{"id":9776,"date":"2023-01-26T10:30:00","date_gmt":"2023-01-26T08:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=9776"},"modified":"2025-08-03T10:53:58","modified_gmt":"2025-08-03T07:53:58","slug":"peace-talks-why-kyiv-should-not-negotiate-ceasefire-with-moscow","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2023\/01\/26\/peace-talks-why-kyiv-should-not-negotiate-ceasefire-with-moscow\/","title":{"rendered":"Pourparlers de paix : pourquoi Kyiv ne devrait pas n\u00e9gocier un cessez-le-feu avec Moscou"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #000000\" data-attachment-id=\"18049\" data-page-id=\"8262\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">589 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since the beginning of the Russian invasion at the end of February 2022, possible negotiations and peace between Russia and Ukraine have been widely discussed. This idea was prevalent in the Western media and in the political discourse of many states. In spite of most countries and their chief analysts believing that Ukraine would fall in a few days, brokering a cold peace or another &#8220;Minsk-3&#8221; seemed quite favorable \u2013 it would satisfy Russia&#8217;s needs, formalize support for Ukraine, allow Western countries to continue doing &#8220;business as usual&#8221; with Moscow, and reduce any additional costs that the West would be faced with. The successful defensive and counter-offensive operations conducted by Ukraine and the incredible resilience of Ukrainians showed that Ukraine could not only withstand Russian aggression but even make Russia pay a huge price for its war of choice. Furthermore, influential politicians and military professionals claimed that Ukraine was capable of liberating all the occupied territories of Russia, including the regions occupied before the full-scale invasion, as well as the Crimea peninsula, which did not exactly coincide with the beliefs of some world leaders, international relations scholars and analysts.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"468\" height=\"282\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-82.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9778\" style=\"width:397px;height:239px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-82.png 468w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-82-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 468px) 100vw, 468px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>N\u00e9gociations entre les d\u00e9l\u00e9gations de Russie<\/em><br><em> et d\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 Istanbul, le 29 mars 2022<\/em><br> <em>Cem Ozdel\/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les int\u00e9r\u00eats des parties bellig\u00e9rantes sont profond\u00e9ment incompatibles. Cela est devenu \u00e9vident lors des premi\u00e8res tentatives de pourparlers de paix entre la Russie et l\u2019Ukraine, qui se sont d\u2019abord d\u00e9roul\u00e9es en Bi\u00e9lorussie avant de se poursuivre en Turquie. Plusieurs cycles de n\u00e9gociations n\u2019ont pas produit les r\u00e9sultats tangibles majeurs que l\u2019Occident pouvait esp\u00e9rer. Beaucoup ont affirm\u00e9 que le gouvernement russe n\u2019\u00e9tait aucunement int\u00e9ress\u00e9 par une solution diplomatique, comme le montrait la formulation de ses objectifs de \u00ab d\u00e9militarisation \u00bb et de \u00ab d\u00e9nazification \u00bb de l\u2019Ukraine. L\u2019Ukraine a toutefois fait preuve de davantage de souplesse que la Russie : Kyiv \u00e9tait pr\u00eat \u00e0 certains compromis concernant son statut de neutralit\u00e9, la question de la langue russe et le retour au statu quo ant\u00e9rieur au 24 f\u00e9vrier. \u00c0 ce jour, il semble que les deux objectifs myst\u00e9rieux susmentionn\u00e9s restent pertinents pour l\u2019establishment politique russe. Cela indique que la Russie reste d\u00e9termin\u00e9e \u00e0 conqu\u00e9rir l\u2019Ukraine par tous les moyens : tuer quiconque s\u2019y oppose et d\u00e9truire l\u2019Ukraine avec son identit\u00e9 nationale. Par cons\u00e9quent, l\u2019Ukraine n\u2019est pas dispos\u00e9e \u00e0 signer un nouvel accord \u00ab Minsk-3 \u00bb, qui ne fournirait ni garanties de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 ni r\u00e9tablissement complet de la souverainet\u00e9 et de l\u2019int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale dans les fronti\u00e8res de 1991.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Due to the fact that Ukraine liberated parts of the territories occupied by Russia and found much evidence of its war crimes, it is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to negotiate a just peace with Russia. Moreover, no one in Ukraine supports any exchange of territories to end the conflict, which has caused countless tragedies in Ukrainian society.