{"id":26487,"date":"2024-11-07T09:53:00","date_gmt":"2024-11-07T07:53:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=26487"},"modified":"2025-08-05T13:12:47","modified_gmt":"2025-08-05T10:12:47","slug":"european-energy-policy-and-security-in-light-of-russias-war-in-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2024\/11\/07\/european-energy-policy-and-security-in-light-of-russias-war-in-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Politica energetica e sicurezza europee alla luce della guerra russa in Ucraina"},"content":{"rendered":"<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"45386\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"Scarica il PDF in inglese\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Scarica il PDF in inglese<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">2 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Punti chiave<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Dipendenza energetica dell\u2019UE dalla Russia:<\/strong>&nbsp;L\u2019UE rimane vulnerabile a causa della sua dipendenza dai combustibili fossili russi, che finanziano la guerra in corso in Ucraina. Raggiungere una piena indipendenza energetica dalla Russia \u00e8 cruciale per la sicurezza europea.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Progressi nella diversificazione energetica:<\/strong>&nbsp;L\u2019UE ha cambiato posizione, riducendo l\u2019uso di gas e formando nuovi partenariati con gli Stati Uniti, la Norvegia e il Qatar. Tuttavia, il completo distacco dall\u2019energia russa, in particolare dal GNL, rimane lento e complesso.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Transizione verde come strategia:&nbsp;<\/strong>La transizione verde \u00e8 considerata essenziale sia per gli obiettivi climatici sia per la sicurezza energetica. Tuttavia, nuove dipendenze da minerali critici provenienti da regioni instabili comportano rischi emergenti.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Potenziale ruolo dell\u2019Ucraina:<\/strong>&nbsp;La capacit\u00e0 di stoccaggio del gas e le riserve di litio dell\u2019Ucraina offrono opportunit\u00e0 strategiche per la sicurezza energetica dell\u2019UE, ma i rischi per le infrastrutture e le sfide geopolitiche limitano i benefici immediati.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Urgenza di agire:<\/strong>&nbsp;La continua dipendenza dall\u2019energia russa indebolisce il sostegno occidentale all\u2019Ucraina. L\u2019UE deve accelerare la transizione alle fonti rinnovabili e garantirsi partner affidabili per assicurare l\u2019indipendenza energetica e una pi\u00f9 ampia stabilit\u00e0 geopolitica.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1240\" height=\"507\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-26488\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image.png 1240w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-600x245.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-1024x419.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-768x314.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-18x7.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1240px) 100vw, 1240px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia has been waging a full-scale war against Ukraine for three years now. The democratic states of the West are united in their support of Ukraine, providing various types of aid. While unprecedented sanctions were imposed on Russia, energy remains the weak spot of the EU due to its dependence on Russia\u2019s energy supplies. It is not yet clear how quickly its members will be able to disconnect from it. Thus, the energy trade that some EU countries continue to engage in huge volumes still finances Russia&#8217;s military machine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As analysts aptly note, aid to Ukraine is not charity. The Russian invasion and the subsequent courageous resistance of the Ukrainian people were a watershed moment for the transatlantic security architecture, demonstrating the value and importance of Ukraine to Europe. So, refusal from Russian energy carriers is also neither an act of charity nor a noble gesture. Therefore, this article will consider the EU&#8217;s sharp shift in its stance towards Russia as an energy supplier in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. It will explore the challenges the European Union faces in reducing its dependency on Russia, as well as the EU&#8217;s green transition and the potential role of Ukraine in contributing to Europe&#8217;s energy security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Evoluzione della posizione dell\u2019UE sui combustibili fossili russi<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Trade in energy carriers used to be one of the points of relations between the EU and Russia. For many years, Russia has been the main supplier of oil and gas to the European Union. In addition to this EU-Russia energy trade included coal and nuclear materials. At first, this cooperation was considered by the European side as quite convenient and profitable. Geographical proximity, existing infrastructure, and Russia&#8217;s ability to export large quantities were the most important reasons why the Russian Federation seemed to be the best partner. In 2021, Russia supplied more than 45,3% of the EU&#8217;s gas consumption. Additionally, Russia was responsible for 27% and 46% of the imports of both oil and coal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Immediatamente dopo l\u2019inizio della guerra russo-ucraina su vasta scala, la maggior parte degli eurodeputati ha convenuto che l\u2019UE dovesse rafforzare rapidamente la propria autonomia strategica nella difesa e nell\u2019energia. Hanno sostenuto la diversificazione degli acquisti energetici e gli investimenti nelle energie rinnovabili. \u00c8 stato infine riconosciuto che l\u2019invasione illegale e non provocata dell\u2019Ucraina da parte della Russia non era solo un attacco all\u2019integrit\u00e0 territoriale del Paese, ma anche un grave rischio per la sicurezza e la stabilit\u00e0 dell\u2019intera Europa. