{"id":20732,"date":"2023-11-16T10:00:00","date_gmt":"2023-11-16T08:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=20732"},"modified":"2025-08-05T13:27:30","modified_gmt":"2025-08-05T10:27:30","slug":"a-saga-of-the-black-sea-grain-initiative","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2023\/11\/16\/a-saga-of-the-black-sea-grain-initiative\/","title":{"rendered":"La saga dell\u2019Iniziativa sui cereali del Mar Nero"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"39342\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Attendere, per favore\u2026\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"Scarica il PDF in inglese\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Scarica il PDF in inglese<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">2 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-key-takeaways\">Punti chiave<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Rilevanza strategica<\/strong>: The Black Sea Grain Initiative&#8217;s suspension underscores the strategic importance of Ukrainian grain exports in the global market. The suspension has caused significant economic implications, not just for Ukraine but for the global market, intensifying inflationary pressures and affecting commodity trade.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Impatto umanitario<\/strong>: The halt of grain exports from one of the world&#8217;s largest producers has exacerbated the global food crisis, particularly affecting countries dependent on UN food programs.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Manovre russe<\/strong>: Russia&#8217;s involvement in the suspension reveals a calculated use of grain export dynamics to pursue its own interests, influencing global grain prices and leveraging its position in the war.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Resilienza ucraina<\/strong>: Despite the suspension, Ukraine&#8217;s exploration of alternative routes and temporary solutions showcases its resilience and determination to maintain its role in the global grain market.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Prospettive future<\/strong>: Sebbene le prospettive di rilanciare l\u2019accordo originario restino incerte, continua la ricerca di alternative praticabili, a testimonianza della natura dinamica dell\u2019attuale panorama geopolitico.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Implicazioni pi\u00f9 ampie<\/strong>: La situazione ricorda l\u2019interconnessione dei sistemi globali, in cui i conflitti regionali possono avere effetti di vasta portata sulla sicurezza alimentare e sulle relazioni internazionali.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1244\" height=\"431\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20734\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8.png 1244w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8-600x208.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8-1024x355.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8-768x266.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8-18x6.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1244px) 100vw, 1244px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dall\u2019impennata dei prezzi del petrolio alla crisi migratoria, la guerra in Ucraina ha causato gravi sconvolgimenti in numerosi ambiti in tutto il mondo. Gradualmente, la comunit\u00e0 internazionale sta trovando modi per limitare l\u2019impatto dei fattori negativi sulla stabilit\u00e0 globale. Tuttavia, una realt\u00e0 in continuo mutamento rende difficile individuare soluzioni pi\u00f9 o meno durature. Di conseguenza, vediamo iniziative gi\u00e0 approvate arenarsi, a distanza di qualche mese, di fronte a nuove circostanze, riportando la questione sul tavolo. Tra questi temi urgenti vi sono le esportazioni ucraine di cereali. A giugno la Russia si \u00e8 ritirata dall\u2019Iniziativa sui cereali del Mar Nero, ponendo cos\u00ec fine all\u2019accordo in vigore da un anno. Da allora si sono svolte consultazioni per esaminare e valutare le opzioni disponibili. Abbiamo deciso di analizzare il funzionamento dell\u2019iniziativa per valutare le prospettive di una sua ripresa, in una forma o nell\u2019altra. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-footnote-the-grain-market-nbsp\"><strong>Nota: il mercato dei cereali&nbsp; <\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Let&#8217;s take a quick look at the trends of the grain market before and after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Two groups of commodities are usually considered in this regard: grains themselves and fertilizers. Grains play an important role in the food market stability because they are at the center of all price chains. According to the FAO, it is their shortage that caused the greatest levels of acute food insecurity in 2019-2020. Among many aspects that influence pricing in this area, fertilizers play a decisive role. The fact that in many least-developed countries imports of fertilizers prevail over production leads to greater market volatility. The prices of grains and fertilizers have already surged before 2022 as a result of the pandemic effects. The situation has been worsened by the extremes of climate change, as low production levels resulting from floods and droughts have mostly affected the countries experiencing acute food insecurity. