{"id":10979,"date":"2023-04-20T10:24:47","date_gmt":"2023-04-20T07:24:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=10979"},"modified":"2025-08-02T10:09:09","modified_gmt":"2025-08-02T07:09:09","slug":"perspectives-of-ukraines-security-umbrella-the-countrys-latest-pacts-and-alliances","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/it\/2023\/04\/20\/perspectives-of-ukraines-security-umbrella-the-countrys-latest-pacts-and-alliances\/","title":{"rendered":"Prospettive dell\u2019ombrello di sicurezza dell\u2019Ucraina: gli ultimi patti e alleanze del Paese"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"19250\" data-page-id=\"8262\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Attendere, per favore\u2026\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"Scarica il PDF in inglese\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Scarica il PDF in inglese<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">723 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Gli Stati sono gli unici soggetti di diritto internazionale dotati di capacit\u00e0 giuridica internazionale, ossia di mantenere relazioni diplomatiche e consolari, partecipare a organizzazioni internazionali, concludere accordi, assumere responsabilit\u00e0 internazionale, avere una propria cittadinanza ecc. In quanto partecipante alle relazioni internazionali, l\u2019Ucraina deve comprendere i propri obiettivi, bisogni, opzioni d\u2019azione e i mezzi di cui dispone per operare nel mondo in modo razionale e conformemente ai propri interessi. Negli ultimi anni, sullo sfondo delle minacce emergenti, l\u2019Ucraina ha iniziato a rendersi conto della necessit\u00e0 di stabilizzare la propria sicurezza e rafforzare la propria posizione internazionale attraverso la partecipazione a meccanismi di sicurezza e difesa collettiva.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Al di fuori delle garanzie della NATO e dell\u2019\u00abombrello di sicurezza\u00bb dell\u2019Unione europea, la diplomazia ucraina ha concentrato i propri sforzi sulla creazione di una rete regionale di cooperazione sotto forma di piccole alleanze. Sono cos\u00ec emersi il Trio associato (Ucraina-Moldova-Georgia), il Triangolo di Lublino (Ucraina-Polonia-Lituania) e il patto trilaterale britannico-polacco-ucraino. Tattiche analoghe sono state usate da tutti i nuovi membri dell\u2019UE e della NATO, che, attraverso associazioni regionali, hanno dimostrato la possibilit\u00e0 di cooperare in vari ambiti, rafforzato le relazioni con i vicini e acquisito maggiore visibilit\u00e0 nell\u2019arena internazionale, dimostrando di poter aderire ad alleanze pi\u00f9 grandi con altri Stati.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dal 14 al 16 gennaio 2023, il Gruppo sociologico Rating ha condotto un sondaggio d\u2019opinione pubblica per valutare le opinioni sulla potenziale adesione dell\u2019Ucraina ad alleanze di sicurezza quali la NATO o sulla formazione di una coalizione politico-militare composta da Ucraina, Polonia e Regno Unito, oppure da Ucraina, Polonia e Lituania. Secondo i risultati del sondaggio, l\u201985% degli intervistati sostiene l\u2019idea di formare un\u2019alleanza politico-militare composta da Ucraina, Polonia e Regno Unito; l\u201980% sostiene l\u2019idea di un\u2019alleanza politico-militare composta da Ucraina, Polonia e Lituania, e l\u201986% sostiene l\u2019adesione alla NATO, la percentuale di sostegno pi\u00f9 alta nella storia dei sondaggi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Analizziamo le basi della cooperazione nel quadro delle coalizioni sopra menzionate, le prospettive di creare alleanze di sicurezza a partire dai loro accordi e le prospettive di adesione dell\u2019Ucraina alla NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left\">Il Triangolo di Lublino<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Lublin Triangle (L3) initiative was established on the basis of an adopted declaration at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine in Lublin on July 28, 2020. The format refers to the Republic of the Three Nations&#8217; historical, political, and cultural heritage &#8211; Poland, Lithuania, and Rus-Ukraine. The Lublin Triangle is a concept that promotes cooperation on multiple levels. \u201cThe establishment of the Lublin Triangle will have practical significance for political cooperation, military cooperation, and any other cooperation,\u201d Lithuania\u2019s foreign minister optimistically stated at the inaugural meeting in Lublin.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"740\" height=\"424\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-8.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10981\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-8.png 740w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-8-600x344.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-8-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 740px) 100vw, 740px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nel quadro del Triangolo di Lublino sono stati definiti i seguenti ambiti di cooperazione:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Regional policies and security. Countering Russia\u2019s aggressive policies in the region and leveraging NATO capabilities to ensure the region&#8217;s security.