{"id":18475,"date":"2023-08-10T10:30:00","date_gmt":"2023-08-10T07:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=18475"},"modified":"2025-08-02T09:22:22","modified_gmt":"2025-08-02T06:22:22","slug":"a-ukrainian-path-to-natohow-to-make-a-bumpy-road-smoother","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2023\/08\/10\/a-ukrainian-path-to-natohow-to-make-a-bumpy-road-smoother\/","title":{"rendered":"Un percorso ucraino verso la NATO: come rendere pi\u00f9 agevole una strada accidentata"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"26466\" data-page-id=\"18157\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"Scarica il PDF in inglese\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Scarica il PDF in inglese<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">516 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Leading up to the most recent NATO Summit in Vilnius, the informational hailstorm has been covering not only Ukrainian but global media. They were constantly coming back to one question &#8211; will Ukraine be accepted or invited to NATO this time? This dilemma was evident after the Ukrainian Presidential Office decided to file an official application to NATO in 2022, at the brink of Russian aggression. Up till a few hours before the start of the Summit\u2019s official part, President Zelenskyi was neither confirming nor denying his arrival in the Lithuanian capital, at the same time demanding an invitation for membership. However, despite bringing some good practical results, such as new weapon supplies and a G7 Declaration that featured the long-awaited security guarantees for Ukraine, a highly anticipated event did not clear out many issues but instead sparked numerous controversies regarding the Ukrainian diplomatic strategy, contemporary media landscape, military power, and future of the NATO itself. Discover how did the Vilnius Summit become a reflection of the bumpy road that Ukraine is going through in its aspiration to become a full NATO member, which hints did it give to make this road a bit easier, and how it gave the long-sought answers for other important questions.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-a-train-ukraine-nato-that-has-not-stopped-yet\"><strong>Un treno \u00abUcraina-NATO\u00bb che non si \u00e8 ancora fermato<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is not that easy to transform from a country that is a part of the core competitor of NATO (that picked such a role for itself) to a country that embraces something that was considered to be your enemy. Opponents of this statement argue that the example of Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, and even Albania contradict it as these states were in a similar situation. While there may be some truth to this, it&#8217;s also not completely accurate.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"407\" height=\"579\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18477\" style=\"width:337px;height:480px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image.png 407w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-8x12.png 8w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 407px) 100vw, 407px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Pubblicit\u00e0 della campagna elettorale di <\/em><br><em>Natalia Vitrenko. &#8220;A woman who will save<\/em><br><em> l\u2019Ucraina. Contro la povert\u00e0, l\u2019illegalit\u00e0, la mancanza <\/em><br><em>di spiritualit\u00e0, la disoccupazione, il nazismo, la medicina a pagamento, <\/em><br><em>medicine, crime, land sales, US colony.&#8221;<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In epoca sovietica, NATO era una parola che innescava forti reazioni negli ucraini. \u00c8 difficile reinventarsi e liberarsi delle ripetizioni quotidiane su quanto sia cattivo l\u2019Occidente, con la NATO considerata l\u2019incarnazione completa dell\u2019Occidente, e su come ogni occidentale voglia distruggere tutti nell\u2019Unione Sovietica. Questo processo di metamorfosi, insieme ad altri importanti processi sociopolitici, quali la trasformazione dell\u2019istruzione e del panorama mediatico, richiede molto tempo, ma pu\u00f2 portare buoni risultati nel lungo periodo. Avrebbe potuto avvenire gradualmente, ma alcuni eventi lo hanno accelerato\u2026 innescati dalla Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Paradoxically, Russia&#8217;s vigorous reaction to NATO expansion to the East and paranoid fear of the military bloc on its borders followed by the attempts to \u201cprotect Ukraine\u201d from it