{"id":33035,"date":"2025-11-07T10:43:52","date_gmt":"2025-11-07T08:43:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=33035"},"modified":"2025-11-11T15:37:51","modified_gmt":"2025-11-11T13:37:51","slug":"top-priorities-for-the-eu-on-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2025\/11\/07\/top-priorities-for-the-eu-on-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Principales priorit\u00e9s de l\u2019UE concernant l\u2019Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"51926\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">258 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Alors que d\u2019importantes initiatives de l\u2019UE concernant l\u2019Ukraine et la Russie sont en cours, c\u2019est un moment crucial pour les d\u00e9put\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens de faire preuve de leadership en <strong>faisant avancer des mesures urgentes pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u2019Ukraine et son adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE<\/strong>, domaine dans lequel un engagement plus fort peut avoir un impact tangible :<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-center\" id=\"h-fast-tracking-macro-financial-assistance-to-ukraine\"><strong>Acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer l\u2019assistance macrofinanci\u00e8re \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le pr\u00eat de r\u00e9paration permettrait de d\u00e9bloquer 140 milliards d\u2019euros pour l\u2019Ukraine en utilisant comme garantie les profits tir\u00e9s des actifs souverains russes gel\u00e9s \u2014 un plan <a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/doceo\/document\/TA-10-2024-0012_EN.html\">soutenu par la Commission europ\u00e9enne et le Parlement europ\u00e9en <\/a>et les partenaires du G7, qui ne n\u00e9cessite aucun nouvel argent des contribuables de l\u2019UE.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Pourquoi est-ce important : <\/em><\/strong>L\u2019aide des \u00c9tats-Unis \u00e9tant incertaine, l\u2019utilisation des actifs russes gel\u00e9s ou un emprunt conjoint au niveau de l\u2019UE restent le seul moyen cr\u00e9dible de maintenir l\u2019assistance militaire \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>D\u00e9fi actuel : <\/em><\/strong>La Belgique craint d\u2019assumer seule les risques juridiques et financiers ; elle a donc convaincu les \u00c9tats membres, lors de <a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/media\/d2nhnqso\/20251023-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf\">la r\u00e9union du Conseil europ\u00e9en du 23 octobre<\/a> to postpone approval until December 2025. Some member states also have concerns about Ukraine&#8217;s procurement of solely US-made weaponry with the potentially unlocked funds.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>L\u2019Ukraine appelle : <\/em><\/strong>les d\u00e9put\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens \u00e0 exhorter<strong><em> <\/em><\/strong>les \u00c9tats membres, notamment au moyen d\u2019une r\u00e9solution pl\u00e9ni\u00e8re d\u00e9di\u00e9e, \u00e0 partager les risques et \u00e0 offrir des garanties juridiques, ainsi qu\u2019\u00e0 prendre une d\u00e9cision finale d\u2019approbation <strong>lors de la r\u00e9union de d\u00e9cembre 2025<\/strong> du Conseil europ\u00e9en. Les d\u00e9put\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens sont \u00e9galement encourag\u00e9s \u00e0 plaider en faveur de <em>l\u2019utilisation directe des actifs russes gel\u00e9s<\/em> et\/ou <em>l\u2019emprunt conjoint au niveau de l\u2019UE<\/em> afin d\u2019\u00e9tablir un paquet d\u2019assistance \u00e0 long terme et pr\u00e9visible pour l\u2019Ukraine.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-center\" id=\"h-frontloading-informal-opening-of-negotiation-clusters-nbsp\"><strong>Anticipation : ouverture informelle des clusters de n\u00e9gociation&nbsp;<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\">En octobre, <a href=\"https:\/\/enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/news\/ukraine-successfully-completes-its-screening-process-2025-09-30_en\">l\u2019Ukraine a achev\u00e9 l\u2019examen<\/a> de la conformit\u00e9 de sa l\u00e9gislation avec l\u2019 <em>acquis communautaire<\/em>. Dans son <a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ip_25_2584\">dernier rapport sur le paquet \u00e9largissement<\/a>, la Commission europ\u00e9enne \u00e9tablit que l\u2019Ukraine a rempli les conditions n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 l\u2019ouverture des clusters 1, 2 et 6. Les trois autres devraient \u00eatre pr\u00eats d\u2019ici \u00e0 la fin de 2025. Toutefois, le veto de la Hongrie bloque l\u2019ouverture formelle des clusters, ce qui conduit l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 mener des consultations informelles avec la Commission europ\u00e9enne comme voie provisoire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>D\u00e9fi actuel : <\/em><\/strong>Le veto de la Hongrie bloque l\u2019int\u00e9gration de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019UE malgr\u00e9 ses progr\u00e8s importants concernant les crit\u00e8res d\u2019adh\u00e9sion.