{"id":37042,"date":"2026-06-11T12:51:34","date_gmt":"2026-06-11T09:51:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=37042"},"modified":"2026-07-04T12:02:54","modified_gmt":"2026-07-04T09:02:54","slug":"from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2026\/06\/11\/from-aid-recipient-to-security-provider-ukraines-role-middle-east\/","title":{"rendered":"De b\u00e9n\u00e9ficiaire de l\u2019aide \u00e0 fournisseur de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 : le r\u00f4le \u00e9mergent de l\u2019Ukraine au Moyen-Orient"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\" data-icon-position=\"left\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px\" data-attachment-id=\"55893\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"true\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M10 4H4c-1.1 0-1.99.9-1.99 2L2 18c0 1.1.9 2 2 2h16c1.1 0 2-.9 2-2V8c0-1.1-.9-2-2-2h-8l-2-2z\"><\/path><\/svg><span class=\"file-size\">635 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"417\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1-1024x417.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37044\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1-1024x417.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1-600x244.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1-768x313.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1-18x7.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-1.png 1194w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For much of the past year, Ukraine&#8217;s position appeared constrained. Russia was sustaining grinding pressure along the front line, Western attention was fragmenting, and Washington was pressing Kyiv toward a settlement on unfavorable terms. The joint US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/List_of_attacks_during_the_2026_Iran_war#Operations_Roaring_Lion_and_Epic_Fury\">lanc\u00e9e le 28 f\u00e9vrier 2026<\/a> dans le cadre des op\u00e9rations Epic Fury et Roaring Lion, a boulevers\u00e9 cette dynamique d\u2019une mani\u00e8re qu\u2019aucune des deux parties n\u2019avait pleinement anticip\u00e9e.<br>Within weeks, a country that had been told it held &#8220;no cards&#8221; was being asked by Gulf monarchies, European capitals, and the United States military itself to share drone interception technology and deploy its specialists to the Middle East. Ukraine&#8217;s Deputy Foreign Minister Marianna Betsa summarised the shift plainly: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/ukraine-iran-war-807d697d?st=k9QenW&amp;reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink\">&#8220;There is a transition from seeing Ukraine only as a recipient of aid, a consumer of security, to seeing it as a contributor to security.&#8221;<\/a> Cette transition est r\u00e9elle. La question la plus importante est de savoir si l\u2019Ukraine peut l\u2019exploiter syst\u00e9matiquement et \u00e9viter les pi\u00e8ges diplomatiques qui l\u2019accompagnent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This paper argues that Ukraine&#8217;s new leverage in the Middle East is grounded in a genuine and non-replicable military-technological advantage, but that converting battlefield credibility into lasting geopolitical agency requires a strategic discipline that Kyiv has not always demonstrated in the region.&nbsp;<br><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-context-what-happened-in-iran\"><strong>Contexte : ce qui s\u2019est pass\u00e9 en Iran<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-group is-nowrap is-layout-flex wp-container-core-group-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-group-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-group is-nowrap is-layout-flex wp-container-core-group-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-group-is-layout-flex\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes targeting Iran&#8217;s nuclear program, missile production infrastructure, and senior military leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran&#8217;s response included ballistic missile barrages against Israel, sustained drone attacks on US military facilities across the Gulf, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/economy\/2026\/3\/3\/shutdown-of-hormuz-strait-raises-fears-of-soaring-oil-prices\">la fermeture du d\u00e9troit d\u2019Ormuz<\/a> par le Corps des gardiens de la r\u00e9volution islamique le 2 mars.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"536\" height=\"658\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-17.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37071\" style=\"aspect-ratio:0.8145852627579492;width:403px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-17.png 536w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-17-489x600.png 489w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-17-10x12.png 10w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 536px) 100vw, 536px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Source : <a href=\"https:\/\/l.facebook.com\/l.