{"id":19265,"date":"2023-09-07T10:30:00","date_gmt":"2023-09-07T07:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=19265"},"modified":"2025-08-05T13:48:44","modified_gmt":"2025-08-05T10:48:44","slug":"reshaping-security-the-evolution-of-the-nordic-countries-role-within-europes-security-framework","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2023\/09\/07\/reshaping-security-the-evolution-of-the-nordic-countries-role-within-europes-security-framework\/","title":{"rendered":"Riplasmare la sicurezza: l\u2019evoluzione del ruolo dei Paesi nordici nel quadro della sicurezza europea"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"37843\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"Scarica il PDF in inglese\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Scarica il PDF in inglese<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">3 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-key-takeaways\">Punti chiave<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Diversa rilevanza della cooperazione nordica:<\/strong> Sebbene Svezia e Finlandia diano priorit\u00e0 alla Dimensione settentrionale nelle rispettive politiche di sicurezza, Norvegia e Islanda sono pi\u00f9 caute, mentre la Danimarca la considera una priorit\u00e0 minore.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Evoluzione del NORDEFCO e accordi regionali:<\/strong> Post-2014, after Russia&#8217;s aggression in Ukraine, NORDEFCO has seen a revival with increased collaboration and joint projects. Significant agreements were signed among the Nordic countries to enhance military cooperation and strategic planning in peacetime and times of crisis or war, reflecting foresight in strengthening regional protection.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Russia&#8217;s Constant Influence and Threat: <\/strong>Russia has always been a significant concern for the security of the Nordic countries, especially Finland, Sweden, and Norway. The geographical and historical context, along with the geopolitical tensions in the Arctic and the struggle for resources, has kept Russia&#8217;s presence as a central focus of defense policies in the region.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Trasformazione della politica di sicurezza di fronte alla guerra in Ucraina: <\/strong>Significant initiatives were taken to make the region sustainable and integrated by 2030, with an emphasis on NATO and EU cooperation. The region&#8217;s approach to security has shifted in response to increasing tensions and a need for stronger alliances.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Le implicazioni dell\u2019adesione di Finlandia e Svezia alla NATO per la sicurezza:<\/strong> Their inclusion strengthens NATO&#8217;s strategic position and impacts regional defense, especially concerning key locations like Sweden&#8217;s Gotland Island.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1190\" height=\"414\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-1.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-19267\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-1.png 1190w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-1-600x209.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-1-1024x356.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-1-768x267.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-1-18x6.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1190px) 100vw, 1190px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Despite the Northern European countries&#8217; proximity, shared history, and cultural links, as well as their similarities in many other areas like politics and business, there have traditionally been substantial variations between them when it comes to their guiding principles for security policy. Within the cooperation in this field of these countries, two dimensions should be outlined: regional (the five Nordic countries) and international (within wider organizations). The most defining indicator has always been the different membership models of these states in such regional organizations as NATO and the EU.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Diverse initial choices of institutional affiliation and security policy in Nordic countries were determined by numerous different factors scoping from historical identity, political culture, and specific small nations&#8217; politics. In this way, the countries chose their own security paths, which remained unchanged for a long time, even during the Cold War.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\">Questo articolo esaminer\u00e0 le origini dell\u2019architettura di sicurezza nell\u2019Europa settentrionale e l\u2019effetto della sua frammentazione sullo stato della sicurezza nella regione. Inoltre, analizzer\u00e0 l\u2019evoluzione dell\u2019architettura di sicurezza e la sua capacit\u00e0 di eliminare potenziali minacce legate soprattutto alla Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-regional-cooperation-in-the-nordic-countries-defense-strategies-and-security-concerns\"><strong>Cooperazione regionale nei Paesi nordici: strategie di difesa e questioni di sicurezza<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Storicamente, i Paesi nordici hanno attribuito un\u2019importanza diversa alla cooperazione nordica. Svezia e Finlandia hanno sempre sottolineato l\u2019importanza e la priorit\u00e0 della Dimensione settentrionale nelle loro politiche di sicurezza. Al contempo, Norvegia e Islanda sono state molto pi\u00f9 caute in merito. Quanto alla Danimarca, essa considera generalmente la Dimensione settentrionale una priorit\u00e0 di terzo ordine. Tra le principali organizzazioni regionali figurano il Consiglio nordico dei ministri (istituito nel 1971) e l\u2019organo parlamentare dei cinque Paesi, il Consiglio nordico (1952). Indubbiamente, l\u2019organizzazione pi\u00f9 importante \u00e8 la Cooperazione nordica di difesa (NORDEFCO), istituita nel 2009 con l\u2019obiettivo di rafforzare le capacit\u00e0 di difesa dei Paesi membri individuando aree di cooperazione e promuovendo soluzioni efficaci.