposed a gap between the cost of modern drone saturation and the affordability of conventional interceptor systems, which Ukraine had spent four years solving. The demand for that solution is now global.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But military capability, however sophisticated, does not automatically translate into sustained geopolitical agency. Ukraine&#8217;s leadership has demonstrated tactical agility in responding to the Iran crisis. The longer-term test is whether Kyiv can build this into a coherent strategy: institutionalizing its Gulf partnerships through permanent training programs and joint development agreements; using its new leverage to secure tangible reciprocity, particularly in Patriot interceptor supply; and developing the diplomatic infrastructure to manage the complex triangular relationship between Gulf states, Israel, and its own European allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Kyiv&#8217;s emerging security partnerships in the Gulf are best understood not as a regional policy in themselves, but as a dimension of Ukraine&#8217;s broader effort to establish itself as an indispensable actor in global security architecture. Military capability will continue to generate Ukraine&#8217;s international standing.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The peace process remains far from resolution: Russia, buoyed by oil revenues and emboldened by US distraction, has no structural incentive to negotiate seriously, and Ukrainian front-line losses, though smaller than Russian ones, continue to accumulate. Whether Ukraine&#8217;s newfound leverage in the Middle East can be translated into security guarantees and durable partnerships, or remains a series of impressive but ultimately episodic moments, will depend on whether Kyiv approaches the region with the strategic patience and diplomatic calibration that the moment demands.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le carte sono reali. La domanda \u00e8 se verranno giocate con la disciplina di un partner di lungo periodo o con l\u2019urgenza di un Paese che lotta ancora per la propria sopravvivenza: in Medio Oriente, questi due atteggiamenti producono risultati molto diversi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Le opinioni, i pensieri e le valutazioni espressi negli articoli pubblicati su questo sito appartengono esclusivamente agli autori e non necessariamente al Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico, ai suoi comitati o alle organizzazioni a esso affiliate. Gli articoli hanno lo scopo di stimolare il dialogo e la discussione e non rappresentano posizioni politiche ufficiali del Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico n\u00e9 di altre organizzazioni alle quali gli autori possano essere associati.<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>For much of the past year, Ukraine&#8217;s position appeared constrained. Russia was sustaining grinding pressure along the front line, Western attention was fragmenting, and Washington was pressing Kyiv toward a settlement on unfavorable terms. The joint US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, launched on 28 February 2026 under Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, disrupted that [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":21,"featured_media":37063,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[60,13],"tags":[],"topic":[88,93,101,87,89,86],"class_list":["post-37042","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-asiaen","category-en-analyses","topic-defense","topic-geopolitics","topic-middle-east","topic-security","topic-technology","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Ukraine as a Security Provider in the Middle East | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The 2026 Iran conflict increased demand for Ukraine\u2019s drone-interception expertise, shifting perceptions of Kyiv from aid recipient to security provider.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"it_IT\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Ukraine as a Security Provider in the Middle East\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The 2026 Iran conflict increased demand for Ukraine\u2019s drone-interception expertise, shifting perceptions of Kyiv from aid recipient to security provider.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Transatlantic-Dialogue-Center-105645698740463\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-06-11T09:51:34+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-07-04T09:02:54+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Middle_East_Cover_2.0-scaled.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"2560\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"1835\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Vladyslava Sen\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:title\" content=\"Ukraine as a Security Provider in the Middle East\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:description\" content=\"The 2026 Iran conflict increased demand for Ukraine\u2019s drone-interception expertise, shifting perceptions of Kyiv from aid recipient to security provider.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Vladyslava Sen\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"16 minuti\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Vladyslava Sen\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/705192eaf4fd14c2586f2248272448b4\"},\"headline\":\"From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine&#8217;s Emerging Role in the Middle East\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-06-11T09:51:34+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-07-04T09:02:54+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/\"},\"wordCount\":3196,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Middle_East_Cover_2.0-scaled.png\",\"articleSection\":[\"Asia\",\"English Analyses\"],\"inLanguage\":\"it-IT\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/\",\"name\":\"Ukraine as a Security Provider in the Middle East | TDC\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Middle_East_Cover_2.0-scaled.png\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-06-11T09:51:34+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-07-04T09:02:54+00:00\",\"description\":\"The 2026 Iran conflict increased demand for Ukraine\u2019s drone-interception expertise, shifting perceptions of Kyiv from aid recipient to security provider.\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"it-IT\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"it-IT\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Middle_East_Cover_2.0-scaled.