{"id":28549,"date":"2025-04-03T10:08:00","date_gmt":"2025-04-03T07:08:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=28549"},"modified":"2026-07-04T12:01:49","modified_gmt":"2026-07-04T09:01:49","slug":"pyongyang-on-the-frontlines-the-risks-and-rewards-of-involvement-in-russian-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2025\/04\/03\/pyongyang-on-the-frontlines-the-risks-and-rewards-of-involvement-in-russian-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Pyongyang in prima linea: rischi e vantaggi del coinvolgimento nella guerra russa"},"content":{"rendered":"<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-\"><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"51874\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Attendere, per favore\u2026\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"Scarica il PDF in inglese\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Scarica il PDF in inglese<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">2 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-key-takeaways\">Punti chiave<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Coinvolgimento militare diretto della Corea del Nord<\/strong>: la Corea del Nord ha dispiegato 10.000-12.000 soldati in prima linea in Ucraina. Questa mossa ha reso Pyongyang una parte attiva nel conflitto sul piano militare.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Vantaggi strategici per la Corea del Nord<\/strong>: aiutando la Russia, la Corea del Nord ottiene tecnologie militari avanzate, esperienza sul campo di battaglia e una posizione militare pi\u00f9 solida. Questi vantaggi sono particolarmente importanti con l\u2019aumento delle tensioni nel Pacifico.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Guadagni finanziari e tecnologici<\/strong>: in cambio del suo sostegno militare, la Corea del Nord starebbe ricevendo dalla Russia una compensazione finanziaria, insieme a preziose armi e tecnologie. Ci\u00f2 rafforza il programma nucleare e le capacit\u00e0 militari di Pyongyang.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>La posizione ambigua della Cina<\/strong>: la Cina ha preso le distanze dall'alleanza tra Russia e Corea del Nord, ma i legami sempre pi\u00f9 stretti fra le due nazioni pongono una sfida a Pechino. La Cina \u00e8 preoccupata delle crescenti capacit\u00e0 nucleari nordcoreane e del potenziale di destabilizzazione della regione.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Implicazioni per la sicurezza globale<\/strong>: il coinvolgimento della Corea del Nord segnala un indebolimento delle norme internazionali, poich\u00e9 sfida le sanzioni e sostiene l'aggressione russa. L'incapacit\u00e0 dell'Occidente di frenare le azioni di Pyongyang potrebbe incoraggiare altri Stati canaglia, minando la stabilit\u00e0 globale.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1240\" height=\"507\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image.png\" alt=\"Immagine di copertina\" class=\"wp-image-28550\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image.png 1240w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-600x245.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-1024x419.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-768x314.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-18x7.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1240px) 100vw, 1240px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since the Russian full-scale invasion, North Korea has been aiding its ally, the Kremlin, not only diplomatically by recognizing the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People&#8217;s Republics, brake-away Ukrainian regions, but also militarily by supplying ammunition and missiles to the sanctioned country. Over the course of the war, Pyongyang&#8217;s involvement with Russia grew extensively and peaked with the deployment of North Koreans to the warzone at the end of October 2024. Such an unprecedented and bold move, along with Pyongyang&#8217;s growing assertiveness on the Korean Peninsula, raised concerns in the international arena. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Questo studio esamina le motivazioni, i benefici e i rischi associati al coinvolgimento della Corea del Nord nella guerra in Ucraina, analizzandone le implicazioni per gli alleati autoritari di Pyongyang, Mosca e Pechino. Esaminare queste dinamiche \u00e8 fondamentale per capire come questa alleanza possa plasmare il futuro della sicurezza internazionale e della stabilit\u00e0 regionale sia in Europa sia nel Pacifico. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-background\">Contesto<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nella seconda met\u00e0 del 2022, quando le scorte russe di missili cominciarono a esaurirsi, il presidente Vladimir Putin si rivolse agli alleati nordcoreani per chiedere aiuto. Il 2024 ha tuttavia visto notevoli progressi nelle relazioni bilaterali tra Mosca e Pyongyang, oltre gli scambi commerciali e la vendita di armamenti. Nel marzo 2024 la Russia, per la prima volta, ha posto il veto al rinnovo annuale del gruppo di esperti dell'ONU che vigila sulle violazioni delle sanzioni nordcoreane. Bench\u00e9 in gran parte simbolico, poich\u00e9 il lavoro del gruppo non influenza direttamente le sanzioni, ci\u00f2 ha segnalato che la posizione di Mosca nei confronti del regime di Kim \u00e8 cambiata drasticamente.