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It appeared that after several decades of close cooperation and turning a blind eye to Russia&#8217;s ever-increasing decline into an undemocratic, authoritarian, and aggressive regime, the EU and its leaders have come to an epiphany. The war showed that the EU&#8217;s belief that economic interdependence would have a positive effect on the regime in Russia was deeply mistaken. Russia&#8217;s massive invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the risks of relying on a single supplier of fossil fuels. Since the spring of 2022, Russia has used the stoppage of gas supplies to its European consumers as a means of blackmail, attempting to force them into changing their policy towards Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u20198 marzo 2022, la Commissione europea ha pubblicato la strategia REPowerEU, volta a ridurre quanto pi\u00f9 rapidamente possibile la dipendenza dai combustibili fossili russi. Attraverso i negoziati, gli Stati membri hanno raggiunto un consenso su una riduzione del 15% dell\u2019uso di gas naturale. Da agosto 2022 a gennaio 2023, l\u2019UE \u00e8 riuscita a fare di pi\u00f9: l\u2019Unione ha ridotto l\u2019uso di gas del 19%. In seguito, gli Stati membri hanno avviato negoziati pi\u00f9 lunghi e difficili sulle sanzioni al petrolio russo.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"804\" height=\"447\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-3.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-26491\" style=\"width:754px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-3.png 804w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-3-600x334.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-3-768x427.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-3-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 804px) 100vw, 804px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In 2023, the US and Norway became the top gas suppliers to the EU. Nearly 30% of all the&nbsp;EU\u2019s gas imports came from Norway. Qatar, the UK, and countries in North Africa are further providers. This exploration has the potential to have negative impacts that include physical disruption of environments important for marine biodiversity and pollution. Nevertheless, in the near future, increased attention is expected to be paid to hydrocarbon production in this area. Moreover, in 2022, Norway decided to extend coal mining in Svalbard until 2025, as the Norwegian Minister of Industry stated that coal is used for steel production in Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Quando problemi nuovi e vecchi si sommano<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As of 2022, EU members found themselves in very different conditions regarding the energy situation. Dependence varied greatly, which started to create and still creates problems for the EU. Unfortunately, despite the quick reaction, the actions of the EU were not so immediate. The complete elimination of the EU&#8217;s dependence on Russian oil and natural gas is a long-term goal for the EU. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table aligncenter\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><tbody><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Non dipendenti<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Dipendenti in una certa misura<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Dipendenti in larga o totale misura<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Belgio, Francia, Portogallo, Slovenia, Spagna, Svezia<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Italia, Germania, Grecia, Finlandia, Romania, Polonia e Lituania<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Bulgaria, Repubblica Ceca, Ungheria, Lettonia, Slovacchia<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Il grado di dipendenza dei Paesi dalle risorse naturali (soprattutto dal gas naturale) della Russia<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nel 2023, il gas russo ha rappresentato il 15% del totale del gas acquistato dall\u2019UE, un vero traguardo rispetto agli indicatori precedenti. Allo stesso tempo, nel maggio 2024 l\u2019UE era il quarto maggiore acquirente di combustibili fossili russi, assorbendo il 13% (\u20ac1,9 miliardi) di tutte le esportazioni russe di gas. Il gas via gasdotto costituiva la quota pi\u00f9 ampia degli acquisti di combustibili fossili dell\u2019UE in Russia (45%), seguito dal GNL (27%) e dal petrolio greggio via oleodotto (22%). I tre maggiori acquirenti di fonti energetiche russe erano Ungheria, Slovacchia e Repubblica Ceca (petrolio greggio e gas via gasdotto). L\u2019UE ha continuato a importare e rivendere GNL russo, trasportato via nave cisterna in forma liquida superraffreddata. Questa situazione \u00e8 divenuta un notevole imbarazzo per il blocco. Spagna, Francia e Belgio sono stati i maggiori acquirenti di GNL russo nell\u2019ultimo anno.