became the ones responsible for Ukraine becoming closer to the West than ever before. Two revolutions in 2004 and 2014 respectively, which both have a Russian root cause, created a wave of (sometimes too) high hopes among Ukrainians. They realized their need and readiness for NATO (even if not all of them and everywhere in the country) sooner than some NATO Member States&#8217; leaders. Yet, at the same time, up till 2014, Russia was spreading the narrative about NATO taking over the residential blocks in Ukrainian cities and their gardens at summer houses. And despite always admiring the West and listening to the stories of those Ukrainians who have already been there, the fear of the unknown was helping this narrative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La Rivoluzione arancione del 2004 e l\u2019integrazione ucraina nella NATO sono strettamente intrecciate. In realt\u00e0, essa \u00e8 stata uno degli elementi chiave della campagna elettorale dell\u2019ex presidente ucraino Viktor Yushchenko e uno di quelli che incontrarono maggiore resistenza. Le questioni di hard security sono sempre state impegnative per gli ucraini, poich\u00e9 \u00e8 piuttosto difficile pensare alla potenza militare e alle armi quando nella propria patria non vi \u00e8 stabilit\u00e0 economica o politica. In vista dell\u2019ormai tristemente noto Vertice NATO di Bucarest del 2008, gli ucraini non erano del tutto pronti mentalmente a entrare nella NATO. Confrontando il livello di consapevolezza sulla NATO tra gli ucraini nel 2008, nel 2014 e soprattutto oggi, si pu\u00f2 vedere l\u2019evoluzione: il punto di partenza era sapere a malapena qualcosa dell\u2019organizzazione, dei suoi obiettivi e di ci\u00f2 che serve realmente per essere uno Stato membro. Al tempo stesso, le grandi speranze della Rivoluzione arancione furono infrante dalla dura realt\u00e0 di un <strong>confronto politico<\/strong> tra diversi gruppi politici in cerca di influenza. Tutto ci\u00f2 diede all\u2019Ucraina una posizione alquanto instabile in vista del vertice, in occasione del quale la Russia riusc\u00ec a convincere gli Stati Uniti e Bush Jr. che l\u2019adesione alla NATO dell\u2019Ucraina e della Georgia sarebbe stata una decisione molto rischiosa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In 2010, Viktor Yanukovych, a freshly elected at that time President of Ukraine who was financially and politically backed by the Kremlin, decided to change the destination, trying to embrace neutrality. A neutral status for Ukraine was one of his central campaign promises. In support of it, Yanukovych and his peers were capitalizing on the \u201cNATO horror\u201d. As he tried to say this, it would be better to focus on the economy rather than think about the military. Was it real neutrality, like, for example, in Austria? It is debatable. As the standards for many aspects of the military are the core element of NATO integration, it is definitely fair to say that the Ukrainian military at that time was drifting away from NATO. The arms reduction, the decline in conditions for soldiers, rising corruption, bullying campaigns for \u201cfreshmen\u201d of the military draft, issues with gender parity &#8211; all of these problems were at their worst during the Yanukovych presidency, and some of them are still lingering as the obstacles on the Ukrainian path to NATO. When Yanukovych&#8217;s policies became unbearably Russian, Ukrainians took another leap of faith in a better future with the 2014 Revolution of Dignity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In 2014, these new hopes helped Petro Poroshenko to get his presidency. He came to power promising to get Ukraine into the EU and NATO topping it all with \u201cfinishing the war in two weeks\u201d. When he gained some success in keeping Ukraine on the radar of Western leaders and had some small wins in the course of European integration, all other issues (that were either impossible to tackle for him alone, like Russian aggression) or implementation of reforms (such as modernization of the military complex) were ignored. Indeed, the transformation was happening, but not everywhere, not every time, and not fast enough. All of that, together with other factors such as imperfections in public diplomacy and its efficiency, \u201clack of fully self-reliant and resilient democratic institutions\u201d, and the worst of them &#8211; too big of a focus on creating his own political cult that still damages Ukrainian politics in its most crucial chapter. The very same reasons were making the West skeptical of Ukraine in NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"856\" height=\"482\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-1.