{"id":35044,"date":"2026-03-19T15:37:10","date_gmt":"2026-03-19T13:37:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=35044"},"modified":"2026-07-04T12:02:23","modified_gmt":"2026-07-04T09:02:23","slug":"the-social-contract-at-war-mobilization-legitimacy-and-post-war-cohesion-in-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2026\/03\/19\/the-social-contract-at-war-mobilization-legitimacy-and-post-war-cohesion-in-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Le contrat social en temps de guerre : mobilisation, l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 et coh\u00e9sion post-guerre en Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\" data-icon-position=\"left\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px\" data-attachment-id=\"53594\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M10 4H4c-1.1 0-1.99.9-1.99 2L2 18c0 1.1.9 2 2 2h16c1.1 0 2-.9 2-2V8c0-1.1-.9-2-2-2h-8l-2-2z\"><\/path><\/svg><span class=\"file-size\">891 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"417\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16-1024x417.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Social Contract at War: Mobilization, Legitimacy, and Post-War Cohesion in Ukraine\" class=\"wp-image-35045\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16-1024x417.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16-600x244.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16-768x313.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16-18x7.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16.png 1194w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En temps de guerre, la coh\u00e9sion interne est une ressource strat\u00e9gique. Les efforts de longue date de la Russie pour pr\u00e9senter l\u2019Ukraine comme intrins\u00e8quement divis\u00e9e s\u2019appuient sur les anciens r\u00e9cits des \u00ab deux Ukraines \u00bb, mais les tensions les plus d\u00e9stabilisatrices aujourd\u2019hui sont moins r\u00e9gionales qu\u2019institutionnelles. Cet article examine comment ces divisions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 fabriqu\u00e9es et montre que la voie \u00e0 suivre passe par le traitement des frictions li\u00e9es \u00e0 la gouvernance, plut\u00f4t que par des cartes culturelles d\u00e9pass\u00e9es.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-1-how-the-two-ukraines-frame-became-a-weapon\"><strong>1. Comment le paradigme des \u00ab deux Ukraines \u00bb est devenu une arme<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-from-concept-to-political-technology-the-2004-inflection-point\"><strong><em>Du concept \u00e0 la technologie politique (le tournant de 2004)<\/em><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Ukraine continue souvent d\u2019\u00eatre d\u00e9crite, de mani\u00e8re inexacte, au moyen du raccourci d\u2019une \u00ab fracture Ouest-Est \u00bb. Ce concept est largement associ\u00e9 \u00e0 <a href=\"https:\/\/shron1.chtyvo.org.ua\/Riabchuk\/Two_Ukraines_Reconsidered_The_End_of_Ukrainian_Ambivalence7_anhl.pdf\">l\u2019analyse de Mykola Riabchuk<\/a> de deux orientations identitaires coexistantes. Ce qui avait commenc\u00e9 comme une tentative universitaire de saisir la complexit\u00e9 de l\u2019identit\u00e9 post-sovi\u00e9tique a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e0 plusieurs reprises <a href=\"https:\/\/commons.com.ua\/en\/oligarhichna-demokratiya-ta-krizi\/\">r\u00e9utilis\u00e9 <\/a>comme instrument politique : d\u2019abord dans la comp\u00e9tition \u00e9lectorale int\u00e9rieure, puis dans le cadre de la strat\u00e9gie russe de long terme visant \u00e0 pr\u00e9senter l\u2019Ukraine comme structurellement ingouvernable et, par cons\u00e9quent, \u00ab inapte \u00bb \u00e0 la souverainet\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Pour rem\u00e9dier \u00e0 cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9, il faut d\u00e9passer la division \u00e9l\u00e9mentaire de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 ukrainienne en camps <a href=\"https:\/\/www.osw.waw.pl\/en\/publikacje\/osw-commentary\/2015-08-19\/ukraines-wartime-nationalism\">&#8220;nationalist&#8221; versus &#8220;pro-Russian&#8221;<\/a> et leurs perspectives. Il convient de r\u00e9examiner le cadre politique \u00e0 partir d\u2019une vision plus pr\u00e9cise de l\u2019\u00e9volution de l\u2019identit\u00e9, et de montrer qu\u2019une \u00ab division \u00bb n\u2019est pas caus\u00e9e par le choc des civilisations, mais par deux m\u00e9thodes diff\u00e9rentes et compl\u00e9mentaires de construire une nation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans la pratique, ces cadres concurrents sont souvent projet\u00e9s sur une g\u00e9ographie simplifi\u00e9e \u00ab Ouest-Est \u00bb. Un p\u00f4le du spectre (l\u2019Ouest) privil\u00e9gie une compr\u00e9hension ethnoculturelle de l\u2019appartenance nationale, dans laquelle la langue, la m\u00e9moire historique et la distance symbolique \u00e0 la Russie rev\u00eatent une importance particuli\u00e8re. L\u2019autre p\u00f4le (l\u2019Est) accorde davantage de poids \u00e0 une conception civique de l\u2019appartenance, ancr\u00e9e dans l\u2019\u00c9tat, o\u00f9 la loyaut\u00e9 envers les institutions et le fonctionnement de l\u2019\u00c9tat priment sur les marqueurs culturels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il importe de souligner qu\u2019il s\u2019agit de types id\u00e9aux plut\u00f4t que d\u2019identit\u00e9s r\u00e9gionales fig\u00e9es. L\u2019exp\u00e9rience de l\u2019agression russe a d\u00e9montr\u00e9 que l\u2019attachement civique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00c9tat ukrainien est largement r\u00e9parti dans tout le pays. Cela aide \u00e0 comprendre pourquoi les <a href=\"https:\/\/www.academia.edu\/102567360\/Rallying_Around_the_Flag_War_Challenges_and_Civic_Mobilization_in_Ukraine\">invasions de 2014 et de 2022 n\u2019ont pas d\u00e9clench\u00e9 l\u2019effondrement attendu par Moscou<\/a>: de nombreuses communaut\u00e9s du Sud et de l\u2019Est se sont mobilis\u00e9es pour d\u00e9fendre l\u2019\u00c9tat ukrainien, garant de leur libert\u00e9 et de leur mode de vie.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1008\" height=\"464\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-18.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Social Contract at War: Mobilization, Legitimacy, and Post-War Cohesion in Ukraine\" class=\"wp-image-35046\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-18.png 1008w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-18-600x276.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-18-768x354.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-18-18x8.