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Both Russia and Ukraine are among the top 10 exporters of crops, with Russia being the main exporter of wheat (with a share of around 14% of global exports) and Ukraine being the main exporter of sunflower oil (with a share of around 40% of global exports). Russia is also the biggest exporter of fertilizers, with gas ammonia among the top 5 related export items. Russia is a world leader in ammonia exports, and this gas constitutes an important share of Russia&#8217;s agricultural revenues, being the 4th most important fertilizer. The key infrastructure for ammonia transportation is the Togliatti-Odesa pipeline, the world&#8217;s longest ammonia pipeline. It stopped working after the start of the war. The launch of war has determined the overall challenges that the world food market will have to face in the coming years. While Ukraine is unable to harvest crops at the pre-war level and maintain stable grain supplies, Russia faces limitations on its exports. To tackle the problems, a mutually acceptable bargain had to be made.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1048\" height=\"590\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20735\" style=\"width:666px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9.png 1048w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9-1024x576.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1048px) 100vw, 1048px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-brief-history-of-the-grain-deal\"><strong>Breve storia dell\u2019accordo sui cereali<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All\u2019inizio della guerra, dopo pesanti bombardamenti sulle citt\u00e0 ucraine, feroci ostilit\u00e0 e ore di negoziati, l\u2019accordo sui cereali sembr\u00f2 una delle prime svolte dopo il 24 febbraio. L\u2019idea era creare un corridoio marittimo umanitario \u00abper facilitare la navigazione sicura ai fini dell\u2019esportazione di cereali e relativi prodotti alimentari e fertilizzanti\u00bb, e cos\u00ec contenere i prezzi alimentari mondiali. Sebbene il compito principale \u2014 attivare le esportazioni \u2014 fosse lo stesso per tutte le parti coinvolte nei negoziati, vanno rilevate divergenze fondamentali nelle rispettive posizioni.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Ucraina.<\/strong> L\u2019Ucraina era pronta ad attuare l\u2019idea, poich\u00e9 ulteriori ostacoli al commercio dei cereali avrebbero distrutto l\u2019economia ucraina. Prima della guerra, l\u2019esportazione di cereali era una delle pi\u00f9 importanti fonti di entrate in valuta estera per il bilancio statale. Poich\u00e9 il peso dell\u2019agricoltura sul PIL dell\u2019Ucraina \u00e8 il pi\u00f9 alto tra tutti i settori economici (oltre il 10%), la riduzione delle esportazioni di cereali comporta gravi conseguenze: l\u2019impossibilit\u00e0 di esportare i raccolti potrebbe infatti provocare un crollo dei prezzi interni. Gli attacchi russi hanno inciso anche sulla disponibilit\u00e0 delle compagnie assicurative straniere a collaborare. Per ridurre i rischi erano state richieste garanzie alla Russia. Tuttavia, alcuni timori rendevano difficile far avanzare i negoziati. Kyiv si opponeva fermamente allo sminamento dei propri porti, poich\u00e9 si riteneva che, senza garanzie sufficienti, la Russia avrebbe potuto sfruttare questo fianco esposto per attaccare l\u2019Ucraina dal mare. Un\u2019altra questione controversa era la volont\u00e0 della Russia di assicurare la presenza di osservatori russi nei porti ucraini. Ci\u00f2 avrebbe potuto comportare attivit\u00e0 di spionaggio e sabotaggio<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>L\u2019ONU.<\/strong> Dopo l\u2019inizio della guerra, gli organismi e le agenzie dell\u2019ONU esaminarono diverse soluzioni per mitigare la crisi. Tuttavia, la convinzione fondamentale del segretario generale Ant\u00f3nio Guterres in quel momento era di agire senza forzare la mano. In seguito, dopo la conclusione dell\u2019accordo, Guterres avrebbe scritto su Twitter: \u00abL\u2019iniziativa dimostra l\u2019importanza di una diplomazia discreta nel trovare soluzioni multilaterali\u00bb. Il motivo di questo approccio delicato alla questione era il ruolo cruciale dei contributi russi e ucraini ai programmi di sicurezza alimentare dell\u2019ONU. Pertanto, uno dei compiti prioritari dell\u2019ONU dall\u2019inizio della guerra \u00e8 diventato il mantenimento, da parte di entrambe le parti, di un sostegno continuo alle operazioni umanitarie nei Paesi con maggiore insicurezza alimentare<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Turchia.