{"id":32929,"date":"2025-10-30T13:44:06","date_gmt":"2025-10-30T11:44:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=32929"},"modified":"2026-07-04T12:01:02","modified_gmt":"2026-07-04T09:01:02","slug":"strategic-retreat-assessing-the-implications-of-a-u-s-withdrawal-from-european-security","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2025\/10\/30\/strategic-retreat-assessing-the-implications-of-a-u-s-withdrawal-from-european-security\/","title":{"rendered":"Retrait strat\u00e9gique ? \u00c9valuer les implications d\u2019un retrait des \u00c9tats-Unis de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"51880\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">2 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-key-takeaways\">Principaux enseignements<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>La r\u00e9orientation progressive des priorit\u00e9s strat\u00e9giques des \u00c9tats-Unis vers l\u2019Indo-Pacifique indique probablement un&nbsp;<strong>r\u00e9ajustement plut\u00f4t qu\u2019un retrait complet&nbsp;<\/strong>des engagements militaires am\u00e9ricains en Europe, remodelant le cadre de dissuasion de l\u2019OTAN.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Une r\u00e9duction de la pr\u00e9sence am\u00e9ricaine pourrait r\u00e9v\u00e9ler des&nbsp;<strong>faiblesses structurelles<\/strong>&nbsp;in Europe\u2019s defense architecture, particularly in strategic airlift, ISR, refueling, and integrated air and missile defense \u2014&nbsp;capabilities still heavily dependent on U.S. assets.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La divergence des perceptions de la menace entre l\u2019Europe de l\u2019Est et l\u2019Europe de l\u2019Ouest risque d\u2019&nbsp;<strong>accentuer les divisions au sein de l\u2019Alliance<\/strong>, compliquant le partage des charges et la coordination des achats alors que les d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense augmentent de mani\u00e8re in\u00e9gale entre les \u00c9tats membres.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>L\u2019Allemagne, la France et le Royaume-Uni \u00e9mergent comme les&nbsp;<strong>acteurs cl\u00e9s \u00e0 m\u00eame de combler les lacunes capacitaires<\/strong>, mais l\u2019\u00e9quilibre de leur leadership d\u00e9pendra de l\u2019alignement des programmes industriels, op\u00e9rationnels et politiques sous une pression budg\u00e9taire durable.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Une empreinte am\u00e9ricaine r\u00e9duite acc\u00e9l\u00e9rerait la&nbsp;<strong>qu\u00eate d\u2019autonomie strat\u00e9gique de l\u2019Europe<\/strong>&nbsp;mais mettrait aussi \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9preuve la capacit\u00e9 du continent \u00e0 maintenir une dissuasion cr\u00e9dible face \u00e0 la Russie sans un ancrage transatlantique unique.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The extent to which Washington\u2019s realignment remains a tactical adjustment&nbsp;or evolves into a genuine strategic withdrawal will determine the future cohesion and credibility of the transatlantic alliance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1244\" height=\"505\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-1.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Strategic Retreat? Assessing the Implications of a U.S. Withdrawal from European Security\" class=\"wp-image-32932\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-1.png 1244w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-1-600x244.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-1-1024x416.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-1-768x312.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-1-18x7.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1244px) 100vw, 1244px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La r\u00e9orientation des priorit\u00e9s strat\u00e9giques des \u00c9tats-Unis vers l\u2019Indo-Pacifique a remodel\u00e9 l\u2019approche de Washington envers l\u2019Europe. Alors que la concurrence avec la Chine <a href=\"https:\/\/www.isas.nus.edu.sg\/papers\/new-directions-and-challenges-of-the-trump-2-0-indo-pacific-strategy\/\">s\u2019intensifie<\/a>, un r\u00e9ajustement progressif de la pr\u00e9sence et des engagements militaires am\u00e9ricains sur le continent europ\u00e9en devient de plus en plus probable. Ce changement soul\u00e8ve des questions non seulement sur l\u2019avenir de l\u2019architecture de dissuasion de l\u2019OTAN, mais aussi sur la capacit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe \u00e0 assumer une plus grande responsabilit\u00e9 pour sa propre d\u00e9fense. Dans ce paysage en mutation, le d\u00e9fi des alli\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens est double : s\u2019adapter \u00e0 une redistribution potentielle des ressources am\u00e9ricaines et d\u00e9velopper les m\u00e9canismes industriels, op\u00e9rationnels et politiques n\u00e9cessaires pour maintenir la stabilit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique sur le