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1008px) 100vw, 1008px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Des habitants de Kherson lors d\u2019un rassemblement contre l\u2019occupation russe sur la place de la Libert\u00e9, le 5 mars 2022. Source : <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/rusaggression.gov.ua\/en\/rallies-in-occupied-kherson-a988369ce577d0eaac1b2ba6f35616d8.html\"><em>Mus\u00e9e virtuel de l\u2019agression russe<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Recognizing this distinction, that the East is not &#8220;anti-Ukrainian&#8221; but rather &#8220;centrist&#8221;, is the foundational key to the following analysis, as it reveals that Russia&#8217;s strategy relies on convincing these two camps that they are irreconcilable opponents, even when their preferences can be understood as complementary pillars of a single political nation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>S\u2019appuyant sur cette compr\u00e9hension, cet article soutient<\/strong> que les lignes de fracture les plus d\u00e9terminantes aujourd\u2019hui ne sont pas \u00ab civilisationnelles \u00bb, mais des tensions li\u00e9es \u00e0 la gouvernance susceptibles d\u2019\u00eatre amplifi\u00e9es de l\u2019ext\u00e9rieur. Nous examinerons trois lignes de fracture pr\u00e9cises qui pourraient perdurer apr\u00e8s la guerre :<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>La politique linguistique<\/strong> comme substitut \u00e0 la construction nationale.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Les dilemmes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 religieuse<\/strong> sous contraintes d\u00e9mocratiques.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Le contrat social en temps de guerre<\/strong>, en particulier l\u2019\u00e9quit\u00e9 per\u00e7ue de la mobilisation et de la r\u00e9int\u00e9gration.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019analyse se conclut par des options de politique publique visant \u00e0 emp\u00eacher ces griefs de se durcir en clivages politiques durables.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-polarization-as-a-repeatable-script-black-pr-and-institutional-incentives\"><strong><em>La polarisation comme script reproductible : propagande noire et incitations institutionnelles<\/em><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The transformation of Ukraine\u2019s regional diversity into a critical vulnerability of national security represents one of the most sophisticated influence operations in modern hybrid warfare. It began as a sociological heuristic to explain the coexistence of civic and neo-Soviet identities, but was later weaponized. Domestic elites used it for election-rallying support while Russian strategists turned it into a mechanism of &#8220;identity warfare&#8221;, designed to eliminate the centrist middle ground and force a complex society into a binary conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ce processus de polarisation artificielle a atteint une \u00e9chelle industrielle lors de l\u2019\u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle de 2004. Le scrutin a \u00e9t\u00e9 largement interpr\u00e9t\u00e9 comme un choix strat\u00e9gique entre des trajectoires divergentes de gouvernance et de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re. Viktor Iouchtchenko <a href=\"https:\/\/ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu\/olj\/et\/et_v12n4\/et_v12n4_003.pdf\">d\u00e9fendait<\/a> une orientation pro-europ\u00e9enne, tandis que Viktor Ianoukovytch, soutenu par les r\u00e9seaux du pouvoir en place, \u00e9tait largement associ\u00e9 \u00e0 une orientation pro-russe et eurasiatique. Ce cadrage a renforc\u00e9 les incitations \u00e0 la manipulation et rendu la mobilisation fond\u00e9e sur l\u2019identit\u00e9 politiquement efficace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La campagne est rapidement devenue l\u2019une des plus disput\u00e9es et des plus \u00ab sales \u00bb de l\u2019histoire de l\u2019Ukraine apr\u00e8s l\u2019ind\u00e9pendance. Pour <a href=\"https:\/\/ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu\/olj\/et\/et_v12n4\/et_v12n4_003.pdf\">assurer<\/a> Yanukovych&#8217;s victory, his supporters deployed &#8220;technical candidates&#8221; to dilute the vote, monopolized mass media to demonize Yushchenko, and engaged in direct sabotage \u2013 most notably, they schemed the dioxin poisoning of Yushchenko in September 2004 and organized the hacking of the Central Election Commission (CVK) servers to manipulate final results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans le cadre de la strat\u00e9gie plus large des <a href=\"https:\/\/ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu\/olj\/et\/et_v12n4\/et_v12n4_003.pdf\">technologues politiques<\/a> travaillant dans l\u2019\u00e9quipe de Ianoukovytch (qui comptait des <a href=\"https:\/\/ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu\/olj\/et\/et_v12n4\/et_v12n4_003.pdf\">consultants align\u00e9s sur le Kremlin<\/a>), la campagne pro-gouvernementale a d\u00e9ploy\u00e9 la m\u00e9thodologie de la <a href=\"https:\/\/www.themoscowtimes.com\/archive\/the-fate-of-political-technology\">&#8220;dramaturgiya&#8221;<\/a> (mise en sc\u00e8ne artificielle et sc\u00e9naris\u00e9e) pour remplacer le d\u00e9bat politique de fond par un <a href=\"https:\/\/en.detector.media\/post\/tactics-of-russian-propaganda-in-portraying-ukraine-as-a-cradle-of-corruption\">m\u00e9tar\u00e9cit<\/a> that framed the political opposition as a &#8220;nationalist&#8221; existential threat to the identity of the industrial Southeast. Thus, in this campaign, regional diversity was reframed as a political instrument.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019un des objets les plus reconnaissables associ\u00e9s \u00e0 cette approche est l\u2019affiche \u00ab Trois cat\u00e9gories d\u2019Ukrainiens \u00bb. Elle a souvent \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9crite comme un outil de propagande noire destin\u00e9 \u00e0 discr\u00e9diter Iouchtchenko en attribuant au camp \u00ab orange \u00bb une hi\u00e9rarchie qui rel\u00e9guerait le Sud et l\u2019Est au statut de citoyens de seconde ou de troisi\u00e8me classe. La fonction centrale de l\u2019affiche \u00e9tait d\u2019activer la menace sur le statut social et la consolidation d\u00e9fensive. Cela a procur\u00e9 des gains de participation \u00e0 court terme, mais a \u00e9galement approfondi la m\u00e9fiance r\u00e9gionale et laiss\u00e9 un script pr\u00eat \u00e0 l\u2019emploi, r\u00e9utilisable lors de batailles politiques ult\u00e9rieures et exploitable par des acteurs ext\u00e9rieurs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cette polarisation fabriqu\u00e9e a ancr\u00e9 un <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ponarseurasia.org\/old-political-habits-die-hard-in-ukraine\/#:~:text=Old%20Political%20Habits%20Die%20Hard%20in%20Ukraine%20%2D%20PONARS%20Eurasia\">\u00ab principe des quotas \u00bb<\/a> au sein des institutions publiques, dans lesquelles minist\u00e8res et agences de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00e9taient r\u00e9partis entre clans politiques rivaux plut\u00f4t que confi\u00e9s \u00e0 des professionnels, \u00e9rodant ainsi la confiance du public et cr\u00e9ant la fragilit\u00e9 institutionnelle que la Russie exploiterait plus tard.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Surtout, son impact ne s\u2019est pas limit\u00e9 \u00e0 un cycle \u00e9lectoral : il a contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 normaliser durablement les cadrages identitaires \u00e0 somme nulle dans la politique ukrainienne, fa\u00e7onnant les contestations ult\u00e9rieures autour de la politique linguistique, de la m\u00e9moire historique et de la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00c9tat.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1006\" height=\"654\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-25.