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18478\" style=\"width:798px;height:449px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-1.png 856w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-1-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-1-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-1-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 856px) 100vw, 856px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko addressed Parliament on Feb 19, after signing a constitutional amendment committing the country to becoming a member of NATO and the European Union. He saw securing Ukraine&#8217;s membership in NATO and the EU as his &#8220;strategic mission.&#8221;<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All\u2019inizio di questa sezione sono stati menzionati per una buona ragione alcuni Paesi del Patto di Varsavia. Talvolta gli esperti ucraini avanzano l\u2019argomento secondo cui l\u2019Ucraina non \u00e8 peggiore e, sotto certi aspetti, \u00e8 persino migliore dei Paesi gi\u00e0 ammessi nella NATO. Possono alludere a un possibile pregiudizio nei confronti dell\u2019Ucraina. Sebbene questo scenario possa essere una delle ragioni possibili, dobbiamo anche ricordare che la prospettiva occidentale \u00e8 assai diversa ed \u00e8 simile a quella adottata per l\u2019integrazione dell\u2019Ucraina nell\u2019UE. S\u00ec, nonostante la Russia cerchi di dimostrare il contrario, l\u2019Ucraina combatte la corruzione meglio di quanto comunemente si pensi. Inoltre, i suoi progressi non sono inferiori a quelli di Romania, Bulgaria e Albania, gi\u00e0 membri della NATO. Con le attuali tendenze geopolitiche, alcuni esperti potrebbero persino ritenere pi\u00f9 logica e praticabile un\u2019Ucraina membro della NATO rispetto all\u2019Ungheria. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tuttavia, i <strong>compiti non svolti da questi Paesi<\/strong> sono il motivo per cui la NATO \u00e8 scettica nei confronti dell\u2019Ucraina. Come vediamo, l\u2019ascesa della politica di estrema destra in Polonia e Ungheria e l\u2019instabilit\u00e0 economica di Bulgaria e Romania hanno gi\u00e0 creato crepe nella sicurezza europea. S\u00ec, l\u2019adesione dell\u2019Albania fu una scelta rischiosa, ma \u00e8 pi\u00f9 facile gestire i problemi di un Paese grande quanto l\u2019Albania che dell\u2019Ucraina. \u00c8 tempo di comprendere che l\u2019Ucraina nella NATO \u00e8 un\u2019opportunit\u00e0 affinch\u00e9 sia la NATO sia l\u2019Ucraina diventino pi\u00f9 resilienti, se le carte saranno giocate bene. Purtroppo, per\u00f2, l\u2019Occidente non lo presenta in modo sufficientemente trasparente, e tutte queste insicurezze hanno macchiato il recente Vertice di Vilnius.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-what-on-earth-was-in-vilnius\"><strong>Che cosa diavolo \u00e8 successo a Vilnius?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Even after days passed since that Summit, we still have so many questions. Usually, these summits fly under the radar of the general public, but this time because of the tension over \u201cthe Ukrainian case\u201d it looked like a reality show. We had it all &#8211; a dramatic commentary, a plot twist, and an ending that leaves everyone arguing whether it was actually a good one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It was one of the rare occasions where President Zelenskyi could meet all leaders who were interested in helping Ukraine in one place. Stakes were high, and risks were not lower, so it is not surprising that Ukraine chose a risky gambling strategy. It is actually quite traditional for modern diplomacy &#8211; try to land on the Moon, so if you fail, you can reach the stars. It seems that this time the Ukrainian team had it in mind &#8211; it is acceptable to demand a sharp guarantee that we would be accepted into NATO. After all, <strong>il trauma del Memorandum di Budapest perseguita ancora gli ucraini<\/strong>, poich\u00e9 per loro simboleggia l\u2019inefficienza diplomatica e la fiducia tradita. Per evitarlo, la squadra di Zelenskyi voleva ottenere qualcosa di concreto. Ma, ancora una volta, la mancanza di volont\u00e0 di cogliere le sfumature ha giocato a sfavore anche questa volta.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"819\" height=\"546\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-2.