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Commercio, investimenti e progetti strutturali per garantire coesione regionale, sviluppo e sicurezza in senso ampio.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Societ\u00e0 civile e comunicazione sociale. Creare legami orizzontali tra gli Stati attraverso la societ\u00e0 civile.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La dimensione istituzionale della cooperazione dell\u2019iniziativa comprende riunioni al vertice dei capi di Stato, incontri dei presidenti dei parlamenti, dei ministri degli esteri e degli ufficiali di collegamento.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The security dimension is very important in the Lublin Triangle agenda. Because of their proximity to Russia and historical experience, Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine, all share a similar perception of \u2018traditional\u2019 military and political threats, as well as a new type of threat in the form of disinformation. Russia is regarded as the primary source of such threats among these countries. In this context, the initiative should serve as a vital forum for regional cooperation in order to maintain regional stability in the face of Russia&#8217;s aggressive policy. This is in everyone\u2019s best interests, especially since Ukraine, by clearly articulating its aspirations for NATO membership, relies on the support of its neighbors (Alliance members) in this regard.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"702\" height=\"469\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-9.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10982\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-9.png 702w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-9-600x401.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-9-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 702px) 100vw, 702px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Il presidente ucraino Volodymyr Zelenskyi, il presidente polacco Andrzej Duda e il presidente lituano Gitanas Nauseda hanno firmato la Dichiarazione del Triangolo di Lublino a sostegno dell\u2019adesione dell\u2019Ucraina all\u2019Unione europea e alla NATO. Fonte: Holos Ukrainy<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In particular, in a declaration on January 11, 2023, the presidents of Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Andrzej Duda, and Gitanas Naus\u0117da stated, at the Lublin Triangle Summit in Lviv, that Lithuania and Poland support Ukraine&#8217;s membership in NATO and are seeking consensus among the Alliance&#8217;s allies on this issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Lublin Triangle not only ensures the political support of its members but also strengthens its own position within the framework of the Central and Eastern European regional framework and NATO security architecture. It will be easier to push through certain solutions and decisions if there is a \u2018Lublin Triangle common position\u2019 or \u2018Lublin Triangle interests\u2019 rather than playing \u2018one-on-one,\u2019 based on individual states&#8217; interests and potential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Quanto alla cooperazione militare, il Gruppo tattico di brigata lituano-polacco-ucraino (con sede, nota bene, a Lublino) richiama la secolare tradizione di cooperazione militare dei tre Paesi. La cooperazione militare potrebbe evolvere in un accordo di difesa pi\u00f9 ampio, che preveda, per esempio, assistenza in caso di conflitto con un Paese terzo (la portata di tale cooperazione pu\u00f2 variare dall\u2019assistenza tecnica alla fornitura di assistenza militare limitata).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Vi sono gi\u00e0 alcuni primi risultati di questa collaborazione. L\u201911 gennaio, il presidente Volodymyr Zelenskyi ha incontrato i leader di Polonia e Lituania, Andrzej Duda e Gitanas Nausda, e sono state prese decisioni importanti per l\u2019Ucraina e la sua risposta all\u2019aggressione russa. Andrzej Duda ha dichiarato che <em>\u00abnell\u2019ambito della formazione di una coalizione internazionale, una compagnia di carri armati Leopard sar\u00e0 trasferita all\u2019Ucraina. La Polonia ha gi\u00e0 preso una decisione in tal senso.\u00bb<\/em> Il presidente Zelenskyi ha espresso gratitudine alla Polonia per la decisione di trasferire i carri armati. Inoltre, ha affermato che la Lituania avrebbe fornito all\u2019Ucraina sistemi di difesa aerea e contraerei. Il leader lituano lo ha confermato, ma non ha specificato quali armi sarebbero state utilizzate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The ongoing war on Ukrainian territory necessitates intensive work by the Ukrainian defense sector. Cooperation in this area could also benefit Ukraine and Poland, both of which are interested in modernizing their armed forces. The Lublin Triangle could be transformed into a military-political alliance, as the alliance members are now more united than ever before by a common threat in the form of Russia. However, for the time being, the Triangle&#8217;s formula is to be a <strong>piattaforma consultiva<\/strong>, pertanto l\u2019istituzionalizzazione della nuova iniziativa \u00e8 fuori discussione.