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Social Contract at War: Mobilization, Legitimacy, and Post-War Cohesion in Ukraine\" class=\"wp-image-35048\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-25.png 1006w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-25-600x390.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-25-768x499.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-25-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1006px) 100vw, 1006px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Cette image est l\u2019inf\u00e2me carte de propagande \u00ab Trois cat\u00e9gories d\u2019Ukrainiens \u00bb de la campagne pr\u00e9sidentielle de 2004, con\u00e7ue par des technologues politiques pro-gouvernementaux comme outil de propagande noire pour attiser la division r\u00e9gionale. En pr\u00e9sentant la vision du pays de l\u2019opposition comme une hi\u00e9rarchie rel\u00e9guant l\u2019Est et le Sud \u00e0 un statut de \u00ab troisi\u00e8me classe \u00bb, cette carte visait \u00e0 d\u00e9clencher une consolidation d\u00e9fensive par la peur fabriqu\u00e9e et la menace sur le statut social.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-discrediting-ukraine-abroad-and-engineering-a-trigger-inside\"><strong><em>D\u00e9nigrer l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger et fabriquer un d\u00e9clencheur \u00e0 l\u2019int\u00e9rieur<\/em><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Following the Orange Revolution and the victory of the pro-Western Yushchenko, Russia\u2019s strategy shifted to the international level. For the Kremlin, keeping Ukraine within its sphere of influence was a vital interest. To undermine Ukraine&#8217;s European aspirations, Moscow launched a campaign of international discredit. The <a href=\"https:\/\/en.detector.media\/post\/gas-gangrene-of-kyiv-and-moscow-the-informational-component\">\u00ab guerres du gaz \u00bb<\/a> ont \u00e9t\u00e9 orchestr\u00e9es pour pr\u00e9senter l\u2019Ukraine comme un partenaire peu fiable du transit \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique vers l\u2019Europe, semant ainsi le doute dans les capitales occidentales. Simultan\u00e9ment, la Russie a mobilis\u00e9 un vaste r\u00e9seau de lobbyistes pour bloquer la voie de l\u2019Ukraine vers l\u2019OTAN, emp\u00eachant le pays d\u2019obtenir un plan d\u2019action pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion (MAP) au sommet de Bucarest en 2008.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Une fois que la menace imm\u00e9diate de l\u2019int\u00e9gration \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN a \u00e9t\u00e9 contenue \u00e0 l\u2019ext\u00e9rieur, la Russie s\u2019est de nouveau employ\u00e9e \u00e0 \u00e9roder l\u2019Ukraine de l\u2019int\u00e9rieur en soutenant la r\u00e9surrection politique de Viktor Ianoukovytch. Son accession finale \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence a marqu\u00e9 le passage de tactiques \u00e9lectorales temporaires \u00e0 des outils l\u00e9gislatifs permanents de division.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Beyond politics, this era focused on &#8220;worldview engineering&#8221; \u2013 reintroducing Soviet-style May 9th parades and other &#8220;Great Patriotic War&#8221; myths to anchor Ukraine in a common &#8220;Russian World&#8221; (Russkiy Mir) cultural space. These symbolic acts were designed to keep the &#8220;identity divide&#8221; relevant and prevent the formation of a unified Ukrainian civic identity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La logique strat\u00e9gique de cette \u00e9rosion interne a culmin\u00e9 avec la <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/ukrainealert\/the-truth-behind-ukraine-s-language-policy\/\">loi linguistique \u00ab Kivalov-Kolesnichenko \u00bb de 2012<\/a>. This was not a genuine effort to protect minority rights but a cynical political gesture designed to institutionalize linguistic segregation. By lowering the threshold for &#8220;regional language&#8221; status to 10%, the law <a href=\"https:\/\/husj.harvard.edu\/articles\/ukrainian-language-legislation-and-the-national-crisis\">a permis<\/a> aux \u00e9lites locales du Sud et de l\u2019Est, majoritairement russophones, de contourner enti\u00e8rement la langue d\u2019\u00c9tat, supprimant de fait l\u2019incitation \u00e0 l\u2019int\u00e9gration nationale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This was a textbook application of the Reflexive Control strategy, which was engineered to provoke a defensive reaction from the patriotic center. The resulting &#8220;Language Maidan&#8221; protests calling to protect Ukrainian language rights were <a href=\"https:\/\/stratcomcoe.org\/cuploads\/pfiles\/webrussia_syria_report_13-dec_.pdf\">relay\u00e9es par les m\u00e9dias russes<\/a> as evidence of &#8220;Western intolerance&#8221; and &#8220;nationalist radicalism&#8221;.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The legacy of this law remains one of Ukraine&#8217;s most complex challenges. Even today, the issue of minority language rights is weaponized on the international stage, most notably by Hungary within the EU, to stall Ukraine&#8217;s European integration. This demonstrates that the identity traps set decades ago continue to function as tools for external geopolitical pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia subsequently weaponized the inevitable Ukrainian backlash against these policies \u2013 specifically the attempted repeal of the language law after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity \u2013 as a primary justification for military intervention. By framing the defense of national identity as &#8220;cultural genocide,&#8221; the Kremlin successfully reframed external aggression as a domestic &#8220;civil war&#8221;, exploiting the very divisions it had spent a decade meticulously cultivating.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-2-what-the-divide-looks-like-now-three-post-2022-fault-lines\"><strong>2. \u00c0 quoi ressemble aujourd\u2019hui la fracture : trois lignes de faille depuis 2022<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Du fait de la guerre en Ukraine, la tension interne de longue date associ\u00e9e \u00e0 une \u00ab fracture Ouest-Est \u00bb a \u00e9volu\u00e9 vers une lutte plus complexe autour de l\u2019appartenance nationale, de la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 institutionnelle et de l\u2019\u00e9quit\u00e9 per\u00e7ue. Si le pays a d\u2019abord connu une vague massive d\u2019unit\u00e9 apr\u00e8s l\u2019invasion \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle, les donn\u00e9es sociales actuelles sugg\u00e8rent que la coh\u00e9sion est mise \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9preuve par plusieurs probl\u00e8mes internes. Pris ensemble, ils menacent la stabilit\u00e9 nationale, car ils compromettent la coh\u00e9sion sociale et l\u2019int\u00e9grit\u00e9 institutionnelle n\u00e9cessaires au fonctionnement effectif de l\u2019\u00c9tat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-language-policy-consolidation-with-residual-friction\"><strong><em>Politique linguistique : consolidation et frictions r\u00e9siduelles<\/em><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le facteur le moins influent dans l\u2019approfondissement de la fracture actuelle est la politique linguistique. Bien qu\u2019elle ait autrefois \u00e9t\u00e9 un outil majeur de manipulation politique, un large consensus a \u00e9merg\u00e9 : \u00e0 la mi-2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/razumkov.org.ua\/en\/component\/k2\/the-identity-of-ukraine-s-citizens-trends-of-change-june-2024\">environ 78 %<\/a> des citoyens identifient l\u2019ukrainien comme leur langue maternelle, et plus de <a href=\"https:\/\/razumkov.org.ua\/en\/component\/k2\/the-identity-of-ukraine-s-citizens-trends-of-change-june-2024\">70%<\/a> l\u2019utilisent principalement chez eux.