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fnyti.ms%2F4unOGjB%3Ffbclid%3DIwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAYnJpZBExWUZHZDY4SW5ybVhyVDhneHNydGMGYXBwX2lkEDIyMjAzOTE3ODgyMDA4OTIAAR531TIKpzPoaj63es7NzeDB_iaYQePHPmckzOvywzMampOyu82EqXzfQnKjCQ_aem_iwOQuXXwwz9pQVFAmFwfcQ&amp;h=AUDPQcwaT2kIaZa3cMlSd1G7Dd3e_9ePkg5bI19WT-tG_yiWajAcQPtcehju73cqXcCfX0Ck6VRuWYeFCeXDbl72OETSYAZVA0rFjFrdV6BlDZ0TlGARChcOtU82k1xAdojI1Nxxbews0dNl&amp;__tn__=-UK*F&amp;c%5b0%5d=AUCEUEnLp-5bDCwOFtodoN7CLiByB-CHc1wBYm9qfEp_uSgrE4R-dSHhdJz_R_lF0roUapTxRKGY3yLTfHT1xuGPWravmIV_Q5sBZ4bseRw9Q-M42LKAnE8L0prGUrpOLJo6D5VawSjMYxBcaakQswEyd1D2JMLzcNI1FZtWvHzZrDMhtf_o0L0QUlzcQoc\">The New York Times<\/a><\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019ampleur de l\u2019\u00e9v\u00e9nement \u00e9tait sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent dans l\u2019histoire r\u00e9cente. L\u2019Iran a d\u00e9ploy\u00e9 des drones d\u2019attaque de la s\u00e9rie Shahed contre des cibles en Arabie saoudite, au Qatar, en Jordanie et aux \u00c9mirats arabes unis \u2014 les m\u00eames syst\u00e8mes qu\u2019il fournissait \u00e0 la Russie depuis des ann\u00e9es et que les forces russes faisaient pleuvoir sur les villes ukrainiennes. Les \u00c9tats-Unis et leurs partenaires du Golfe, s\u2019effor\u00e7ant de d\u00e9fendre leurs bases et leurs infrastructures, ont rapidement d\u00e9couvert que leur architecture d\u2019interception existante \u00e9tait \u00e0 la fois trop co\u00fbteuse et insuffisamment pr\u00e9par\u00e9e \u00e0 une saturation massive par drones. Le secr\u00e9taire am\u00e9ricain \u00e0 la D\u00e9fense, Pete Hegseth, et le pr\u00e9sident des chefs d\u2019\u00e9tat-major interarm\u00e9es, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Dan Caine, auraient reconnu lors d\u2019une r\u00e9union \u00e0 huis clos que <a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/03\/04\/politics\/us-air-defenses-iran-attack-drones-challenge\">les drones iraniens s\u2019av\u00e9raient plus probl\u00e9matiques que pr\u00e9vu<\/a>, et que les d\u00e9fenses a\u00e9riennes am\u00e9ricaines conventionnelles ne pouvaient pas tous les intercepter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019asym\u00e9trie des co\u00fbts \u00e9tait frappante. La production d\u2019un seul drone Shahed co\u00fbte environ $20,000 \u00e0 $50,000. Un intercepteur Patriot PAC-3 co\u00fbte plus de $13.5 million. Le volume consid\u00e9rable de missiles Patriot tir\u00e9s durant les premiers jours des hostilit\u00e9s dans le Golfe a stup\u00e9fi\u00e9 les observateurs \u2014 des responsables ukrainiens ont indiqu\u00e9 que le total aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 ce que Kyiv avait lui-m\u00eame tir\u00e9 en quatre ans de d\u00e9fense contre les missiles balistiques russes. Les \u00c9tats du Golfe ont commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 chercher d\u2019urgence une solution moins co\u00fbteuse, plus \u00e9volutive et \u00e9prouv\u00e9e sur le plan op\u00e9rationnel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-the-double-burden-risks-ukraine-did-not-choose\"><strong>Le double fardeau : des risques que l\u2019Ukraine n\u2019a pas choisis<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Before assessing Ukraine&#8217;s gains, it is necessary to acknowledge the very real costs the Iran conflict has imposed on Kyiv.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-group is-nowrap is-layout-flex wp-container-core-group-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-group-is-layout-flex\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019effet le plus imm\u00e9diat a \u00e9t\u00e9 sur l\u2019attention. Comme lors de la pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente crise au Moyen-Orient, la guerre contre l\u2019Ukraine a \u00e9t\u00e9 rel\u00e9gu\u00e9e hors des unes et des priorit\u00e9s urgentes des dirigeants occidentaux. Cela compte plus qu\u2019il n\u2019y para\u00eet : c\u2019est une visibilit\u00e9 soutenue dans les capitales occidentales qui motive l\u2019action l\u00e9gislative, les d\u00e9cisions de d\u00e9penses d\u2019urgence et la volont\u00e9 politique de maintenir les sanctions. Les trois sont devenus plus difficiles \u00e0 pr\u00e9server d\u00e8s lors qu\u2019un passage p\u00e9trolier majeur \u00e9tait sous le feu iranien et que les monarchies du Golfe appelaient Washington \u00e0 l\u2019aide.