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Closer cooperation within the framework of the Lublin Triangle may be hampered in the future by strained relations conditioned by differences in interests, mutual perceptions, and historical policies. This has been most visible in Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Lithuanian relations &#8211; in this context, the initiative may become a factor for improving bilateral relations, by reducing competing interests, but it may also be a weakness of the initiative, e.g., if circles in either country that are historically antagonistic towards their neighbors take power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left\">Patto trilaterale britannico-polacco-ucraino<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The British\u2013Polish\u2013Ukrainian trilateral pact is a trilateral military and political cooperation format between the United Kingdom, Poland, and Ukraine to counter the Russian threat and work for European security. The formation of a new London-Warsaw-Kyiv axis coincides with a significant deterioration in Ukraine&#8217;s border security and the United Kingdom&#8217;s active supply of weapons to Ukraine. Representatives of the three newly allied countries said in a statement that the countries have \u201cdeep historical ties\u201d and \u201ca common history of confronting aggressors who threaten freedom in Europe.\u201d The alliance&#8217;s stated goal is to \u201cwork together to ensure stability and strengthen Ukraine&#8217;s resilience by reinforcing democracy along the border in Eastern Europe\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"787\" height=\"589\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-10.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10983\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-10.png 787w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-10-600x449.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-10-768x575.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-10-16x12.png 16w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 787px) 100vw, 787px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Fonte: Council on Geostrategy<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Ucraina ha avviato questa cooperazione trilaterale nell\u2019ottobre 2021. Il 1\u00b0 febbraio 2022, il ministro degli esteri ucraino Dmytro Kuleba ha annunciato una piccola alleanza tra Ucraina, Regno Unito e Polonia. Il lancio dell\u2019alleanza \u00e8 stato annunciato il 17 febbraio 2022, ma essa non ha ancora un nome ufficiale n\u00e9 \u00e8 documentata; tuttavia, ha gi\u00e0 iniziato a funzionare nella pratica.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Inizialmente la cooperazione si \u00e8 concentrata sul coordinamento del sostegno alla Piattaforma Crimea, sulla cooperazione in materia di sicurezza informatica ed energetica e sul rafforzamento delle comunicazioni strategiche. La cooperazione e l\u2019interazione militari potrebbero essere ambiti di cooperazione nell\u2019alleanza, ma \u00e8 troppo presto per dire se saranno quelli principali. Questo perch\u00e9 il Regno Unito fornisce assistenza all\u2019Ucraina direttamente, anzich\u00e9 nel contesto di un\u2019alleanza.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"741\" height=\"494\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-11.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10984\" style=\"width:741px;height:494px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-11.png 741w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-11-600x400.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-11-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 741px) 100vw, 741px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>La ministra degli esteri britannica Liz Truss (S) e il ministro degli esteri ucraino Dmytro Kuleba partecipano a una conferenza stampa congiunta dopo i loro colloqui a Kyiv, il 17 feb. 2022. (Foto di Efrem Lukatsky\/Pool\/AFP via Getty Images)<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019esperto militare ucraino Oleh Zhdanov prevede che, se i tre Paesi riusciranno a raggiungere un accordo in quanto alleati, vi sar\u00e0 probabilmente coordinamento tra stati maggiori e comandi militari, nonch\u00e9 aiuti militari, anzich\u00e9 il solo sostegno tecnico in materia di difesa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ukraine&#8217;s interest in this type of cooperation can be explained by the fact that it will be easier to rely on practical and concrete assistance from countries that are already willing to assist, i.e., no time is required to reach a consensus among countries in larger alliances such as the European Union or NATO. However, Poland and the United Kingdom have influence in these alliances, and as in the case of the Lublin Triangle, they will be able to better convey Ukraine\u2019s position and requests, whether in the EU or NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Oleksii Danilov, segretario del Consiglio nazionale di sicurezza e difesa dell\u2019Ucraina, ritiene che l\u2019Ucraina debba formare un\u2019alleanza di difesa con un Paese dotato di armi nucleari. In un\u2019intervista del 15 marzo, il politico ha indicato che tale Paese \u00e8 il Regno Unito.