<br>Cooperation within the framework of NORDEFCO can be divided into two periods: before and after 2014. Until the time of Russia&#8217;s attack on Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, the organization&#8217;s activity was quite sluggish and, in general, it was often characterized as money-saving. Interestingly, even Russia&#8217;s attack on Georgia in 2008 did not have the proper effect, and \u201crelations as usual\u201d with the aggressor country were restored quite quickly. It was after 2014 that NORDEFCO experienced a kind of revival because the change in the geopolitical climate redefined the goals of this organization&#8217;s cooperation. Collaboration in various joint projects has significantly increased, so some of the most significant events of this time period should be singled out. In 2016, five countries signed the Easy Access Agreement that allowed their armed forces to use each other&#8217;s air, sea, and land areas in peacetime. In 2018, Sweden and Finland signed a memorandum on military cooperation, which allows the two countries to jointly carry out operational planning in the event of a crisis or war. In 2020, the defense ministers of Finland, Sweden, and Norway signed a &#8220;Declaration of Intent for Enhanced Operational Cooperation&#8221;, which aims at operational synergy and joint planning in times of crisis or war. Taking into account the further situation around Russia and Ukraine, at that moment the Nordic countries indeed showed foresight by developing such a strategic tool to strengthen the protection of their territories.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"842\" height=\"258\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image.jpeg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-19268\" style=\"width:658px;height:202px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image.jpeg 842w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-600x184.jpeg 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-768x235.jpeg 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-18x6.jpeg 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 842px) 100vw, 842px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La cooperazione regionale in materia di sicurezza fu in gran parte oscurata da quella nell\u2019ambito della NATO e venne considerata soprattutto un suo elemento complementare. Danimarca e Norvegia erano tra i Paesi che facevano maggiormente affidamento sull\u2019Alleanza Atlantica, sottolineando in particolare i legami bilaterali con gli Stati Uniti. Per quanto riguarda l\u2019Islanda, dal 1951 gli Stati Uniti, su richiesta della NATO, ne garantiscono la difesa. Un serio ostacolo era tuttavia rappresentato dal fatto che Svezia e Finlandia restavano fuori dalla NATO. In generale, la cooperazione regionale non svolse un ruolo importante per lungo tempo, principalmente a causa della frammentazione politica della regione, a sua volta notevolmente provocata dalle grandi differenze nelle modalit\u00e0 di appartenenza a organizzazioni quali la NATO e l\u2019UE. Inoltre, mancava qualsiasi impulso esterno che dimostrasse chiaramente la necessit\u00e0 di un\u2019interazione pi\u00f9 stretta.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-russia-s-presence-as-a-constant-threat-to-the-nordic-region\"><strong>Russia&#8217;s Presence as a Constant Threat to the Nordic Region<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La minaccia rappresentata dalla Russia per la sicurezza dei Paesi dell\u2019Europa settentrionale ha raggiunto il culmine soltanto dopo l\u2019invasione russa su vasta scala dell\u2019Ucraina nel febbraio 2022, sebbene in realt\u00e0 il fattore russo sia sempre stato, in misura maggiore o minore, molto allarmante e abbia sempre costituito la principale sfida alla sicurezza per i vicini Paesi scandinavi.&nbsp;<br>Above all, it has traditionally had a particularly strong influence on Finland. Firstly, this is explained by the country&#8217;s geographical position, since it shares its longest land border of 1,309 km with Russia. The second reason is related to historical events, namely the occupation of Finland by the USSR in the previous century, and therefore the presence in this Scandinavian country of the feeling of a further constant threat from the Russian side. Finally, the most important reason is geopolitical, which in a certain way combines the first two and includes the current political tension in the Arctic, the division of zones of influence there, and the struggle for resources.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"828\" height=\"562\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-1.jpeg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-19269\" style=\"width:622px;height:422px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-1.jpeg 828w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-1-600x407.jpeg 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-1-768x521.jpeg 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-1-18x12.jpeg 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 828px) 100vw, 828px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus, the defense policy of Finland has always been tightly related to Russia. After Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, an important element of Finland&#8217;s defense policy was non-contractual defense cooperation, primarily with such countries as Sweden, Norway, the USA, Great Britain, and Estonia. It is interesting that this partly served as a substitute for NATO membership. Although to a lesser extent, due to geopolitical and geographical reasons as the countries share a maritime border, Russia has also always caused similar serious concern for Sweden related to military tension in the north.