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This was, however, preceded by a significant social friction that began following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The invasion triggered a massive internal migration, forcing hundreds of thousands of citizens from predominantly Russian-speaking regions to settle in the largely Ukrainian-speaking communities of the West. This movement brought the country\u2019s regional differences into immediate, daily contact, often resulting in localized conflicts where the Russian language was stigmatized as the &#8220;language of the occupier&#8221; or the &#8220;language of the aggressor&#8221;.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For many displaced persons, who were already reeling from the trauma of losing their homes to Russian aggression, being told that their native speech was a marker of political disloyalty created a profound sense of alienation, effectively making them feel like &#8220;outsiders&#8221; within their own country. These linguistic tensions were not merely organic social misunderstandings but were exacerbated by a <a href=\"https:\/\/kb.osu.edu\/server\/api\/core\/bitstreams\/1b008dfe-50dd-4b31-b72d-7e3023f1d96f\/content\">&#8220;war of words&#8221;<\/a> dans les m\u00e9dias, qui a renforc\u00e9 les st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes n\u00e9gatifs et entrav\u00e9 l\u2019int\u00e9gration sociale des nouveaux arrivants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La langue est devenue l\u2019un des marqueurs les plus \u00e9vidents d\u2019un d\u00e9bat plus large sur la construction nationale : l\u2019identit\u00e9 ukrainienne doit-elle \u00eatre d\u00e9finie principalement en termes civiques (loyaut\u00e9 et citoyennet\u00e9) ou ethnoculturels (langue, h\u00e9ritage et tradition) ? Si la majorit\u00e9 (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kiis.com.ua\/?lang=eng&amp;cat=reports&amp;id=1458&amp;page=4\">71%<\/a>) supports the inclusive definition of a Ukrainian citizen, a smaller but vocal group remains skeptical of those who speak Russian, which creates a &#8220;status threat&#8221; where some patriots feel their contribution is undervalued because of their linguistic background.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1010\" height=\"438\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-27.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Social Contract at War: Mobilization, Legitimacy, and Post-War Cohesion in Ukraine\" class=\"wp-image-35050\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-27.png 1010w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-27-600x260.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-27-768x333.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-27-18x8.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1010px) 100vw, 1010px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>\u00ab La Russie s\u2019arr\u00eate l\u00e0 o\u00f9 s\u2019arr\u00eate la langue russe. \u00bb Image du pr\u00e9sident russe Vladimir Poutine sur une affiche lors d\u2019une manifestation devant la Cour constitutionnelle d\u2019Ukraine, qui examinait alors la constitutionnalit\u00e9 de la loi linguistique Kivalov-Kolesnichenko. Kyiv, le 26 janvier 2017.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans le m\u00eame temps, la politique linguistique demeure la ligne de division la moins susceptible de s\u2019aggraver, car l\u2019orientation de l\u2019\u00c9tat est relativement claire et institutionnalis\u00e9e. L\u2019Ukraine a consolid\u00e9 un mod\u00e8le dans lequel l\u2019ukrainien est renforc\u00e9 comme seule langue d\u2019\u00c9tat et langue par d\u00e9faut de la sph\u00e8re publique, tandis que la communication priv\u00e9e ne fait pas l\u2019objet d\u2019un contr\u00f4le direct de l\u2019\u00c9tat. La cr\u00e9ation de l\u2019institution du <a href=\"https:\/\/www.radiosvoboda.org\/a\/mova-bezpeka-viyna-zbroya-ukrayina\/33410777.html\">commissaire \u00e0 la protection de la langue d\u2019\u00c9tat<\/a> renforce encore l\u2019application des r\u00e8gles par des m\u00e9canismes administratifs plut\u00f4t que par des campagnes politiques ponctuelles. Cela signifie que la question continuera d\u2019appara\u00eetre dans le d\u00e9bat public \u2014 surtout tant que les probl\u00e8mes de conformit\u00e9 persisteront \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9chelle nationale et seront signal\u00e9s le plus fr\u00e9quemment dans de grandes villes multilingues telles que Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv et Dnipro.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Pourtant, la trajectoire globale est stabilisatrice : la protection de la langue est largement per\u00e7ue comme d\u00e9fensive, fa\u00e7onn\u00e9e par une longue histoire de <a href=\"https:\/\/chytomo.com\/en\/a-guide-to-the-history-of-oppression-of-the-ukrainian-language\/\">restrictions impos\u00e9es \u00e0 la langue ukrainienne<\/a> et de son \u00e9viction de la vie publique et professionnelle \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque sovi\u00e9tique. Dans ce contexte, l\u2019issue probable \u00e0 moyen terme est la normalisation progressive de l\u2019ukrainien comme langue des institutions, des \u00e9lites et de la communication professionnelle, r\u00e9duisant la capacit\u00e9 de la langue \u00e0 servir de levier politique \u00e0 forte volatilit\u00e9 \u2014 m\u00eame si des conflits localis\u00e9s et des diff\u00e9rends symboliques persistent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-religious-security-dilemmas-enforcement-under-democratic-constraints\"><strong><em>Dilemmes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 religieuse : application des r\u00e8gles sous contraintes d\u00e9mocratiques<\/em><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Une source de friction plus importante est la confrontation religieuse, en particulier quant au r\u00f4le de l\u2019\u00c9glise orthodoxe ukrainienne li\u00e9e au patriarcat de Moscou (UOC-MP). Dans ce domaine, la tension oppose ceux qui consid\u00e8rent cette \u00c9glise comme un instrument direct de l\u2019influence et de la propagande de Moscou \u00e0 ceux qui estiment que la religion doit rester en dehors de la politique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In connection with the war in Ukraine, this divide has triggered a massive shift in the country&#8217;s religious landscape, resulting in a dramatic decline for the Moscow-linked institution. Before the start of the full-scale invasion in 2021, <a href=\"https:\/\/unn.ua\/en\/news\/how-the-number-of-believers-of-the-ocu-and-uoc-mp-has-changed-since-the-beginning-of-the-full-scale-war-sociology\">environ 13 %<\/a> des Ukrainiens se d\u00e9claraient fid\u00e8les de l\u2019UOC-MP, tandis que <a href=\"https:\/\/unn.ua\/en\/news\/how-the-number-of-believers-of-the-ocu-and-uoc-mp-has-changed-since-the-beginning-of-the-full-scale-war-sociology\">24%<\/a> appartenaient \u00e0 l\u2019\u00c9glise orthodoxe d\u2019Ukraine (OCU), ind\u00e9pendante. Fin 2024, la situation avait compl\u00e8tement chang\u00e9 : l\u2019affiliation \u00e0 l\u2019UOC-MP \u00e9tait tomb\u00e9e \u00e0 seulement <a href=\"https:\/\/unn.ua\/en\/news\/how-the-number-of-believers-of-the-ocu-and-uoc-mp-has-changed-since-the-beginning-of-the-full-scale-war-sociology\">5.5%<\/a>, tandis que l\u2019OCU repr\u00e9sentait d\u00e9sormais <a href=\"https:\/\/unn.ua\/en\/news\/how-the-number-of-believers-of-the-ocu-and-uoc-mp-has-changed-since-the-beginning-of-the-full-scale-war-sociology\">35%<\/a> de la population (selon le sondage du centre Razoumkov).