&nbsp; According to a poll run by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in December, <strong>85 % des personnes interrog\u00e9es<\/strong> across the country believe that even though the war may last longer and Ukraine&#8217;s independence may be threatened, <strong>l\u2019Ukraine ne devrait renoncer \u00e0 aucun de ses territoires, quelles que soient les circonstances<\/strong>. The vital interests of the parties are diametrically opposite, making diplomatic compromise nearly impossible. Yet, some positive results emerged from the negotiations, such as the release of some prisoners of war and the unblocking of Ukraine&#8217;s Black Sea ports to allow grain exports to be restored in order to address the food crisis caused by the invasion. But again, this was only possible because Russia had an interest. For example, Russia claimed it was facing problems exporting agricultural products and mineral fertilizers because of sanctions. Moscow uses any diplomatic initiative to make tradeoffs in order to lift certain sanctions that harm the Russian economy. Ukrainian analysts sometimes refer to this as <strong>&#8220;a strategy of small compromises&#8221;<\/strong> que la Russie emploie afin de maintenir ses relations avec l\u2019Occident et d\u2019obtenir de lui des concessions pour pouvoir proclamer sa victoire devant son opinion publique. Autrement dit, la Russie peut affirmer qu\u2019elle reste une grande puissance et que les autres grandes puissances doivent tenir compte de sa position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Le discours sur les pourparlers de paix et la m\u00e9connaissance des intentions russes<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After the all-out war broke out, calls for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine were made by various actors. \u201cGive diplomacy a chance\u201d is probably the most commonly used phrase that leads one to believe that all conflicts are resolved by diplomatic means. Probably. This is, however, not the case in this war. Sometimes, these calls were formulated in the way that the West should exert pressure on Ukraine and make it negotiate with Russia. Furthermore, such proposals were made by US military leadership or members of Joe Biden&#8217;s administration, which received a lot of criticism. For instance, General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is the US\u2019s highest-ranking military officer, during several forums suggested that Ukraine\u2019s successful operations on the ground created a <em>&#8220;window of opportunity&#8221;<\/em> pour engager des n\u00e9gociations avec la Russie en position de force. Il a \u00e9galement indiqu\u00e9 qu\u2019il imaginait difficilement l\u2019Ukraine vaincre la Russie pendant l\u2019hiver. Une autre illusion fr\u00e9quemment reprise par la presse et les responsables politiques est que l\u2019hiver rend difficile la conduite d\u2019op\u00e9rations militaires et la d\u00e9faite de l\u2019ennemi. Les \u00c9tats-Unis, par exemple, n\u2019ont pas men\u00e9 de campagne hivernale depuis la guerre de Cor\u00e9e, tandis que l\u2019Ukraine a acquis une exp\u00e9rience du combat hivernal depuis l\u2019invasion russe de 2014. Selon les conditions m\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques, les performances militaires peuvent se d\u00e9grader ou s\u2019am\u00e9liorer. Elles ne devraient donc pas servir de moyen de <strong>faire pression sur l\u2019Ukraine pour qu\u2019elle n\u00e9gocie<\/strong>. The only fact that Milley advocated for negotiations makes it surprising. Being a member of the US military, he should be familiar with this and should understand Russia&#8217;s true intentions in this war as he receives all necessary intelligence.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"393\" height=\"230\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-83.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9779\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-83.png 393w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-83-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 393px) 100vw, 393px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Un nouveau scandale impliquant Elon Musk illustre une fois de plus le niveau d\u2019incompr\u00e9hension et de m\u00e9connaissance de la Russie en Occident. Musk a propos\u00e9 des conditions inacceptables pour r\u00e9gler le conflit : de nouvelles \u00e9lections dans les territoires des r\u00e9gions de Louhansk et de Donetsk occup\u00e9s avant le 24 f\u00e9vrier, la reconnaissance de la Crim\u00e9e comme partie de la Russie, la garantie de l\u2019approvisionnement en eau de la p\u00e9ninsule et la neutralit\u00e9 de l\u2019Ukraine. Aux yeux des Ukrainiens, cela apparaissait comme une proposition de politique renouvel\u00e9e d\u2019 <strong>apaisement<\/strong> that would not end the war but only encourage the aggressor to annex more territories. The case of Elon Musk\u2019s tweets also demonstrates that the West is still under the influence of Russian propaganda. It might seem that Musk has nothing to do with international politics, though his stance became a climax point of what was discussed by many political analysts since the start of the invasion. Such an attitude unites those under the influence of the Russian legacy of being a great nuclear power, the interests of which should be considered first in the decision-making process. Moreover, it highlights that many in the West tend to forget about the historical lessons that the world was supposed to learn after the end of World War II. It is not even surprising that the only country that openly supported Musk\u2019s \u201cpeace plan\u201d was Russia and its propagandists. Furthermore, Pope Francis urged Ukraine&#8217;s President Volodymyr Zelenskyi to engage in serious negotiations with Russia and that &#8220;all actors in international life and political leaders should do everything possible to end this conflict&#8221;, preventing &#8220;a dangerous escalation.