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In June 2024 came another worrying turn of events: Putin and Kim signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People&#8217;s Republic of Korea. The agreement was dubbed \u201cmutual defense treaty\u201d in the media for its Article 4 in which both parties committed to provide each other with military assistance in case of an armed attack. The treaty involved a tightening of cooperation in a range of other spheres, including trade, economy, science, etc. This agreement was used as justification for the deployment of North Korean troops to the frontline to aid Russia in its campaign against Kyiv. <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"811\" height=\"540\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-2.png\" alt=\"Immagine di copertina\" class=\"wp-image-28552\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-2.png 811w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-2-600x400.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-2-768x511.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-2-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 811px) 100vw, 811px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Il falso documento d'identit\u00e0 di un soldato nordcoreano catturato. Fonte: canale Telegram ufficiale di Zelenskyi<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le prime notizie sul coinvolgimento di soldati nordcoreani sul campo di battaglia risalgono alla fine di ottobre 2024. Da allora \u00e8 stato confermato che Pyongyang ha inviato circa 10.000-12.000 suoi soldati a sostegno dell'alleato. Secondo le notizie, i nordcoreani sono stati dispiegati a combattere nell'oblast' di Kursk, territorio sovrano russo conquistato nell'ambito dell'offensiva a sorpresa dell'Ucraina nell'agosto 2024. Le valutazioni sulla professionalit\u00e0 delle truppe nordcoreane variano: alcuni combattenti ucraini sostengono che le loro tattiche siano obsolete, altri li considerano un nemico pericoloso e sottolineano che sono pi\u00f9 disciplinati e metodici degli stessi russi. Catturare vivi soldati nordcoreani si \u00e8 rivelato estremamente difficile, poich\u00e9 tendono a suicidarsi quando rischiano la cattura. Negli ultimi mesi l'esercito ucraino \u00e8 riuscito a fare prigionieri soltanto due soldati nordcoreani feriti. Secondo le notizie da Kyiv, Mosca e Pyongyang hanno fatto del loro meglio per occultarne la presenza in prima linea: i soldati portavano documenti falsi e dichiaravano di essere nati nella regione di Tuva, in Russia. L'Ucraina ha stimato le perdite nordcoreane in circa 3.000 uomini, tra morti e feriti. All'inizio di febbraio 2025 sono inoltre emerse preoccupazioni che Pyongyang si stesse preparando a inviare nuove truppe in prima linea nonostante le perdite piuttosto elevate subite.<strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-north-korea-benefits-outweigh-the-risks\">Corea del Nord: i benefici superano i rischi<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\">Pyongyang ha tratto enormi vantaggi dall'alleanza con il Cremlino e, per ora, il dispiegamento di truppe in prima linea \u00e8 valso la pena per Kim. In cambio di diverse migliaia di vite umane, la Corea del Nord ha ricevuto un'enorme quantit\u00e0 di armi e tecnologie che prima non poteva ottenere. Ci\u00f2 consentir\u00e0 allo Stato canaglia di esercitare pressione sui suoi nemici nel Pacifico, soprattutto sulla Corea del Sud, con cui le relazioni sono drasticamente peggiorate negli ultimi mesi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\">Con l'aumento delle tensioni nel Pacifico, non senza il coinvolgimento diretto di Pyongyang, la Corea del Nord intende rafforzare le proprie forze armate in previsione di un potenziale conflitto. L'invio di truppe in Ucraina \u00e8 considerato un'opportunit\u00e0 perfetta per far acquisire ai soldati esperienza diretta nella guerra moderna e nell'uso di nuove tecnologie e armi. La collaborazione con la Russia e l'accordo di difesa reciproca potrebbero consentire a Kim di chiedere sostegno russo se la situazione nel Pacifico degenerasse in un conflitto militare. Inoltre, con l'aiuto di Mosca, la Corea del Nord potr\u00e0 far avanzare il proprio programma nucleare e diventare uno Stato ancora pi\u00f9 influente a livello regionale.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"795\" height=\"447\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-3.png\" alt=\"Immagine di copertina\" class=\"wp-image-28553\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-3.png 795w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-3-600x337.