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u00abMolte organizzazioni internazionali formate dopo la Seconda guerra mondiale non hanno alcuna influenza e si limitano a esprimere preoccupazione. L\u2019Ucraina deve aderire a una nuova alleanza di difesa che includa uno Stato dotato di armi nucleari. Attualmente, si tratta del Regno Unito.\u00bb<\/em> Danilov&#8217;s words were quoted by the National Security and Defense Council&#8217;s press service.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By taking part in the trilateral cooperation initiative, the United Kingdom is pursuing a \u201cglobal Britain\u201d policy and attempting to play an active role in the world outside of the European Union. The concept of \u201cglobal Britain\u201d first appeared in the policy document \u201cGlobal Britain in a Competitive Age\u201d, a year after the UK\u2019s withdrawal from the European Union. The same document identifies Russia as the primary threat to NATO and the United Kingdom while emphasizing support for Ukraine&#8217;s territorial integrity and willingness to assist in the development of Ukrainian armed forces. Due to the fact that not all NATO countries are prepared to decisively counter the Russian threat, Britain continues to use small alliance tactics to work more effectively in Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"696\" height=\"463\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-12.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10985\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-12.png 696w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-12-600x399.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-12-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Il primo ministro polacco Mateusz Morawiecki e il primo ministro ucraino Denys Shmygal partecipano a un briefing per la stampa dopo i loro colloqui a Kyiv, Ucraina, 1\u00b0 febbraio 2022. REUTERS\/Valentyn Ogirenko<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La Russia rappresenta una minaccia anche per la Polonia, pertanto le capacit\u00e0 difensive sviluppate dall\u2019Ucraina avranno un impatto sulla sicurezza polacca. La Polonia rafforza inoltre la propria posizione nell\u2019UE e nella NATO grazie alla partecipazione attiva a piccole alleanze. Secondo il primo ministro polacco Mateusz Morawiecki, il principale vantaggio del nuovo formato di cooperazione consiste nel rafforzare la sicurezza regionale. L\u2019attacco ibrido del regime di Lukashenko al confine polacco-bielorusso costituisce un ulteriore argomento per la Polonia. Un\u2019altra questione di sicurezza per la Polonia \u00e8 la probabile concentrazione permanente di truppe russe in Bielorussia. Di conseguenza, \u00e8 necessario concentrarsi sul rafforzamento del fianco orientale e dei confini della Polonia, che sono anche frontiere esterne dell\u2019Unione europea e della NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Attualmente, mentre \u00e8 in corso l\u2019aggressione russa, il Regno Unito \u00e8 tra i maggiori fornitori di assistenza militare e di sicurezza all\u2019Ucraina; la Polonia, avendo un naturale interesse al rafforzamento delle capacit\u00e0 difensive ucraine, coopera con l\u2019Ucraina su un piano pi\u00f9 ampio, che va oltre l\u2019ambito della sicurezza. <em>\u00abQuesto li pone sullo stesso piano dei britannici, li rafforza all\u2019interno dell\u2019Unione europea e dimostra che la Polonia coinvolge la Gran Bretagna in compiti di sicurezza ai quali \u00e8 interessata l\u2019intera UE\u00bb,<\/em> afferma Serhii Herasymchuk, vicedirettore del Consiglio di politica estera \u00abUkrainian Prism\u00bb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u201cDeeper cooperation in this triangle appears to be natural. After all, we&#8217;re talking about two countries that take Russia&#8217;s threat seriously and have dealt with it to varying degrees. Because not all NATO countries are prepared to resolutely counter the Russian threat, Britain continues to use small alliance tactics to work more effectively in Eastern Europe. As a result, a three-way alliance can function as a Small Entente, similar to how Central and Eastern Europe formed a small bloc and shared the goals of the Great Entente in the early twentieth century.\u201d<\/em> &#8211; says expert Oleksandr Kraiev.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left\">NATO<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">NATO is a military-political alliance with a history dating back more than 70 years, whose primary function is to provide member states with mutual defense through civilian and military means. And it also serves as a forum for cooperation and consultation in a variety of other security-related areas. The Alliance is based on the North Atlantic Treaty, which was drafted in Washington on April 4, 1949, and is currently in effect indefinitely. After WWII, the Soviet Union and its satellite states posed a growing political and military threat to Western countries, prompting the treaty&#8217;s conclusion. The key provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, a founding act of NATO, concern the principles of member states&#8217; defense self-sufficiency (Article 3), allied consultations on security matters (Article 4), mutual assistance in a situation of armed aggression &#8211; the so-called \u201ccollective defense\u201d (Article 5), its application to the sum of the allied states&#8217; territories (Article 6), and the conditions for the organization&#8217;s enlargement (Article 10.