&#8221; This once again shows a low understanding of the conflict and the situation on the ground. Therefore, such calls only play in the hands of Russia and create a false perception about Ukraine which \u201cdoes not want peace and rejects any proposal of this type\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le 24 octobre, un groupe de d\u00e9mocrates progressistes a envoy\u00e9 une lettre \u00e0 Joe Biden, lui demandant de rechercher d\u2019urgence les possibilit\u00e9s d\u2019 <strong>instaurer un cessez-le-feu<\/strong> in Ukraine. They also asked him to start negotiations with Russia. It was based on fears of a Russian nuclear attack and the outbreak of World War III. After facing strong criticism, the letter was retracted the next day. The letter was sent several weeks after Russia started shelling Ukraine\u2019s energy and critical infrastructure, causing a dire humanitarian crisis. The appeal of these Congress members sent a troubling signal, which doubted the support efforts that the US and other allies have already provided to Ukraine and highlighted another threat: possible interference of Russia in US domestic politics. For instance, Russia might use various influential political figures within the US in order to push the agenda of a &#8220;diplomatic solution\u201d that would benefit only Russia. There is a possibility that the RF could try to take advantage of it to further destabilize the US by sowing discord and tension between political parties. In such a way Russia would get a divided US that is facing difficulties agreeing on military assistance and other types of aid to Ukraine. By promoting the talks\u2019 agenda, Russia would achieve a frozen conflict and have time to regroup and prepare for a new invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It seems that the numerous calls to negotiate with Moscow, articles in journals and newspapers, and the analyses provided by the Western expert and scientific communities highlight another major issue &#8211; many in the West still <strong>regardent l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 travers le prisme de la Russie<\/strong>. It is indeed a boiling issue since it limits the scope of research, resulting in misperceptions of both countries. Such a problem is especially evident in Western research institutions where experts on Russia and Eurasia believe they are very well aware of Ukraine, simply because they studied Russia or lived there. As a matter of fact, many researchers look at Ukraine from Russia&#8217;s perspective, as a major power in the post-Soviet region, whose interests are above the interests of all the other neighboring countries. It actually plays into Russia&#8217;s vision of sovereignty that dates back to the 19th-century absolutist interpretation. Specifically, it regards the use of force against neighbors as a vital means corresponding to the status of a great power. Furthermore, many in academia still believe that Ukraine belongs to Russia\u2019s \u201cborderlands\u201d or to the \u201csphere of privileged interests\u201d as once declared by Dmitry Medvedev, derived from the Cold War competition between the US and the Soviet Union. By acknowledging this and simultaneously disregarding Ukraine as a sovereign nation, analysis of Ukraine as something inextricably linked to Russia undermines the possibility of understanding the Kremlin&#8217;s motivations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this respect, it is noteworthy to quote Andreas Umland, political scientist and analyst of the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, who said that Russian leadership engages in aggression after they know that it will result in a victory. Russia\u2019s victories in Moldova, Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine (in 2014) did not dampen Moscow&#8217;s appetites. In contrast to popular belief, Russia was preparing for other military operations. That is why it is dangerous to misperceive Russian intentions, as any potential gain or victory will lead to another wave of aggression until Russia is stopped.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sans exag\u00e9ration, la Russie ne peut \u00eatre arr\u00eat\u00e9e que par la force, et non par la n\u00e9gociation diplomatique comme beaucoup ont tendance \u00e0 le croire. Au lieu de chercher des contre-arguments expliquant pourquoi l\u2019Ukraine ne devrait pas gagner, pourquoi la Russie ne devrait pas perdre ou pourquoi il faudrait sauver la face de Poutine, l\u2019Occident devrait mener un travail syst\u00e9matique pour expliquer en quoi la victoire de l\u2019Ukraine est importante non seulement pour l\u2019Ukraine, mais pour le monde entier. Ce travail exigerait un important <strong>r\u00e9examen du comportement de la Russie dans diff\u00e9rents conflits<\/strong>. The role of history cannot be underestimated in current realities, as Russian conduct is largely determined by historical precedents. Each time the West shows weakness toward Russia, Moscow is not afraid to use any means, including military ones. As part of this discussion, Ukraine&#8217;s foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba suggested that the West should &#8220;better prepare for Russian defeat already now, instead of trying to explain why Ukraine cannot or should not win.