<\/strong> As for Turkey, the establishment of the route posed an opportunity to once again present itself as a separate leading power in the region. For some years Ankara tried to distance itself from the West. The possibility to act as one of the key mediators between Ukraine and Russia could enhance the country&#8217;s image and allow maneuvers (e.g., to evade sanctions). That\u2019s why Turkey became a crucial advocate of the agreement. It also explains why Turkey is so desperate to revive the work of the corridor as it was (including Russia as a party to the document).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Russia.<\/strong> La Russia fu il primo Paese visitato da Guterres per proporre l\u2019idea di un corridoio umanitario. Ottenere il consenso di Putin era essenziale affinch\u00e9 l\u2019accordo fosse firmato sia da Mosca sia da Kyiv. Fin dall\u2019inizio, la Russia si dichiar\u00f2 favorevole all\u2019intesa purch\u00e9 fossero soddisfatte determinate condizioni. La posizione russa durante i negoziati \u00e8 esaminata nella sezione successiva dell\u2019articolo. <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"503\" height=\"343\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-10.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20736\" style=\"width:415px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-10.png 503w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-10-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 503px) 100vw, 503px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Gli ispettori dell\u2019ONU effettuano un\u2019ispezione per il Centro di coordinamento congiunto<\/em><br><em> (JCC). Fonte: ONU<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the end, the Grain Deal Initiative was the result of third parties&#8217; efforts. The initiative took the form of two separate agreements (Ukraine\/Turkey\/UN and Russia\/Turkey\/UN). The parties refused to view a temporary truce and demining of selected ports as conditions. Instead, the Joint Coordination Centre (comprising representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey) was established in Istanbul to monitor the cargo routes and conduct inspections<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019accordo concluso presentava alcuni vincoli. A causa dei costanti bombardamenti russi, la gamma dei porti disponibili era limitata a sole 3 citt\u00e0 dell\u2019oblast\u2019 di Odesa (Odesa, Chornomorsk, Yuzhne), escludendo Mykolaiv, il secondo porto marittimo ucraino per grandezza. Le proposte dell\u2019Ucraina di aggiungere Mykolaiv all\u2019iniziativa incontrarono la riluttanza della Russia. Inoltre, l\u2019accordo non prevedeva un meccanismo di applicazione e si basava sulla parola d\u2019onore (rendendo l\u2019attuazione del trattato essenzialmente dipendente dalle decisioni russe). L\u2019accordo fu quindi considerato provvisorio. Per sottolineare il proprio potere di violarlo in qualsiasi momento, la Russia attacc\u00f2 le infrastrutture portuali di Odesa il giorno successivo alla firma dell\u2019accordo<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-\"><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Iniziativa sui cereali del Mar Nero era concepita per essere reciprocamente vantaggiosa. Sebbene l\u2019attenzione principale sia di solito posta sui benefici per l\u2019Ucraina, non si devono trascurare i profitti, sia materiali sia immateriali, ottenuti dalla Russia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sul piano dell\u2019immagine, l\u2019accordo rafforz\u00f2 la percezione positiva della Russia, soprattutto tra i Paesi in via di sviluppo. Inizialmente, la Russia present\u00f2 l\u2019Iniziativa del Mar Nero come una propria concessione, per cos\u00ec dire un gesto di buona volont\u00e0. Questa interpretazione permise a Mosca di rendere pi\u00f9 credibili le proprie dichiarazioni di preoccupazione per il benessere degli Stati con maggiore insicurezza alimentare. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Inoltre, il periodo di validit\u00e0 del documento consentiva di tenere l\u2019Ucraina, per cos\u00ec dire, al guinzaglio, alimentando l\u2019instabilit\u00e0 delle sue esportazioni di cereali. Un altro vantaggio derivava dall\u2019effettiva concorrenza tra Russia e Ucraina, tipica del periodo precedente alla guerra. La partecipazione alle ispezioni delle navi permise a Mosca di rallentare le esportazioni ucraine e, nel contempo, di occupare con il proprio grano gli spazi lasciati liberi nei principali mercati lontani<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"874\" height=\"492\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-11.