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Pourquoi est-ce important : <\/em><\/strong>Ukraine is fully prepared for the next steps, but EU political will is needed to move forward. Prolonged delays and the lack of alternative mechanisms deprive Ukraine of the EU&#8217;s leverage and control in reforms implementation, and risk eroding public support for Ukraine\u2019s accession.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>L\u2019Ukraine appelle : <\/em><\/strong>les d\u00e9put\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens \u00e0 soutenir l\u2019initiative d\u2019\u00ab<em>anticipation <\/em>\u00bb, qui consiste \u00e0 lancer des n\u00e9gociations informelles sans ouvrir officiellement les clusters d\u2019adh\u00e9sion. Cela assurera un nouveau rapprochement de l\u2019Ukraine avec l\u2019UE, des <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eurointegration.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2025\/10\/21\/7222960\/\">consultations informelles<\/a> avec les institutions de l\u2019UE et une mise en \u0153uvre plus efficace des r\u00e9formes. Les d\u00e9put\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens peuvent \u00e9galement \u0153uvrer \u00e0 l\u2019inclusion imm\u00e9diate de l\u2019Ukraine en tant que pays associ\u00e9 dans la plupart des programmes de politique sectorielle, en prenant pour exemple le succ\u00e8s du Fonds europ\u00e9en de d\u00e9fense.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-center\" id=\"h-using-the-safe-instrument-to-provide-military-support-to-ukraine\"><strong>Utiliser l\u2019instrument SAFE pour fournir un soutien militaire \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\">19 \u00c9tats membres de l\u2019UE ont demand\u00e9 des pr\u00eats au titre de l\u2019instrument SAFE de 150 milliards d\u2019euros <a href=\"https:\/\/op.europa.eu\/en\/publication-detail\/-\/publication\/1445e3da-3b5c-11f0-8a44-01aa75ed71a1\/language-en\">, adopt\u00e9 par le Conseil de l\u2019UE en mai 2025<\/a>, afin de soutenir les acquisitions militaires et les investissements dans l\u2019industrie de la d\u00e9fense. L\u2019Ukraine ne peut pas recevoir les financements de l\u2019UE, mais peut agir en tant que sous-traitant dans des entreprises conjointes (r\u00e9cemment, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/en\/news\/vistup-prezidenta-pid-chas-zagalnih-debativ-generalnoyi-asam-100349\">l\u2019\u00c9tat a partiellement<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/en\/news\/prezident-obgovoriv-iz-kerivnikami-investicijnih-fondiv-i-bi-100681\">ouvert les exportations d\u2019armes<\/a>), si les \u00c9tats membres l\u2019incluent dans leurs plans d\u2019investissement pour l\u2019industrie europ\u00e9enne de la d\u00e9fense.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Pourquoi est-ce important :<\/em><\/strong> Apr\u00e8s l\u2019interruption de l\u2019assistance am\u00e9ricaine \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense, l\u2019Ukraine est confront\u00e9e \u00e0 des p\u00e9nuries d\u2019armes imminentes qui mettent en danger tant ses d\u00e9fenses que la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. Les \u00c9tats membres peuvent aussi b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier des capacit\u00e9s ukrainiennes de pointe, \u00e9prouv\u00e9es au combat.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>D\u00e9fi actuel :<\/em><\/strong> De nombreux \u00c9tats de l\u2019UE privil\u00e9gient le renforcement de leurs industries de d\u00e9fense nationales dans le cadre de SAFE, sans tenir compte de la participation de l\u2019Ukraine.