continent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans ce contexte, l\u2019\u00e9tude examine les implications d\u2019un \u00e9ventuel retrait partiel des \u00c9tats-Unis d\u2019Europe, en \u00e9valuant ses cons\u00e9quences politiques, militaires et \u00e9conomiques, ainsi que les perspectives d\u2019un renforcement de la coop\u00e9ration et de l\u2019autonomie europ\u00e9ennes en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9fense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-u-s-posture-and-commitments-in-europe\"><strong>Posture et engagements des \u00c9tats-Unis en Europe<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il convient de consid\u00e9rer le retrait partiel des forces am\u00e9ricaines non seulement comme une cons\u00e9quence de la r\u00e9affectation des ressources, mais aussi comme un moyen de pression destin\u00e9 \u00e0 encourager les \u00c9tats europ\u00e9ens \u00e0 renforcer leurs propres capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense et leur aptitude \u00e0 assurer la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 r\u00e9gionale.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Actuellement, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/article\/where-are-us-forces-deployed-europe\">entre 75 000 et 105 000 militaires am\u00e9ricains sont stationn\u00e9s sur le continent europ\u00e9en<\/a>, la plupart servant dans l\u2019arm\u00e9e de l\u2019air et la marine. En outre, les \u00c9tats-Unis disposent de plus de 40 installations militaires de niveaux divers, d\u2019un nombre important de v\u00e9hicules blind\u00e9s, d\u2019a\u00e9ronefs, de lance-roquettes multiples et d\u2019environ 100 ogives nucl\u00e9aires tactiques d\u00e9ploy\u00e9es en Europe. Selon les estimations de l\u2019IISS, les d\u00e9penses directes de d\u00e9fense des \u00c9tats-Unis en Europe repr\u00e9sentent environ <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/ja-JP\/online-analysis\/military-balance\/2018\/07\/us-and-nato-allies-costs-and-value\/\">5 \u00e0 6 % du budget am\u00e9ricain de d\u00e9fense nationale<\/a>, et en appliquant ce ratio au budget total de la d\u00e9fense nationale pour l\u2019exercice 2025 d\u2019environ <a href=\"https:\/\/comptroller.defense.gov\/Portals\/45\/Documents\/defbudget\/FY2025\/FY2025_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf\">900 milliards de dollars<\/a>, les co\u00fbts annuels des \u00c9tats-Unis li\u00e9s \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne s\u2019\u00e9l\u00e8vent approximativement \u00e0 45 \u00e0 54 milliards de dollars, y compris le financement du personnel, des infrastructures, des exercices et des programmes conjoints.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1016\" height=\"571\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-2.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Strategic Retreat? Assessing the Implications of a U.S. Withdrawal from European Security\" class=\"wp-image-32933\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-2.png 1016w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-2-600x337.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-2-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-2-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1016px) 100vw, 1016px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Un \u00ab retrait partiel \u00bb d\u00e9signe une r\u00e9duction du nombre de troupes, des infrastructures, des \u00e9quipements et des armements. Toutefois, il est impossible \u00e0 ce stade d\u2019en pr\u00e9voir l\u2019ampleur et les param\u00e8tres pr\u00e9cis. Sous l\u2019administration am\u00e9ricaine actuelle, les d\u00e9cisions concernant le nombre de soldats am\u00e9ricains en Europe peuvent parfois \u00eatre davantage influenc\u00e9es par l\u2019approche personnelle du pr\u00e9sident et les avis de ses conseillers les plus proches que par les recommandations d\u2019institutions telles que le Conseil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale ou le Pentagone, comme l\u2019illustre la <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/opinions\/2025\/06\/23\/trump-iran-strikes-congress-approval\/\">d\u00e9cision de juin 2025 de frapper des installations nucl\u00e9aires iraniennes<\/a> sans approbation pr\u00e9alable du Congr\u00e8s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Un retrait complet affaiblirait fortement l\u2019influence des \u00c9tats-Unis sur les pays europ\u00e9ens et priverait Washington d\u2019importantes bases et infrastructures militaires et logistiques, telles que la base a\u00e9rienne de Ramstein en Allemagne et la base navale de Rota en Espagne, qui jouent un r\u00f4le cl\u00e9 non seulement pour la pr\u00e9sence militaire am\u00e9ricaine en Europe, mais aussi \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9chelle mondiale.