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Pour le groupe qui consid\u00e8re l\u2019\u00c9glise comme un instrument de l\u2019agresseur, cette position est \u00e9tay\u00e9e par <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2025\/09\/11\/7530320\/\">plus de 180 proc\u00e9dures p\u00e9nales<\/a> ouvertes par le Service de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 d\u2019Ukraine (SBU\/SSU) contre des membres du clerg\u00e9 de l\u2019UOC-MP depuis 2022, dont 23 \u00e9v\u00eaques. Ces proc\u00e9dures portent sur des chefs pr\u00e9cis d\u2019espionnage et de haute trahison qui d\u00e9passent le d\u00e9bat id\u00e9ologique. Ainsi, en avril 2025, le contre-espionnage du SBU <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2025\/04\/10\/7506886\/\">a arr\u00eat\u00e9 un archipr\u00eatre du vicariat de Pokrovskyi, dans l\u2019oblast de Donetsk<\/a> qui avait \u00e9t\u00e9 surpris en train de recueillir, pour le FSB russe, des renseignements sur l\u2019emplacement de centres de commandement de secours et de p\u00f4les logistiques, en \u00e9change de l\u2019\u00e9vacuation de sa famille vers la Russie. Des affaires semblables ont \u00e9t\u00e9 document\u00e9es <a href=\"https:\/\/bukvy.org\/en\/russian-led-priest-caugh-spying-in-kharkiv-sbu\/\">\u00e0 Kharkiv<\/a>, o\u00f9 un recteur espionnait les mouvements des troupes ukrainiennes pr\u00e8s de points de contr\u00f4le, et <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/articles\/2025\/09\/11\/7530266\/\">\u00e0 Soumy<\/a>, o\u00f9 un archipr\u00eatre a \u00e9t\u00e9 condamn\u00e9 \u00e0 15 ans de prison pour avoir fourni des coordonn\u00e9es destin\u00e9es \u00e0 des frappes de missiles. L\u2019affaire peut-\u00eatre la plus sensible est celle d\u2019un pr\u00eatre de Zaporijjia arr\u00eat\u00e9 en ao\u00fbt 2025, accus\u00e9 d\u2019avoir utilis\u00e9 la confidentialit\u00e9 des confessions religieuses <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/articles\/2025\/09\/11\/7530266\/\">pour identifier et recruter des r\u00e9sidents pro-russes<\/a> pour un r\u00e9seau de renseignement dirig\u00e9 par le GRU. Pour cette raison, une part des Ukrainiens, soit environ <a href=\"https:\/\/razumkov.org.ua\/images\/2025\/01\/27\/2024-Religiya-religion-ENGL.pdf\">74%<\/a> de la population, soutient une interdiction totale de l\u2019\u00c9glise orthodoxe russe, consid\u00e9rant son influence comme un risque pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. De l\u2019autre c\u00f4t\u00e9, un groupe de fid\u00e8les affirme que sa vie spirituelle n\u2019a rien \u00e0 voir avec la guerre. Ce groupe est devenu encore plus ferme dans ses convictions : environ <a href=\"https:\/\/razumkov.org.ua\/images\/2025\/01\/27\/2024-Religiya-religion-ENGL.pdf\">44%<\/a> of UOC-MP followers report that their faith has only strengthened under the current pressure, which is a higher rate of &#8220;spiritual hardening&#8221; than seen in other denominations. This creates a dynamic where a segment of the population begins to feel like an oppressed minority, potentially isolating them from the rest of the national community.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1010\" height=\"414\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-29.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Social Contract at War: Mobilization, Legitimacy, and Post-War Cohesion in Ukraine\" class=\"wp-image-35052\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-29.png 1010w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-29-600x246.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-29-768x315.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-29-18x7.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1010px) 100vw, 1010px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><a href=\"https:\/\/suspilne.media\/338230-sbu-prijsla-z-obsukami-v-cerkvi-upc-mp-se-u-9-oblastah\/\"><em>Des agents du SBU m\u00e8nent des op\u00e9rations d\u2019enqu\u00eate au sein d\u2019\u00e9glises de l\u2019UOC-MP, saisissant des passeports russes, du mat\u00e9riel de propagande et des esp\u00e8ces.<\/em><\/a><em> Source : SBU (SSU)<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En d\u00e9finitive, la crise religieuse devrait s\u2019intensifier \u00e0 mesure que l\u2019Ukraine s\u2019aligne davantage sur l\u2019espace juridique et politique europ\u00e9en. Une interdiction de jure totale de l\u2019\u00c9glise orthodoxe russe pr\u00e9sente un risque diplomatique important, car les partenaires europ\u00e9ens et les organismes internationaux de d\u00e9fense des droits humains consid\u00e8rent souvent de telles restrictions g\u00e9n\u00e9rales comme des violations potentielles de <a href=\"https:\/\/fra.europa.eu\/en\/eu-charter\/article\/10-freedom-thought-conscience-and-religion\">l\u2019article 10 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne<\/a> et du principe de non-discrimination religieuse. Cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 institutionnelle offre aux \u00c9tats sceptiques, notamment la Hongrie, un argument commode pour entraver le processus d\u2019adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019UE en pr\u00e9sentant l\u2019application de la loi motiv\u00e9e par la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 comme une pers\u00e9cution de croyants organis\u00e9e par l\u2019\u00c9tat. Par cons\u00e9quent, malgr\u00e9 l\u2019abondance des preuves de recrutement syst\u00e9matique et d\u2019espionnage au sein des structures eccl\u00e9siastiques, le gouvernement ukrainien ne peut pas ais\u00e9ment \u00e9liminer l\u2019influence spirituelle et organisationnelle de Moscou <a href=\"https:\/\/svidomi.in.ua\/en\/page\/banning-of-the-ukrainian-orthodox-church-of-the-moscow-patriarchate-uoc-mp-in-ukraine-why-and-whats-next\">d\u2019un seul coup de l\u00e9gislation<\/a> without triggering a massive international backlash and accusations of collective punishment. This puts the administration in a profound dilemma, requiring it to move away from blunt prohibitions toward a strategy of &#8220;delicate counteractions&#8221;. This approach focuses strictly on individual criminal liability, while carefully upholding the standards of religious pluralism necessary to maintain support from Western allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-social-justice-and-wartime-burden-sharing-the-cohesion-stress-test\"><strong><em>Justice sociale et partage des charges de guerre : le test de r\u00e9sistance de la coh\u00e9sion<\/em><\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le