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18479\" style=\"width:761px;height:507px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-2.png 819w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-2-600x400.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-2-768x512.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-2-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 819px) 100vw, 819px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>A margine del vertice NATO di Vilnius, con la partecipazione del presidente dell\u2019Ucraina, il 12 luglio 2023 i leader dei Paesi del Gruppo dei Sette hanno concordato la Dichiarazione congiunta di sostegno all\u2019Ucraina.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In tempi cos\u00ec difficili, tendiamo a comprendere i complessi processi che avvengono attorno a noi ricorrendo alle generalizzazioni. Dal punto di vista psicologico \u00e8 rassicurante. Nel farlo, per\u00f2, non tutto pu\u00f2 essere generalizzato, e questa situazione ne \u00e8 un esempio perfetto.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019idea di dare all\u2019Ucraina il \u00abbiglietto d\u2019oro per la NATO\u00bb \u00e8 in generale buona e animata da buone intenzioni. Tuttavia, non \u00e8 pianificata con sufficiente precisione. <strong>Questa idea manca di visione e la sua giustificazione manca di una comprensione pi\u00f9 profonda<\/strong>. Yes, the Budapest Memorandum is one of the proofs that not every promise is kept in the Western world. But there is one crucial detail &#8211; it is not a legally binding document. And there are situations in modern geopolitics when even a legally binding document can be thrown into a trash can. It is indeed painful to give away your nuclear weapons, but would it be more painful to be isolated from the outer world with them?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">E che cos\u2019\u00e8 davvero un \u00abinvito\u00bb per l\u2019Ucraina ad aderire alla NATO? Qualcuno ha mai ricevuto un \u00abinvito\u00bb di questo tipo? Che cosa significa? Numerosi leader occidentali hanno ripetutamente affermato che l\u2019Ucraina entrer\u00e0 nella NATO non appena la guerra sar\u00e0 finita. Nel frattempo, in Ucraina cresce l\u2019entusiasmo per quella svolta verso la NATO, che dovrebbe servire a\u2026 ma a che cosa dovrebbe servire? Questo \u00abinvito\u00bb pu\u00f2 essere un documento giuridicamente vincolante? \u00c8 lecito dubitarne. Potremmo invece ritrovarci di fronte a un altro caso simile al Memorandum di Budapest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00c8 complicato calibrare una buona strategia per un simile evento quando bisogna bilanciare la comunicazione per il pubblico interno e quello estero, soprattutto quando in patria tutto \u00e8 cos\u00ec carico di aspettative. Se Zelenskyi fosse stato troppo arrendevole a Vilnius, sarebbe stato criticato per aver abbandonato gli sforzi sul campo di battaglia. Se fosse stato troppo duro, avrebbe rischiato di perdere tutto il sostegno aggiuntivo dei partner occidentali. Se non fosse venuto affatto al vertice, sarebbe stato deriso per aver ignorato l\u2019opportunit\u00e0 ed essersi concentrato solo sulle proprie richieste. Come vediamo, la situazione stessa era decisamente un campo minato. La strategia scelta ha funzionato meglio in patria che all\u2019estero, anche se inizialmente era stata adattata alla mentalit\u00e0 americana.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La guerra \u00e8 un processo molto emotivo, soprattutto quando dura da pi\u00f9 di nove anni. E talvolta \u00e8 difficile elaborare tutte queste emozioni senza danneggiare le proprie altre attivit\u00e0. Anche i politici sono persone, specialmente coloro che non hanno una solida esperienza politica. Al tempo stesso, tutto ci\u00f2 che \u00e8 caricato di emozioni intense, positive o negative che siano, nel tempo prosciuga energia. \u00c8 un\u2019intuizione essenziale anche per la diplomazia: <strong>la guerra prosciuga emotivamente tutti<\/strong>. Soprattutto quando \u00e8 costantemente nei media. Per l\u2019Ucraina, essere sempre sotto i riflettori sembra positivo; tuttavia, quando non vi \u00e8 nulla a compensarlo, anche il pi\u00f9 piccolo passo falso pu\u00f2 trasformarsi in un enorme dramma<strong>. Le emozioni sono state il problema maggiore del vertice di Vilnius.