{"id":35027,"date":"2026-03-16T17:35:43","date_gmt":"2026-03-16T15:35:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=35027"},"modified":"2026-03-22T00:25:42","modified_gmt":"2026-03-21T22:25:42","slug":"germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Les prochaines \u00e9tapes de l\u2019Allemagne pour soutenir l\u2019Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"53876\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">321 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The US administration&#8217;s foreign policy shift has made European support the lifeline for Ukraine&#8217;s defense. After the most devastating winter since the full-scale invasion began, the pressure on Ukraine is only intensifying. As Europe&#8217;s largest economy and top contributor of military aid, Germany is uniquely positioned to lead. The Bundestag, with its authority over defense policy, budgetary decisions, and international commitments, can turn this position into immediate, concrete action to sustain Ukraine&#8217;s ability to defend itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-procuring-from-ukraine-s-defense-industry\"><strong>Procuring from Ukraine&#8217;s Defense Industry<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-\">Ukraine&#8217;s defense production capacity <a href=\"https:\/\/mod.gov.ua\/en\/news\/the-ministry-of-defence-secured-over-6-billion-for-ukraine-s-defense-industry-in-2025\">a atteint 35 milliards de dollars<\/a> en 2025, mais l\u2019\u00c9tat ne peut en acheter qu\u2019un tiers. Les financements \u00e9trangers via le <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/production-procurement-how-europe-and-ukraine-are-transforming-defense-supply-chains\">mod\u00e8le danois<\/a> et ses variantes <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rnbo.gov.ua\/en\/Diialnist\/7361.html\">ont atteint 6,7 milliards de dollars<\/a> en 2025. M\u00eame combin\u00e9s, les achats nationaux et \u00e9trangers laissent une part importante des capacit\u00e9s inutilis\u00e9e. L\u2019Allemagne \u2014 qui ne compte qu\u2019 <a href=\"https:\/\/quantum-systems.com\/news\/first-joint-co-production-of-ukrainian-drones-in-europe-launched-by-quantum-systems-and-frontline-robotics\/\">un seul site de production conjoint<\/a> de syst\u00e8mes de d\u00e9fense ukrainiens sur son territoire \u2014 exploite \u00e0 peine le potentiel du partenariat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-\"><strong>Justification strat\u00e9gique<\/strong>: Ukrainian producers offer combat-tested systems at a fraction of Western costs. German procurement would sustain Ukrainian capacity that risks being lost to underuse, while helping address Europe&#8217;s own defense production shortfalls \u2014 a strategic investment in collective deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-\"><strong>D\u00e9fi actuel : <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.juergenhardt.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/10-Punkte-Plan-DEU-UKR-Ruestungskooperation.pdf\">Plan en 10 points<\/a> sur le renforcement de la coop\u00e9ration germano-ukrainienne dans l\u2019industrie de d\u00e9fense pr\u00e9voit des coentreprises, des garanties d\u2019investissement et l\u2019acquisition de syst\u00e8mes ukrainiens \u2014 mais les achats effectifs aupr\u00e8s de l\u2019Ukraine restent marginaux par rapport \u00e0 son budget de d\u00e9fense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Marge de man\u0153uvre<\/strong>: L\u2019Allemagne peut consacrer davantage de fonds d\u2019aide militaire \u00e0 des achats directs aupr\u00e8s de producteurs ukrainiens, tout en acqu\u00e9rant \u00e9galement des syst\u00e8mes fabriqu\u00e9s en Ukraine pour la Bundeswehr elle-m\u00eame. Les deux voies devraient \u00eatre prioritaires dans les domaines o\u00f9 l\u2019Ukraine dispose d\u2019un avantage technologique av\u00e9r\u00e9, comme les drones, la guerre \u00e9lectronique et les syst\u00e8mes d\u2019interception.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-accelerating-ukraine-s-eu-accession\"><strong>Accelerating Ukraine&#8217;s EU Accession<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As the US withdraws from European security commitments, Ukraine becomes indispensable to Europe&#8217;s own defense. Yet the traditional enlargement framework is increasingly mismatched with today&#8217;s urgency. A new accession model is needed \u2014 one that reflects the security reality and can be advanced separately from other candidacies. The European Commission is already developing <a href=\"https:\/\/table.media\/en\/europe\/news-en\/ukraine-commission-proposes-gradual-integration\">des mod\u00e8les possibles<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Justification strat\u00e9gique<\/strong>: EU membership is the only credible long-term guarantee of Ukraine&#8217;s stability and prosperity as well as a structural deterrent against future aggression. A stalled process weakens not only Ukraine but the EU&#8217;s own credibility, creating openings for hostile external actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>D\u00e9fi actuel : <\/strong>Member states, including Germany, have not prepared domestically for enlargement. The conversation about its implications has barely begun, while in Ukraine and Moldova accession dominates the agenda. Hungary&#8217;s blocking of the opening of negotiation clusters has exposed how one spoiler can undermine the entire process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Marge de man\u0153uvre<\/strong>: Germany should launch a substantive domestic and European debate on EU enlargement, positioning itself as a constructive leader on both the substance and the process. Concrete steps include working with the European Commission on its reform proposals and building consensus among member states for a solution that preserves both the merit-based principle and the strategic urgency of Ukraine&#8217;s European path.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-circumventing-vetoes-on-ukraine-aid\"><strong>Contourner les vetos sur l\u2019aide \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La Hongrie et la Slovaquie continuent de <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/hungary-vows-block-eu-sanctions-russia-eve-ukraine-war-anniversary-2026-02-23\/\">bloquer le programme d\u2019aide de l\u2019UE de 90 milliards d\u2019euros<\/a> en faveur de l\u2019Ukraine. En r\u00e9ponse, les pays nordiques et baltes se sont engag\u00e9s \u00e0 fournir <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/europe-plan-to-keep-ukraine-afloat-hungary-blocking-e90b-loan\/\">jusqu\u2019\u00e0 30 milliards d\u2019euros de pr\u00eats bilat\u00e9raux<\/a> to meet Ukraine&#8217;s immediate financial needs through mid-2026, regardless of the veto.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Justification strat\u00e9gique<\/strong>: Predictable financial support underpins Ukraine&#8217;s defense capacity, economic resilience, and negotiating position in peace talks. Allowing a single member state to hold European security policy hostage sets a dangerous precedent \u2014 for Ukraine and for Europe&#8217;s crisis-response capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>D\u00e9fi actuel : <\/strong>With Hungary&#8217;s electoral campaign in full swing and the &#8220;threat from Ukraine&#8221; among its central themes, the blockage is unlikely to be lifted before a new government takes office around late May or June. Until then, Ukraine faces an acute funding gap that could trigger worsening conditions on the ground and a new wave of refugees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Marge de man\u0153uvre<\/strong>: L\u2019Allemagne peut rejoindre ou codiriger la coalition de pr\u00eats bilat\u00e9raux, en lui apportant le poids financier et politique dont elle a besoin. \u00c0 plus long terme, Berlin devrait relancer les discussions sur une transition progressive vers le vote \u00e0 la majorit\u00e9 qualifi\u00e9e dans les d\u00e9cisions de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re et de sanctions (comme l\u2019a montr\u00e9 la r\u00e9cente d\u00e9cision de gel ind\u00e9fini des avoirs russes), ainsi que sur une proc\u00e9dure op\u00e9rationnelle au titre de l\u2019article 7 du TUE susceptible de tenir les \u00c9tats membres responsables.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-disrupting-russia-s-shadow-fleet-in-the-baltic-sea\"><strong>Disrupting Russia&#8217;s Shadow Fleet in the Baltic Sea<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">European enforcement against Russia&#8217;s shadow fleet has entered a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/online-analysis\/2026\/03\/europes-coastal-states-tighten-enforcement-on-russias-shadow-fleet\/\">nouvelle phase op\u00e9rationnelle<\/a>, la Belgique, la France et la Su\u00e8de \u00e9tant \u00e0 l\u2019avant-garde. Les \u00c9tats-Unis ont saisi au moins <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/dispatches\/when-economic-warfare-meets-gunboat-diplomacy-what-to-know-about-the-us-seizures-of-shadow-fleet-tankers\/\">sept p\u00e9troliers<\/a> depuis la fin de 2025. Aucune de ces op\u00e9rations n\u2019a entra\u00een\u00e9 de repr\u00e9sailles russes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Justification strat\u00e9gique<\/strong>: The EU&#8217;s oil price cap stands at <a href=\"https:\/\/finance.ec.europa.eu\/news\/new-dynamic-mechanism-lower-price-cap-russian-crude-oil-4410-barrel-2026-01-15_en\">$44.10 le baril<\/a>. Quelque 68 % des exportations de brut russes <a href=\"https:\/\/supplystatus.com\/list\/how-the-iran-war-and-sanctions-are-reshaping-russian-oil-exports-2026\/v\">sont d\u00e9sormais transport\u00e9es par des navires sous sanctions<\/a>, contournant enti\u00e8rement le plafonnement. Ces m\u00eames navires font peser des risques aigus sur l\u2019environnement et le renseignement dans les eaux europ\u00e9ennes. Depuis le d\u00e9but de la guerre en Iran, la Russie a engrang\u00e9 <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/russia-earns-additional-6-billion-euros-in-fossil-fuel-revenue-as-oil-prices-soar-amid-us-iran-war-analysis-finds\/\">6 milliards d\u2019euros suppl\u00e9mentaires de recettes issues des combustibles fossiles<\/a>. Alors que Washington <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/clyzj3g3pygo\">assouplit d\u00e9j\u00e0 les sanctions<\/a>, l\u2019Europe doit \u00eatre pr\u00eate \u00e0 maintenir et \u00e0 appliquer le r\u00e9gime de sanctions de mani\u00e8re ind\u00e9pendante.