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les march\u00e9s de l\u2019\u00e9nergie ont aggrav\u00e9 le probl\u00e8me. La fermeture du d\u00e9troit d\u2019Ormuz <a href=\"https:\/\/atlasinstitute.org\/the-strait-that-moves-the-market-the-2026-strait-of-hormuz-crisis-and-the-anatomy-of-a-global-energy-shock\/\">a fait fortement monter les prix du p\u00e9trole en quelques jours<\/a> of the first strikes, with market projections quickly pointing toward $100 per barrel and beyond if the disruption persisted. For Russia, this was an unearned windfall: Moscow&#8217;s 2026 budget had been built on conservative oil price assumptions, and any sustained elevation of Urals crude prices translates directly into billions in additional revenues available to fund the war. The energy shock also provided political cover for countries like Hungary and Slovakia to resist tightening sanctions on Russian LNG, with some capitals arguing that European energy security demanded greater flexibility with Russian supply.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Hormuz crisis also forced the United States to effectively relax sanctions on Russian oil exports in order to help stabilize global energy markets. This partially offset the impact of Ukraine&#8217;s own sustained campaign targeting Russian oil export infrastructure on the Baltic coast, which had reportedly <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/the-iran-conflict-is-becoming-a-russia-ukraine-proxy-war\">r\u00e9duit la capacit\u00e9 maritime d\u2019exportation de p\u00e9trole russe d\u2019environ 40 %.<\/a> Ukraine&#8217;s intelligence-driven strikes on Russian port infrastructure represent one of the most effective economic pressure campaigns of the war; the energy shock has blunted that edge, at least temporarily.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"820\" height=\"535\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-18.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37074\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-18.png 820w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-18-600x391.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-18-768x501.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-18-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 820px) 100vw, 820px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Plus grave encore pour le champ de bataille, la campagne contre l\u2019Iran a consomm\u00e9 des stocks am\u00e9ricains de munitions de pr\u00e9cision \u2014 en particulier des missiles pour les batteries Patriot \u2014 qui recoupent directement les besoins de l\u2019Ukraine. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/national-security\/2026\/05\/11\/us-ukraine-trump-weapons-purl\/\">En mai 2026, les alli\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens faisaient \u00e9tat d\u2019une inqui\u00e9tude croissante au sujet du programme PURL<\/a> (Priority Ukraine Requirements List), through which allied funds purchase US weapons for Ukraine. Some European capitals have become more hesitant to contribute, with one official noting that &#8220;trust is eroding&#8221; as the Iran conflict generates uncertainty about delivery timelines. To be clear, PURL transfers have not been formally halted \u2014 but the delays are real, the pipeline is under stress, and the structural competition for US defense industrial capacity between Ukraine, the Iran theatre, and Pacific contingency planning is not going away.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-russia-s-strategic-gamble-and-its-limits\"><strong>Russia&#8217;s Strategic Gamble and Its Limits<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia has pursued a dual advantage from the Iran conflict: benefiting economically from elevated oil prices and using the US distraction to stabilize its military position. Russian forces maintained their aerial campaign against Ukraine without interruption throughout the opening weeks of the Iran operation, launching heavy mixed-strike packages against Ukrainian energy infrastructure \u2014 a signal that Moscow saw no reason to show restraint while Western eyes were elsewhere. Ukraine&#8217;s available electricity-generating capacity, <a href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2026\/03\/05\/ukraines-wartime-energy-destruction-governance-and-the-european-pivot\/\">d\u00e9j\u00e0 r\u00e9duite de pr\u00e8s de 58 %<\/a> par rapport \u00e0 son niveau d\u2019avant l\u2019invasion, \u00e0 environ 14 GW en janvier 2026, a continu\u00e9 d\u2019\u00eatre cibl\u00e9e sans rel\u00e2che.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Yet Russia&#8217;s position contains a significant structural contradiction. Iran has been Moscow&#8217;s most important military-industrial partner, supplying the Shahed drones that became the backbone of Russia&#8217;s long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. When the US and Israel struck Iran, Russia chose to protect its own interests rather than those of its ally. Moscow offered only a muted diplomatic <a href=\"https:\/\/www.themoscowtimes.com\/2025\/06\/22\/russia-condemns-irresponsible-us-strikes-on-iran-a89526\">condamnation <\/a>of the strikes and provided no meaningful military support to Tehran. This restraint was arguably more damaging to Russia&#8217;s credibility than an open conflict with the West would have been: it demonstrated that Moscow&#8217;s security commitments are conditional and ultimately self-interested.