troisi\u00e8me point de friction concerne la notion de justice et de partage \u00e9gal des charges. Une majorit\u00e9 de citoyens (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kiis.com.ua\/?lang=eng&amp;cat=reports&amp;id=1578&amp;page=1\">53%<\/a>) estime que les autorit\u00e9s ne parviennent pas \u00e0 garantir la justice sociale. Sous la pression de la guerre, cette perception se traduit par le sentiment que les r\u00e8gles sont appliqu\u00e9es de mani\u00e8re s\u00e9lective, que les charges sont r\u00e9parties de mani\u00e8re in\u00e9gale et que la responsabilit\u00e9 est ponctuelle plut\u00f4t que syst\u00e9mique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This persistent struggle with legislative failures and social injustice is not a recent development but rather a crisis with deep historical roots that the war has only intensified. In the early stages of the hostilities, there was a widespread public expectation that the shared national trauma would serve as a &#8220;reset&#8221; button, forcing government officials to acknowledge the fragility of their positions and finally address the structural deficiencies that had long hindered the state. Many citizens believed the urgency of survival would instill a new sense of accountability and self-reflection. Yet the expectations were not met.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le rythme des r\u00e9formes a stagn\u00e9 sous l\u2019effet de la distraction et de la pression des d\u00e9fis de la guerre. Les membres du Parlement, largement \u00e9lus en 2019 contre l\u2019ancienne administration et en soutien au nouveau pr\u00e9sident, n\u2019\u00e9taient pas pr\u00e9par\u00e9s \u00e0 assumer la responsabilit\u00e9 de la survie de l\u2019\u00c9tat. Ils sont donc devenus les ex\u00e9cutants de directives venues d\u2019en haut plut\u00f4t que les architectes de solutions. Cela a contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 un sentiment de stagnation, d\u2019enlisement dans des probl\u00e8mes syst\u00e9miques largement reconnus mais laiss\u00e9s sans r\u00e9ponse. Cette d\u00e9sillusion a \u00e9rod\u00e9 l\u2019espoir d\u2019un syst\u00e8me plus \u00e9quitable et ouvert la voie \u00e0 une rupture entre l\u2019\u00c9tat et sa population. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le test de r\u00e9sistance le plus aigu du contrat social en temps de guerre est le syst\u00e8me de mobilisation. Indispensable \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense de l\u2019Ukraine, il devient un facteur de polarisation lorsque les citoyens per\u00e7oivent le processus comme opaque, humiliant ou susceptible de traitements diff\u00e9renci\u00e9s. Le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne couramment appel\u00e9 \u00ab<a href=\"https:\/\/english.nv.ua\/opinion\/ukraine-s-busification-how-forced-draft-raids-fuel-fear-and-backlash-50568034.html\">busification<\/a>\u00bb n\u2019est pas seulement une question d\u2019abus isol\u00e9s ; il est devenu le symbole de la capacit\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00c9tat \u00e0 imposer des obligations extraordinaires tout en demeurant li\u00e9 par des r\u00e8gles pr\u00e9visibles et des normes \u00e9gales.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En 2024, plus de <a href=\"https:\/\/sceeus.se\/en\/publications\/the-ukrainian-mobilization-challenge-military-and-society-during-full-scale-war\/\">51 000 soldats ont d\u00e9sert\u00e9<\/a> leurs unit\u00e9s. Ces chiffres ne doivent pas \u00eatre compris comme un d\u00e9ficit de patriotisme individuel, mais comme une r\u00e9ponse syst\u00e9mique directe \u00e0 une iniquit\u00e9 institutionnalis\u00e9e. Lorsque les r\u00e8gles du sacrifice sont per\u00e7ues comme s\u00e9lectives, l\u2019obligation morale envers l\u2019\u00c9tat est de plus en plus remplac\u00e9e par un repli de survie face \u00e0 un contrat social bris\u00e9. En outre, la conviction que la richesse et les relations permettent d\u2019acheter des exemptions, tandis que d\u2019autres sont expos\u00e9s \u00e0 une application coercitive, sape directement le principe d\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 devant la loi. Comme le <a href=\"https:\/\/sceeus.se\/en\/publications\/the-ukrainian-mobilization-challenge-military-and-society-during-full-scale-war\/\">rapport du SCEEUS le rel\u00e8ve<\/a>, la mobilisation accro\u00eet la polarisation interne si elle n\u2019est pas g\u00e9r\u00e9e avec transparence et \u00e9quit\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cette iniquit\u00e9 institutionnalis\u00e9e est aggrav\u00e9e par le co\u00fbt psychologique d\u2019un service \u00e0 dur\u00e9e ind\u00e9termin\u00e9e, sans horizons clairs de d\u00e9mobilisation ni de rotation. Pour les personnels d\u00e9ploy\u00e9s depuis 2022, l\u2019absence de voies de sortie pr\u00e9visibles et de r\u00e8gles de rotation transparentes <a href=\"https:\/\/sceeus.se\/en\/publications\/the-ukrainian-mobilization-challenge-military-and-society-during-full-scale-war\/\">produit une incertitude chronique<\/a> et un sentiment de pi\u00e8ge \u2014 une exp\u00e9rience qui nuit au moral et \u00e0 la confiance dans les obligations r\u00e9ciproques de l\u2019\u00c9tat envers ceux qui servent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La dimension post-guerre de ce grief sera probablement encore plus sensible. Une fois la pression existentielle imm\u00e9diate att\u00e9nu\u00e9e, la diff\u00e9renciation des r\u00f4les durant la guerre peut se durcir en hi\u00e9rarchies morales<strong><em>: \u00ab qui a port\u00e9 la charge \u00bb contre \u00ab qui l\u2019a \u00e9vit\u00e9e \u00bb<\/em><\/strong>. Cela est particuli\u00e8rement saillant pour les v\u00e9t\u00e9rans et les hommes en \u00e2ge d\u2019\u00eatre mobilis\u00e9s qui vivaient \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger ou sont consid\u00e9r\u00e9s comme des insoumis. M\u00eame lorsque les personnes ont des motifs l\u00e9gitimes, tels que leur sant\u00e9, leurs responsabilit\u00e9s familiales ou leur statut juridique, la stigmatisation sociale peut perdurer. Si elles ne sont pas g\u00e9r\u00e9es, ces narrations peuvent alimenter l\u2019hostilit\u00e9 sociale, compliquer la r\u00e9int\u00e9gration et cr\u00e9er un terrain fertile pour que des entrepreneurs politiques et des op\u00e9rations informationnelles hostiles instrumentalisent la question : \u00ab O\u00f9 \u00e9tiez-vous pendant la guerre ? \u00bb<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En outre, les v\u00e9t\u00e9rans de l\u2019apr\u00e8s-guerre <a href=\"https:\/\/pism.pl\/publikacje\/weterani-zmieniaja-ukraine\">ne constitueront pas un \u00e9lectorat unique et homog\u00e8ne<\/a>. Les diff\u00e9rences de parcours et d\u2019incitations dans le service (entre personnels mobilis\u00e9s et militaires de carri\u00e8re, entre affectations au combat et \u00e0 l\u2019arri\u00e8re, et entre cohortes relevant de cadres contractuels diff\u00e9rents) peuvent fa\u00e7onner les attentes quant \u00e0 la reconnaissance, aux prestations et au soutien apr\u00e8s le service. De telles asym\u00e9tries peuvent approfondir les in\u00e9galit\u00e9s per\u00e7ues, y compris au sein de groupes partageant l\u2019exp\u00e9rience du front. Si les r\u00e9ponses institutionnelles sont fragment\u00e9es ou jug\u00e9es d\u00e9daigneuses, cela peut se traduire par une ali\u00e9nation politique et, dans les pires cas, une plus grande r\u00e9ceptivit\u00e9 \u00e0 des r\u00e9cits radicaux qui normalisent la coercition ou l\u2019action \u00ab extral\u00e9gale \u00bb comme substitut \u00e0 la justice. L\u2019ampleur de la d\u00e9mobilisation des v\u00e9t\u00e9rans depuis 2022, estim\u00e9e \u00e0 <a href=\"https:\/\/fba.se\/media\/ypdfqo5e\/fba-policy-brief-ukrainian-veterans-political-reintegration.pdf\">5 \u00e0 8 millions, membres de leur famille compris<\/a>, rend ce d\u00e9fi qualitativement diff\u00e9rent des cycles pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents, m\u00eame si l\u2019Ukraine poss\u00e8de une exp\u00e9rience ant\u00e9rieure positive de l\u2019int\u00e9gration de volontaires arm\u00e9s dans les structures de l\u2019\u00c9tat apr\u00e8s 2014.