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>D\u00e9fi actuel : <\/strong>Plus de <a href=\"https:\/\/maritime-executive.com\/article\/european-nations-warn-shadow-fleet-shipowners-to-play-by-the-rules\">300 navires de la flotte fant\u00f4me<\/a> naviguent d\u00e9sormais sous de faux pavillons ou sans pavillon du tout \u2014 ce qui les rend susceptibles d\u2019\u00eatre arraisonn\u00e9s au titre de l\u2019article 92 de la CNUDM \u2014, mais l\u2019Allemagne ne dispose pas des protocoles op\u00e9rationnels n\u00e9cessaires pour exercer cette comp\u00e9tence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Marge de man\u0153uvre<\/strong>: L\u2019Allemagne peut suivre le <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/cy8pn7jgy3no\">mod\u00e8le britannique<\/a>, en utilisant la l\u00e9gislation existante sur les sanctions pour autoriser une action militaire, ou l\u00e9gif\u00e9rer pour se doter du pouvoir national d\u2019arraisonner, d\u2019inspecter et de d\u00e9tenir les navires suspects. Elle devrait assurer la transposition int\u00e9grale de la directive UE 2024\/1226 afin que le contournement des sanctions puisse faire l\u2019objet de poursuites p\u00e9nales. Elle devrait \u00e9galement consacrer des ressources sp\u00e9cifiques aux patrouilles conjointes en mer Baltique avec les partenaires nordiques et baltes \u2014 d\u00e9montrant ainsi sa volont\u00e9 de faire appliquer les sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-delivering-taurus-missles-to-ukraine\"><strong>Livrer des missiles Taurus \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Ukraine a d\u00e9truit <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/robert_magyar\/2041\">54 syst\u00e8mes de d\u00e9fense antia\u00e9rienne russes<\/a> au cours de l\u2019hiver et <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/robert_magyar\/2074\">19 autres<\/a> au cours de la premi\u00e8re moiti\u00e9 de mars, ouvrant une fen\u00eatre pour frapper des cibles de l\u2019industrie de d\u00e9fense plus profond\u00e9ment derri\u00e8re la ligne de front \u2014 comme l\u2019a montr\u00e9 la frappe du 10 mars contre l\u2019 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/03\/11\/world\/europe\/ukraine-russia-electronics-plant-missiles.html\">usine Kremniy-El<\/a> \u00e0 Briansk. Pourtant, l\u2019arsenal de frappe \u00e0 longue port\u00e9e reste dangereusement limit\u00e9 : les capacit\u00e9s de production britanniques et fran\u00e7aises sont restreintes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Justification strat\u00e9gique<\/strong>: Les Taurus \u00e9largiraient la capacit\u00e9 de frappe \u00e0 longue port\u00e9e de l\u2019Ukraine et mettraient davantage \u00e0 rude \u00e9preuve les d\u00e9fenses antia\u00e9riennes russes, d\u00e9j\u00e0 affaiblies. Alors que la guerre en Iran accentue la p\u00e9nurie d\u2019intercepteurs occidentaux, frapper \u00e0 la source la production russe de missiles devient encore plus crucial pour pr\u00e9venir une nouvelle catastrophe humanitaire durant l\u2019hiver 2026\/27.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>D\u00e9fi actuel :<\/strong> Germany has prioritized Ukraine&#8217;s indigenous long-range strike program \u2014 a sound investment, but one that does not close the spring\u2013summer gap, when the Russian offensive is expected. Comparable Ukrainian systems are unlikely to reach reliable serial production before late 2026 at the earliest, and drones cannot substitute the firepower of cruise missiles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Marge de man\u0153uvre<\/strong>: Les Taurus <a href=\"https:\/\/www.twz.com\/germanys-taurus-cruise-missile-could-be-the-next-for-ukraine\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">peuvent \u00eatre int\u00e9gr\u00e9s aux F-16<\/a> d\u00e9j\u00e0 en service en Ukraine, la formation pouvant \u00eatre achev\u00e9e en <a href=\"https:\/\/deaidua.org\/news\/2025\/02\/23\/taurus-kepd-350-for-ukraine-how-a-delivery-might-look-like\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">3\u20134 mois<\/a>. Les stocks livr\u00e9s peuvent \u00eatre remplac\u00e9s par une version Taurus Neo am\u00e9lior\u00e9e. Le Bundestag peut jouer un r\u00f4le catalyseur \u2014 en suscitant un d\u00e9bat parlementaire et en exigeant que l\u2019accord de coop\u00e9ration avec l\u2019Ukraine sur les armes \u00e0 longue port\u00e9e pr\u00e9voie des mesures provisoires pour combler le d\u00e9ficit jusqu\u2019\u00e0 ce que les syst\u00e8mes produits en Ukraine atteignent la production en s\u00e9rie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The US administration&#8217;s foreign policy shift has made European support the