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>L\u2019Ukraine appelle :<\/em><\/strong> les d\u00e9put\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens \u00e0 faire pression sur les 19 demandeurs de SAFE afin qu\u2019ils incluent l\u2019Ukraine dans leurs plans d\u2019investissement pour l\u2019industrie europ\u00e9enne de la d\u00e9fense <strong>d\u2019ici au 30 novembre 2025<\/strong>. Si les d\u00e9lais ne sont pas respect\u00e9s, <a href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2025\/09\/02\/can-safe-make-ukraine-safer-insights-into-the-new-european-financial-instrument\/\">ils pourraient :<\/a> 1) transf\u00e9rer des armes existantes \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, puis reconstituer ult\u00e9rieurement leurs stocks gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 des pr\u00eats SAFE ; 2) donner \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine de nouveaux \u00e9quipements acquis avec des fonds SAFE ; 3) utiliser des pr\u00eats SAFE pour acqu\u00e9rir des armes ukrainiennes et les donner ensuite \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine selon le \u00ab mod\u00e8le danois \u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-center\" id=\"h-strengthening-international-rules-to-sanction-russia-s-shadow-fleet\"><strong>Renforcer les r\u00e8gles internationales afin de sanctionner la \u00ab flotte fant\u00f4me \u00bb russe<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\">Le Service europ\u00e9en pour l\u2019action ext\u00e9rieure (SEAE) a pr\u00e9par\u00e9 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-seeks-boost-powers-to-board-shadow-fleet-vessels-exclusive-document-sanctions-war\/\">un projet de d\u00e9claration<\/a> visant \u00e0 l\u00e9gitimer l\u2019arraisonnement des navires de la \u00ab flotte fant\u00f4me \u00bb russe. Le plan pr\u00e9voit des accords bilat\u00e9raux entre l\u2019UE et les \u00c9tats du pavillon autorisant des inspections pr\u00e9autoris\u00e9es \u00e0 bord des navires.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Pourquoi est-ce important :<\/strong> La flotte fant\u00f4me russe contribue \u00e0 contourner les sanctions p\u00e9troli\u00e8res de l\u2019UE et, en octobre, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-seeks-boost-powers-to-board-shadow-fleet-vessels-exclusive-document-sanctions-war\/\">a servi de plateformes de lancement de drones<\/a> qui ont entra\u00een\u00e9 des fermetures temporaires d\u2019a\u00e9roports dans certains \u00c9tats de l\u2019UE.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>D\u00e9fi actuel :<\/strong> La poursuite des op\u00e9rations sans contr\u00f4le de la flotte compromettrait l\u2019ensemble des <a href=\"https:\/\/finance.ec.europa.eu\/news\/eu-adopts-19th-package-sanctions-against-russia-2025-10-23_en\">19 paquets de sanctions de l\u2019UE <\/a>et permettrait de nouvelles attaques hybrides, mena\u00e7ant la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>L\u2019Ukraine appelle :<\/strong> les d\u00e9put\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens \u00e0 soutenir l\u2019adoption de la d\u00e9claration dans leurs \u00c9tats, dont la finalisation est attendue <strong>fin novembre <\/strong>et qui devrait \u00eatre ent\u00e9rin\u00e9e lors de la r\u00e9union des ministres des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res de l\u2019UE. Ensuite, les d\u00e9put\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens devraient plaider, dans leurs pays, pour habiliter le Conseil de l\u2019UE \u00e0 n\u00e9gocier des accords d\u2019arraisonnement au nom des \u00c9tats membres, simplifiant ainsi les discussions avec les \u00c9tats du pavillon et renfor\u00e7ant le r\u00f4le de l\u2019UE en tant qu\u2019acteur coh\u00e9rent.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-center\" id=\"h-adaptation-of-the-eu-directive-on-criminalization-of-sanctions-evasion\"><strong>Adaptation de la directive de l\u2019UE relative \u00e0 l\u2019incrimination du contournement des sanctions<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\">En avril 2024, l\u2019UE a adopt\u00e9 <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/dir\/2024\/1226\/oj\/eng\">Directive 2024\/1226<\/a>, qui instaure l\u2019incrimination des violations de sanctions et r\u00e9affirme l\u2019engagement de l\u2019Union en faveur d\u2019une application stricte et uniforme de sa politique de sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Pourquoi est-ce important :<\/strong> Une application efficace et coh\u00e9rente emp\u00eachera de nouveaux contournements des sanctions et renforcera la cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 de l\u2019UE. La directive harmonise les normes juridiques et d\u00e9finit les proc\u00e9dures et outils que les \u00c9tats membres doivent adopter pour assurer une application effective.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>D\u00e9fi actuel :<\/strong> Le d\u00e9lai d\u2019un an \u00e9tant \u00e9coul\u00e9, seuls deux \u00c9tats membres se sont conform\u00e9s, tandis que les vingt-cinq autres ne l\u2019ont pas fait ; <a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/inf_25_1842\">la Commission<\/a> a engag\u00e9 des proc\u00e9dures d\u2019infraction contre les autres, dont certains contestent l\u2019\u00e9valuation de leurs progr\u00e8s.