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As for Norway (it shares with Russia a 196 km border that stretches almost to the North Pole), after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the country stopped military cooperation with Russia. Moreover, political contacts were largely limited or canceled altogether. For example, Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg visited Russia and met with the Russian president only five years later, in 2019. One of the most vulnerable points for Norway has always been&nbsp;Spitsbergen. Russia&#8217;s Northern Fleet, which is one of Russia&#8217;s four strategic fleets, is a stone&#8217;s throw from the Norwegian border and occupies a central place in Russia&#8217;s military strategy. Nevertheless, realizing the need soon after that, Norway, like most European countries, sought to normalize relations with Russia. The new government led by Jonas Gar St\u00f8re, which came to power in 2021, stated on its platform that it would &#8220;further develop bilateral cooperation with Russia in the north&#8221;.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-nordic-countries-diverse-cooperation-with-nato-historical-perspectives\"><strong>Nordic Countries&#8217; Diverse Cooperation with NATO: Historical Perspectives<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Esaminando il periodo dalla fondazione dell\u2019Organizzazione del Trattato dell\u2019Atlantico del Nord fino agli eventi del 2022, va rilevato che le relazioni di ciascuno di questi Paesi con l\u2019Alleanza erano uniche. Tre dei cinque Paesi nordici, ossia Norvegia, Danimarca e Islanda, sono membri della NATO dal 1949, vale a dire erano tra i dodici Stati fondatori dell\u2019Alleanza.&nbsp;<br>I casi di Svezia e Finlandia, che si dichiararono neutrali e non allineate e mantennero a lungo una posizione di non adesione alla NATO, erano radicalmente diversi. Le autorit\u00e0 svedesi, di un Paese che non prende parte a conflitti dal 1814, dichiararono persino che la guerra apparteneva al passato. \u00c8 significativo che l\u2019esercito svedese sia stato ridotto di quasi il 90% e l\u2019aeronautica e la marina di circa il 70%. Persino il reggimento responsabile della difesa dell\u2019isola strategicamente esposta di Gotland nel Mar Baltico fu ritirato nel 2004.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"470\" height=\"344\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-2.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-19270\" style=\"width:419px;height:307px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-2.png 470w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-2-16x12.png 16w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 470px) 100vw, 470px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At the same time, Finland and Sweden have always closely cooperated with NATO. In the 1990s, both of these countries decided to officially change their defense policies from neutral to militarily nonaligned. Soon after, both of them joined NATO&#8217;s Partnership for Peace Program. It was Finland&#8217;s accession to the Partnership for Peace in 1994 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997 that initiated cooperation between the countries and the alliance. As a result of the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, Finland and Sweden, along with three other countries, became Enhanced Opportunity Partners (EOP) and participated in a number of NATO arrangements, including the NATO Response Force.&nbsp;Finland&nbsp;has become a partner with enhanced capabilities. Being one of the most active partners of NATO, Finland participated in various operations and missions led by the Alliance (in particular, in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan). In 2017, Finland signed the Political Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Cyber Defense with NATO. Considering the fact that hybrid activity gradually became a constant challenge for European security, it is important that in the same year, Finland created the Helsinki European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. Supported by NATO and the EU, this center is a real incentive for cooperation between these organizations and is open to the member countries of the Alliance. Official&nbsp;Stockholm&nbsp;continued to pursue a very pragmatic security policy, moving as close as possible to NATO without talking about membership. In 2020, exercises took place between the special forces of the Swedish army and the American unit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Compared to other Nordic countries, Norway&#8217;s historical experience was significantly different. During the Second World War, Norway took a neutral position, which in no way protected the state and did not become an obstacle to the German occupation of the country. In view of this, nowadays, the country resolutely rejects the policy of neutrality and considers the North Atlantic Alliance the most important aspect of its security policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Grazie alle diverse posizioni di tutti i Paesi nordici, fino agli anni Novanta il cosiddetto&nbsp;<em>equilibrio scandinavo<\/em>&nbsp;fu mantenuto, consapevolmente o inconsapevolmente.