lifeline for Ukraine&#8217;s defense. After the most devastating winter since the full-scale invasion began, the pressure on Ukraine is only intensifying. As Europe&#8217;s largest economy and top contributor of military aid, Germany is uniquely positioned to lead. The Bundestag, with its authority over defense [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":35042,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13,53,72,58],"tags":[],"topic":[91,96,84,86],"class_list":["post-35027","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","category-reports-handbooks","category-eng-reports-german-ukrainian-partnership-program","category-eng-western-europe","topic-eu","topic-germany","topic-russia","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Germany&#039;s Next Steps to Support Ukraine | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This report sets out steps Germany can take to support Ukraine as changing U.S. policy increases Europe\u2019s responsibility for defence and wartime assistance.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Germany&#039;s Next Steps to Support Ukraine\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"This report sets out steps Germany can take to support Ukraine as changing U.S. policy increases Europe\u2019s responsibility for defence and wartime assistance.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Transatlantic-Dialogue-Center-105645698740463\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-03-16T15:35:43+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-03-21T22:25:42+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Major-Policy-Shift-Announced-Today-6.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1088\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"720\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Stepan Rusyn\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:title\" content=\"Germany&#039;s Next Steps to Support Ukraine\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:description\" content=\"This report sets out steps Germany can take to support Ukraine as changing U.S. policy increases Europe\u2019s responsibility for defence and wartime assistance.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Stepan Rusyn\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"6 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Stepan Rusyn\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/10d9eb6be418ce623b4525c0dedbadfa\"},\"headline\":\"Germany&#8217;s Next Steps to Support Ukraine\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-03-16T15:35:43+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-03-21T22:25:42+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/\"},\"wordCount\":1163,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Major-Policy-Shift-Announced-Today-6.png\",\"articleSection\":[\"Central &amp; Eastern Europe\",\"English Analyses\",\"English Reports &amp; Handbooks\",\"Germany-Ukraine Partnership Program\",\"Western Europe\"],\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/\",\"name\":\"Germany's Next Steps to Support Ukraine | TDC\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Major-Policy-Shift-Announced-Today-6.png\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-03-16T15:35:43+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-03-21T22:25:42+00:00\",\"description\":\"This report sets out steps Germany can take to support Ukraine as changing U.S. policy increases Europe\u2019s responsibility for defence and wartime assistance.\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Major-Policy-Shift-Announced-Today-6.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Major-Policy-Shift-Announced-Today-6.png\",\"width\":1088,\"height\":720,\"caption\":\"Cover image for: Germany\u2019s Next Steps to Support Ukraine\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Germany&#8217;s Next Steps to Support Ukraine\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/\",\"name\":\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center\",\"description\":\"Promoting International Peace and Security\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/google.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/google.png\",\"width\":2568,\"height\":2487,\"caption\":\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Transatlantic-Dialogue-Center-105645698740463\",\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/channel\/UCpJuhU4JBfpv_jsldNOc5LA\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/10d9eb6be418ce623b4525c0dedbadfa\",\"name\":\"Stepan Rusyn\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/litespeed\/avatar\/933c2b7a4204b3771069324be5fa5a24.jpg?ver=1788348441\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/litespeed\/avatar\/933c2b7a4204b3771069324be5fa5a24.jpg?ver=1788348441\",\"caption\":\"Stepan Rusyn\"}}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO Premium plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Germany's Next Steps to Support Ukraine | TDC","description":"This report sets out steps Germany can take