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En outre, un retrait complet des troupes entamerait in\u00e9vitablement la confiance des alli\u00e9s et provoquerait une grave crise au sein de l\u2019OTAN, cr\u00e9ant un vide strat\u00e9gique que la Russie pourrait exploiter pour \u00e9tendre son influence. <strong>Thus, despite the political rhetoric and the Trump administration&#8217;s desire to cut spending, the United States cannot afford to completely abandon its military presence in Europe.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans le m\u00eame temps, une seconde voie ne peut \u00eatre exclue. Le Congr\u00e8s pourrait d\u00e9finir une strat\u00e9gie structur\u00e9e au moyen du processus annuel d\u2019autorisation et de cr\u00e9dits de d\u00e9fense, en chargeant le d\u00e9partement de la D\u00e9fense de r\u00e9\u00e9quilibrer la posture des forces vers l\u2019Indo-Pacifique tout en fixant des plafonds pour la pr\u00e9sence permanente en Europe, en rempla\u00e7ant certaines rotations par des stocks pr\u00e9positionn\u00e9s et en conditionnant les retraits aux gains de capacit\u00e9s et aux niveaux de pr\u00e9paration des alli\u00e9s. Un tel plan \u00e9talerait probablement les changements sur plusieurs cycles budg\u00e9taires, exigerait des rapports d\u00e9taill\u00e9s du Pentagone et du NSC, prot\u00e9gerait des capacit\u00e9s cl\u00e9s telles que le transport a\u00e9rien, le ravitaillement en vol, l\u2019ISR et la d\u00e9fense antimissile, et renforcerait le partage des co\u00fbts et les achats conjoints avec les alli\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans la pratique, le pr\u00e9sident pourrait tout de m\u00eame ordonner, pour des raisons politiques, une r\u00e9duction symbolique d\u2019environ 10 % ou une coupe plus profonde pouvant atteindre 50 %. Le Congr\u00e8s, \u00e0 l\u2019inverse, pourrait inscrire dans la loi les changements de posture, \u00e9chelonner tout retrait sur plusieurs cycles budg\u00e9taires, le lier \u00e0 des jalons de capacit\u00e9s alli\u00e9es, pr\u00e9server l\u2019article 5 de l\u2019OTAN et red\u00e9ployer les forces et les financements vers des th\u00e9\u00e2tres prioritaires.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-strategic-consequences-of-a-partial-withdrawal\"><strong>Cons\u00e9quences strat\u00e9giques d\u2019un retrait partiel<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Un retrait partiel des \u00c9tats-Unis d\u2019Europe entra\u00eenera in\u00e9vitablement un d\u00e9placement de l\u2019\u00e9quilibre strat\u00e9gique des forces sur le continent eurasiatique. Une telle mesure aurait des cons\u00e9quences contrast\u00e9es : certains pays perdraient une partie de leurs capacit\u00e9s strat\u00e9giques, tandis que d\u2019autres auraient l\u2019occasion de renforcer leurs positions et d\u2019\u00e9tendre leur influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sur le plan politique, l\u2019une des cons\u00e9quences potentielles les plus importantes est la fragmentation de l\u2019OTAN. Un recul de l\u2019engagement des \u00c9tats-Unis pourrait r\u00e9v\u00e9ler des lignes de fracture latentes au sein de l\u2019Alliance, entra\u00eenant des divergences d\u2019opinion entre les membres d\u2019Europe orientale et d\u2019Europe occidentale au sujet des menaces. Les pays d\u2019Europe orientale directement menac\u00e9s par l\u2019agression russe pourraient exiger une action rapide et d\u00e9cisive. \u00c0 l\u2019inverse, les \u00c9tats d\u2019Europe occidentale pourraient privil\u00e9gier des solutions diplomatiques, ce qui affaiblirait la coh\u00e9sion de l\u2019OTAN et compliquerait les r\u00e9ponses collectives. En outre, le vide de pouvoir \u00e9mergent pourrait affaiblir la dissuasion r\u00e9gionale, incitant la Russie \u00e0 intensifier les menaces conventionnelles et hybrides, notamment les cyberattaques, les campagnes de d\u00e9sinformation et les op\u00e9rations clandestines visant \u00e0 d\u00e9stabiliser les \u00c9tats vuln\u00e9rables.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From a military perspective, Europe&#8217;s ability to effectively fill the gaps left by the partial withdrawal of US troops remains uncertain, despite recent initiatives such as the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/RegData\/etudes\/BRIE\/2025\/769566\/EPRS_BRI(2025)769566_EN.pdf\">European Commission&#8217;s ReArm Europe Plan\/Readiness 2030<\/a>, qui visent \u00e0 renforcer la coop\u00e9ration en mati\u00e8re d\u2019achats de d\u00e9fense et \u00e0 accro\u00eetre l\u2019autonomie strat\u00e9gique europ\u00e9enne. Les arm\u00e9es europ\u00e9ennes continuent d\u2019accuser <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/what-european-nato-lacks\/\">d\u2019importantes lacunes capacitaires dans des domaines cl\u00e9s<\/a>, such as strategic airlift, air refueling, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and integrated air and missile defense systems &#8211; all areas traditionally supported by US capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"999\" height=\"563\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-3.