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After Ukraine became independent in 1991, it initially pursued a non-aligned foreign policy, which meant it did not join any military alliances.&nbsp; Ukraine began cooperating with NATO in 1994, but it wasn&#8217;t until 2002 that it officially declared its desire to join the alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"739\" height=\"477\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-13.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10986\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-13.png 739w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-13-600x387.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-13-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 739px) 100vw, 739px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Ukraine&#8217;s President Viktor Yushchenko talks with US President George W. Bush, at the NATO Summit conference in Bucharest, where one of the most controversial decisions of the Alliance was made. Thursday, April 3, 2008. Source: White House by Eric Draper.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nel 2008, all\u2019Ucraina, insieme alla Georgia, fu promesso un Piano d\u2019azione per l\u2019adesione alla NATO, che avrebbe portato all\u2019adesione dell\u2019Ucraina alla NATO. Tuttavia, l\u2019opposizione politica interna all\u2019Ucraina e quella della Russia, che considerava l\u2019espansione della NATO una minaccia, hanno bloccato le prospettive di adesione dell\u2019Ucraina e il piano non fu mai proposto ufficialmente. La corruzione, le questioni politiche, l\u2019insufficienza delle riforme e, in aggiunta, l\u2019aggressione russa contro l\u2019Ucraina, che ha portato all\u2019annessione di territori ucraini, hanno ostacolato il percorso del Paese verso la NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ciononostante, nel giugno 2017 il parlamento ucraino ha riconosciuto l\u2019adesione alla NATO come obiettivo di politica estera del Paese e, nel febbraio 2019, l\u2019obiettivo di aderire alla NATO e all\u2019UE \u00e8 stato inserito nella Costituzione.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014, the annexation of Crimea, and the creation of Russian proxies in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, NATO responded by reinforcing the alliance&#8217;s defenses in Eastern Europe and halting all civilian and military cooperation with Russia. But for Russia, the lack of a strong consolidated response, which would entail steps to actively support Ukrainian resistance, proved to be a signal of the appropriateness of further campaigning against Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty and independence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the time frame that preceded the full-scale Russian invasion, the Ukrainian-NATO partnership encompassed various initiatives, such as enhancing Ukraine&#8217;s abilities and compatibility with NATO forces, facilitating reforms in the country`s defense and security sectors, and supporting non-military endeavors like joint scientific research and public diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tuttavia, l\u2019adesione dell\u2019Ucraina all\u2019organizzazione rimase fuori dal tavolo dei negoziati. Un elenco di \u00abostacoli\u00bb comprendeva la riluttanza della popolazione del Paese ad aderire all\u2019Alleanza, il cui sostegno \u00e8 passato dal 19% degli ucraini nell\u2019ottobre 2012 al 47% nel gennaio 2016 e all\u201986% nel 2023 (secondo i sondaggi Rating del 2012, 2016 e 2023); l\u2019impossibilit\u00e0 di aderire a causa del conflitto in corso; e il timore di provocare la Russia, che tradizionalmente ha trattenuto la NATO da un impegno pi\u00f9 profondo con l\u2019Ucraina.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dopo lo scoppio della guerra di aggressione russa su vasta scala nel 2022, i Paesi membri della NATO non sono riusciti a raggiungere un accordo sull\u2019adesione dell\u2019Ucraina all\u2019alleanza, temendo che avrebbe aggravato le relazioni con la Russia e portato al coinvolgimento diretto della NATO nella guerra. L\u2019Alleanza ha per\u00f2 sostenuto gli sforzi dell\u2019Ucraina per difendere la propria indipendenza e integrit\u00e0 territoriale. Dall\u2019inizio dell\u2019invasione su vasta scala, gli Stati membri della NATO hanno fornito all\u2019Ucraina consistenti aiuti militari per miliardi di dollari e si sono impegnati a proseguirli \u00abper tutto il tempo necessario\u00bb. Per questo motivo, l\u2019Ucraina ha gi\u00e0 ricevuto un gran numero di sistemi d\u2019arma standard NATO che, a lungo termine, avvicineranno in modo significativo le forze armate ucraine agli standard della NATO, poich\u00e9 le armi di epoca sovietica si stanno rapidamente esaurendo sul campo di battaglia.