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>La participation de la Russie aux pourparlers de paix : les accords de Khassaviourt et les n\u00e9gociations de Minsk<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When one approaches Russia\u2019s behavior during various conflicts, it is possible to trace a common pattern or strategy that Russia sticks to. Russia has been involved in numerous military actions and negotiation processes in the post-Soviet space and beyond. My suggestion is to focus on two examples &#8211; the Khasavyurt Accords signed as a result of The First Chechen War, and the Minsk negotiations during Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine in 2014-2015. The ending of The First Chechen War demonstrates that even if you manage to reach a diplomatic agreement with Russia, <strong>Moscou ne le respectera que s\u2019il correspond \u00e0 ses propres int\u00e9r\u00eats<\/strong>. Russia, as demonstrated in the case of Chechnya, attempts to achieve an agreement that can be interpreted in a variety of ways through the use of unclear language. During the first Chechen campaign, Russia hoped to suppress the political party of Dzhokhar Dudayev, who sought to gain independence for Chechnya. As long as previous Russian attempts to remove Dudayev failed, Moscow started drafting plans for military intervention, which was supposed to be conducted in a blitzkrieg manner. However, despite Russian hopes for a quick siege, the campaign lasted for almost two years. This is because the Russians could not find a way to fight the guerrilla warfare tactics of the Chechens. Even considering Russia\u2019s advantage in manpower, weaponry, and air superiority, the Russian military faced severe casualties, which triggered a political and socio-economic crisis within the country. There were also heavy casualties among the civilian population &#8211; estimates suggest that Chechens lost around 100,000 civilians, mostly during Russia&#8217;s assault on Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. It was the demoralized Russian forces, and the Russian population&#8217;s opposition to a long-term conflict, that made Russia and President Yeltsin pursue negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"215\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84-1024x215.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9780\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84-1024x215.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84-600x126.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84-768x161.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84-18x4.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-84.png 1049w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Premi\u00e8re guerre de Tch\u00e9tch\u00e9nie. Images de Grozny, capitale de la Tch\u00e9tch\u00e9nie, apr\u00e8s d\u2019intenses bombardements russes.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the first Chechen campaign, Russia discovered that its military had not been ready to fight against the Chechens. The war exposed the weaknesses of the Russian army and no one in the Kremlin denied that it should be reformed. Representatives of Russia and Chechnya signed the Khasavyurt agreement in 1996. According to the agreement, the conflict between Russia and Chechnya should have been resolved through political means. A deadline was set for withdrawing federal troops from Chechnya. Also, Russia was to provide assistance for the restoration of the Republic&#8217;s social and economic structure. Experts note, however, that the agreement did not explain how the parties planned to address the root cause of the conflict \u2013 Chechen aspirations for independence. Observers claim that even the wording of the agreement was vague, leaving Russia some flexibility for maneuvering in the future. Others mentioned that Russia recognized the independent Chechen Republic by signing the Khasavyurt accord. In spite of this, experts in international law argue, referring in the document to the parties acting according to international law does not mean independence is recognized. Also pertinent to mention is the fact that the outcome of the First Chechen War also divided Russian society and the army. For instance, some of the Russian generals said that \u201ctheir victory was stolen\u201d and they were not presented with a final chance to defeat the guerrillas. Russia\u2019s ultra-patriots called the Khasavyurt accord to be &#8220;capitulatory&#8221; and &#8220;treacherous&#8221; for Russia. This, in its turn, paved the way for <strong>sentiments revanchards<\/strong> au sein de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 russe et des \u00e9lites politiques russes, qui exigeaient une victoire, fondement de leur l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"412\" height=\"281\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-85.