{"id":35027,"date":"2026-03-16T17:35:43","date_gmt":"2026-03-16T15:35:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=35027"},"modified":"2026-03-22T00:25:42","modified_gmt":"2026-03-21T22:25:42","slug":"germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"I prossimi passi della Germania a sostegno dell\u2019Ucraina"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"53876\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"Scarica il PDF in inglese\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Scarica il PDF in inglese<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">321 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The US administration&#8217;s foreign policy shift has made European support the lifeline for Ukraine&#8217;s defense. After the most devastating winter since the full-scale invasion began, the pressure on Ukraine is only intensifying. As Europe&#8217;s largest economy and top contributor of military aid, Germany is uniquely positioned to lead. The Bundestag, with its authority over defense policy, budgetary decisions, and international commitments, can turn this position into immediate, concrete action to sustain Ukraine&#8217;s ability to defend itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-procuring-from-ukraine-s-defense-industry\"><strong>Procuring from Ukraine&#8217;s Defense Industry<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-\">Ukraine&#8217;s defense production capacity <a href=\"https:\/\/mod.gov.ua\/en\/news\/the-ministry-of-defence-secured-over-6-billion-for-ukraine-s-defense-industry-in-2025\">ha raggiunto $35 miliardi<\/a> nel 2025, ma lo Stato pu\u00f2 acquistare soltanto un terzo di questa produzione. I finanziamenti esteri attraverso il <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/production-procurement-how-europe-and-ukraine-are-transforming-defense-supply-chains\">modello danese<\/a> e le sue varianti <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rnbo.gov.ua\/en\/Diialnist\/7361.html\">hanno raggiunto $6.7 miliardi<\/a> nel 2025. Anche sommati, gli acquisti nazionali ed esteri lasciano inutilizzata una parte significativa della capacit\u00e0 produttiva. La Germania \u2014 con un solo <a href=\"https:\/\/quantum-systems.com\/news\/first-joint-co-production-of-ukrainian-drones-in-europe-launched-by-quantum-systems-and-frontline-robotics\/\">sito di produzione congiunto<\/a> per sistemi di difesa ucraini sul proprio territorio \u2014 sfrutta appena il potenziale della cooperazione.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-\"><strong>Logica strategica<\/strong>: Ukrainian producers offer combat-tested systems at a fraction of Western costs. German procurement would sustain Ukrainian capacity that risks being lost to underuse, while helping address Europe&#8217;s own defense production shortfalls \u2014 a strategic investment in collective deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-\"><strong>Sfida attuale: <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.juergenhardt.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/10-Punkte-Plan-DEU-UKR-Ruestungskooperation.pdf\">Piano in 10 punti<\/a> sul rafforzamento della cooperazione industriale nel settore della difesa tra Germania e Ucraina prevede joint venture, garanzie per gli investimenti e l\u2019acquisto di sistemi ucraini \u2014 ma gli acquisti effettivi dall\u2019Ucraina restano marginali rispetto al bilancio della difesa tedesco.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Spazio d\u2019azione<\/strong>: la Germania pu\u00f2 destinare pi\u00f9 fondi di assistenza militare agli acquisti diretti dai produttori ucraini, acquistando al contempo sistemi fabbricati in Ucraina per la stessa Bundeswehr. Entrambe le direttrici dovrebbero essere prioritarie nei settori in cui l\u2019Ucraina detiene un comprovato vantaggio tecnologico, quali droni, guerra elettronica e sistemi intercettori.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-accelerating-ukraine-s-eu-accession\"><strong>Accelerating Ukraine&#8217;s EU Accession<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As the US withdraws from European security commitments, Ukraine becomes indispensable to Europe&#8217;s own defense. Yet the traditional enlargement framework is increasingly mismatched with today&#8217;s urgency. A new accession model is needed \u2014 one that reflects the security reality and can be advanced separately from other candidacies. The European Commission is already developing <a href=\"https:\/\/table.media\/en\/europe\/news-en\/ukraine-commission-proposes-gradual-integration\">possibili modelli<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Logica strategica<\/strong>: EU membership is the only credible long-term guarantee of Ukraine&#8217;s stability and prosperity as well as a structural deterrent against future aggression. A stalled process weakens not only Ukraine but the EU&#8217;s own credibility, creating openings for hostile external actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Sfida attuale: <\/strong>Member states, including Germany, have