<\/strong> Per stabilire questo equilibrio fu importante la posizione di Norvegia e Danimarca secondo cui, nonostante la loro appartenenza alla NATO, non era consentito dispiegare nei loro territori, in tempo di pace, forze militari straniere dei partner dell\u2019Alleanza, n\u00e9 tantomeno armi nucleari. Va inoltre osservato che le forze armate di Svezia, Norvegia, Danimarca e Finlandia hanno fornito un contributo significativo alle missioni di mantenimento della pace dell\u2019ONU, operando piuttosto spesso al di fuori del continente europeo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-the-background-of-nordic-countries-engagement-with-the-eu-the-defense-dimension\"><strong>The Background of Nordic Countries&#8217; Engagement with the EU: The Defense Dimension<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tutti i Paesi nordici, eccetto Norvegia e Islanda, sono membri dell\u2019Unione europea. Nel 1973 la Danimarca fu la prima di questi Paesi ad aderire all\u2019UE. Dopo la modifica della definizione ufficiale della politica di difesa, Svezia (1991) e Finlandia (1992) presentarono domanda di adesione all\u2019associazione. Entrambe entrarono nell\u2019Unione con l\u2019allargamento settentrionale dell\u2019UE del 1995. Tuttavia, ciascuno di questi tre Paesi presenta caratteristiche o eccezioni che lo distinguono dalla maggior parte degli altri membri dell\u2019UE.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nel campo della sicurezza, la Danimarca si distingueva dai suoi colleghi nordici poich\u00e9 nei 30 anni dal 1992 al 2022 lo Stato ignor\u00f2 la dimensione militare dell\u2019integrazione, non partecipando a uno dei tre pilastri dell\u2019UE: la Politica estera e di sicurezza comune.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"594\" height=\"454\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-3.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-19271\" style=\"width:426px;height:327px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-3.png 594w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-3-16x12.png 16w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 594px) 100vw, 594px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Una mappa che mostra l\u2019appartenenza dei Paesi <\/em><br><em>all\u2019UE e alla NATO. <\/em><br><em>Viola: entrambe; blu: solo UE; <\/em><br><em>arancione: solo NATO.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ci\u00f2 fu causato dal rifiuto del Trattato di Maastricht da parte di una maggioranza molto esigua della popolazione (50.7%) nel referendum del 1992. Perci\u00f2, nel 1993 il Paese ottenne varie clausole di esclusione dalla cooperazione dell\u2019UE, sancite dal Trattato di Edimburgo. L\u2019accordo stabiliva che la Danimarca non avrebbe partecipato allo sviluppo e all\u2019attuazione di decisioni e azioni dell\u2019UE con finalit\u00e0 di difesa. Al tempo stesso, si sottolineava che la Danimarca non avrebbe ostacolato lo sviluppo di una pi\u00f9 stretta cooperazione tra gli altri Stati membri in quest\u2019area. Ne deriv\u00f2 una situazione piuttosto paradossale: la Danimarca era di fatto l\u2019unico Paese dell\u2019Europa settentrionale membro sia dell\u2019UE sia della NATO, l\u2019unico doppiamente integrato, ed era il meno coinvolto nell\u2019UE tra tutti i Paesi nordici.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the contrary, statements made in 2009 by Sweden were very unusual for this state. The Swedish White Paper adopted that year emphasized the government&#8217;s support for the so-called Declaration of Solidarity presented by the Defense Committee. According to this declaration, it was announced that Sweden would not remain passive if another EU member state or a Scandinavian country (i.e., Norway or Iceland) were to suffer an attack. It was emphasized that Sweden would expect the same action from these countries if this country was in a similar situation. In fact, this declaration was very consistent with the Lisbon Treaty of the EU. According to Article 42.7, if a member state is a victim of armed aggression on its territory, other member states undertake to provide it with assistance by all means.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The feature of Sweden&#8217;s policy was that the governments that came to power emphasized, to varying degrees, either the EU or the UN as a predominant subject of the general security order. For example, from 2006 to 2014, during the rule of the center-right government, the country sought a leading role in the EU&#8217;s Eastern Partnership and, in general, to increase its role in the EU.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il nuovo governo di sinistra nel 2014 ridusse significativamente l\u2019importanza dell\u2019UE e l\u2019equilibrio si spost\u00f2 a favore dell\u2019ONU. Nel 2017\u20132018, la Svezia ottenne un seggio nel Consiglio di sicurezza dell\u2019ONU, a lungo desiderato. Infine, il nuovo governo di destra del 2022, prestando maggiore attenzione al ruolo di membro centrale dell\u2019UE, ha segnalato una svolta nella politica estera.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Norvegia e Islanda sono membri dello Spazio economico europeo. Cooperano con l\u2019UE in vari ambiti, in particolare nella sicurezza. Nel 2006 la Norvegia firm\u00f2 un accordo con l\u2019Agenzia europea per la difesa, divenendo cos\u00ec il primo Paese con cui fu concluso un simile accordo. Ciononostante, per la Norvegia la NATO \u00e8 sempre rimasta il miglior garante della sicurezza e l\u2019accento \u00e8 stato posto sugli Stati Uniti e sulla Gran Bretagna.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The different approaches of these countries to the EU can be explained as arising either mainly from security or economic factors. For example, while the main reasons for Finland&#8217;s accession to the EU were primarily related to security, Sweden followed its economic interests, as it had a positive experience of neutrality and non-alignment. From this point of view, the situation in Norway was quite special. The main arguments against the full integration of this country into the EU were economic factors. At the same time, the active involvement of the country in the CSDP was caused by security considerations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-transformation-of-nordic-countries-security-policy-in-the-face-of-the-war-in-ukraine\"><strong>Transformation of Nordic Countries&#8217; Security Policy in the Face of the War in Ukraine<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019invasione russa su vasta scala dell\u2019Ucraina del 24 febbraio 2022, che ha provocato lo scoppio della pi\u00f9 grande guerra sul continente europeo dalla Seconda guerra mondiale, ha infine cambiato, sta cambiando e continuer\u00e0 a cambiare la politica di sicurezza della stragrande maggioranza dei Paesi europei.