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il Paese ampiamente riconosciuto come responsabile dell\u2019inizio della guerra in Europa e percepito come la maggiore minaccia per il continente continua a ricevere un sostanziale sostegno finanziario da diverse nazioni europee. Dall\u2019inizio della guerra russo-ucraina su vasta scala, la spesa della Repubblica Ceca per petrolio e gas russi \u00e8 stata cinque volte superiore ai suoi aiuti finanziari all\u2019Ucraina. Il diagramma mostra il confronto tra alcuni Paesi.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"784\" height=\"475\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-9.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-26531\" style=\"width:646px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-9.png 784w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-9-600x364.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-9-768x465.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-9-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 784px) 100vw, 784px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>In miliardi (dall\u2019inizio della guerra su vasta scala fino a circa aprile 2024, Repubblica Ceca: fino a settembre).<\/em><br><em> Realizzato dall\u2019autore. Fonti: CREA, Politico, Kiel Institute for the World Economy<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In molti casi, la dipendenza economica, in particolare quella energetica, genera dipendenza politica. Ci\u00f2, a sua volta, pu\u00f2 mettere in pericolo il sistema politico o accelerarne lo scivolamento verso forme illiberali e antidemocratiche. Di conseguenza, questi Paesi diventano centri di promozione di narrazioni e influenze filorusse, minano l\u2019unit\u00e0 politica dell\u2019UE e creano ulteriori problemi interni. Paesi come l\u2019Ungheria e la Slovacchia, pur continuando ad acquistare combustibili russi, promuovono ostinatamente anche a livello dell\u2019UE la retorica del ripristino dei legami economici con la Federazione Russa, ritenendola la scelta migliore per l\u2019UE.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Questa situazione \u00e8 stata possibile perch\u00e9 ai Paesi dell\u2019Europa centrale senza sbocco sul mare, come Ungheria, Slovacchia e Repubblica Ceca, \u00e8 stato concesso il diritto di continuare a importare risorse energetiche russe. Mentre la Bulgaria ha vietato l\u2019importazione di petrolio russo nonostante la sua esenzione dalle sanzioni UE, i tre Paesi sopra menzionati stanno solo aumentando tali forniture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In seguito all\u2019aggressione russa, diversi Stati fortemente dipendenti dal petrolio e dal gas russi si sono opposti alle sanzioni energetiche, mentre gli Stati membri meno dipendenti hanno chiesto un abbandono immediato e rapido delle fonti russe. Le sanzioni hanno riguardato l\u2019energia per la prima volta soltanto nel quinto pacchetto, adottato nell\u2019aprile 2022, che ha introdotto un embargo sul carbone russo; un embargo parziale sul petrolio \u00e8 stato poi introdotto con il sesto pacchetto nel giugno 2022, con significative esenzioni per alcuni Stati membri, mentre un accordo sul tetto al prezzo del petrolio \u00e8 stato raggiunto solo nell\u2019ottavo pacchetto, adottato nell\u2019ottobre 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Despite efforts made by the EU to reduce dependence on Russian gas, some countries continue to receive significant volumes indirectly. Austria&#8217;s pipeline imports from Russia increased to 98%, while Russian gas is being routed through Azerbaijan and Turkey to meet EU demands. Deals with Azerbaijan entail infrastructure that is partly held by Lukoil in Russia, and the country itself depends more on imports from Russia to meet its own needs. The gas deals that Romania and Hungary have with Turkey most likely involve Russian gas. Furthermore, a few nations, including France and Austria, have long-term agreements with Russian energy suppliers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the end, the first sanctions on Russian gas were approved by the EU only in June 2024. However, even after that, the majority of Russia\u2019s liquid natural gas (LNG) exports to the EU remain unaffected by the sanctions. Instead, the measures prohibit EU ports from reselling Russian LNG upon arrival and obstruct funding for Russia&#8217;s proposed LNG installations in the Arctic and Baltic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">La transizione verde \u00e8 una soluzione?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In recent decades, the energy transition, which is characterized by a shift from fossil fuels to renewable and low-carbon energy sources, has become an important climate change mitigation strategy. The European Climate Law sets objectives of meeting the 2050 climate neutrality objective and a 55% reduction of net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2030. The war showed not only that the EU and European countries need to choose reliable partners for the provision of strategically important resources. It showed that climate neutrality by 2050 is both a necessity to slow down climate change and a thorough way to ensure&nbsp;the security of the EU. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La sicurezza e la sovranit\u00e0 energetiche dei Paesi sono rafforzate dalla transizione energetica. L\u2019UE e i suoi Stati membri hanno gi\u00e0 ampliato l\u2019uso delle fonti rinnovabili, aumentato l\u2019efficienza energetica e adottato tecnologie pulite, e ora devono proteggere e consolidare questi risultati. Al tempo stesso, in quest\u2019ambito l\u2019UE presenta anche alcuni potenziali problemi che devono essere risolti o prevenuti rapidamente. <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"798\" height=\"600\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-5.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-26493\" style=\"width:686px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-5.png 798w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-5-600x451.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-5-768x577.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-5-16x12.png 16w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 798px) 100vw, 798px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Alla luce dell\u2019esperienza con la Federazione Russa, l\u2019UE dovrebbe prestare grande attenzione nella scelta dei partner per la fornitura di prodotti tanto importanti. La dipendenza dai Paesi fornitori di combustibili fossili pu\u00f2 trasformarsi in dipendenza dai Paesi che forniscono le risorse necessarie per l\u2019energia verde, in particolare le terre rare. Molti Paesi possiedono grandi riserve minerarie, strategicamente importanti per l\u2019industria europea. L\u2019UE ha instaurato partenariati con Argentina, Australia, Canada, Cile, Repubblica Democratica del Congo, Groenlandia, Kazakistan, Namibia, Norvegia, Ruanda, Serbia, Ucraina e Zambia. Osservando il grafico sottostante, possiamo rilevare una forte dipendenza dell\u2019UE da partner che potrebbero essere colpiti da conflitti o coinvolti in guerre commerciali, in primo luogo Cina, Congo o Turchia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A causa della crescente necessit\u00e0 della transizione verde, la domanda di minerali essenziali da parte dei principali attori globali, come la Cina, cresce a un ritmo vertiginoso. Esempi emblematici di questa corsa sono la contesa per il Cile e quella per la Groenlandia. Nel luglio 2023, l\u2019UE e il Cile hanno firmato un memorandum d\u2019intesa sui materiali critici e sulle catene di approvvigionamento, volto a rafforzare la cooperazione. A dicembre, le due parti hanno raggiunto un\u2019intesa su un accordo di associazione modernizzato. Il Cile \u00e8 un partner molto interessante per l\u2019UE per molte ragioni. \u00c8 una democrazia liberale fermamente aderente al multilateralismo, ai diritti umani e al diritto internazionale. Inoltre, aspira con decisione a diventare un\u2019economia a zero emissioni di carbonio.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nel novembre 2023, l\u2019UE ha stretto un partenariato con la Groenlandia sulle materie prime critiche e ha anche aperto un nuovo ufficio nella capitale groenlandese. M\u00fate Bourup Egede, primo ministro della Groenlandia, e la presidente della Commissione europea Ursula von der Leyen hanno firmato due accordi. Uno riguarda gli investimenti nelle catene del valore per l\u2019energia rinnovabile e le materie prime critiche, per i quali sono stati stanziati 22 milioni di euro. Il secondo accordo riguarda la cooperazione e gli investimenti nell\u2019istruzione, per cui l\u2019UE fornisce 71 milioni di euro. L\u2019interesse dell\u2019UE per la Groenlandia, come ha mostrato il discorso di Ursula von der Leyen, ha due motivazioni: la Groenlandia possiede materie prime molto richieste e occupa una posizione geostrategicamente importante.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"679\" height=\"791\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-6.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-26494\" style=\"width:495px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-6.png 679w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-6-515x600.png 515w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-6-10x12.png 10w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 679px) 100vw, 679px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Principali fonti di energia nei Paesi europei <\/em><br><em>(novembre 2021 \u2013 novembre 2022)<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Another reliable and almost ideal partner in the EU&#8217;s green transition could be Norway. In Norway, 98% of electricity is produced from renewable energy sources, and the source of most of it at the moment is hydropower. In general, the situation with this country is particularly interesting since it is now the world&#8217;s fifth oil exporter and the world&#8217;s third natural gas exporter. As mentioned earlier, it is currently the leading supplier of gas and oil to the EU. However, with a huge potential to increase, it aims to become a green power plant for the EU. This country is a pioneer in carbon capture and storage research and is also investing in battery manufacturing, hydrogen and pure ammonia projects, and renewable energy technologies such as offshore wind and solar panels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Vale la pena menzionare anche altri problemi che l\u2019UE affronta nel