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-3-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-3-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 795px) 100vw, 795px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea&#8217;s leader Kim Jong Un shake hands after a signing ceremony of the new partnership in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. (Kristina Kormilitsyna\/Sputnik\/AP)<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I nuovi stretti legami con la Russia avvicinano inoltre Pyongyang all\u2019uscita dall\u2019isolamento internazionale: se il Cremlino pu\u00f2 cambiare opinione sulla Corea del Nord, possono farlo anche altri Stati. Se il dispiegamento di truppe modificasse la situazione in prima linea a vantaggio di Mosca, Kim potrebbe anche fare pressione su Putin affinch\u00e9 gli consenta di aderire a organizzazioni internazionali sostenute dalla Russia, per esempio la Comunit\u00e0 degli Stati Indipendenti, ampliando cos\u00ec il ruolo di Pyongyang sulla scena internazionale. Una tale mossa potrebbe incrinare l\u2019isolamento internazionale del regime di Kim e non solo offrirgli un modo per salvare la sua economia in difficolt\u00e0, ma anche dimostrare l\u2019inefficacia delle istituzioni guidate dall\u2019ONU. Potrebbe inoltre ridurre il timore che gli altri Paesi nutrono nei confronti delle sanzioni e delle conseguenze delle loro azioni da Stati canaglia, generando una destabilizzazione e un caos vantaggiosi sia per Pyongyang sia per Mosca. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Si discute inoltre molto della possibilit\u00e0 che la Corea del Nord riceva da Mosca un generoso compenso finanziario per ogni soldato inviato ad aiutare l'esercito russo. Kim non ottiene quindi soltanto benefici militari, politici ed economici, ma riempie anche le proprie tasche di denaro. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Naturalmente, la decisione di inviare truppe in guerra comporta anche alcuni rischi potenziali. Se i soldati nordcoreani non riuscissero ad adattarsi alla realt\u00e0 della guerra moderna e subissero pesanti perdite, ci\u00f2 danneggerebbe la reputazione di Kim e del suo regime, sia all'esterno sia all'interno del Paese. Un altro grave rischio \u00e8 l'esposizione delle truppe dispiegate a informazioni sulla vita fuori dalla Corea del Nord, del tutto diversa dalla realt\u00e0 del loro Paese. Pi\u00f9 a lungo resteranno fuori, pi\u00f9 conosceranno il mondo esterno. Al loro ritorno, il muro informativo che circonda la Corea del Nord da decenni potrebbe crollare, destabilizzando il regime di Kim. <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"825\" height=\"550\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-5.png\" alt=\"Immagine di copertina\" class=\"wp-image-28555\" style=\"width:721px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-5.png 825w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-5-600x400.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-5-768x512.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/image-5-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 825px) 100vw, 825px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>In questa foto fornita dal governo nordcoreano, il leader nordcoreano Kim Jong Un, al centro, incontra soldati che hanno partecipato a un addestramento in Corea del Nord, il 13 marzo 2024. (Korean Central News Agency\/Korea News Service via AP, archivio)<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-russia-on-the-lookout-for-cannon-fodder\">Russia: alla ricerca di \u00abcarne da cannone\u00bb<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Despite some advancements, Russia hasn\u2019t been doing great on the frontline and has been running out of soldiers. Moscow adopted the war tactic that was meant to outnumber and overwhelm the opponent. Not extremely practical in the modern type of warfare, this strategy requires constant deployment of new troops and has cost Putin a lot of lives. In dire need of new soldiers, the Kremlin is trying its best to replenish the troops without having to resort to a new wave of mobilization. Russia\u2019s first and, for now, last attempt at mobilization during this war has destabilized the situation within the country and has caused reputational damage for Putin &#8211; something that is extremely sensitive for the Russian leader. The Russian government is now offering immense amounts of money to those who are willing to sign a contract with the Russian military. Moscow is also actively looking for volunteers from other friendly countries who are willing to exchange their lives for money. The deployment of North Korean troops to the frontline absolutely fits this pattern and is beneficial for Moscow as several thousand new soldiers are coming, not several hundred individuals or fewer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tuttavia, \u00e8 importante notare che circa 10.000 soldati non risolveranno certo il problema della Russia, che non ha rinunciato all\u2019obiettivo di conquistare Kyiv e ha gi\u00e0 sacrificato