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20737\" style=\"width:670px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-11.png 874w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-11-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-11-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-11-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 874px) 100vw, 874px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Inoltre, lo stesso giorno in cui fu conclusa l\u2019Iniziativa sui cereali, la Russia firm\u00f2 un Memorandum d\u2019intesa con il Segretariato delle Nazioni Unite sulla promozione dei prodotti alimentari e dei fertilizzanti russi sui mercati mondiali. In seguito la Russia avrebbe dichiarato l\u2019interdipendenza dei documenti. Il Memorandum era infatti collegato all\u2019iniziativa del Mar Nero da disposizioni concrete: la facilitazione dell\u2019export ucraino attraverso i porti era uno dei punti elencati. Tuttavia, il valore principale dello strumento era l\u2019impegno dell\u2019ONU a facilitare l\u2019esportazione senza ostacoli di prodotti alimentari dalla Russia. Poich\u00e9 n\u00e9 gli Stati Uniti n\u00e9 l\u2019UE hanno imposto sanzioni sui prodotti agricoli russi da febbraio, gli sforzi di mediazione dell\u2019ONU miravano quindi soprattutto all\u2019eliminazione e all\u2019attenuazione degli impedimenti logistici e finanziari e alla ripresa del funzionamento del gasdotto per l\u2019ammoniaca \u00abTogliatti \u2013 Odesa<strong>\u201d. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Quasi immediatamente dopo l\u2019avvio dell\u2019accordo, Mosca lanci\u00f2 una campagna per minare la reputazione dell\u2019Ucraina a livello internazionale. La Russia ricorse a due narrative degne di nota:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>La quantit\u00e0 di cereali esportata dall\u2019Ucraina non \u00e8 determinante per risolvere la crisi alimentare globale;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>L\u2019Ucraina ha ingannato \u00abtutti\u00bb (la Russia e gli Stati pi\u00f9 poveri) e, insieme all\u2019Occidente, ha commercializzato un\u2019iniziativa inizialmente umanitaria.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Queste affermazioni non riflettono la realt\u00e0. Secondo le stime del WFP, con le proprie forniture l\u2019Ucraina ha sfamato circa 400 milioni di persone. Va inoltre ricordato che il volume effettivo delle esportazioni nel periodo 2022-2023 nell\u2019ambito dell\u2019Iniziativa per l\u2019accordo sui cereali \u00e8 risultato inferiore alle previsioni a causa delle interruzioni provocate dall\u2019esercito russo. La Russia ha ostacolato il funzionamento del corridoio, ad esempio rallentando e ritardando le ispezioni.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Quanto alla seconda affermazione, vale la pena menzionare diversi aspetti. Il termine \u00abcorridoio marittimo umanitario\u00bb implica un collegamento sicuro e il divieto di fuoco diretto. Non esclude il passaggio di navi mercantili neutrali. Pertanto, l\u2019uso di questo corridoio per scopi commerciali non costituisce una violazione del diritto internazionale \u2014 in effetti, persino i russi avevano gi\u00e0 accettato di organizzare il passaggio sicuro delle navi mercantili dai porti ucraini nell\u2019ambito del corridoio menzionato<strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That\u2019s why claims regarding the commercialization of the corridor are irrelevant. Likewise, the final destination was not determined as the decisive prerequisite for calling the corridor \u201chumanitarian\u201d when the treaty was designed. Though generally speaking, Ukraine has devoted an adequate share of its exports to the least developed countries. According to the UN data, Ukraine exported 57% of its grain to developing nations, and these figures include 20% of exports to low-income and lower-middle-income countries. Later President Zelenskyi announced a special program \u201cGrain from Ukraine\u201d as a separate humanitarian food program directed specifically at the least secure countries in Africa. The idea behind both narratives is to discredit Ukraine\u2019s efforts and use its damaged image as a favorable background for Russia&#8217;s actions and reputation.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"872\" height=\"490\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-12.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20738\" style=\"width:691px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-12.png 872w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-12-600x337.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-12-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-12-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 872px) 100vw, 872px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il 1\u00b0 giugno, poco prima della successiva scadenza per la proroga dell\u2019accordo sul Mar Nero, la Russia annunci\u00f2 che avrebbe bloccato la registrazione delle navi nel porto di Yuzhne fino alla ripresa delle esportazioni di ammoniaca attraverso il gasdotto Togliatti-Odesa. Una settimana dopo, il 7 giugno, lo stesso gasdotto fu distrutto. L\u2019incidente accrebbe la tensione tra le due parti, che si accusarono a vicenda di averlo fatto saltare. Alla vigilia di un\u2019altra data di scadenza, il 17 luglio, il Servizio di sicurezza dell\u2019Ucraina condusse un nuovo attacco al ponte di Crimea, simbolo del dominio russo sulla penisola. Nella stessa data, la Russia annunci\u00f2 il ritiro dal trattato. \u00c8 interessante notare, tuttavia, che l\u2019esplosione sul ponte di Crimea non fu menzionata tra le ragioni dichiarate. Le dichiarazioni russe si concentrarono invece sul \u00abpieno fallimento\u00bb dell\u2019ONU e dell\u2019Occidente, come lo defin\u00ec Putin, nell\u2019adempiere agli obblighi verso la Russia. <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"625\" height=\"415\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-13.