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Uno degli esempi pi\u00f9 evidenti sono i Paesi dell\u2019Europa settentrionale, alcune delle cui decisioni sono state davvero storiche. Definito in Germania <strong>\u201c<em>Zeitenwende<\/em>\u201d<\/strong>, questo periodo si adatta perfettamente ai Paesi nordici.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">During the&nbsp;Nordic Council of Ministers&nbsp;held in the Norwegian capital on August 15, 2022, five member countries agreed on a rather ambitious decision: to make the Nordic region the most sustainable and integrated region in the world by 2030. The Nordic countries announced that they share the goal of maintaining stability and strengthening security in the region. To achieve this, the importance of enhancing multilateral cooperation in all possible formats was emphasized: at the regional level (primarily within the framework of NORDEFCO), and at the European and Euro-Atlantic levels (NATO and the EU).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In passato, la cooperazione nordica veniva spesso criticata perch\u00e9 non disponeva dei mezzi necessari per affrontare le crescenti tensioni geopolitiche nella regione. Si riteneva infatti che non avesse n\u00e9 gli strumenti necessari n\u00e9 strutture istituzionali sufficienti n\u00e9 la volont\u00e0 politica di sviluppare una politica comune settentrionale di sicurezza e difesa. Recentemente, tuttavia, stiamo osservando cambiamenti significativi lungo questa strada. In particolare, nell\u2019agosto 2022 i primi ministri nordici hanno sottolineato l\u2019importanza di realizzare sinergie nel coordinamento dei piani di difesa nazionali e dei piani della NATO. A novembre, i ministri della Difesa di Finlandia, Svezia e Norvegia hanno firmato una dichiarazione congiunta per approfondire la cooperazione di difesa dei Paesi nordici.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia&#8217;s actions constantly contribute to increasing tension in the Northern region. For example, in the fall of 2022, satellite images were published indicating that Russia had deployed strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons near the border with Norway. In May 2023, Russia transferred the maximum number (from February 24, 2022) of such bombers to the border with Norway and Finland. In addition, in February 2023, according to Norwegian intelligence, for the first time in 30 years, Russia introduced ships with nuclear weapons into the Baltic Sea. At the same time, it is necessary for both Norway and Denmark to continue negotiations with Russia regarding territorial claims at the North Pole and cooperation in the Barents Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"618\" height=\"348\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-2.jpeg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-19272\" style=\"width:530px;height:298px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-2.jpeg 618w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-2-600x338.jpeg 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-2-18x10.jpeg 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 618px) 100vw, 618px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Soldati del reggimento di Gotland pattugliano il porto di Visby. <\/em><br><em>Il dispiegamento \u00e8 avvenuto in un contesto di crescente nervosismo nei Paesi nordici <\/em><br><em>e baltici sulle intenzioni della Russia al <\/em><br><em>confine con l\u2019Ucraina \u00a9 via REUTERS<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Drastic and important changes have happened in Denmark&#8217;s position regarding the EU CSDP. In 2022, the country&#8217;s ruling parties adopted the &#8220;National Compromise on Denmark&#8217;s Security Policy&#8221;, which&nbsp;emphasized&nbsp;that changes in Denmark&#8217;s existing security and defense architecture were necessary in view of the strengthening geopolitical context. During the referendum on July 1, 2022, 66.9% of the population voted to join The Common Security and Defense Policy. After the referendum, the Danish parliament in mid-June&nbsp;adopted a law&nbsp;that opened the way for Denmark&#8217;s participation in the CSDP. It gave the country a chance to participate in the EU&#8217;s military missions and operations. The opportunity to join the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Agency has paramount importance and was approved during the vote on March 23, 2023. Thus, Denmark will be able to participate in joint EU military operations and, importantly, cooperate on the development and acquisition of military potential within the framework of the association.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There is another factor affecting the country&#8217;s attitude to security, which was indirectly shaped by Russia&#8217;s actions. Denmark&#8217;s political decisions regarding security were also driven by fear of being left behind in ambitious actions relating to the defense of its neighbors, especially Germany. Therefore, given the general awakening of Europe, in case of neglecting the security policy, Denmark just may not get a very positive reputation as a NATO member state. Therefore, the country decided to reach 2% by 2033. On the one hand, it seems like insufficient steps, as the deadline is extremely distant. However, at the same time, even this is a great achievement for Denmark because traditionally the strategy of this country has always been aimed at preserving US security guarantees while at the same time not spending significant funds on defense (Denmark has never reached the requirement of 2%).