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9781\" style=\"width:398px;height:271px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-85.png 412w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-85-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 412px) 100vw, 412px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Pr\u00e9sident de la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie B. Eltsine et pr\u00e9sident<\/em><br><em> de la R\u00e9publique tch\u00e9tch\u00e8ne d\u2019Itchk\u00e9rie <\/em><br><em>A. Maskhadov \u00e0 Moscou, le 12 mai 1997<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Because of this, the Khasavyurt accord is a clear example of how Russia keeps trying to reach its goals after it loses. Moscow tries to gain victory by fixing its previous mistakes, organizing better plans for military operations and reorganizing its military forces. Russia also changed its communication strategy and prioritized information warfare. In effect, Russian propagandists described The Second Chechen War as a different war, emphasizing the &#8220;terrorist nature of the Chechen threat&#8221;. They continued to mention apartment bombings in Moscow and other cities, which many researchers claim is the work of the FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) in order to justify a new war. And Russian society gradually changed its opinion on the Chechen War. 65% of respondents to a public opinion poll stated they support keeping Chechnya in Russia through all means, including military ones. Using the case of the First Chechen War to link to current events, one could find interesting comments by Russian propagandist Zakhar Prilepin. In an argument with Olga Skabeeva, another top Russian propagandist, he argued that Russia would not achieve its goals by shelling Ukraine&#8217;s infrastructure. Instead, Moscow has to negotiate with Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Moreover, Prilepin went further and openly said that Russia had to <strong>contraindre l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 n\u00e9gocier avec la Russie<\/strong>. En effet, Moscou sera occup\u00e9e \u00e0 regrouper ses forces et, au final, sera de toute fa\u00e7on pr\u00eate \u00e0 achever la guerre par une offensive militaire. En outre, sans aucune h\u00e9sitation, il a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que <strong>la Russie a besoin d\u2019un \u00ab nouveau Khassaviourt \u00bb<\/strong>, which is of course going to be a shame for Russia but will only be of a temporary character for Moscow. Russia&#8217;s true intentions cannot be explained by taking the words of Russia&#8217;s propaganda seriously. Even so, given the fact that Russia&#8217;s TV propaganda shows are often staged, one might logically assume that they were ordered by the Kremlin to convey the message that Russia needs negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"447\" height=\"276\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-86.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9782\" style=\"width:383px;height:236px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-86.png 447w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-86-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 447px) 100vw, 447px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Les deuxi\u00e8mes pourparlers de Normandie \u00e0 Milan, le <\/em><br><em>17 octobre 2014.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is crucial to track the outcome of the Minsk negotiations &#8211; back in 2014-2015, when Ukraine was forced to negotiate with Russia in light of the failures on the battlefield. In reality, Ukraine negotiated with Russia under pressure, which came not only from the Kremlin but also from partners of Ukraine &#8211; Germany and France, who acted as mediators during the conflict. In the first attempt to establish peace, the Trilateral Contact Group, which consisted of representatives from Ukraine, the OSCE, and Russia, drew the Minsk Protocol. The representatives of the so-called \u201cDPR\u201d and \u201cLPR\u201d were also among the signatories. The protocol failed to produce any results because Russia-led mercenaries continued to breach the ceasefire agreement and launched an offensive operation on Donetsk Airport. Moreover, a few days before the Protocol was signed, Ukrainian forces were encircled during the Battle for Ilovaysk, which became one of the most tragic chapters in the history of the Russian invasion. Before that, Ukrainian troops liberated one town after another. However, regular forces of the Russian army crossed the border on August 23 and 24, shifting the balance and creating unfavorable conditions for Ukrainian forces on the ground. Since Ukrainian troops were encircled, the Russian side proposed opening a humanitarian corridor, which was then ruthlessly shelled by the Russian army. The estimated number of casualties ranges, however, according to the preliminary investigation, Ukraine lost 366 killed and 429 wounded soldiers, 128 were captured and 158 were missing. The only episode of Ilovaysk indicates what Russia\u2019s guarantees really mean in practice.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"443\" height=\"296\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-87.