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La coh\u00e9sion est en outre compliqu\u00e9e par les <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iom.int\/crisis-ukraine\">d\u00e9placements massifs<\/a>, les exp\u00e9riences de guerre in\u00e9gales des citoyens vivant \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger et de ceux rest\u00e9s au pays, ainsi que par l\u2019aggravation de la charge li\u00e9e \u00e0 la sant\u00e9 mentale. Ces facteurs s\u2019accumulent en fatigue et en irritabilit\u00e9, abaissant le seuil du conflit social.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-3-policy-options-preventing-post-war-escalation\"><strong>3. Options de politique publique : pr\u00e9venir l\u2019escalade apr\u00e8s la guerre<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Pour r\u00e9duire le risque d\u2019escalade sociale apr\u00e8s la guerre, l\u2019Ukraine devrait consid\u00e9rer la coh\u00e9sion comme un r\u00e9sultat de gouvernance construit par la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9, l\u2019\u00e9quit\u00e9 et la capacit\u00e9 de mise en \u0153uvre.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Concr\u00e8tement, cela implique de passer d\u2019une gestion de crise ad hoc \u00e0 une approche coh\u00e9rente qui : a) prot\u00e8ge la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 des d\u00e9cisions de l\u2019\u00c9tat aux yeux des citoyens ; b) rend la justice et l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 des normes visibles dans l\u2019application quotidienne ; et c) d\u00e9ploie \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle le soutien \u00e0 la r\u00e9int\u00e9gration et \u00e0 la sant\u00e9 mentale par l\u2019interm\u00e9diaire des institutions et partenariats capables de le fournir effectivement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les options de politique publique ci-dessous suivent cette s\u00e9quence : d\u2019abord, stabiliser l\u2019environnement narratif et de l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 ; ensuite, traiter les obligations de guerre les plus g\u00e9n\u00e9ratrices de frictions ; enfin, construire l\u2019infrastructure de r\u00e9int\u00e9gration \u00e0 long terme qui emp\u00eache les griefs de se durcir en conflit politique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-1-legitimacy-fairness-and-narrative-management\"><strong>1. L\u00e9gitimit\u00e9, \u00e9quit\u00e9 et gestion des r\u00e9cits<\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Ukraine devrait remplacer les mod\u00e8les de \u00ab silence et d\u2019\u00e9vitement \u00bb par une expression structur\u00e9e de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 et une communication fond\u00e9e sur des preuves. La reconnaissance publique des \u00e9checs de gouvernance en temps de guerre, des explications claires des contraintes et des rapports d\u2019avancement r\u00e9guliers r\u00e9duisent la col\u00e8re aliment\u00e9e par les rumeurs et privent l\u2019industrie russe de la d\u00e9sinformation d\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9s exploitables.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans le m\u00eame temps, l\u2019\u00e9quit\u00e9 doit \u00eatre rendue <em>visible<\/em>, et non suppos\u00e9e : les citoyens doivent constater des r\u00e8gles coh\u00e9rentes, une application \u00e9gale et des cons\u00e9quences cr\u00e9dibles en cas d\u2019abus. C\u2019est \u00e9galement \u00e0 ce niveau que l\u2019\u00c9tat et la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile peuvent pr\u00e9venir la spirale de stigmatisation d\u2019apr\u00e8s-guerre (\u00ab O\u00f9 \u00e9tiez-vous pendant la guerre ? \u00bb), en d\u00e9courageant l\u2019\u00e9tiquetage moral des personnes de retour, des hommes \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger et des personnes per\u00e7ues comme insoumises. Il ne s\u2019agit pas de relativisme moral. C\u2019est une mesure de coh\u00e9sion sociale et de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 qui r\u00e9duit l\u2019espace disponible pour les entrepreneurs politiques et les op\u00e9rations informationnelles adverses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cependant, la gestion des r\u00e9cits n\u2019est cr\u00e9dible que si elle s\u2019appuie sur des proc\u00e9dures que les citoyens vivent comme l\u00e9gales et \u00e9gales, surtout dans le domaine le plus sensible de la guerre : la mobilisation. Sans l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 proc\u00e9durale, m\u00eame des messages exacts appara\u00eetront comme des man\u0153uvres de diversion, et les griefs continueront de s\u2019accumuler.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-2-mobilization-and-service-conditions-package\"><strong>2. Ensemble de mesures sur la mobilisation et les conditions de service<\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La mobilisation est une n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique, mais elle devient politiquement corrosive lorsque les proc\u00e9dures paraissent opaques, humiliantes ou appliqu\u00e9es de mani\u00e8re s\u00e9lective.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To stabilize the front-line presence, Ukraine should consider a strategic shift toward a high-incentive contract model. This includes significantly increasing base salaries and sign-on bonuses to transform service from a coercive mandate into a professional choice. Given domestic fiscal constraints, this &#8216;professionalization fund&#8217; could be structured as a targeted international aid program (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/uk\/zelenskij-evropa-mogla-b-dopomogti-z-perehodom-vid-mobilizacii-do-kontraktiv\/a-76085043\">une id\u00e9e r\u00e9cemment avanc\u00e9e<\/a> by the Ukrainian leadership) where European partners directly finance the wages of those defending the continent\u2019s security. This approach would not only increase recruitment throughput but also reduce the social friction caused by coercive &#8216;busification&#8217;.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1008\" height=\"430\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-31.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Social Contract at War: Mobilization, Legitimacy, and Post-War Cohesion in Ukraine\" class=\"wp-image-35054\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-31.png 1008w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-31-600x256.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-31-768x328.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-31-18x8.