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-nato-membership-of-finland-and-sweden-implications-for-the-security-architecture\"><strong>L\u2019adesione di Finlandia e Svezia alla NATO: implicazioni per l\u2019architettura di sicurezza<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia&#8217;s full-scale invasion of Ukraine radically changed the foreign policy approaches of Sweden and Finland. Both countries drastically reassessed their security policies and, as a result, realized that the most realistic and reliable way to ensure security would be a quick accession to NATO.<br>Se in precedenza la Russia era la ragione principale per restare fuori dall\u2019Alleanza Atlantica, nel 2022 \u00e8 diventata la ragione principale del desiderio dei Paesi di aderirvi.&nbsp;<strong><em>La neutralit\u00e0, anzich\u00e9 garantire la sicurezza, rende il Paese vulnerabile all\u2019aggressione russa.<\/em>&nbsp;<\/strong>Questa tesi \u00e8 stata confermata, in particolare, dai risultati di sondaggi tra la popolazione svedese. Nel 2022 i cittadini svedesi consideravano la Russia la sfida alla sicurezza pi\u00f9 importante tra le nove minacce proposte; il 21% degli intervistati ha espresso questa opinione. Questo indicatore \u00e8 superiore al valore medio di coloro che percepiscono la Russia come la minaccia maggiore rispetto a tutti gli altri Paesi.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"908\" height=\"512\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-4.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-19273\" style=\"width:634px;height:357px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-4.png 908w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-4-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-4-768x433.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-4-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 908px) 100vw, 908px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nel maggio 2022 entrambi i Paesi hanno presentato congiuntamente lettere ufficiali di domanda di adesione all\u2019Alleanza. La cancellazione della fase di concessione del MAP fu una decisione senza precedenti, resa possibile dalla vicinanza dei Paesi all\u2019Alleanza, in particolare dalla loro appartenenza all\u2019UE, nonch\u00e9 da solide istituzioni democratiche, trasparenza delle autorit\u00e0 e, naturalmente, interoperabilit\u00e0 delle forze armate e conformit\u00e0 agli standard NATO. Dopo il vertice NATO di Madrid, il 4 luglio 2022 Svezia e Finlandia hanno concluso i negoziati di adesione. Il 5 luglio tutti gli Stati membri hanno firmato i Protocolli sulla loro adesione alla NATO. Dopo la ratifica del Protocollo da parte di tutti i 30 membri dell\u2019Alleanza il 4 aprile 2023, la Finlandia \u00e8 divenuta il 31\u00b0 membro a pieno titolo della NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-3.jpeg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-19274\" style=\"width:634px;height:357px\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Il ministro degli Esteri finlandese Pekka Haavisto, a sinistra, consegna il documento di adesione della Finlandia al segretario di Stato degli Stati Uniti Antony Blinken, a destra, mentre Jens Stoltenberg osserva. Fotografia: Johanna Geron\/AP<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The path to NATO Membership was more difficult for Sweden though due to the veto of Hungary and Turkey. Only during the NATO summit in Vilnius did Turkish President Erdo\u011fan announce that he agreed to unblock Sweden&#8217;s accession to NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is worth noting that, NATO&#8217;s protection is geographically much wider than it might seem at first glance; for example, Sweden owns territories that are very important in strategic terms. Especially crucial is the island of Gotland, regarding which there is even a common expression that whoever controls this island controls the Baltic Sea. This makes it very important for the defense of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Thus, after the accession of Sweden, the North Atlantic Alliance will fully cover the entire region of Northern Europe. Undoubtedly, after the accession of the entire Northern region to NATO, the alliance will become much stronger. Full entry would bring the alliance a strategic advantage on a global scale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is imperative to acknowledge the prominence of Gothenburg, located along Sweden&#8217;s western coastline. Addressing maritime security, it not only stands as a vital port for Sweden but also assumes significance for Norway and Finland. Rooted in historical tradition, Norway&#8217;s pivotal role within NATO lends substantial weight to its influence in the North. The overarching national commitment entails a sustained presence in the Far North. The forthcoming inclusion of Finland and Sweden into the Alliance augments this endeavor significantly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The recent military engagements between Finland, Sweden, and NATO signal an unprecedented alignment with the Alliance&#8217;s strategies and standards. This synergy is developing more rapidly than what is typical for potential members. A notable feature is the significant contribution these countries have made to regional security without yet formally joining the Alliance. Since April 2022, NATO forces have been stationed in Finland almost