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1008\" height=\"442\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-14.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37057\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-14.png 1008w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-14-600x263.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-14-768x337.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-14-18x8.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1008px) 100vw, 1008px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>A meeting between Iran&#8217;s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Tehran on July 19, 2022. Source: Getty Images<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The failure to shield Iran carries costs beyond the bilateral relationship. CSTO and SCO, Russia&#8217;s main institutional tools for projecting security influence across Eurasia, have been further revealed as declaratory rather than operational. Central Asian elites, observing the Iran episode carefully, are drawing their own conclusions about <a href=\"https:\/\/uames.org.ua\/stratehichni-reaktsii-ta-heopolitychni-naslidky-dlia-derzhav-tsentralnoi-azii-v-konteksti-vijny-v-irani-berezen-2026-r\/\">the reliability of Moscow&#8217;s security umbrella<\/a>. This reinforces a longer-term erosion of Russian regional influence that began with the fall of Assad&#8217;s Syria in late 2024. For Ukraine, this dynamic creates both an opportunity and a responsibility: the space vacating around Russia&#8217;s regional credibility is available to fill, but only if Kyiv builds lasting relationships rather than simply transactional ones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il convient \u00e9galement de noter ce que la Russie a tir\u00e9 du conflit au-del\u00e0 des revenus p\u00e9troliers. Selon les services de renseignement ukrainiens, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kyivpost.com\/analysis\/74346\">des satellites russes ont fourni des images de grandes installations militaires am\u00e9ricaines dans la r\u00e9gion du Golfe<\/a> \u2014 including facilities in Qatar and Saudi Arabia \u2014 before those same facilities were struck by Iran. This opportunistic intelligence-sharing with Tehran, if confirmed, further entrenches the Kremlin&#8217;s role as a destabilizing actor in the region and positions the Iran conflict explicitly as another front in the broader Russia-Ukraine confrontation. In one of the CFR\u2019s opinion pieces, it was described bluntly <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/the-iran-conflict-is-becoming-a-russia-ukraine-proxy-war\">comme une guerre par procuration <\/a>in which Ukraine arms and advises Gulf states while Russia assists Iran. That framing has traction in Washington, but it also requires Ukraine to manage perceptions carefully \u2014 being seen as a belligerent party in a wider regional conflict could complicate Kyiv&#8217;s diplomatic standing with states that prefer to avoid entanglement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-ukraine-s-comparative-advantage-what-nobody-else-has\"><strong>Ukraine&#8217;s Comparative Advantage: What Nobody Else Has<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"> However, Ukraine&#8217;s current offer to the Middle East is not merely a matter of diplomatic goodwill. It represents a genuine and, crucially, non-replicable military-technological asset. European partners can buy drone hardware. They can test Ukrainian systems on their own ranges. They can fund production lines. But what no partner can quickly replicate is the operational experience embedded in Ukrainian military culture, the live-data ecosystem that powers Ukrainian software, or the speed of innovation that four years of high-intensity war has generated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cette valeur non reproductible se refl\u00e8te dans des capacit\u00e9s pr\u00e9cises. Ses drones intercepteurs \u2014 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/the-iran-conflict-is-becoming-a-russia-ukraine-proxy-war\">certains produits pour seulement $1,000 \u00e0 $2,000 l\u2019unit\u00e9 <\/a>\u2014 sont des produits sp\u00e9cialement con\u00e7us issus d\u2019une it\u00e9ration continue sur le champ de bataille, d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s par des \u00e9quipes d\u2019ing\u00e9nieurs qui re\u00e7oivent un retour d\u2019exp\u00e9rience en temps r\u00e9el et actualisent les mod\u00e8les en quelques jours. La plateforme de gestion de bataille Delta, qui fusionne les donn\u00e9es de drones, les capteurs acoustiques, les images satellites et les renseignements signal\u00e9s par les soldats en une seule image op\u00e9rationnelle, a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9crite par le secr\u00e9taire de l\u2019arm\u00e9e am\u00e9ricaine Daniel Driscoll <a href=\"https:\/\/nymag.com\/intelligencer\/article\/ukraine-russia-war-drones-iran.html\">as &#8220;absolutely incredible&#8221;<\/a> et sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes am\u00e9ricains comparables. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/livecoverage\/us-israel-iran-war-2026\/card\/saudi-aramco-in-talks-to-buy-ukrainian-drones-to-protect-oil-fields-OeOLvO58Rgo4tDqV7e4q\">Saudi Aramco, the world&#8217;s largest oil company, entered negotiations to acquire Ukrainian interceptor drones to protect its oil fields <\/a>\u2014 non parce que l\u2019Ukraine est le fournisseur le moins cher, mais parce qu\u2019elle est le seul fournisseur dont les performances op\u00e9rationnelles sont av\u00e9r\u00e9es contre la menace pr\u00e9cise \u00e0 laquelle ces champs sont confront\u00e9s.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1008\" height=\"462\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-15.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37058\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-15.png 1008w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-15-600x275.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-15-768x352.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-15-18x8.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1008px) 100vw, 1008px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>La Russie a tir\u00e9 des milliers de drones Shahed de conception iranienne sur des villes \u00e0 travers l\u2019Ukraine. Source : <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/clyv10dre79o\"><em>BBC<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les forces ukrainiennes <a href=\"https:\/\/help.hvylya.net\/uk\/327092-wsj-voyna-v-irane-neozhidanno-prevratila-ukrainu-iz-problemy-v-reshenie\">atteignent actuellement un taux d\u2019interception de 97 %<\/a> against Shahed drones \u2014 the same Shaheds now threatening Gulf infrastructure. They reached that rate through a systematic, multi-layered approach combining electronic warfare jamming, acoustic detection networks, mobile gun teams, and interceptor drones operating as a coordinated ecosystem. That ecosystem is best understood not as a product but as a doctrine \u2014 one built from experience that cannot be downloaded or licensed. When Zelenskyi&#8217;s adviser Oleksandr Kamyshin noted that he was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/ukraine-iran-war-807d697d?st=k9QenW&amp;reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink\">&#8220;surprised anyone started an attack on Iran without first having a solution against Shaheds for themselves or their allies,&#8221;<\/a> son observation relevait moins de la provocation que d\u2019une v\u00e9ritable analyse strat\u00e9gique : l\u2019Ukraine \u00e9tait le seul pays \u00e0 avoir r\u00e9solu ce probl\u00e8me pr\u00e9cis \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle, en conditions de combat r\u00e9elles, face \u00e0 un adversaire qui adapte continuellement ses tactiques.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le rythme de l\u2019innovation militaire ukrainienne est tout aussi important. La boucle de retour entre la ligne de front et la table de conception fonctionne en quelques semaines, voire quelques jours. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/media-telecom\/russian-tv-shows-teenagers-worlds-biggest-drone-factory-making-arms-hit-ukraine-2025-07-21\/\">Les forces russes ont consid\u00e9rablement am\u00e9lior\u00e9 leur flotte de Shahed depuis 2022<\/a> \u2014 des variantes plus grandes, plus rapides et propuls\u00e9es par r\u00e9action apparaissent d\u00e9sormais r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement aux c\u00f4t\u00e9s des mod\u00e8les \u00e0 turbopropulseur d\u2019origine, et les syst\u00e8mes de riposte ukrainiens se sont adapt\u00e9s en parall\u00e8le.