to support Ukraine as changing U.S. policy increases Europe\u2019s responsibility for defence and wartime assistance.","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/","og_locale":"fr_FR","og_type":"article","og_title":"Germany's Next Steps to Support Ukraine","og_description":"This report sets out steps Germany can take to support Ukraine as changing U.S. policy increases Europe\u2019s responsibility for defence and wartime assistance.","og_url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/","og_site_name":"Transatlantic Dialogue Center","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Transatlantic-Dialogue-Center-105645698740463","article_published_time":"2026-03-16T15:35:43+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-03-21T22:25:42+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1088,"height":720,"url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Major-Policy-Shift-Announced-Today-6.png","type":"image\/png"}],"author":"Stepan Rusyn","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_title":"Germany's Next Steps to Support Ukraine","twitter_description":"This report sets out steps Germany can take to support Ukraine as changing U.S. policy increases Europe\u2019s responsibility for defence and wartime assistance.","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Stepan Rusyn","Est. reading time":"6 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/"},"author":{"name":"Stepan Rusyn","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/10d9eb6be418ce623b4525c0dedbadfa"},"headline":"Germany&#8217;s Next Steps to Support Ukraine","datePublished":"2026-03-16T15:35:43+00:00","dateModified":"2026-03-21T22:25:42+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/"},"wordCount":1163,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Major-Policy-Shift-Announced-Today-6.png","articleSection":["Central &amp; Eastern Europe","English Analyses","English Reports &amp; Handbooks","Germany-Ukraine Partnership Program","Western Europe"],"inLanguage":"fr-FR","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/","name":"Germany's Next Steps to Support Ukraine | TDC","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Major-Policy-Shift-Announced-Today-6.png","datePublished":"2026-03-16T15:35:43+00:00","dateModified":"2026-03-21T22:25:42+00:00","description":"This report sets out steps Germany can take to support Ukraine as changing U.S. policy increases Europe\u2019s responsibility for defence and wartime assistance.","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"fr-FR","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"fr-FR","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Major-Policy-Shift-Announced-Today-6.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Major-Policy-Shift-Announced-Today-6.png","width":1088,"height":720,"caption":"Cover image for: Germany\u2019s Next Steps to Support Ukraine"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Germany&#8217;s Next Steps to Support Ukraine"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#website","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/","name":"Transatlantic Dialogue Center","description":"Promoting International Peace and Security","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"fr-FR"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization","name":"Transatlantic Dialogue Center","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"fr-FR","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/google.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/google.png","width":2568,"height":2487,"caption":"Transatlantic Dialogue Center"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Transatlantic-Dialogue-Center-105645698740463","https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/channel\/UCpJuhU4JBfpv_jsldNOc5LA"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/10d9eb6be418ce623b4525c0dedbadfa","name":"Stepan Rusyn","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"fr-FR","@id":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/litespeed\/avatar\/933c2b7a4204b3771069324be5fa5a24.jpg?ver=1788348441","contentUrl":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/litespeed\/avatar\/933c2b7a4204b3771069324be5fa5a24.jpg?ver=1788348441","caption":"Stepan Rusyn"}}]}},"mfb_rest_fields":["title","yoast_head","yoast_head_json","gutenberg_elementor_mode"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/35027","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=35027"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/35027\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":35029,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/35027\/revisions\/35029"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/35042"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=35027"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=35027"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=35027"},{"taxonomy":"topic","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/topic?post=35027"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}