continuously, conducting collective defense exercises that ensure a greater presence of the Alliance in the region. In November 2022, Finland, Sweden, and Norway took a step further by updating their tripartite statement of intent to strengthen operational planning, particularly in their northern territories. This alignment reached a new peak in March 2023 when Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden announced a major agreement to use approximately 250 of their fighters as joint operational units. Such collaborations reflect a deepening relationship and a commitment to the region&#8217;s security that transcends formal membership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-nordic-nations-stance-on-the-war-in-ukraine-military-aid-financial-support-and-diplomatic-engagement\"><strong>Nordic Nations&#8217; Stance on the War in Ukraine: Military Aid, Financial Support, and Diplomatic Engagement<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Like the entire collective West, the countries of Northern Europe immediately strongly condemned Russia&#8217;s unjustified war against Ukraine. They remain unwavering in their commitment to the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. All Nordic countries provide Ukraine with versatile political, military, financial, and humanitarian assistance. They also supported tough sanctions against Russia, in particular against the country&#8217;s energy sector. According to Kiel University data for the period from February 2022 to May 2023, in terms of some indicators of the total volume of bilateral aid to Ukraine, calculated both in billions of euros and as a percentage of GDP, the countries of Northern Europe are in the top ten aid providers of Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00c8 caratteristico che la principale assistenza di questi Paesi consista nel sostegno militare. Il maggior contributore in quest\u2019ambito \u00e8 la Danimarca, i cui aiuti per il 2022\u20132023 sono aumentati solo gradualmente.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"572\" height=\"322\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-5.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-19275\" style=\"width:451px;height:254px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-5.png 572w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-5-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 572px) 100vw, 572px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"564\" height=\"318\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-6.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-19276\" style=\"width:454px;height:256px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-6.png 564w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-6-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 564px) 100vw, 564px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Per esempio, nel maggio 2023 il Paese ha inviato il pi\u00f9 grande pacchetto di aiuti militari, pari a 250 milioni di dollari, destinato ad aiutare la controffensiva delle Forze armate. In una prospettiva di lungo periodo, \u00e8 importante che il Paese abbia aumentato a 3.2 miliardi di dollari il fondo di aiuti militari all\u2019Ucraina previsto per il periodo 2023\u20132028. La Danimarca ha inoltre creato un fondo di sostegno all\u2019Ucraina di un miliardo di euro, volto principalmente alla ricostruzione del Paese. \u00c8 fondamentale anche il sostegno di Svezia e Finlandia, le pi\u00f9 potenti militarmente tra tutti i Paesi nordici. Esse trasferiscono all\u2019Ucraina un\u2019ampia gamma di armi: armi anticarro, attrezzature per lo sminamento, sistemi anticarro leggeri, veicoli da combattimento della fanteria, carri armati e artiglieria, attrezzature di difesa aerea ecc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Norway is one of the major contributors to NATO&#8217;s Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. The country also plays an important role thanks to the creation of the Nansen Support Program for Ukraine. As part of this multi-year support program for Ukraine, Norway will provide more than 75 billion kroner over the five years 2023\u20132027. It is worth noting that Norway was one of the first countries to announce a similar support program for Ukraine. Above all, this includes military support, humanitarian aid, funding to support civilian infrastructure and essential public functions. According to the statement of Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr St\u00f8re, it is assumed that in 2023, half of the aid will be in the form of military support. In addition, during the Vilnius summit, the country&#8217;s prime minister announced an increase in the military aid fund this year by 2.5 billion kroner, i.e., in 2023, military support will amount to 10 billion kroner.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"548\" height=\"308\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-7.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-19277\" style=\"width:514px;height:289px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-7.png 548w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-7-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 548px) 100vw, 548px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Iceland, being a small country with a population of approximately 357,000 people that does not have significant defense capabilities, also provides Ukraine with primarily political, financial, and humanitarian aid in the war with Russia. Assistance in the restoration and modernization of Ukraine&#8217;s energy sector is also important. This country provided Kyiv with the equipment needed to restore the damaged power system for 1.5 billion euros. In terms of financial aid as a percentage of GDP, Iceland ranks 11th. Iceland&#8217;s presidency of the Council of Europe (November 2022\u2013May 2023) focused on strengthening the main principles of the Council\u2014human rights, democracy, and the rule of law\u2014which were seriously threatened by the Russian war against Ukraine. After the end of this presidency, on May 16\u201317, 2023, a summit of heads of state and government of the Council of Europe was held in Reykjavik, during which the international register of damages caused to Ukraine during the war was presented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\" id=\"h-conclusion\"><strong>Conclusione<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the article, the evolution of the Nordic countries&#8217; role within Europe&#8217;s security framework was considered. Summing up, the Russian invasion of Ukraine became a powerful impulse for the countries of Northern Europe to significantly deepen cooperation in the field of security policy; this applied both at the regional level and within the Euro-Atlantic organization NATO.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sweden and Finland have ultimately carved out their unique positions within the extensive security architecture of Europe. This observation is somewhat applicable to Denmark as well, especially in light of the European Union&#8217;s growing desire to stake a more prominent claim in the domains of security and military prowess.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Per quanto riguarda la NATO, i casi di Finlandia e Svezia hanno sottolineato l\u2019importanza suprema dell\u2019appartenenza all\u2019Alleanza per la sicurezza e la difesa delle nazioni di influenza moderata. Al tempo stesso, ci\u00f2 solleva interrogativi sostanziali sull\u2019efficacia del mantenimento di una posizione neutrale. Di conseguenza, \u00e8 emersa un\u2019unit\u00e0 senza precedenti tra tutte e cinque le nazioni nordiche, superando la divergenza precedentemente marcata che aveva caratterizzato le loro relazioni.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Avvertenza: le opinioni, i pensieri e i giudizi espressi negli articoli pubblicati su questo sito appartengono esclusivamente agli autori e non necessariamente al Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico, ai suoi comitati o alle organizzazioni a esso affiliate. Gli articoli mirano a stimolare il dialogo e la discussione e non rappresentano posizioni politiche ufficiali del Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico n\u00e9 di altre organizzazioni alle quali gli autori possano essere associati.<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Key Takeaways Despite the Northern European countries&#8217; proximity, shared history, and cultural links, as well as their similarities in many other areas like politics and business, there have traditionally been substantial variations between them when it comes to their guiding principles for security policy. Within the cooperation in this field of these countries, two dimensions [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":19274,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,58],"tags":[],"topic":[88,93,110,84,87],"class_list":["post-19265","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-en-analyses","category-eng-western-europe","topic-defense","topic-geopolitics","topic-nato","topic-russia","topic-security"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>The Nordic Role in European Security | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Tensions with Russia drove Finland and Sweden toward NATO while Nordic states expanded military cooperation through NORDEFCO and regional agreements.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2023\/09\/07\/reshaping-security-the-evolution-of-the-nordic-countries-role-within-europes-security-framework\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"it_IT\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Nordic Role in European Security\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Tensions with Russia drove Finland and Sweden toward NATO while Nordic states expanded military cooperation through NORDEFCO and regional agreements.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2023\/09\/07\/reshaping-security-the-evolution-of-the-nordic-countries-role-within-europes-security-framework\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Transatlantic-Dialogue-Center-105645698740463\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2023-09-07T07:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2025-08-05T10:48:44+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/image-3-e1754051197448.jpeg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"814\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"330\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Alina Horbenko\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:title\" content=\"The Nordic Role in European Security\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:description\" content=\"Tensions with Russia drove Finland and Sweden toward NATO while Nordic states expanded military cooperation through NORDEFCO and regional agreements.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Alina Horbenko\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"25 minuti\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2023\/09\/07\/reshaping-security-the-evolution-of-the-nordic-countries-role-within-europes-security-framework\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2023\/09\/07\/reshaping-security-the-evolution-of-the-nordic-countries-role-within-europes-security-framework\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Alina Horbenko\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/80009f5c977ad6af93392a183d2126e9\"},\"headline\":\"Reshaping Security: The Evolution of the Nordic Countries&#8217; 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