<strong>Ce cycle d\u2019adaptation en guerre r\u00e9elle est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment ce que les \u00c9tats du Golfe ne peuvent obtenir aupr\u00e8s des grands industriels occidentaux de la d\u00e9fense, qui fonctionnent selon des calendriers d\u2019acquisition standards mesur\u00e9s en ann\u00e9es. <\/strong>A country can purchase a Ukrainian interceptor drone; it cannot purchase the institutional knowledge of the unit that developed it in response to last month&#8217;s Russian modifications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La port\u00e9e plus large d\u00e9passe toute plateforme sp\u00e9cifique. <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2026\/04\/ukraine-russia-war-changing-warfare-practice-military-strategy\">Ukraine has effectively pioneered what Carnegie&#8217;s Andriy Zagorodnyuk calls &#8220;affordable precise mass&#8221;<\/a> \u2014 a model in which precision at scale is no longer the exclusive property of expensive state-level weapons programs. Drone units in Ukraine now account for over 80% of Russian battlefield casualties despite representing only 20% of the force&#8217;s personnel. The doctrinal and industrial model behind that ratio is what Gulf partners are purchasing access to, even if they do not always articulate it in those terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En mars 2026, environ <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/ukrainealert\/iran-war-highlights-ukraines-rapid-rise-to-drone-superpower-status\/\">200 sp\u00e9cialistes ukrainiens \u00e9taient d\u00e9ploy\u00e9s au Moyen-Orient<\/a>, travaillant avec l\u2019Arabie saoudite, le Qatar, les \u00c9mirats arabes unis, Bahre\u00efn, la Jordanie, le Kowe\u00eft et les forces am\u00e9ricaines pour am\u00e9liorer la d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne contre les attaques de drones iraniens. <a href=\"https:\/\/explainer.ua\/shho-pokazav-pershyj-misyats-vijny-v-irani-golovni-naslidky\/\">L\u2019Ukraine a sign\u00e9 un accord de coop\u00e9ration en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9fense avec l\u2019Arabie saoudite le 27 mars et un partenariat de dix ans dans les domaines de la d\u00e9fense et de la technologie avec le Qatar le 28 mars<\/a>. Ces accords comprennent non seulement la vente d\u2019\u00e9quipements, mais aussi des installations de production conjointes, la formation du personnel, le transfert de connaissances et un cadre commun pour le d\u00e9veloppement technologique \u00e0 long terme. Les \u00c9tats-Unis et les \u00c9tats du Golfe ont \u00e9galement <a href=\"https:\/\/militarnyi.com\/uk\/news\/ssha-ta-katar-obgovoryuyut-z-ukrayinoyu-prydbannya-akustychnyh-system-dlya-vyyavlennya-shahed\/\">ouvert des n\u00e9gociations sur l\u2019acquisition de syst\u00e8mes ukrainiens de d\u00e9tection acoustique<\/a> pour identifier l\u2019approche de drones \u2014 une technologie que l\u2019Ukraine a d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e par n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 op\u00e9rationnelle et perfectionn\u00e9e au fil de milliers d\u2019interceptions r\u00e9elles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-the-ukraine-middle-east-axis-opportunity-and-accumulated-baggage\"><strong>L\u2019axe Ukraine\u2013Moyen-Orient : opportunit\u00e9s et passif accumul\u00e9<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The political architecture of Ukraine&#8217;s Middle East engagement is considerably more complicated than a straightforward technology transaction. To understand why, it is worth looking back at how Ukraine managed \u2014 and mismanaged \u2014 its regional positioning during the Gaza crisis of 2023\u20132024, because the lessons from that episode are directly relevant to the current moment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When Hamas attacked Israel in October 2023, Ukraine&#8217;s initial response was immediate and unequivocal support for Israel. This was driven by a mixture of genuine solidarity, domestic political sentiment (<a href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/publications\/the-difficulties-of-ukrainian-policy-towards-the-war-in-the-gaza-strip\/\">les sondages de l\u2019\u00e9poque indiquaient que pr\u00e8s de 70 % des Ukrainiens sympathisaient avec Isra\u00ebl<\/a>), et d\u2019un calcul strat\u00e9gique selon lequel l\u2019alignement sur Isra\u00ebl pourrait attirer une part de la vague sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent de soutien occidental qui a suivi l\u2019attaque du Hamas. Le pr\u00e9sident Zelenskyi a \u00e9tabli des parall\u00e8les explicites entre l\u2019attaque du Hamas et Boutcha, et a cherch\u00e9 \u00e0 pr\u00e9senter l\u2019Ukraine et Isra\u00ebl comme deux d\u00e9mocraties combattant le m\u00eame axe de violence autoritaire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That calculation backfired. Arab states, which had been warming toward Ukraine through 2023 \u2014 Saudi Arabia&#8217;s Foreign Minister had visited Kyiv in February of that year, and Zelenskyi had spoken at the Arab League summit in Jeddah in May \u2014 <a href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2024\/02\/15\/the-difficulties-of-ukrainian-policy-towards-the-war-in-the-gaza-strip\/\">se sont nettement refroidis. Des repr\u00e9sentants de l\u2019Arabie saoudite, des \u00c9mirats arabes