<\/strong> Dal punto di vista psicologico, il presidente Zelenskyi ha caricato la situazione di emozioni quando gli altri attori, in quel caso, volevano affrontarla a mente fredda. Immaginate uno scenario in cui un bambino cerca di risolvere un problema di matematica e un insegnante gli urla contro, pretendendo che lo risolva subito. Perch\u00e9, se non lo fa, l\u2019insegnante potrebbe non essere pagato e non avere nulla con cui saldare le bollette. Questo riflette accuratamente la situazione e ha naturalmente prodotto un effetto contrario. Talvolta le emozioni sono uno strumento molto utile e potente, ma non quando tutti gli altri cercano di calmarsi in una situazione gi\u00e0 molto emotiva.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"463\" height=\"297\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-3.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18480\" style=\"width:391px;height:251px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-3.png 463w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-3-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 463px) 100vw, 463px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Eppure, non tutto \u00e8 negativo come sembra. Quel vertice ha fornito all\u2019Ucraina garanzie di sicurezza che stabiliscono quali misure adotteranno i partner occidentali qualora la Russia in futuro inasprisca il conflitto. Ha portato altre armi, un risultato importante nel contesto della controffensiva. Inoltre, l\u2019Ucraina ha ricevuto la garanzia di poter aderire alla NATO senza un Piano d\u2019azione per l\u2019adesione, come la Finlandia. Nonostante tutto ci\u00f2, il ministro degli Esteri Dmytro Kuleba ha dichiarato che la strada dell\u2019Ucraina verso la NATO \u00e8 diventata \u00abpi\u00f9 corta, ma non pi\u00f9 veloce\u00bb. Ma ci\u00f2 non significa forse che, con meno ostacoli, sar\u00e0 pi\u00f9 facile arrivare davvero alla meta? Come vediamo, questo sogno febbrile di vertice ha fatto emergere alcuni <strong>fraintendimenti nell\u2019approccio ucraino<\/strong> non solo all\u2019integrazione atlantica, ma anche a quella europea. Come evitare che questo processo si perda ulteriormente nella traduzione?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-the-current-nato-scoreboard\"><strong>L\u2019attuale quadro delle posizioni nella NATO<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is a challenging task not to lose sight in the case of the current diffusion between the NATO member states. In fact, they are divided on how to support Ukraine and whether to invite it to join the Alliance. Many of Ukraine&#8217;s Western partners, except for a few, have different best-case scenarios in mind for Ukraine, and these are not always NATO membership. In addition to Hungary&#8217;s well-known position against Ukraine&#8217;s accession to NATO, the United States also has a fairly clear stance on this issue, saying that it is inappropriate for Ukraine to join NATO right now. At the same time, under the influence of the full-scale invasion, countries such as France, Italy, and Germany have become more positive about the idea of Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Alliance than before. However, it is difficult to speak about clear blocks of positions within NATO, except for Poland and the Baltic States, which are unanimously in favor of Ukraine&#8217;s accession.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Come vediamo, le posizioni e le opinioni dei Paesi cambiano sotto la pressione delle circostanze e dei recenti sviluppi sul campo di battaglia. Dire che la Germania \u00e8 pi\u00f9 favorevole di prima non significa che offra, nelle dichiarazioni e nei fatti, un sostegno altrettanto deciso quanto quello dei Paesi citati. Va tenuto presente che il cancelliere Scholz agisce con grande cautela sulla questione e che il ministro della Difesa tedesco ha dichiarato che l\u2019Ucraina potr\u00e0 contare sull\u2019adesione all\u2019Alleanza e sull\u2019afflusso di investimenti soltanto dopo la fine della guerra. Un gruppo di Paesi, tra cui la Polonia e gli Stati baltici, sostiene dunque inequivocabilmente l\u2019adesione, mentre altri si esprimono con cautela sulla questione.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, it is worth noting that the Allies never agreed on clear goals of the war, nor on how Ukraine should win. Unfortunately, there is also an error on Ukraine&#8217;s part. Since January of this year, the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been one of the main topics of discussion. After the transfer of German Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, the Ukrainian media space was filled with statements that tanks and infantry fighting vehicles such as Marder, etc. were needed to prepare for a counteroffensive and breakthrough of Russian defenses in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"464\" height=\"309\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-4.