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>L\u2019Ukraine appelle :<\/strong> les d\u00e9put\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens \u00e0 promouvoir une mise en \u0153uvre compl\u00e8te et rapide dans leurs pays, en soulignant les cons\u00e9quences du non-respect des d\u00e9lais, \u00e0 savoir l\u2019application des moyens coercitifs de la Commission et le renforcement de la r\u00e9silience \u00e9conomique et de l\u2019effort de guerre russe.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-center\" id=\"h-including-ukraine-s-interests-in-the-eu-budget-for-2028-2034\"><strong>Prise en compte des int\u00e9r\u00eats de l\u2019Ukraine dans le budget de l\u2019UE pour 2028\u20132034<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\">Le 16 juillet 2025, la Commission europ\u00e9enne a pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 son projet de <a href=\"https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/eu-budget\/long-term-eu-budget\/eu-budget-2028-2034_en\">cadre financier pluriannuel<\/a> (CFP) pour 2028\u20132034, introduisant l\u2019initiative R\u00e9serve pour l\u2019Ukraine (allouant jusqu\u2019\u00e0 100 milliards d\u2019euros, soit 14,3 milliards d\u2019euros par an). Des organisations de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile des Balkans occidentaux, d\u2019Ukraine et de Moldavie proposent \u00e9galement d\u2019inclure une<a href=\"https:\/\/europe-plus.com\/46-civil-society-organisations-call-on-the-eu-to-embed-enlargement-in-the-next\/\"> \u00ab enveloppe \u00e9largissement \u00bb<\/a>, comprenant un solide IPA IV (30 milliards d\u2019euros) et un m\u00e9canisme de transition pr\u00e9adh\u00e9sion, dans le nouveau CFP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Pourquoi est-ce important :<\/em><\/strong><em> L\u2019initiative R\u00e9serve pour l\u2019Ukraine<\/em> garantirait un financement stable \u00e0 long terme pour la reconstruction, les r\u00e9formes et la d\u00e9fense de l\u2019Ukraine, en r\u00e9pondant \u00e0 son <a href=\"https:\/\/voxukraine.org\/en\/ukraine-and-the-eu-budget-for-2028-2034-deep-integration-but-still-no-membership\">d\u00e9ficit budg\u00e9taire annuel de $35\u201340 milliards.<\/a> De m\u00eame, une <em>ligne budg\u00e9taire pour l\u2019\u00e9largissement<\/em> dot\u00e9e de financements cr\u00e9dibles fond\u00e9s sur les r\u00e9sultats pour les pays candidats \u00e0 l\u2019UE renforcerait les efforts de r\u00e9forme et l\u2019engagement de l\u2019UE en faveur de leur int\u00e9gration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>D\u00e9fi actuel<\/em><\/strong>: Certains \u00c9tats membres pourraient se montrer r\u00e9ticents \u00e0 cr\u00e9er une ligne de financement distincte \u00e0 long terme pour l\u2019Ukraine dans le plan budg\u00e9taire, pour des consid\u00e9rations budg\u00e9taires et de politique int\u00e9rieure.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>L\u2019Ukraine appelle : <\/em><\/strong>les d\u00e9put\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens \u00e0 soutenir la proposition de CFP de la Commission, en approuvant la R\u00e9serve pour l\u2019Ukraine comme instrument de financement d\u00e9di\u00e9, et \u00e0 plaider pour une \u00ab enveloppe \u00e9largissement \u00bb afin d\u2019assurer un financement stable et strat\u00e9gique \u00e0 tous les pays candidats.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\"><br><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>With major EU initiatives on Ukraine and Russia underway, this is a crucial moment for MEPs to show leadership by advancing urgent measures on Ukraine\u2019s security and EU accession, where stronger engagement can make a tangible impact: Fast-tracking macro-financial assistance to Ukraine The Reparation Loan would unlock \u20ac140 billion for Ukraine using profits from frozen [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":33082,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13,53,71,58],"tags":[],"topic":[91,84,87,86],"class_list":["post-33035","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","category-reports-handbooks","category-eng-reports-eu-ukraine-partnership-program","category-eng-western-europe","topic-eu","topic-russia","topic-security","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Top Priorities for the EU on Ukraine | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This report sets out EU priorities on Ukraine, including security support, the proposed \u20ac140 billion Reparation Loan and progress toward 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