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Strategic Retreat? Assessing the Implications of a U.S. Withdrawal from European Security\" class=\"wp-image-32934\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-3.png 999w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-3-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-3-768x433.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-3-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 999px) 100vw, 999px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le potentiel de l\u2019industrie europ\u00e9enne de la d\u00e9fense pour remplacer les forces et les capacit\u00e9s am\u00e9ricaines est prometteur, mais limit\u00e9. L\u2019Europe dispose d\u2019une base industrielle de d\u00e9fense de pointe, avec de grandes entreprises telles que Rheinmetall, Airbus Defense, BAE Systems, Leonardo et Dassault, capables de produire des armements complexes. Cependant, d\u2019importants <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bruegel.org\/policy-brief\/european-defence-industrial-strategy-hostile-world\">obstacles subsistent<\/a>: a fragmented market that discourages cross-border buying, duplication across national programs, and limited surge capacity with long lead times for munitions and air-defence components. Accelerating joint defense procurement and industry consolidation, necessary to meet Europe&#8217;s security needs after the withdrawal of US troops, remains a challenge, although they are increasingly recognized as strategically necessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sur le plan \u00e9conomique, l\u2019industrie am\u00e9ricaine de d\u00e9fense pourrait dans un premier temps b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier d\u2019une hausse des achats \u00e0 court terme en Europe visant \u00e0 rem\u00e9dier aux insuffisances de capacit\u00e9s militaires, mais elle subira probablement des pertes de parts de march\u00e9 <a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2025\/06\/if-america-abandons-europe-will-the-continent-fragment-or-unify\/\">\u00e0 mesure que l\u2019Europe d\u00e9veloppera ses propres alternatives<\/a>. Politiquement, une implication r\u00e9duite dans les affaires europ\u00e9ennes pourrait affaiblir l\u2019influence diplomatique des \u00c9tats-Unis dans le monde, <a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2025\/06\/if-america-abandons-europe-will-the-continent-fragment-or-unify\/\">fragiliser les alliances et nuire aux int\u00e9r\u00eats commerciaux dans une r\u00e9gion d\u2019importance strat\u00e9gique<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-prospects-for-european-strategic-autonomy\"><strong>Perspectives d\u2019autonomie strat\u00e9gique europ\u00e9enne<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En cas de retrait partiel des \u00c9tats-Unis d\u2019Europe, la question suivante se pose naturellement : qui, et dans quelle mesure, est capable de combler le vide qui serait cr\u00e9\u00e9 si ce sc\u00e9nario venait r\u00e9ellement \u00e0 se concr\u00e9tiser ?&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Comme indiqu\u00e9 pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment, tous les pays ne subiraient pas de pertes strat\u00e9giques en cas de r\u00e9duction de la pr\u00e9sence am\u00e9ricaine. L\u2019Allemagne, la France, le Royaume-Uni et l\u2019Italie semblent \u00eatre les candidats les plus susceptibles de jouer un r\u00f4le cl\u00e9 pour compenser en partie le recul de l\u2019influence am\u00e9ricaine, en tirant parti de la situation pour renforcer leur propre influence et \u00e9tendre leurs capacit\u00e9s strat\u00e9giques. L\u2019Allemagne poss\u00e8de les ressources financi\u00e8res, le potentiel humain, les capacit\u00e9s technologiques et, surtout, la volont\u00e9 politique ainsi qu\u2019un horizon de planification long n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 la mise en \u0153uvre de programmes pluriannuels. Berlin s\u2019appuie sur des cadres financiers contraignants \u00e0 moyen terme, utilise des fonds d\u00e9di\u00e9s et des contrats d\u2019acquisition pluriannuels, et aligne les minist\u00e8res et l\u2019industrie sur des feuilles de route de capacit\u00e9s qui <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/berlin-simplify-rules-bid-speed-up-defence-surge-draft-law-says-2025-06-27\/\">se prolongent jusqu\u2019au<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/berlin-simplify-rules-bid-speed-up-defence-surge-draft-law-says-2025-06-27\/\">d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 2030<\/a>.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1048\" height=\"589\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-4.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: Strategic Retreat? Assessing the Implications of a U.S. Withdrawal from European Security\" class=\"wp-image-32935\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-4.png 1048w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-4-600x337.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-4-1024x576.