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-9783\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-87.png 443w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/image-87-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 443px) 100vw, 443px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Comm\u00e9moration des soldats ukrainiens tu\u00e9s <\/em><br><em>lors des batailles de Debaltseve dans la ville de <\/em><br><em>Loutsk, le 18 f\u00e9vrier 2021<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Malgr\u00e9 le cessez-le-feu convenu dans le cadre du protocole de Minsk, les Russes ont continu\u00e9 de bombarder le territoire ukrainien et d\u2019y avancer. Ils sont parvenus \u00e0 prendre l\u2019a\u00e9roport de Donetsk apr\u00e8s que les troupes ukrainiennes l\u2019eurent d\u00e9fendu pendant 242 jours. \u00c0 la fin janvier 2015, le protocole de Minsk s\u2019\u00e9tait compl\u00e8tement effondr\u00e9, car la Russie ne le prenait pas au s\u00e9rieux. La n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d\u2019un nouveau cycle de n\u00e9gociations a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9clench\u00e9e par une autre bataille autour de la ville strat\u00e9giquement importante de Debaltseve. Cette ville est situ\u00e9e \u00e0 un carrefour routier et ferroviaire. Bien que l\u2019Ukraine, la Russie, l\u2019Allemagne et la France aient tenu des pourparlers le 12 f\u00e9vrier et sign\u00e9 un accord, les forces russes ont continu\u00e9 de bombarder Debaltseve et de mener un assaut contre la ville. Il en a r\u00e9sult\u00e9 de lourdes pertes parmi les soldats ukrainiens. Il semble que la Russie ait d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9ment retard\u00e9 la signature du document afin d\u2019accro\u00eetre son pouvoir de n\u00e9gociation et d\u2019obtenir de meilleurs r\u00e9sultats, simplement en s\u2019emparant de davantage de territoires. La version finale des accords de Minsk a donc \u00e9t\u00e9 fortement influenc\u00e9e par les combats sur le terrain. Minsk-2 a ainsi \u00e9t\u00e9 le r\u00e9sultat d\u2019un d\u00e9saccord absolu entre la Russie et l\u2019Ukraine. La s\u00e9quence des actions visant \u00e0 mettre en \u0153uvre l\u2019accord \u00e9tait l\u2019un des principaux obstacles. L\u2019Ukraine exigeait la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 avant de passer \u00e0 l\u2019application de la partie politique de l\u2019accord.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\">En r\u00e9alit\u00e9, les dispositions des accords de Minsk auraient entra\u00een\u00e9 la perte de souverainet\u00e9 ukrainienne par la f\u00e9d\u00e9ralisation. Les r\u00e9gions r\u00e9int\u00e9gr\u00e9es de Donetsk et de Louhansk seraient devenues un obstacle \u00e0 une politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re v\u00e9ritablement ind\u00e9pendante et auraient eu le droit de veto sur toute tentative d\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN et \u00e0 l\u2019UE. On peut soutenir que l\u2019Ukraine a b\u00e9n\u00e9fici\u00e9 de l\u2019accord, qui a arr\u00eat\u00e9 les principaux combats et lui a donn\u00e9 le temps de reconstruire son arm\u00e9e et son \u00e9conomie. Mais la Russie y a aussi trouv\u00e9 avantage : elle pouvait escalader la situation en Ukraine lorsqu\u2019elle voulait imposer son agenda, sans se soucier outre mesure de sa r\u00e9putation. C\u2019est pourquoi le cessez-le-feu a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement viol\u00e9 : la Russie n\u2019a pas retir\u00e9 ses armes lourdes et son artillerie conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 l\u2019accord. Les rapports de l\u2019OSCE faisaient souvent \u00e9tat de centaines ou milliers de violations quotidiennes. Les n\u00e9gociations de Minsk ont, selon nous, surtout servi \u00e0 la Russie pour pr\u00e9parer une invasion totale et tester la r\u00e9action de l\u2019Occident collectif. L\u2019accord de Minsk \u00e9tait donc, dans son principe, incapable de r\u00e9soudre le conflit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Generally speaking, Ukraine was humiliated by the Minsk agreements, which did nothing but brought more casualties. OHCHR in one of its reports mentioned that the total number of estimated casualties in Ukraine from April 2014 to December 2021 was between 51 000 and 54 000. Approximately 14 000 to 15 000 people were killed in this war, and the rest were injured. Moreover, Russia claimed that it was not a party to the conflict, which further hindered the implementation of any agreement in practice. After Volodymyr Zelenskyi became President of Ukraine, Moscow expected Ukraine to accept every condition it might have for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Zelenskyi&#8217;s background and inexperience in politics made the Kremlin think that the flexible position of the newly elected Ukrainian President would work for Moscow. However, Russian demands could not have been satisfied, as it would have meant losing Ukraine&#8217;s sovereignty, which was unacceptable. Hence, after the Normandy Four high-level talks in 2019, it was clear that Russia\u2019s hopes to coerce Zelenskyi to accept Russian demands failed. There is a problem that Moscow still does not grasp when it comes to its assessment of Ukraine. No matter who is the President of Ukraine, he or she would never accept Russian conditions because of the position of a vibrant civil society. The issue of negotiations with Russia is extremely sensitive to the Ukrainian people. Any attempts to negotiate with Russia would face strong resistance from society and end up in the collapse of the government. Even President Zelenskyi himself was frequently criticized for his inconsistent take on Russia after he was elected. At that time, he believed it was possible to negotiate a just peace with the Kremlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Considering Russia&#8217;s plans for Ukraine, it is pretty clear that Moscow was not interested in a peaceful settlement, given the fact that the Russian-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have been passportized. Russian official sources themselves claimed they issued more than 720 000 passports to inhabitants of the so-called \u201cDPR\u201d and \u201cLPR\u201d, which is a striking violation of international law and Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is the different interpretations of sovereignty by Ukraine and Russia that are at the center of any potential peace talks between Ukraine and Russia. Therefore, a just peace deal is unlikely to be achieved unless Moscow changes its position, which stayed the same since 2014-2015.