unis, du Qatar et de Bahre\u00efn \u00e9taient absents de la troisi\u00e8me r\u00e9union sur la formule de paix ukrainienne \u00e0 Malte \u00e0 la fin octobre 2023<\/a>. Ukraine&#8217;s one-sided framing played into a narrative, actively amplified by Russian propaganda, that the West was hypocritical in its concern for Ukrainian civilians while indifferent to Palestinian ones. In the Global South, where the Palestinian issue is a significant marker of political identity, Ukraine&#8217;s positioning actively weakened its standing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The episode illustrated a structural tension in Ukraine&#8217;s Middle East diplomacy that has not disappeared. Qatar is simultaneously Ukraine&#8217;s most strategically important Arab partner, which routinely facilitates prisoner exchanges, helps return deported children, and positions itself as a potential energy alternative to Russian LNG for Europe \u2014 and a country whose foreign policy includes active support for Islamist movements that Israel regards as adversaries. Kyiv eventually adjusted its position, emphasizing compliance with international humanitarian law by all parties and reaffirming recognition of both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. But the damage had been real, and the underlying tension between maintaining Arab partnerships and not alienating Israel remains structurally unresolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In 2026, that tension is still present, and arguably more complex. Ukraine&#8217;s Middle East itinerary in March <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kyivpost.com\/analysis\/74346\">excluait notamment J\u00e9rusalem<\/a>. Zelenskyi&#8217;s absence from Israel raised questions in Israeli policy circles, with some analysts arguing that Israel had missed earlier opportunities to deepen cooperation with Ukraine and that the relationship was now paying the price for years of studied neutrality. Israel has not supplied Ukraine with lethal weapons, citing, among other reasons, concerns that Israeli systems could be captured and transferred to Iran and Syria. That concern has not diminished; if anything, the deepened Russia-Iran military relationship makes it more acute.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1008\" height=\"444\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-16.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: From Aid Recipient to Security Provider: Ukraine\u2019s Emerging Role in the Middle East\" class=\"wp-image-37059\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-16.png 1008w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-16-600x264.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-16-768x338.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-16-18x8.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1008px) 100vw, 1008px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Le pr\u00e9sident ukrainien Volodymyr Zelenskyi a rencontr\u00e9 le pr\u00e9sident des \u00c9mirats arabes unis, Mohammed ben Zayed Al Nahyane. Source : Bureau de la pr\u00e9sidence<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Israel&#8217;s complex position vis-\u00e0-vis Russia remains a complicating factor. Despite Russia&#8217;s active assistance to Iran during the conflict, Israeli-Russian channels have not been formally severed. Moscow retains leverage over Israeli interests in Syria, and Jerusalem continues to calculate its relationship with the Kremlin in terms of regional security rather than ideological alignment. Ukraine needs to account for this dynamic rather than assume that the Iran conflict has automatically transformed Israel into a straightforward partner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At the same time, there are real opportunities in the current configuration that did not exist two years ago. The Iran conflict has shifted the Gulf states&#8217; threat perception in ways that create genuine alignment with Ukrainian interests. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar now face the drone threat in an immediate, visceral way that transforms their relationship with Ukrainian expertise from academic curiosity into operational necessity. <a href=\"https:\/\/militarnyi.com\/uk\/news\/ukrayina-otrymala-zapyt-vid-ssha\/\">Ukraine&#8217;s offer of acoustic detection systems, interceptor drones, and EW expertise<\/a> r\u00e9pond \u00e0 une menace commune pos\u00e9e par des adversaires communs. C\u2019est une base de partenariat bien plus solide que le cadre de solidarit\u00e9 humanitaire de 2022\u20132023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/news\/2026\/03\/02\/8023538\/\">L\u2019Ukraine a \u00e9galement avanc\u00e9 l\u2019id\u00e9e de conditionner son assistance technique aux \u00c9tats du Golfe \u00e0 l\u2019utilisation par ceux-ci de leur influence sur la Russie en faveur d\u2019un cadre de cessez-le-feu.