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-4-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/image-4-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1048px) 100vw, 1048px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Des soldats allemands se tiennent devant un v\u00e9hicule militaire Boxer, un nouveau type de v\u00e9hicule blind\u00e9 de transport de troupes, \u00e0 la caserne Julius Leber \u00e0 Berlin, en marge de la visite du Premier ministre britannique dans la capitale allemande le 24 avril 2024. (Photo : HENRY NICHOLLS \/ POOL \/ AFP)<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cette organisation permet \u00e0 l\u2019Allemagne de s\u2019engager d\u00e8s \u00e0 pr\u00e9sent dans de grands projets s\u00e9quenc\u00e9s, tels qu\u2019une d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne et <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/raytheon-wins-12-bln-contract-additional-patriot-air-missile-defense-systems-2024-07-11\/\">antimissile<\/a>, une <a href=\"https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/2024\/06\/rheinmetall-announces-155mm-ammunition-mega-order-from-germany\/#:~:text=BELFAST%20%E2%80%94%20German%20manufacturer%20Rheinmetall%20received,Ukrainian%20and%20other%20allies'%20stocks.\">augmentation durable de la production de munitions<\/a>, l\u2019int\u00e9gration de <a href=\"https:\/\/www.airbus.com\/en\/newsroom\/stories\/2024-03-eurofighternextgen-taking-the-eurofighter-to-the-next-level\">nouveaux avions de combat<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/knds.com\/en\/press-releases\/bundeswehr-orders-18-new-leopard-2-a8-battle-tanks-and-triggers-the-option-for-twelve-new-pzh-2000\">le renouvellement des forces terrestres lourdes<\/a>, et <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/lithuania-begins-construction-base-german-troops-near-russian-border-2024-08-19\/\">des infrastructures de d\u00e9ploiement avanc\u00e9<\/a>.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With the arrival of a new leadership headed by Friedrich Merz, Germany has significantly changed its military-political course, declaring its intention to become one of NATO&#8217;s mainstays on the European continent. As part of this strategy, Berlin plans to increase its military budget from the current <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/germany-raise-defence-spending-35-gdp-by-2029-sources-say-2025-06-23\/\">2,4 % du PIB (environ 95 milliards d\u2019euros) \u00e0 3,5 % du PIB (environ 162 milliards d\u2019euros) d\u2019ici 2029<\/a>, ce qui constituera la plus forte expansion des d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense de l\u2019histoire de l\u2019Allemagne moderne.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Another key contender for regional leadership alongside Germany is France, which has historically held a strong position in the European security architecture. In recent years, France has consistently contributed around 10% of NATO&#8217;s total budget, making it one of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/uk\/natohq\/topics_67655.htm?selectedLocale=en\">Alliance&#8217;s main financial and military donors<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La position singuli\u00e8re de la France en Europe repose sur sa dissuasion nucl\u00e9aire ind\u00e9pendante. Avec environ <a href=\"https:\/\/armscontrolcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/France.pdf\">290 ogives<\/a> embarqu\u00e9es sur des sous-marins et des avions de combat, Paris conserve une capacit\u00e9 de riposte assur\u00e9e et laisse entrevoir un parapluie nucl\u00e9aire potentiel et limit\u00e9 pour les partenaires europ\u00e9ens, tout en conservant un contr\u00f4le national exclusif. Cela contribue \u00e0 compenser toute \u00e9rosion des garanties am\u00e9ricaines. Bien que son arsenal soit plus petit que celui de la Russie et des \u00c9tats-Unis, une modernisation continue pr\u00e9serve sa cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 et renforce le r\u00f4le de la France dans les d\u00e9bats sur le partage des charges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le Royaume-Uni, qui dispose de la <a href=\"https:\/\/www.geostrategy.org.uk\/research\/why-britain-needs-a-larger-navy\/\">marine la plus puissante de l\u2019Alliance de l\u2019Atlantique Nord<\/a> apr\u00e8s les \u00c9tats-Unis, est \u00e9galement consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme l\u2019un des principaux pr\u00e9tendants au r\u00f4le de chef potentiel de l\u2019architecture europ\u00e9enne de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Londres a officiellement annonc\u00e9 son intention de porter ses d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense \u00e0 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/official_texts_236705.htm\">5 % du PIB d\u2019ici 2035<\/a>, as has France, which should significantly strengthen its military capabilities and expand its presence in key strategic regions, including the North Atlantic and High North, the GIUK Gap, the Baltic and North Seas, the Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, and the wider Indo-Pacific, particularly the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The UK&#8217;s status as a nuclear power remains an equally important factor: the country has approximately <a href=\"https:\/\/commonslibrary.parliament.uk\/research-briefings\/cbp-9077\/#:~:text=Nuclear%20stockpile%20%E2%80%93%20Prior%20to%20the,no%20more%20than%20260%20warheads.