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18481\" style=\"width:367px;height:244px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-4.png 464w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-4-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 464px) 100vw, 464px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A maggio, gli ucraini e i partner attendevano ancora una controffensiva, che continuava a essere un tema centrale sui media. Questa strategia si conciliava bene con l\u2019obiettivo di ottenere armi, ma ha anche generato, in una certa misura, <strong>aspettative irrealistiche<\/strong> among Western partners. Despite the fact that Ukraine&#8217;s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba emphasized that the upcoming operation should not be perceived as a &#8220;decisive battle&#8221; and shared the opinion that Ukraine may need more than one counteroffensive to liberate all the temporarily occupied territories, this did not help to reduce expectations. For example, in an interview with The Guardian, the Czech president said that a counteroffensive could be the &#8220;last chance&#8221; this year because it would be difficult for Ukraine to quickly train new troops if the Armed Forces suffer heavy losses if they are not well-prepared for offensive operations, and it would be extremely difficult to re-provision the necessary ammunition and fuel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At the same time, the Vilnius Summit also confirmed that the strategy of &#8220;last chance weapons&#8221; is not that efficient in its informational planning. After all, those who communicated those needs from the Ukrainian side were portraying various types of weaponry in a progressive timeline as its last chance, which is technically true, but in terms of diplomacy is not clear enough. Therefore, Europeans became tired of the &#8220;last chance&#8221; narrative and started to pay less attention to the decisive matter of military help for Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Osservando l\u2019approccio informativo dell\u2019Ufficio del Presidente alla NATO, \u00e8 evidente che un simile approccio era rivolto esclusivamente agli Stati Uniti. Purtroppo si rivela controproducente, poich\u00e9 molti rappresentanti delle \u00e9lite politiche europee e ucraine lo considerano una conferma della narrazione della propaganda russa secondo cui gli Stati Uniti sono l\u2019unico vero leader in tali formati e l\u2019Europa solo la loro marionetta. Come pu\u00f2 qualcosa creato solo per il pubblico americano funzionare anche in Europa, se vi sono diverse sottoregioni con contesti mediatici e culture differenti? Per esempio, mentre gli appelli video di Zelenskyi dall\u2019Isola dei Serpenti hanno funzionato bene per il pubblico americano, gli europei non hanno recepito molto bene il messaggio. \u00c8 bene bilanciare i possibili rischi e le implicazioni del prodotto mediatico che la squadra del Presidente condivide con un pubblico internazionale. \u00c8 ancora pi\u00f9 importante creare qualcosa che sia gradito sia al pubblico interno sia a quello internazionale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Still, the summit in Vilnius did not bring Ukraine an official invitation to join NATO and left open all further scenarios for the development of cooperation with the Alliance. However, it is worth noting that this does not slow down the process of Euro-Atlantic integration for Ukraine, but it also does not speed it up. Although the political objectives set by Kyiv did not work, the task of &#8220;getting weapons&#8221; worked again at the summit. As early as August, the 11-nation coalition may begin training Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets. All of that leaves a lingering feeling of chaos and confusion, where answers are needed fast to move on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-how-should-ukraine-proceed-further\"><strong>Come dovrebbe procedere l\u2019Ucraina?