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20739\" style=\"width:462px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-13.png 625w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-13-600x398.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-13-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 625px) 100vw, 625px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption translation-block\"><em>Un vigile del fuoco ucraino affronta le conseguenze dell\u2019<\/em><br><em>attacco russo a Odessa del 19 luglio 2023. Fonte: <\/em><br><em>Ministero degli affari interni dell\u2019Ucraina<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, despite Russia&#8217;s claims that the grain deal didn&#8217;t appear to be beneficial for it at all, the figures show the opposite. Unlike Ukraine, whose revenue from agricultural exports decreased by 15%, Russia\u2019s earnings weren&#8217;t even stalled. According to the Russian Agriculture Ministry&#8217;s Agroexport Center, they increased by 18%. The truth is, from the very beginning Russians perceived the treaty as a hidden instrument of manipulation. The termination of the treaty was regularly used for blackmailing Ukraine and as a way to achieve new stakes during negotiations rather than for a constructive decision based on statistics. This time, new priorities were sounded by Putin right after the termination of the treaty: the resumption of the Togliatti-Odessa ammonia pipeline and the reconnection of Russian banks to SWIFT. The first would increase Russian revenue from diversified selling of fertilizers, the second would possibly undermine EU sanctions<strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Gi\u00e0 il 18 giugno, la Russia sferr\u00f2 un massiccio attacco con droni contro Odesa e avvi\u00f2 un blocco per ottenere tali concessioni. Il 19 luglio ebbe luogo il primo attacco da molto tempo alle infrastrutture portuali della citt\u00e0<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>E adesso? Alternative <\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Non \u00e8 la prima volta che la Russia pone fine a un trattato (dopotutto, questa possibilit\u00e0 era prevista fin dall\u2019inizio); \u00e8 per\u00f2 la prima volta che Mosca pone fine a questo particolare accordo senza bluffare. Mentre proseguono i tentativi di rilanciare il trattato, si cercano soluzioni alternative. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il rilancio dell\u2019Iniziativa sui cereali, a costo di rivedere i termini della cooperazione tra Occidente e Russia, \u00e8 sostenuto principalmente dall\u2019ONU e dalla Turchia. L\u2019ONU fu persino sospettata di condurre negoziati segreti con la Russia. Secondo BILD, che pubblic\u00f2 informazioni presumibilmente trapelate, l\u2019ONU propose di riconnettere le banche russe a SWIFT, assicurare le navi russe contro gli attacchi ucraini, sbloccare i beni congelati e agevolare l\u2019accesso delle navi russe ai porti dell\u2019UE nell\u2019ambito del commercio agricolo. Questi sforzi disperati per rinnovare il trattato si spiegano con la sua importanza per i programmi alimentari dell\u2019ONU: nel solo 2023, l\u2019Iniziativa ha permesso all\u2019Ucraina di fornire al WFP una quantit\u00e0 di grano pari a circa l\u201980% dell\u2019approvvigionamento totale di grano del WFP. Tuttavia, l\u2019Ucraina ha chiarito che non avrebbe mai accettato le condizioni trapelate, mentre l\u2019UE ha gi\u00e0 escluso la possibilit\u00e0 di riconnettere le banche russe a SWIFT prima della fine della guerra.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Transit routes via Poland and Romania were among the first suggested substitute routes functioning prior to the Black Sea initiative. The operation of the aforementioned passages received high support from the EU: in spring it took the first steps to lift all duties and quotas on Ukrainian agricultural products and devised the Solidarity Lanes Action Plan to develop transport infrastructure. During the first months of the war, these decisions contributed to the mitigation of the domestic economic crisis in Ukraine, as they offered the way from Ukraine to European ports. However, after several months of work, the first dissatisfied European farmers started to voice their concerns. The decision to lift restrictions on Ukrainian exports under the instant zero-duty policy of the EU, accompanied by speculations about cheaper Ukrainian products, led to a short adaptation period of neighboring countries\u2019 markets. The