\">225 ogives nucl\u00e9aires.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Italie a affich\u00e9 son ambition, pr\u00e9voyant de porter ses d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense de <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/italy-says-meet-natos-2-gdp-defence-spending-goal-this-year-2025-04-17\/\">1,49 % du PIB (\u224835 milliards d\u2019euros) \u00e0 2 % (46,8 milliards d\u2019euros) d\u2019ici 2025 et vers 5 % (117 milliards d\u2019euros) d\u2019ici 2035<\/a>. Toutefois, m\u00eame avec ces objectifs, les capacit\u00e9s militaires, la profondeur industrielle et le poids politique de l\u2019Italie restent inf\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 ceux de l\u2019Allemagne, de la France et du Royaume-Uni, ce qui en fait un candidat moins probable pour ancrer l\u2019architecture europ\u00e9enne de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00e0 court terme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Malgr\u00e9 l\u2019accord alli\u00e9 visant \u00e0 augmenter les d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense, <strong>des progr\u00e8s in\u00e9gaux<\/strong> mettront \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9preuve la coh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Alliance en tant que variable structurelle de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 collective. Les \u00c9tats de premi\u00e8re ligne directement sous pression russe pourraient atteindre plus t\u00f4t le seuil de 5 %, tandis que d\u2019autres resteront en retard, ce qui refl\u00e8te des perceptions diff\u00e9renci\u00e9es de la menace et des contraintes de ressources. Cette divergence peut intensifier les diff\u00e9rends sur le partage des charges, compliquer la planification des forces et le stationnement en tant que probl\u00e8mes d\u2019action collective, et susciter des contestations sur les achats et la politique industrielle \u2014 des dynamiques susceptibles de d\u00e9g\u00e9n\u00e9rer en conflit politique au sein de l\u2019Alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-prospective-european-leadership-framework\"><strong>Cadre prospectif du leadership europ\u00e9en<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Aucun pays europ\u00e9en ne peut \u00e0 lui seul compenser pleinement l\u2019affaiblissement possible de la pr\u00e9sence am\u00e9ricaine. Le sc\u00e9nario le plus probable pourrait \u00eatre la cr\u00e9ation d\u2019une coalition d\u2019\u00c9tats les plus int\u00e9ress\u00e9s par le maintien de la stabilit\u00e9 et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense dans la r\u00e9gion. En pratique, cette coalition inclurait probablement l\u2019Allemagne, la France et le Royaume-Uni comme noyau, compl\u00e9t\u00e9s par les pays d\u2019Europe orientale et baltes directement expos\u00e9s aux menaces russes.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ces \u00c9tats, les plus vuln\u00e9rables et les plus motiv\u00e9s, seraient les premiers \u00e0 proposer des initiatives de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 concr\u00e8tes, \u00e0 assumer le leadership dans l\u2019\u00e9laboration de nouveaux m\u00e9canismes de coop\u00e9ration et \u00e0 d\u00e9fendre activement les int\u00e9r\u00eats strat\u00e9giques de l\u2019Europe au sein de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019UE. La partie occidentale du continent jouerait, \u00e0 l\u2019inverse, un r\u00f4le davantage de soutien, contribuant principalement par ses ressources financi\u00e8res et son appui politique, mais sans la m\u00eame urgence ni la m\u00eame implication directe dans la planification op\u00e9rationnelle. Cette r\u00e9partition des r\u00f4les cr\u00e9erait un \u00e9quilibre dans lequel les \u00ab trois grands \u00bb et les \u00c9tats de premi\u00e8re ligne orientent l\u2019agenda, tandis que les autres le renforcent en arri\u00e8re-plan, garantissant que l\u2019Europe dans son ensemble conserve sa coh\u00e9sion face \u00e0 une pr\u00e9sence am\u00e9ricaine r\u00e9duite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La coop\u00e9ration entre ces \u00c9tats reposera tr\u00e8s probablement sur les principes d\u2019\u00e9quilibre et de contr\u00f4le mutuel, emp\u00eachant une puissance de dominer les questions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Dans le m\u00eame temps, les \u00ab trois grands \u00bb (l\u2019Allemagne, la France et le Royaume-Uni) assumeront des r\u00f4les strat\u00e9giques de premier plan, compte tenu de leurs capacit\u00e9s \u00e9conomiques, militaires et technologiques.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Toutefois, cette approche comporte un certain nombre de probl\u00e8mes potentiels.