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1008px) 100vw, 1008px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\">En outre, un \u00ab paquet de l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 de la mobilisation \u00bb de base devrait associer des proc\u00e9dures standardis\u00e9es entre les r\u00e9gions, un contr\u00f4le document\u00e9, des canaux de recours accessibles et la publication des r\u00e9sultats disciplinaires. Il serait \u00e9galement tr\u00e8s utile que le gouvernement instaure des horizons de service <em>pr\u00e9visibles<\/em> et des principes de rotation. M\u00eame lorsque la d\u00e9mobilisation totale n\u2019est pas r\u00e9alisable, une logique transparente concernant la rotation, les cycles de repos et les parcours m\u00e9dicaux et psychologiques r\u00e9duit l\u2019incertitude et prot\u00e8ge le moral.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Toutefois, m\u00eame un syst\u00e8me de mobilisation proc\u00e9duralement l\u00e9gitime ne suffira pas, \u00e0 lui seul, \u00e0 emp\u00eacher la fragmentation apr\u00e8s la guerre. L\u2019ampleur du retour des v\u00e9t\u00e9rans, des d\u00e9placements et de la tension psychologique accumul\u00e9e exige un mod\u00e8le de mise en \u0153uvre capable d\u2019absorber la demande et de la convertir en emplois, services et inclusion sociale. C\u2019est un probl\u00e8me de capacit\u00e9, et non seulement de valeurs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-3-whole-of-society-reintegration-capacity\"><strong>3. Capacit\u00e9 de r\u00e9int\u00e9gration de l\u2019ensemble de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9<\/strong><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La stabilit\u00e9 apr\u00e8s la guerre exige un mod\u00e8le de mise en \u0153uvre \u00e0 la mesure des besoins. L\u2019Ukraine devrait institutionnaliser les m\u00e9canismes \u00ab de l\u2019ensemble de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 \u00bb qui se sont r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9s efficaces pendant la guerre : co-conception et mise en \u0153uvre avec les municipalit\u00e9s, les organisations de v\u00e9t\u00e9rans et les r\u00e9seaux de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile dignes de confiance, avec une coordination et un financement centralis\u00e9s. Lorsque cela est possible, les partenariats public-priv\u00e9 peuvent monter en puissance plus vite que les programmes purement centralis\u00e9s, notamment pour les fili\u00e8res d\u2019emploi, la reconversion, les normes de soutien aux v\u00e9t\u00e9rans sur le lieu de travail et les pratiques RH favorables \u00e0 la r\u00e9int\u00e9gration. Le soutien \u00e0 la sant\u00e9 mentale doit \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme une politique de coh\u00e9sion, et non seulement comme un \u00e9l\u00e9ment des soins de sant\u00e9 : \u00e9tendre l\u2019acc\u00e8s par des services communautaires, le soutien par les pairs et l\u2019int\u00e9gration aux soins primaires r\u00e9duit les risques de violence domestique, d\u2019abus de substances et de r\u00e9ceptivit\u00e9 aux r\u00e9cits radicaux.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1004\" height=\"464\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-33.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Social Contract at War: Mobilization, Legitimacy, and Post-War Cohesion in Ukraine\" class=\"wp-image-35056\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-33.png 1004w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-33-600x277.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-33-768x355.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-33-18x8.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1004px) 100vw, 1004px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Cr\u00e9dit photo : PNUD Ukraine \/ Reporters \/ Vyacheslav Ratynskyi. Tir\u00e9 de <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/euneighbourseast.eu\/news\/publications\/adapting-to-civilian-life-entry-points-to-strengthen-veterans-reintegration-in-ukraine\/\"><em>S\u2019adapter \u00e0 la vie civile : pistes pour renforcer la r\u00e9int\u00e9gration des v\u00e9t\u00e9rans en Ukraine<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En somme, la stabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Ukraine apr\u00e8s la guerre d\u00e9pendra moins de la rh\u00e9torique que du fait que les citoyens per\u00e7oivent l\u2019\u00c9tat comme \u00e9quitable, pr\u00e9visible et capable de mettre en \u0153uvre la r\u00e9int\u00e9gration \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle. Si la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 est reconstruite par une justice visible et une mise en \u0153uvre par l\u2019ensemble de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9, les pressions les plus divisives de la guerre pourront \u00eatre contenues plut\u00f4t qu\u2019instrumentalis\u00e9es.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Les points de vue, pens\u00e9es et opinions exprim\u00e9s dans les \u00e9tudes publi\u00e9es sur ce site n\u2019appartiennent qu\u2019\u00e0 leurs auteurs et ne refl\u00e8tent pas n\u00e9cessairement ceux du Transatlantic Dialogue Center, de ses comit\u00e9s ou de ses organisations affili\u00e9es. Ces \u00e9tudes visent \u00e0 stimuler le dialogue et la discussion et ne repr\u00e9sentent pas les positions politiques officielles du Transatlantic Dialogue Center ni de toute autre organisation \u00e0 laquelle les auteurs peuvent \u00eatre associ\u00e9s.<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In wartime, internal cohesion is a strategic resource. Russia\u2019s long-running efforts to portray Ukraine as inherently divided draw on older narratives of \u201cTwo Ukraines,\u201d but today\u2019s most destabilizing tensions are less regional than institutional. This article evaluates how these divides were manufactured and suggests that the path forward lies in addressing governance-linked friction rather than [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":21,"featured_media":35066,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13],"tags":[],"topic":[99,98,87,86,92],"class_list":["post-35044","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","topic-disinformation","topic-religion","topic-security","topic-ukraine","topic-war"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Ukraine\u2019s Wartime Social Contract and Cohesion | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The paper maps Ukraine\u2019s wartime fault lines around language, 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fairness, offering policy options to protect post-war cohesion.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Vladyslava Sen\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"21 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/19\/the-social-contract-at-war-mobilization-legitimacy-and-post-war-cohesion-in-ukraine\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/19\/the-social-contract-at-war-mobilization-legitimacy-and-post-war-cohesion-in-ukraine\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Vladyslava Sen\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/705192eaf4fd14c2586f2248272448b4\"},\"headline\":\"The Social Contract at War: Mobilization, Legitimacy, and Post-War Cohesion in 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