fin troppe vite in questa guerra. I soldati nordcoreani, inoltre, non sono addestrati come quelli russi e non parlano altra lingua oltre al coreano, perci\u00f2 farli combattere efficacemente rappresenter\u00e0 una sfida per le forze armate russe. Inoltre, come gi\u00e0 detto, se Putin paga Kim per ciascun soldato, il Cremlino ha aggiunto una nuova voce alle sue gi\u00e0 ingenti spese di guerra, mentre la situazione economica interna peggiora drasticamente. Per ora, il Cremlino \u00e8 anche vincolato al territorio in cui le truppe nordcoreane possono operare. Inviare soldati di un altro Paese nel territorio sovrano della Russia in base a un trattato di difesa reciproca \u00e8 una cosa, ma dispiegare nordcoreani nel territorio sovrano dell\u2019Ucraina significherebbe che Pyongyang diventerebbe ufficialmente parte del conflitto. Potrebbe trattarsi di un\u2019escalation estremamente pericolosa, dalla quale Mosca si \u00e8 finora astenuta ma di cui ha urgente bisogno.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-china-beyond-the-ambiguity\">Cina: oltre l'ambiguit\u00e0<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Although China &#8211; the most prominent ally of North Korea &#8211; has not been directly involved in the arrangement between Moscow and Pyongyang, it is of keen importance to understand where Beijing\u2019s interests lie as North Korea gets more heavily involved with the Kremlin. Since the start of the Russian invasion in 2022, Chinese official statements regarding the war have been extremely ambiguous. Beijing emphasized its desire for a peaceful solution and stressed the importance of respecting territorial integrity, but at the same time, it helped Putin avoid Western sanctions and didn\u2019t condemn Russian actions against Ukraine. China has also tried to distance itself from the new level of escalation that came with the defense agreement and deployment of North Korean troops by underlining that it is a matter between Moscow and Pyongyang. But the key question is: does Beijing favor this \u201cmatter\u201d?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If the Kremlin reaches success in its campaign against Ukraine, China might reap some benefits that will bring it closer to achieving its goals in the international arena. With the issue of Taiwan unsolved, Beijing hopes that Russian victory will show the \u201crogue island\u201d that Taipei doesn\u2019t stand a chance at winning the war. So, the only rational way would be to pursue peaceful unification &#8211; a scenario that China has been attempting to achieve for the last several decades. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Another reason why Beijing could be interested in the deployment of North Korean troops to the frontline is seeing the Western response: actions of already heavily sanctioned North Korea are challenging the norms of international law once again. The US and its allies have issued a joint statement condemning the military alliance of Russia and North Korea. Washington has also introduced additional sanctions against both Pyongyang and Moscow aiming at obstructing Kim\u2019s capability to help his friend in the Kremlin. Yet, as reports state that Pyongyang is getting ready to send new troops to the frontline despite heavy losses, it seems that the Western actions weren\u2019t enough to disrupt the alliance.&nbsp; If the West doesn\u2019t prove that it can contain Pyongyang and pressure it to abide by norms, it will signal that the US-led system is in dire need of amendment. This would perfectly play into the hand of Beijing which is interested in reforming the global world order.<strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La guerra in Ucraina distoglie inoltre l'attenzione dell'Occidente dal Pacifico e lo costringe a fornire armamenti a Kyiv: pi\u00f9 a lungo dura la guerra, pi\u00f9 risorse gli Stati Uniti e i loro alleati consumano in Ucraina. Se Pechino decidesse di prendere Taiwan con la forza, avrebbe bisogno di un Occidente il pi\u00f9 debole possibile; da questo punto di vista, l'escalation pu\u00f2 essere considerata vantaggiosa. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, despite the clear advantages of sending North Korean troops to war against Ukraine, there are also quite a few downsides for China. Beijing has highlighted its desire for peace for a reason &#8211; its economy heavily relies on international trade and thus stability on the global level. The Chinese economy is currently not at its finest, so Beijing is eager to avoid Western sanctions at all costs. Having one of its closest allies involved in Ukraine on the Russian side doesn\u2019t exactly help the case. Although Beijing prefers not to get in between the Moscow-Pyongyang alliance, the rapprochement of these two states should be worrying, at least for one reason: nuclear weapons. It has been handy for China to have under its full control a \u201cmad ally with nukes,\u201d but closer ties with Russia challenge Pyongyang\u2019s dependence on Beijing and offer it an opportunity to pursue a nuclear program without supervision from China. With the Kremlin\u2019s constant threats to nuke Ukraine or the West and North Korea\u2019s interest in destabilizing the situation in the international arena, specifically in the Pacific, this alliance might turn \u201cexplosive.