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Premi\u00e8rement, il existe un risque de divisions internes d\u00e9coulant de perceptions diff\u00e9rentes des menaces, des int\u00e9r\u00eats et des priorit\u00e9s de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Deuxi\u00e8mement, les pays europ\u00e9ens doivent augmenter consid\u00e9rablement leurs d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense, ce qui engendre des tensions politiques et sociales dans un contexte de ressources budg\u00e9taires limit\u00e9es.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Third, the absence of a single leader, such as the US, may complicate operational decision-making in crisis situations, weakening Europe&#8217;s overall strategic effectiveness.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Enfin, une \u00e9ventuelle r\u00e9duction de la pr\u00e9sence militaire am\u00e9ricaine pourrait affaiblir le facteur de dissuasion dans les relations avec la Russie, augmentant le risque de d\u00e9stabilisation aux fronti\u00e8res orientales de l\u2019UE et de l\u2019OTAN.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans ce contexte, l\u2019Ukraine deviendra le principal soutien des \u00ab trois grands \u00bb, car son exp\u00e9rience unique de r\u00e9sistance \u00e0 la Russie apporte des connaissances pratiques de la guerre moderne, de la r\u00e9silience et de l\u2019adaptation, indispensables au renforcement de l\u2019architecture europ\u00e9enne de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 au sens large. En ce sens, le r\u00f4le de l\u2019Ukraine ne se limite pas \u00e0 celui d\u2019un partenaire symbolique : elle devient un enseignant pratique dont les connaissances \u00e9prouv\u00e9es sur le champ de bataille renforcent directement la r\u00e9silience collective de l\u2019OTAN et la stabilit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique de l\u2019Europe dans son ensemble.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00c0 long terme, la capacit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe \u00e0 s\u2019adapter \u00e0 une \u00e9ventuelle r\u00e9duction de la pr\u00e9sence am\u00e9ricaine d\u00e9pendra non seulement des ambitions des diff\u00e9rents \u00c9tats, mais aussi de la capacit\u00e9 institutionnelle de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne \u00e0 aligner les priorit\u00e9s et les ressources. Plut\u00f4t que de s\u2019appuyer sur un dirigeant dominant, la r\u00e9silience strat\u00e9gique de l\u2019Europe reposera sur une coop\u00e9ration en r\u00e9seau \u2014 par le biais d\u2019achats conjoints de d\u00e9fense, de l\u2019interop\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 et d\u2019investissements collectifs dans l\u2019innovation technologique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\" id=\"h-conclusion\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Considering all factors, a partial withdrawal of US troops from Europe is probable. The priority is shifting to the Indo-Pacific region due to China&#8217;s growing power and the risk of a crisis around Taiwan. Resources are limited by the budget, personnel shortages, and the burden on the defense industry, which requires long-term contracts and capacity expansion. At the same time, the US still needs extended nuclear deterrence, space and cyber capabilities, early warning, and maritime communications security in Europe, so it&#8217;s more about calibrating its presence than abandoning its alliance commitments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le sc\u00e9nario le plus probable est une r\u00e9duction progressive du contingent permanent, accompagn\u00e9e d\u2019une augmentation des rotations et d\u2019un recours accru au pr\u00e9positionnement. La charge de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 sera transf\u00e9r\u00e9e aux \u00ab trois grands \u00bb. Le Royaume-Uni couvrira la composante maritime et sous-marine, la projection de force par les groupes a\u00e9ronavals, la cyberd\u00e9fense et la guerre \u00e9lectronique, ainsi que le soutien \u00e0 la mer Noire et \u00e0 l\u2019Atlantique Nord. La France assurera une dissuasion nucl\u00e9aire ind\u00e9pendante, la pr\u00e9paration aux op\u00e9rations exp\u00e9ditionnaires, des capacit\u00e9s de frappe a\u00e9rienne et une d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne \u00e0 moyenne port\u00e9e. L\u2019Allemagne assumera les forces terrestres lourdes, la logistique, la r\u00e9paration et les munitions, ainsi que le d\u00e9ploiement d\u2019une d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne et antimissile multicouche en Europe centrale.