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There are many ways to improve the current situation. For instance, as previously mentioned the damage was done by an emotional approach to communications. One more example of this is the debacle between the UK\u2019s Minister of Defense Ben Wallace and Zelenskyi. It appears that actually, the media focused on the emotional part which appeals to the public more, though Wallace&#8217;s core message was about the difficulties of getting weapons to Ukraine. Yet the Ukrainian President\u2019s response appeared too emotionally charged. There might have been alternative, perhaps more diplomatic, ways to communicate his message. After all, in his role as the President of a parliamentary-presidential republic, not all matters fall within his direct purview, including the conduct of individuals communicating with Wallace. It would look even better from the perspective of Ukrainian integration into the EU, as it would show the power to delegate in such difficult times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There seems to be a discrepancy in perceptions when it comes to the provisioning of critically needed weapons to Ukraine. While Kyiv may view the requested aid as a relatively small portion of foreign nations&#8217; capabilities, the reality in these donor countries, particularly those in the West, might be different. For instance, changes in the U.S. military manufacturing sector, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, illustrate the complex interplay between large defense conglomerates and smaller contractors. This complexity, alongside resource and facility constraints, could impact the speed and scale of weapon production and distribution. All of these details have to be taken into consideration while asking the West for more weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But after all of that, a question remains &#8211; why does Ukraine need NATO? To answer simply, many in Ukraine see NATO membership as a magic wand able to solve all problems. It is just a vehicle for its aspirations, reforms, and security improvements, like a train that goes to its final destination. While Ukrainians might think that they are ready and deserve membership, it would be good not to put heads too high yet, as there are still some issues in the Ukrainian military complex. We have to reject a mindset where security is only about the military and the military is only about weapons and the number of people. Ukraine needs NATO to improve the situation with the rights of soldiers, the procedures of a military draft, the bureaucracy at the local military centers, the living conditions of the military, their equipment, their knowledge and training, and the situation with the women and LGBTQI+ rights in the army. There is still so much to learn, and NATO can be that helping hand that can push Ukraine toward these improvements. However, the utilization of such aid ultimately rests with the Ukrainian government. It would thus be strategic to remind international counterparts of Ukraine&#8217;s need for NATO to progress with the proposed reforms, and of Ukraine&#8217;s readiness to swiftly implement these reforms. Negotiations could potentially be smoothed if the dialogue was to incorporate discussions on potential successful outcomes that could arise concurrently with the provision of aid. After all, Ukraine has no desire to let the efforts made and sacrifices endured be in vain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Avvertenza: le opinioni, i pensieri e i giudizi espressi negli articoli pubblicati su questo sito appartengono esclusivamente agli autori e non necessariamente al Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico, ai suoi comitati o alle organizzazioni a esso affiliate. Gli articoli mirano a stimolare il dialogo e la discussione e non rappresentano posizioni politiche ufficiali del Centro per il Dialogo Transatlantico n\u00e9 di altre organizzazioni alle quali gli autori possano essere associati.<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Leading up to the most recent NATO Summit in Vilnius, the informational hailstorm has been covering not only Ukrainian but global media. They were constantly coming back to one question &#8211; will Ukraine be accepted or invited to NATO this time? This dilemma was evident after the Ukrainian Presidential Office decided to file an official [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":18479,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13],"tags":[],"topic":[110,87,86],"class_list":["post-18475","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","topic-nato","topic-security","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>A Ukrainian Path to NATO: How to Make a Bumpy Road Smoother<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This analysis examines Ukraine\u2019s path to NATO membership, the political and security obstacles it faces and options for strengthening integration.\" \/>\n<meta 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