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tenter de n\u00e9gocier la paix avec la Russie, alors comme aujourd\u2019hui, est une erreur critique des partenaires ukrainiens \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger. C\u2019est pourquoi le legs de l\u2019Allemagne et de la France devrait servir d\u2019exemple \u00e0 tous en Occident. Faire pression sur l\u2019Ukraine pour qu\u2019elle n\u00e9gocie avec la Russie, comme sous la direction d\u2019Angela Merkel et de Fran\u00e7ois Hollande, ne servira que les int\u00e9r\u00eats russes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>L\u2019Ukraine et la Russie sont loin de n\u00e9gocier<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les deux cas susmentionn\u00e9s permettent de comprendre que la Russie utilise les n\u00e9gociations pour dissimuler ses v\u00e9ritables intentions. Le cas de la guerre de Tch\u00e9tch\u00e9nie et les accords de Khassaviourt montrent que, m\u00eame si l\u2019on parvient \u00e0 un accord avec la Russie, Moscou ne le respectera que tant qu\u2019il lui sera profitable. Malgr\u00e9 une grave crise politique et \u00e9conomique, la population russe n\u2019oublie pas les pertes pass\u00e9es et continuera, sous l\u2019influence de la propagande russe, \u00e0 exiger des victoires de ses dirigeants. La mont\u00e9e des sentiments r\u00e9visionnistes peut conduire \u00e0 une nouvelle tentative de gagner une guerre.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As a result of the Minsk negotiations, it is possible to observe Russia&#8217;s attitude toward Ukraine. We see that the Minsk agreement in fact exposed the points of disagreement between the two countries. It had no success at all since Russia had not shown any flexibility or willingness to compromise. Instead, Moscow used the agreement to put pressure on Ukraine, create tensions and sow discord within the country, divide people and prepare the ground for a full-scale invasion. The root cause of the impossibility of negotiating a just peace with Moscow is that Russia does not recognize Ukraine as a sovereign nation. Furthermore, Kyrylo Budanov, the Ukrainian intelligence chief, stated that 82% of Russians support hostilities in Ukraine. That is a crucial factor to consider since many in the West believe this is only Putin\u2019s war. However, we must admit that Ukraine fights not only the Russian regime but also the Russian people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Therefore, instead of seeking negotiations that would only provide Russia with an opportunity to regroup, it is vital to continue supporting Ukraine by providing the necessary military equipment. During the winter, another crucial step is strengthening the resilience of Ukraine&#8217;s energy and critical infrastructure. <strong>Les n\u00e9gociations avec Moscou ne sont aujourd\u2019hui rien d\u2019autre qu\u2019un report vers une autre guerre.<\/strong> Il faut admettre que les pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes tentatives d\u2019apaisement de la Russie n\u2019ont pas fonctionn\u00e9 et n\u2019ont fait qu\u2019accro\u00eetre les app\u00e9tits russes. Demander aujourd\u2019hui \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine de n\u00e9gocier revient \u00e0 demander \u00e0 Winston Churchill de n\u00e9gocier avec Adolf Hitler durant la bataille d\u2019Angleterre. La mobilisation en Russie signale que Moscou n\u2019entend pas abandonner l\u2019id\u00e9e de conqu\u00e9rir l\u2019ensemble de l\u2019Ukraine. En lan\u00e7ant une invasion \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle, Vladimir Poutine et la Russie se sont engag\u00e9s dans un jeu \u00e0 somme nulle. Apr\u00e8s avoir subi plusieurs pertes majeures, la Russie n\u2019a pas chang\u00e9 de position. Au contraire, le Kremlin souhaite prolonger la guerre pour reprendre l\u2019initiative, sur fond de bombardements d\u2019infrastructures critiques et d\u2019instrumentalisation de l\u2019hiver. Moscou tente en outre de faire tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour retarder les livraisons d\u2019aide militaire occidentale \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine et de mobiliser davantage de personnes pour combattre en Ukraine. Le co\u00fbt de la poursuite de la guerre est devenu relativement faible, car la probabilit\u00e9 de gagner l\u2019emporte sur les pertes potentielles pour les deux parties. Pour l\u2019Ukraine, c\u2019est l\u2019occasion de reprendre tous les territoires captur\u00e9s. La Russie peut esp\u00e9rer offrir quelques victoires \u00e0 son opinion publique et montrer \u00e0 l\u2019Occident qu\u2019elle est encore capable de combattre. Plus encore, pour Poutine, poursuivre la guerre est une question de vie ou de mort, tant politique que physique. C\u2019est pourquoi la question des n\u00e9gociations n\u2019est pas actuellement sur la table.