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Middle_East_Cover_2.0-scaled.png\",\"width\":2560,\"height\":1835,\"caption\":\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine&#8217;s Emerging Role in the Middle East\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/\",\"name\":\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center\",\"description\":\"Promoting International Peace and Security\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"it-IT\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"it-IT\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/google.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/google.png\",\"width\":2568,\"height\":2487,\"caption\":\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Transatlantic-Dialogue-Center-105645698740463\",\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/channel\/UCpJuhU4JBfpv_jsldNOc5LA\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/705192eaf4fd14c2586f2248272448b4\",\"name\":\"Vladyslava Sen\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"it-IT\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/litespeed\/avatar\/52936a32ac1f8353647d06145a3e5985.jpg?ver=1787138653\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/litespeed\/avatar\/52936a32ac1f8353647d06145a3e5985.jpg?ver=1787138653\",\"caption\":\"Vladyslava Sen\"}}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO Premium plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Ukraine as a Security Provider in the Middle East | TDC","description":"The 2026 Iran conflict increased demand for Ukraine\u2019s drone-interception expertise, shifting perceptions of Kyiv from aid recipient to security provider.","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/","og_locale":"it_IT","og_type":"article","og_title":"Ukraine as a Security Provider in the Middle East","og_description":"The 2026 Iran conflict increased demand for Ukraine\u2019s drone-interception expertise, shifting perceptions of Kyiv from aid recipient to security provider.","og_url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/","og_site_name":"Transatlantic Dialogue Center","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Transatlantic-Dialogue-Center-105645698740463","article_published_time":"2026-06-11T09:51:34+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-07-04T09:02:54+00:00","og_image":[{"width":2560,"height":1835,"url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Middle_East_Cover_2.0-scaled.png","type":"image\/png"}],"author":"Vladyslava Sen","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_title":"Ukraine as a Security Provider in the Middle East","twitter_description":"The 2026 Iran conflict increased demand for Ukraine\u2019s drone-interception expertise, shifting perceptions of Kyiv from aid recipient to security provider.","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Vladyslava Sen","Est. reading time":"16 minuti"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/"},"author":{"name":"Vladyslava Sen","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/705192eaf4fd14c2586f2248272448b4"},"headline":"From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine&#8217;s Emerging Role in the Middle East","datePublished":"2026-06-11T09:51:34+00:00","dateModified":"2026-07-04T09:02:54+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/"},"wordCount":3196,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Middle_East_Cover_2.0-scaled.png","articleSection":["Asia","English Analyses"],"inLanguage":"it-IT","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/","name":"Ukraine as a Security Provider in the Middle East | TDC","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Middle_East_Cover_2.0-scaled.png","datePublished":"2026-06-11T09:51:34+00:00","dateModified":"2026-07-04T09:02:54+00:00","description":"The 2026 Iran conflict increased demand for Ukraine\u2019s drone-interception expertise, shifting perceptions of Kyiv from aid recipient to security provider.","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"it-IT","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"it-IT","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Middle_East_Cover_2.0-scaled.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Middle_East_Cover_2.0-scaled.png","width":2560,"height":1835,"caption":"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine&#8217;s Emerging Role in the Middle East"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#website","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/","name":"Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico","description":"Promoting International Peace and Security","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"it-IT"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization","name":"Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"it-IT","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/google.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/google.png","width":2568,"height":2487,"caption":"Transatlantic Dialogue Center"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Transatlantic-Dialogue-Center-105645698740463","https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/channel\/UCpJuhU4JBfpv_jsldNOc5LA"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/705192eaf4fd14c2586f2248272448b4","name":"Vladyslava Sen","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"it-IT","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/litespeed\/avatar\/52936a32ac1f8353647d06145a3e5985.jpg?ver=1787138653","contentUrl":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/litespeed\/avatar\/52936a32ac1f8353647d06145a3e5985.jpg?ver=1787138653","caption":"Vladyslava Sen"}}]}},"mfb_rest_fields":["title","yoast_head","yoast_head_json","gutenberg_elementor_mode"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37042","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/21"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=37042"}],"version-history":[{"count":11,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37042\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":37540,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37042\/revisions\/37540"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/37063"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=37042"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=37042"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=37042"},{"taxonomy":"topic","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/topic?post=37042"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}