not prepared domestically for enlargement. The conversation about its implications has barely begun, while in Ukraine and Moldova accession dominates the agenda. Hungary&#8217;s blocking of the opening of negotiation clusters has exposed how one spoiler can undermine the entire process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Spazio d\u2019azione<\/strong>: Germany should launch a substantive domestic and European debate on EU enlargement, positioning itself as a constructive leader on both the substance and the process. Concrete steps include working with the European Commission on its reform proposals and building consensus among member states for a solution that preserves both the merit-based principle and the strategic urgency of Ukraine&#8217;s European path.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-circumventing-vetoes-on-ukraine-aid\"><strong>Aggirare i veti sugli aiuti all\u2019Ucraina<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Ungheria e la Slovacchia continuano a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/hungary-vows-block-eu-sanctions-russia-eve-ukraine-war-anniversary-2026-02-23\/\">bloccare il pacchetto di aiuti UE da \u20ac90 miliardi<\/a> per l\u2019Ucraina. In risposta, i Paesi nordici e baltici si sono impegnati a fornire <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/europe-plan-to-keep-ukraine-afloat-hungary-blocking-e90b-loan\/\">fino a \u20ac30 miliardi in prestiti bilaterali<\/a> to meet Ukraine&#8217;s immediate financial needs through mid-2026, regardless of the veto.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Logica strategica<\/strong>: Predictable financial support underpins Ukraine&#8217;s defense capacity, economic resilience, and negotiating position in peace talks. Allowing a single member state to hold European security policy hostage sets a dangerous precedent \u2014 for Ukraine and for Europe&#8217;s crisis-response capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Sfida attuale: <\/strong>With Hungary&#8217;s electoral campaign in full swing and the &#8220;threat from Ukraine&#8221; among its central themes, the blockage is unlikely to be lifted before a new government takes office around late May or June. Until then, Ukraine faces an acute funding gap that could trigger worsening conditions on the ground and a new wave of refugees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Spazio d\u2019azione<\/strong>: la Germania pu\u00f2 aderire alla coalizione per i prestiti bilaterali o guidarla congiuntamente, conferendole il necessario peso finanziario e politico. Nel lungo periodo, Berlino dovrebbe riavviare le discussioni su una graduale transizione al voto a maggioranza qualificata nelle decisioni di politica estera e sulle sanzioni (come dimostrato dalla recente decisione sul congelamento a tempo indeterminato dei beni russi), nonch\u00e9 su una procedura efficace ai sensi dell\u2019articolo 7 TUE, in grado di responsabilizzare gli Stati membri.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-disrupting-russia-s-shadow-fleet-in-the-baltic-sea\"><strong>Disrupting Russia&#8217;s Shadow Fleet in the Baltic Sea<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">European enforcement against Russia&#8217;s shadow fleet has entered a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/online-analysis\/2026\/03\/europes-coastal-states-tighten-enforcement-on-russias-shadow-fleet\/\">nuova fase operativa<\/a>, con Belgio, Francia e Svezia in prima linea. Gli Stati Uniti hanno sequestrato almeno <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/dispatches\/when-economic-warfare-meets-gunboat-diplomacy-what-to-know-about-the-us-seizures-of-shadow-fleet-tankers\/\">sette petroliere<\/a> dalla fine del 2025. Nessuna di queste operazioni ha provocato ritorsioni russe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Logica strategica<\/strong>: The EU&#8217;s oil price cap stands at <a href=\"https:\/\/finance.ec.europa.eu\/news\/new-dynamic-mechanism-lower-price-cap-russian-crude-oil-4410-barrel-2026-01-15_en\">$44.10 al barile<\/a>. Circa il 68% delle esportazioni russe di greggio ora <a href=\"https:\/\/supplystatus.com\/list\/how-the-iran-war-and-sanctions-are-reshaping-russian-oil-exports-2026\/v\">viaggia su navi sanzionate<\/a>, aggirando completamente il tetto. Queste stesse navi comportano gravi rischi ambientali e di intelligence per le acque europee. Dall\u2019inizio della guerra in Iran, la Russia ha ottenuto <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/russia-earns-additional-6-billion-euros-in-fossil-fuel-revenue-as-oil-prices-soar-amid-us-iran-war-analysis-finds\/\">ulteriori \u20ac6 miliardi di entrate dai combustibili fossili<\/a>. Poich\u00e9 Washington <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/clyzj3g3pygo\">sta gi\u00e0 allentando le sanzioni<\/a>, l\u2019Europa deve essere pronta a mantenere e applicare il regime sanzionatorio in modo indipendente.