grievance reached its climax when Poland and Hungary imposed unilateral restrictions on Ukraine\u2019s exports, followed by the same move in the name of Slovakia, Bulgaria, and later Romania. To address the issue, the European Commission had to impose &#8220;exceptional safeguard measures&#8221; on the Ukrainian export of \u201csensitive products\u201d (wheat, corn, rapeseed, sunflower seeds) to neighboring states. To prevent the piling up of agricultural commodities in those countries, the EU introduced regulations allowing only direct transit via five frontline Member States. To mitigate the crisis, Ukraine has already introduced licensing of its grain exports to five countries and together with Poland and Lithuania agreed to transfer control of agricultural cargo from the Ukrainian-Polish border to a Lithuanian port to reduce the pressure on the Polish transfer capacity. <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"888\" height=\"500\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-14.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20740\" style=\"width:726px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-14.png 888w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-14-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-14-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-14-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 888px) 100vw, 888px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Fonte: VOA. *Il colore viola indica la rotta baltica.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The detrimental impact of Ukraine&#8217;s exports on the economy of neighboring countries seems to become a solid obstacle that will impede the fostering of the work of grain corridors in the future. Since Ukraine strives to increase exports from European ports, the problem of where to store huge amounts of grain remains relevant. Although the EU has already lifted restrictions under certain conditions, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia have extended the embargo. The situation remains tense as Ukraine puts a complaint to the WTO against those states. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Alcuni Paesi dell\u2019UE della regione proposero anche altre soluzioni, in particolare le rotte baltica e balcanica. Tuttavia, dal punto di vista logistico tali rotte sono considerate pi\u00f9 costose e meno vantaggiose. I porti proposti hanno una capacit\u00e0 di transito ridotta e pertanto non possono soddisfare pienamente la domanda<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Una delle rotte alternative pi\u00f9 promettenti riconosciute dagli Stati Uniti e dall\u2019Ucraina \u00e8 la cosiddetta rotta del Danubio, che passa per i porti della Romania. Non solo \u00e8 la soluzione migliore per il trasporto dai porti ucraini a quelli rumeni, ma gode anche del favore della Romania. La rotta del Danubio \u00e8 gi\u00e0 diventata la principale via di esportazione per l\u2019Ucraina. Restano tuttavia diversi problemi da risolvere. Innanzitutto, i costanti bombardamenti russi dei porti ucraini rendono pi\u00f9 difficile esportare cereali attraverso di essi. Ci\u00f2 non solo riduce i possibili volumi di trasferimento, ma ritarda anche gli arrivi e le partenze. In secondo luogo, la capacit\u00e0 di transito \u00e8 ancora insufficiente. Inoltre, prima della guerra i principali porti danubiani dell\u2019Ucraina, Izmail e Reni, gestivano una quota limitata degli scambi e sono quindi meno sviluppati rispetto a Odesa (ad esempio, dispongono di meno silos). In terzo luogo, il Danubio \u00e8 un fiume stretto, quindi non \u00e8 adatto a un traffico commerciale regolare e intenso n\u00e9 ad accogliere grandi navi. Ad aggravare la situazione vi \u00e8 il calo del livello dell\u2019acqua nel Danubio dovuto agli eventi meteorologici estremi. Nel complesso, questi fattori rallentano la navigazione e limitano il passaggio delle navi<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Pu\u00f2 l\u2019Ucraina farcela da sola?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"573\" height=\"312\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-15.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20741\" style=\"width:443px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-15.png 573w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-15-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 573px) 100vw, 573px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It&#8217;s important to mention that since the termination of the Black Sea agreement Ukraine was determined to continue the work of the grain corridor without Russia. Thus, in consultation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the country began devising an alternative corridor in the Black Sea for merchant vessels. The launch of the corridor&#8217;s operation was announced in August and despite concerns, there have already been several cases of successful evacuation of ships stuck in Ukraine&#8217;s port since February 24. On top of that, the first civilian