<\/a> This is a creative use of newfound leverage, and it reflects a more sophisticated regional strategy than Kyiv was deploying eighteen months ago. But it also carries risks: conditioning security cooperation on diplomatic outcomes can make Ukraine appear to be instrumentalizing partners rather than building genuine alliances, and Gulf states have their own complex relationships with Moscow that they will not easily sacrifice on Ukraine&#8217;s behalf.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\" id=\"h-conclusion\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ukraine&#8217;s emergence as a security provider in the Middle East is real, consequential, and grounded in an actual comparative advantage rather than diplomatic positioning alone. The Iran conflict exposed a gap between the cost of modern drone saturation and the affordability of conventional interceptor systems, which Ukraine had spent four years solving. The demand for that solution is now global.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But military capability, however sophisticated, does not automatically translate into sustained geopolitical agency. Ukraine&#8217;s leadership has demonstrated tactical agility in responding to the Iran crisis. The longer-term test is whether Kyiv can build this into a coherent strategy: institutionalizing its Gulf partnerships through permanent training programs and joint development agreements; using its new leverage to secure tangible reciprocity, particularly in Patriot interceptor supply; and developing the diplomatic infrastructure to manage the complex triangular relationship between Gulf states, Israel, and its own European allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Kyiv&#8217;s emerging security partnerships in the Gulf are best understood not as a regional policy in themselves, but as a dimension of Ukraine&#8217;s broader effort to establish itself as an indispensable actor in global security architecture. Military capability will continue to generate Ukraine&#8217;s international standing.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The peace process remains far from resolution: Russia, buoyed by oil revenues and emboldened by US distraction, has no structural incentive to negotiate seriously, and Ukrainian front-line losses, though smaller than Russian ones, continue to accumulate. Whether Ukraine&#8217;s newfound leverage in the Middle East can be translated into security guarantees and durable partnerships, or remains a series of impressive but ultimately episodic moments, will depend on whether Kyiv approaches the region with the strategic patience and diplomatic calibration that the moment demands.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les cartes sont r\u00e9elles. La question est de savoir si elles seront jou\u00e9es avec la discipline d\u2019un partenaire de long terme ou l\u2019urgence d\u2019un pays qui lutte encore pour sa survie \u2014 car, au Moyen-Orient, ces deux postures produisent des r\u00e9sultats tr\u00e8s diff\u00e9rents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Les points de vue, pens\u00e9es et opinions exprim\u00e9s dans les \u00e9tudes publi\u00e9es sur ce site n\u2019appartiennent qu\u2019\u00e0 leurs auteurs et ne refl\u00e8tent pas n\u00e9cessairement ceux du Transatlantic Dialogue Center, de ses comit\u00e9s ou de ses organisations affili\u00e9es. Ces \u00e9tudes visent \u00e0 stimuler le dialogue et la discussion et ne repr\u00e9sentent pas les positions politiques officielles du Transatlantic Dialogue Center ni de toute autre organisation \u00e0 laquelle les auteurs peuvent \u00eatre associ\u00e9s.<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>For much of the past year, Ukraine&#8217;s position appeared constrained. Russia was sustaining grinding pressure along the front line, Western attention was fragmenting, and Washington was pressing Kyiv toward a settlement on unfavorable terms. The joint US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, launched on 28 February 2026 under Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, disrupted that [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":21,"featured_media":37063,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[60,13],"tags":[],"topic":[88,93,101,87,89,86],"class_list":["post-37042","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-asiaen","category-en-analyses","topic-defense","topic-geopolitics","topic-middle-east","topic-security","topic-technology","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Ukraine as a Security Provider in the Middle East | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The 2026 Iran conflict increased demand for Ukraine\u2019s 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