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In effetti, la riuscita difesa dell\u2019Ucraina contro l\u2019offensiva russa l\u2019ha resa un alleato pi\u00f9 promettente per la NATO. L\u2019Ucraina dispone ora di uno degli eserciti pi\u00f9 numerosi d\u2019Europa, temprato in battaglia e addestrato a usare armamenti occidentali moderni in combattimento reale. Inoltre, le operazioni delle unit\u00e0 ucraine, condotte contro un nemico molto pi\u00f9 numeroso, sono ora studiate per consentire all\u2019organizzazione una risposta pi\u00f9 efficace e rapida a potenziali minacce alla sicurezza. Pertanto, la potenziale adesione dell\u2019Ucraina rafforzer\u00e0 significativamente il potenziale militare dell\u2019Alleanza.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"735\" height=\"490\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-14.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10987\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-14.png 735w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-14-600x400.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-14-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 735px) 100vw, 735px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Il presidente Volodymyr Zelenskyi ha annunciato a sorpresa una candidatura per l\u2019adesione accelerata all\u2019alleanza militare NATO il 30 set. 2022. Foto: Ufficio presidenziale ucraino. <\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Remarkably, Russia\u2019s unprecedented war against Ukraine prompted the accession of two other countries to NATO: Sweden and Finland. They applied under the simplified procedure (without MAP), which Ukraine also did on September 30, 2022. And although there is still no explicit agreement on Ukraine\u2019s accession, there are now hopes that the words of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg that \u201cNATO&#8217;s doors are open\u201d will have a practical implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La situazione attuale ha smentito molte delle precedenti argomentazioni contro l\u2019adesione dell\u2019Ucraina alla NATO e pertanto le prospettive di aderire all\u2019alleanza dopo la guerra sembrano pi\u00f9 concrete che mai. L\u2019adesione dell\u2019Ucraina all\u2019Alleanza dovrebbe risolvere l\u2019eterno problema del Paese nel ruolo di zona cuscinetto tra NATO e Russia, nonch\u00e9 garantire pace e prosperit\u00e0 nell\u2019Europa orientale, impossibili senza meccanismi efficaci per contenere le inclinazioni aggressive dei Paesi ostili.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In conclusione, la politica dell\u2019Ucraina volta ad avviare cooperazioni in materia di sicurezza \u00e8 una decisione sensata che ne rafforza la posizione nell\u2019arena internazionale. Dimostrando la volont\u00e0 di essere un alleato affidabile e di adempiere alle proprie responsabilit\u00e0, l\u2019Ucraina aumenta le proprie possibilit\u00e0 di essere ascoltata e riconosciuta come partner di valore. Il Triangolo di Lublino e il patto trilaterale britannico-polacco-ucraino contribuiscono gi\u00e0 agli sforzi dell\u2019Ucraina per difendere la propria sovranit\u00e0 e integrit\u00e0 territoriale, e tali partenariati possono evolvere in un\u2019alleanza di sicurezza con solide garanzie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tuttavia, il desiderio dell\u2019Ucraina di aderire alla NATO deve ancora realizzarsi e il percorso futuro resta incerto. Sebbene l\u2019ambizione dell\u2019Ucraina di diventare membro della NATO possa realizzarsi in futuro, essa dipende da vari fattori, tra cui una sconfitta completa della Russia. Nonostante questi ostacoli, gli sforzi dell\u2019Ucraina per promuovere la cooperazione in materia di sicurezza sono encomiabili e possono recare beneficio a tutti i partecipanti.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>States are the only subjects of international law, that possess international legal capacity, i.e.: to maintain diplomatic and consular relations, participate in international organizations, enter into agreements, bear international responsibility, have their citizenship, etc. As a participant in international relations, Ukraine must understand its goals, needs, options for action, and the means at its disposal [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":10983,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13,58],"tags":[],"topic":[91,110,87,86],"class_list":["post-10979","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","category-eng-western-europe","topic-eu","topic-nato","topic-security","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Ukraine\u2019s Security Pacts and Alliances | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This analysis reviews Ukraine\u2019s recent security agreements and alliances, assessing their contribution to deterrence and longer-term security guarantees.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, 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