\u201d This is extremely troubling for the whole world, including Beijing, which has made it very clear that it stands against any attempts at the use of nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\" id=\"h-conclusion\"><strong>Conclusione<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La cooperazione tra Russia e Corea del Nord \u00e8 cresciuta notevolmente negli ultimi anni, durante i quali Kim ha fornito assistenza militare alla sua controparte russa. Vladimir Putin \u00e8 passato dal sostenere il regime di sanzioni contro Pyongyang al firmare un trattato di difesa reciproca con la Corea del Nord. La decisione di Kim di inviare soldati nordcoreani in prima linea a sostegno delle forze russe sul campo ha portato l\u2019alleanza fra i due Stati a un livello nuovo e senza precedenti. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Per ora, il regime nordcoreano sta ricavando notevoli vantaggi dalla sua audace decisione. Ha ottenuto accesso non solo alle nuove tecnologie militari fornite dagli alleati russi, ma anche all\u2019opportunit\u00e0 di addestrare i propri soldati in condizioni reali di guerra moderna. Questa preziosa esperienza potrebbe rivelarsi utile qualora le tensioni nel Pacifico aumentassero. L\u2019alleanza con Putin offre inoltre a Pyongyang la possibilit\u00e0 di uscire dall\u2019isolamento internazionale e ampliare la propria influenza nel Pacifico.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il Cremlino cerca nuovi modi per reintegrare le proprie truppe sul campo di battaglia senza ricorrere alla mobilitazione dei russi, che comporta alti costi reputazionali. Nonostante questo beneficio di natura piuttosto temporanea, il dispiegamento di truppe nordcoreane aumenta le gi\u00e0 irragionevolmente elevate spese di guerra di Mosca, poich\u00e9 il regime di Kim chiede aiuti finanziari e tecnologici in cambio del proprio sostegno. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La Cina ha fatto del suo meglio per prendere le distanze dall'alleanza tra Putin e Kim; la sua reazione ufficiale \u00e8 stata del tutto ambigua. Ciononostante, questa nuova amicizia \u00e8 per Pechino tanto vantaggiosa quanto preoccupante. Se Mosca riuscisse a costringere Kyiv alla sottomissione, ci\u00f2 potrebbe favorire la Cina convincendo Taiwan ad accettare una riunificazione pacifica. Metterebbe inoltre in luce l'incapacit\u00e0 dell'Occidente di mantenere l'ordine internazionale. Al tempo stesso, Pyongyang potrebbe decidere di proseguire il proprio programma nucleare sotto la supervisione di Mosca, aumentando il rischio di un uso irresponsabile delle armi nucleari.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><strong><em>Avvertenza: i punti di vista, i pensieri e le opinioni espressi negli articoli pubblicati su questo sito appartengono esclusivamente agli autori e non riflettono necessariamente quelli del Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico, dei suoi comitati o delle organizzazioni a esso affiliate. Gli articoli intendono stimolare il dialogo e il dibattito e non rappresentano posizioni politiche ufficiali del Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico n\u00e9 di altre organizzazioni alle quali gli autori possano essere associati<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Questa pubblicazione \u00e8 stata realizzata con il sostegno dell'International Renaissance Foundation. Il suo contenuto \u00e8 di esclusiva responsabilit\u00e0 degli autori e non riflette necessariamente le opinioni dell'International Renaissance Foundation.<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Key Takeaways Since the Russian full-scale invasion, North Korea has been aiding its ally, the Kremlin, not only diplomatically by recognizing the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People&#8217;s Republics, brake-away Ukrainian regions, but also militarily by supplying ammunition and missiles to the sanctioned country. Over the course of the war, Pyongyang&#8217;s involvement with [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":28554,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[60,13],"tags":[],"topic":[85,84,86,92],"class_list":["post-28549","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-asiaen","category-en-analyses","topic-china","topic-russia","topic-ukraine","topic-war"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>North Korea\u2019s Role in Russia\u2019s War | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"North Korea\u2019s support for Russia brings financial compensation and military technology, strengthening its nuclear capabilities amid rising tensions.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, 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