ships passed through the temporary corridor to the port of Chornomorsk in September. After the above-mentioned cases, some Western countries offered their assistance in ensuring the corridor&#8217;s operation. In particular, English Lloyd\u2019s of London insurer has been devising strategies to cover grain ships traveling, while Germany has promised to supply air defense systems to protect the grain corridors. In the same month, Ukraine proposed Turkey and Romania establish a new framework for the corridor\u2019s work without Russia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tuttavia, sebbene il numero di navi che hanno attraversato il nuovo corridoio sia gradualmente aumentato (al 24 ottobre, 45 navi avevano gi\u00e0 utilizzato questa rotta e 25 imbarcazioni avevano trasportato con successo merci tra porti ucraini e stranieri), l\u2019iniziativa non ha ancora ottenuto un sostegno generalizzato, poich\u00e9 gli armatori stranieri non sono disposti a operare senza sufficienti garanzie di sicurezza da parte della Russia. Inoltre, a causa dell\u2019instabilit\u00e0 della situazione, i premi assicurativi restano elevati. Tutte le opzioni sopra menzionate hanno un elemento in comune che le rende alternative incerte: non includono la Russia come garante. Tutti i tentativi della Turchia, dell\u2019ONU e degli Stati Uniti di ripristinare l\u2019iniziativa sui cereali siglata nel 2022 indicano che questi attori non vogliono isolare la Russia. Cercano infatti di riportarla al tavolo dei negoziati.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\"><strong>Conclusioni<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All in all, the Grain Initiative has lasted for over one year and proved to be effective. It is critical not only for relieving hunger and reducing prices but also for keeping the Ukrainian economy on its toes. Although several proposals offering alternative routes were made, most of them have notable drawbacks compared to the Grain Deal. Ukrainian export appeared to be a complex issue, the nature of solutions to which is significantly influenced by the interests of neighboring states. In general, it seems that in order to raise the confidence of foreign businessmen and states in the safety of humanitarian passages, Moscow&#8217;s agreement for the vessels&#8217; passage is highly desirable. That is why the renewal of the existing deal with specified revisions is more preferred than Ukraine&#8217;s new proposal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Quanto alla Russia, molto probabilmente continuer\u00e0 a considerare le spedizioni di cereali uno strumento di manipolazione. Mosca cerca di minare la fiducia nell\u2019Ucraina manipolando fatti e cifre e, al contempo, mettendo i bastoni tra le ruote a Kyiv per indebolirla. Putin conosce il valore del proprio consenso all\u2019uso delle rotte e le considera quindi un\u2019opportunit\u00e0 per ottenere condizioni migliori per il Paese. \u00c8 pertanto improbabile che in futuro la Russia rinunci all\u2019idea di passaggi condivisi, perch\u00e9 non vorrebbe perdere una simile leva. Vi \u00e8 dunque la necessit\u00e0 di ripristinare un corridoio marittimo stabile e funzionante, coordinato sia dalla Russia sia dall\u2019Ucraina; gli sviluppi futuri dipendono dalla determinazione dei Paesi a tornare a questo formato. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Avvertenza: le opinioni, i pensieri e i punti di vista espressi negli articoli pubblicati su questo sito appartengono esclusivamente agli autori e non riflettono necessariamente quelli del Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico, dei suoi comitati o delle organizzazioni a esso affiliate. Gli articoli intendono stimolare il dialogo e il dibattito e non rappresentano posizioni politiche ufficiali del Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico n\u00e9 di altre organizzazioni alle quali gli autori possano essere associati<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Key Takeaways From extreme oil prices to the migration crisis, the war in Ukraine caused severe upheavals in numerous areas all over the world. Gradually, the international community finds ways to limit the impact of negative factors on global stability. However, the shifting reality makes it difficult to find more or less lasting solutions. As [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":20742,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13],"tags":[],"topic":[90,115,84,87,86],"class_list":["post-20732","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","topic-economy","topic-resilience","topic-russia","topic-security","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>A Saga of the Black Sea Grain Initiative | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This analysis traces the Black Sea Grain Initiative, its role in global food security and the consequences of Russia\u2019s withdrawal and renewed attacks.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, 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