percorso verso l\u2019azzeramento delle emissioni di carbonio. Naturalmente, ogni Paese membro presenta una diversa composizione delle fonti usate per produrre elettricit\u00e0. In particolare, la fonte principale per Ungheria, Italia, Paesi Bassi e Slovacchia \u00e8 il gas; per Polonia, Repubblica Ceca ed Estonia, i combustibili solidi; per la Francia, il nucleare; le fonti rinnovabili detengono invece la quota maggiore in Svezia, Danimarca, Finlandia e Lettonia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Member states started to re-evaluate their energy policies in order to find domestic reserves that would allow them to improve their own energy security. While some countries focused on doubling down on renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, and other measures with the potential to reduce the share of fossil fuels in the EU&#8217;s energy mix, several member states, being in a critical situation, had no other choice but to choose coal as a suitable solution. For example, Germany restored a significant capacity of coal-fired electricity generation. Austria, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands also started considering coal as a crucial energy security element<strong>.&nbsp; <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">EU countries with substantial fossil fuel reserves should not be allowed to rely on these resources indefinitely under the assumption that it ensures their energy independence and security. This creates the risk that some countries would begin not to diversify their energy sources but just replace them with similar or even greater polluters of the atmosphere. It can become a reality for Poland, where in 2022, thanks to domestic reserves, 70% of electricity was generated from coal, and the conservative government was clearly not very ambitious about the transition. However, in the first seven months of 2024, this country demonstrated very positive results. Thanks to the arrival of the new government of Donald Tusk, the situation began to change rapidly, and in July, the share of coal reached a monthly minimum of 53%. It is interesting how the situation with electricity in this country will develop in the future, as the previous administration&#8217;s procrastination on climate action will definitely complicate matters. In addition, the Polish energy and climate research group Forum Energii recently disheartened that the country&#8217;s energy transition is still largely driven by market forces and reforms that remove barriers to clean energy developers rather than a concerted push from the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Following the adoption of the Climate Law and most of the \u2018fit for 55\u2019 legislative revisions, member states had to update their national energy and climate plans. The 2030 EU Climate Law target is binding at the EU level. Its achievement, however, depends on the success of plans and measures at the national level across a range of policy areas. And here, accordingly, another problem arises \u2013 the pace of the green transition in all countries is very different; for example,&nbsp;the countries of Eastern Europe have much lower indicators compared to the successes of Northern or Western ones. Accordingly, the EU should provide assistance to these countries that would facilitate the transition and significantly improve the overall performance of the EU. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At the same time, there were also some misunderstandings between major European countries over energy sources. Particularly, tensions between France and Germany over nuclear power. Currently, approximately 70% of France&#8217;s electricity is generated from nuclear power, and under Emmanuel Macron&#8217;s plan, it will only increase. While in Germany, this source of electricity was completely banned and still causes a lot of opposition. Additional challenges may be caused by the fact that the new European Parliament elected in 2024 is less \u201cgreen\u201d compared to the previous one, as the Green Party received 53 seats compared to the previous 70. Additionally, a lack of coordination at the EU level resulted in most agreements with new energy partners being negotiated independently by member states. As a result, some contracts for fossil fuel supplies extend until 2050 or beyond, contradicting the EU Green Deal&#8217;s objective of achieving carbon neutrality by that time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Inoltre, la diplomazia ambientale e quella climatica costituiscono strumenti essenziali di soft power e svolgono un ruolo fondamentale nel plasmare l\u2019immagine e l\u2019influenza dell\u2019UE. L\u2019integrazione europea, iniziata negli anni Cinquanta concentrandosi sul carbone e sull\u2019industria pesante per prevenire guerre tra le principali potenze europee, sembra ora chiudere il cerchio. Puntando a diventare il primo continente verde entro il 2050, l\u2019Europa conseguir\u00e0 l\u2019indipendenza energetica e rafforzer\u00e0 nuovamente la propria sicurezza. Questa trasformazione rappresenterebbe dunque un\u2019evoluzione profonda e simbolica. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Potenziale ruolo dell\u2019Ucraina<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Addressing the current situation in the EU and its members&#8217; gas needs, Ukraine has the potential to play a significant role in enhancing Europe\u2019s energy security. Ukraine&#8217;s position offers an opportunity to help Europe reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies. With the largest underground gas storage facilities in Europe, Ukraine even provided valuable storage capacity for EU companies last year. Currently, Europe&#8217;s gas storage facilities are over 90% full. \u201cWe can offer our partners enough free space in Ukrainian storage facilities to store their gas,\u201d stated Oleksii Chernyshov, CEO of NJSC Naftogaz. However, the ongoing shelling of Ukrainian territory by Russia raises concerns among European partners regarding the reliability of this option. Ukraine, nevertheless, emphasizes its capacity to provide storage while stressing the need for additional measures to protect its energy infrastructure from attacks and to strengthen air defense systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Ucraina possiede inoltre significative riserve di litio, un metallo fondamentale per la transizione verde, pari, secondo le stime, fino al 10% delle riserve mondiali. Tuttavia, permangono delle sfide. I giacimenti di litio sono situati principalmente nell\u2019Ucraina orientale, alcuni in aree attualmente occupate dalla Russia. Inoltre, a causa della natura peculiare dei giacimenti di litio ucraini e dell\u2019assenza, a livello mondiale, di tecnologie per estrarre il litio da minerali analoghi, nel breve termine l\u2019Ucraina non sar\u00e0 in grado di produrre derivati del litio n\u00e9 di vendere concentrato minerale. Ciononostante, nel lungo periodo queste riserve acquisiranno probabilmente una notevole importanza strategica.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\"><strong>Conclusione<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La presenza persistente di combustibili fossili russi nell\u2019Unione europea costituisce un ostacolo rilevante sia all\u2019indipendenza energetica sia alla stabilit\u00e0 geopolitica. Mentre l\u2019UE affronta le ripercussioni della guerra in Europa, recidere i legami con i fornitori energetici russi di lunga data resta complesso. Decenni di dipendenza non si possono superare dall\u2019oggi al domani. Per affrontare il problema, l\u2019UE punta a migliorare l\u2019efficienza energetica, aumentare gli investimenti nelle energie rinnovabili e diversificare le proprie fonti energetiche rivolgendosi all\u2019Africa occidentale, all\u2019Asia centrale, agli Stati Uniti e alla Norvegia. Sebbene siano stati compiuti progressi, occorrono ulteriori sforzi per eliminare completamente le forniture energetiche russe dalla catena di approvvigionamento dell\u2019UE.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Additionally, the continued purchase of Russian fossil fuels directly finances the conflict in Ukraine, diminishing the impact of Western aid. This makes urgent and decisive action essential. The green transition offers the only long-term solution, and its success depends on the EU\u2019s ability to secure reliable new partners. Accelerating this transition will not only enhance Europe&#8217;s energy security but also contribute to broader geopolitical stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><strong><em>Avvertenza: i punti di vista, i pensieri e le opinioni espressi negli articoli pubblicati su questo sito appartengono esclusivamente agli autori e non riflettono necessariamente quelli del Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico, dei suoi comitati o delle organizzazioni a esso affiliate. Gli articoli intendono stimolare il dialogo e il dibattito e non rappresentano posizioni politiche ufficiali del Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico n\u00e9 di altre organizzazioni alle quali gli autori possano essere associati<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Key Takeaways Russia has been waging a full-scale war against Ukraine for three years now. The democratic states of the West are united in their support of Ukraine, providing various types of aid. While unprecedented sanctions were imposed on Russia, energy remains the weak spot of the EU due to its dependence on Russia\u2019s energy [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":26489,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13,58],"tags":[],"topic":[97,91,84],"class_list":["post-26487","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","category-eng-western-europe","topic-energy","topic-eu","topic-russia"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>European Energy Policy and Security in Light of Russia\u2019s War in Ukraine - Transatlantic Dialogue Center<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Explore the EU\u2019s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy, the role of Ukraine\u2019s resources, and the urgent need for a green transition to ensure energy security.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2024\/11\/07\/european-energy-policy-and-security-in-light-of-russias-war-in-ukraine\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"it_IT\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"European Energy Policy and Security in Light of Russia\u2019s War in Ukraine\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center (TDC) is a non-governmental and non-partisan think tank that provides high-quality policy advice to private and public clients. 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