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Furthermore, the partners of Ukraine should be ready to increase support amid reports of a new potential invasion of the territory of Ukraine from Belarus. As NATO&#8217;s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg rightly mentioned, it is Ukraine that has to decide when to start negotiations and what kind of conditions. He also emphasized that <em>&#8220;if you want an outcome of those negotiations, which ensures that Ukraine prevails as a sovereign, independent nation, we need to provide military support to Ukraine&#8221;.<\/em> Compte tenu du fait que cette guerre rev\u00eat une importance existentielle pour l\u2019Ukraine, il me para\u00eet pertinent de citer les mots de Golda Meir : <em>\u201cIf we lose a war, that&#8217;s the end forever \u2014 and we disappear from the earth. If one fails to understand this, then one fails to understand obstinacy. <strong>Nous avons l\u2019intention de rester en vie. Nos voisins veulent nous voir morts. Ce n\u2019est pas une question qui laisse beaucoup de place au compromis<\/strong>.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La conviction que toutes les guerres se terminent par la diplomatie est loin de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, et de nombreuses guerres ont \u00e9t\u00e9 men\u00e9es jusqu\u2019\u00e0 leur conclusion sur le champ de bataille. Il est certain que tout accord hypoth\u00e9tique pr\u00e9voirait un cessez-le-feu susceptible d\u2019entra\u00eener davantage de r\u00e9pression pour des millions d\u2019Ukrainiens dans les territoires occup\u00e9s. Les exemples de Boutcha, Irpin, Hostomel, Izioum, Marioupol et de nombreuses autres villes parlent d\u2019eux-m\u00eames. La Russie violerait de toute fa\u00e7on l\u2019accord, comme dans le contexte des accords de Minsk, car Moscou ne se soucie tout simplement pas du co\u00fbt en r\u00e9putation. De plus, les Russes ne seront pas dispos\u00e9s \u00e0 se retirer des territoires d\u00e9j\u00e0 occup\u00e9s tant qu\u2019ils pr\u00e9senteront une importance strat\u00e9gique pour Moscou, qui souhaite pr\u00e9server une t\u00eate de pont pour de futures op\u00e9rations offensives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As a final note, Volodymyr Zelenskyi outlined the key demands of Ukraine in order to open negotiations with Russia: withdrawal of Russian troops, return of Ukraine&#8217;s occupied lands, compensation for war damage, and prosecution for war crimes. It is the only way to achieve a just and sustainable peace. The collective West must now support the position of the Ukrainian President and give up the fantasy of changing reality where Ukraine is not strong enough and Russia is still able to prevail. The Ukrainian forces have retaken the strategic initiative in this war. Ukraine\u2019s negotiating power will only increase amid the continuing progress in liberating its territories. As Kaja Kallas, Estonian PM stressed, there is no need to push for premature peace now. Unless Russia abandons its goal of conquering new territory in Ukraine, peace talks have a slim chance of achieving anything. History shows that appeasement strengthens and encourages aggressors and that aggression can only be stopped by force. Russia has not achieved any of its goals since declaring war. Kherson, the only regional center it managed to seize after the 24th of February, has already been lost. Finally, the latest study conducted by the Sociological group \u201cRating\u201d at the request of the Transatlantic Dialogue Center revealed that victory in the war is the liberation of all Ukrainian territories, including Crimea and temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions \u2013 the opinion is supported by 85% of Ukrainian respondents. Prior to commencing any negotiations with Russia, the opinion of Ukrainian society must be considered. The Ukrainian people are ready to fight till victory, despite the shelling of energy infrastructure and constant blackouts across the country. The will of the people must be respected, and observers and politicians from the West must halt their unrealistic calls for negotiations immediately. The push for negotiations will only demoralize Ukrainian soldiers and Ukrainian civil society, leading to a misperception about the intentions of the collective West in this war. Ukraine is not planning to give up no matter how desperate Russia is to win some time by promoting negotiations.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Since the beginning of the Russian invasion at the end of February 2022, possible negotiations and peace between Russia and Ukraine have been widely discussed. This idea was prevalent in the Western media and in the political discourse of many states. In spite of most countries and their chief analysts believing that Ukraine would fall [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":9799,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13],"tags":[],"topic":[93,84,86,92],"class_list":["post-9776","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","topic-geopolitics","topic-russia","topic-ukraine","topic-war"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Peace Talks: Why Kyiv Should Not Negotiate Ceasefire with Moscow - Transatlantic Dialogue Center<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Delve into the reasons and arguments explaining why Kyiv should maintain its stance of not engaging in ceasefire negotiations with Moscow. 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