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Sfida attuale: <\/strong>Oltre <a href=\"https:\/\/maritime-executive.com\/article\/european-nations-warn-shadow-fleet-shipowners-to-play-by-the-rules\">300 navi della flotta ombra<\/a> navigano ormai sotto bandiere false o del tutto prive di bandiera \u2014 e possono quindi essere abbordate ai sensi dell\u2019articolo 92 dell\u2019UNCLOS \u2014 ma la Germania non dispone di protocolli operativi per esercitare questo potere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Spazio d\u2019azione<\/strong>: la Germania pu\u00f2 seguire il <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/cy8pn7jgy3no\">modello britannico<\/a>, utilizzando la normativa vigente in materia di sanzioni per autorizzarne l\u2019applicazione con mezzi militari, oppure adottare una legge nazionale che autorizzi l\u2019abbordaggio, l\u2019ispezione e il fermo delle navi sospette. Dovrebbe garantire il pieno recepimento della direttiva UE 2024\/1226, affinch\u00e9 l\u2019elusione delle sanzioni sia perseguibile come reato. Dovrebbe inoltre destinare risorse specifiche a pattugliamenti congiunti nel Mar Baltico con i partner nordici e baltici, dimostrando di essere pronta a far rispettare le sanzioni.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-delivering-taurus-missles-to-ukraine\"><strong>Fornire missili Taurus all\u2019Ucraina<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Ucraina ha distrutto <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/robert_magyar\/2041\">54 sistemi russi di difesa aerea<\/a> durante l\u2019inverno e <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/robert_magyar\/2074\">altri 19<\/a> nella prima met\u00e0 di marzo, aprendo la possibilit\u00e0 di colpire obiettivi dell\u2019industria della difesa pi\u00f9 in profondit\u00e0 dietro la linea del fronte \u2014 il 10 marzo ne \u00e8 stato un esempio: l\u2019 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/03\/11\/world\/europe\/ukraine-russia-electronics-plant-missiles.html\">attacco alla fabbrica Kremniy-El<\/a> a Brjansk. Tuttavia, l\u2019arsenale di attacco a lungo raggio rimane pericolosamente limitato: le capacit\u00e0 produttive britanniche e francesi sono ridotte.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Logica strategica<\/strong>: Taurus amplierebbe la capacit\u00e0 ucraina di attacco a lungo raggio e metterebbe ulteriormente sotto pressione le difese aeree russe, gi\u00e0 indebolite. Poich\u00e9 la guerra in Iran aggrava la carenza di intercettori occidentali, colpire alla fonte la produzione missilistica russa diventa ancora pi\u00f9 cruciale per prevenire un\u2019altra catastrofe umanitaria nell\u2019inverno 2026\/27.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Sfida attuale:<\/strong> Germany has prioritized Ukraine&#8217;s indigenous long-range strike program \u2014 a sound investment, but one that does not close the spring\u2013summer gap, when the Russian offensive is expected. Comparable Ukrainian systems are unlikely to reach reliable serial production before late 2026 at the earliest, and drones cannot substitute the firepower of cruise missiles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Spazio d\u2019azione<\/strong>: Taurus <a href=\"https:\/\/www.twz.com\/germanys-taurus-cruise-missile-could-be-the-next-for-ukraine\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">pu\u00f2 essere integrato sugli F-16<\/a> gi\u00e0 in servizio in Ucraina, e l\u2019 <a href=\"https:\/\/deaidua.org\/news\/2025\/02\/23\/taurus-kepd-350-for-ukraine-how-a-delivery-might-look-like\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">addestramento pu\u00f2 essere completato in 3\u20134 mesi<\/a>. Le scorte consegnate possono essere sostituite da una variante Taurus Neo aggiornata. Il Bundestag pu\u00f2 svolgere un ruolo catalizzatore \u2014 attraverso il dibattito parlamentare e imponendo che l\u2019accordo di cooperazione sulle armi a lungo raggio con l\u2019Ucraina includa misure provvisorie per colmare il divario fino a quando i sistemi prodotti in Ucraina non raggiungeranno la produzione in serie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The US administration&#8217;s foreign policy shift has made European support the lifeline for Ukraine&#8217;s defense. After the most devastating winter since the full-scale invasion began, the pressure on Ukraine is only intensifying. As Europe&#8217;s largest economy and top contributor of military aid, Germany is uniquely positioned to lead. The Bundestag, with its authority over defense [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":35042,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13,53,72,58],"tags":[],"topic":[91,96,84,86],"class_list":["post-35027","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","category-reports-handbooks","category-eng-reports-german-ukrainian-partnership-program","category-eng-western-europe","topic-eu","topic-germany","topic-russia","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Germany&#039;s Next Steps to Support Ukraine | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This report sets out steps Germany can take to support Ukraine as changing U.S. 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