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les autres alli\u00e9s se voient attribuer des cr\u00e9neaux dans la lutte anti-UAV, la d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne de proximit\u00e9, la lutte contre les mines et la guerre anti-sous-marine. Les lacunes critiques que l\u2019Europe doit rapidement combler comprennent le transport a\u00e9rien strat\u00e9gique et le ravitaillement en vol, l\u2019ISR, la d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne et antimissile int\u00e9gr\u00e9e, des stocks durables de munitions et les capacit\u00e9s de MRO. Les \u00c9tats-Unis conserveront le cadre C4ISR, le parapluie nucl\u00e9aire et leur capacit\u00e9 de renforcement rapide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the end, the question of how quick and deep the cuts will be is still up in the air. It is difficult to predict specific steps: the choice between symbolic cuts and more noticeable reductions will depend on developments in the Indo-Pacific region, Russia&#8217;s behavior, the willingness of Europeans to increase spending, and restrictions imposed by Congress, basic agreements, and NATO plans. The logic of the moment suggests evolution rather than a sharp break, with the US reducing its \u201cheavy footprint\u201d but retaining strategic functions, and Europe translating its ambitions into measurable combat readiness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Les points de vue, pens\u00e9es et opinions exprim\u00e9s dans les \u00e9tudes publi\u00e9es sur ce site n\u2019appartiennent qu\u2019\u00e0 leurs auteurs et ne refl\u00e8tent pas n\u00e9cessairement ceux du Transatlantic Dialogue Center, de ses comit\u00e9s ou de ses organisations affili\u00e9es. Ces \u00e9tudes visent \u00e0 stimuler le dialogue et la discussion et ne repr\u00e9sentent pas les positions politiques officielles du Transatlantic Dialogue Center ni de toute autre organisation \u00e0 laquelle les auteurs peuvent \u00eatre associ\u00e9s.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Cette publication a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9labor\u00e9e avec le soutien de l\u2019International Renaissance Foundation. Son contenu rel\u00e8ve de la responsabilit\u00e9 exclusive des auteurs et ne refl\u00e8te pas n\u00e9cessairement les opinions de l\u2019International Renaissance Foundation.<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Key takeaways The reorientation of U.S. strategic priorities toward the Indo-Pacific has reshaped Washington\u2019s approach to Europe. As competition with China intensifies, a gradual recalibration of American military presence and commitments on the European continent becomes increasingly likely. This shift raises questions not only about the future of NATO\u2019s deterrence architecture but also about Europe\u2019s [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":32936,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,56,58],"tags":[],"topic":[88,93,96,110,87,95],"class_list":["post-32929","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-en-analyses","category-eng-north-america","category-eng-western-europe","topic-defense","topic-geopolitics","topic-germany","topic-nato","topic-security","topic-usa"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>A U.S. Retreat From European Security? | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"A U.S. pivot toward the Indo-Pacific could reshape NATO, test Europe\u2019s defence autonomy and expose gaps in transatlantic deterrence.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2025\/10\/30\/strategic-retreat-assessing-the-implications-of-a-u-s-withdrawal-from-european-security\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"A U.S. Retreat From European Security?\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"A U.S. pivot toward the Indo-Pacific could reshape NATO, test Europe\u2019s defence autonomy and expose gaps in transatlantic deterrence.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2025\/10\/30\/strategic-retreat-assessing-the-implications-of-a-u-s-withdrawal-from-european-security\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Transatlantic-Dialogue-Center-105645698740463\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2025-10-30T11:44:06+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-07-04T09:01:02+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/Estados-Unidos-ocultaria-informacion-sobre-Afganistan.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1920\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"1440\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Daryna Sydorenko\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:title\" content=\"A U.S. Retreat From European Security?\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:description\" content=\"A U.S. pivot toward the Indo-Pacific could reshape NATO, test Europe\u2019s defence autonomy and expose gaps in transatlantic deterrence.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Daryna Sydorenko\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"14 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2025\/10\/30\/strategic-retreat-assessing-the-implications-of-a-u-s-withdrawal-from-european-security\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2025\/10\/30\/strategic-retreat-assessing-the-implications-of-a-u-s-withdrawal-from-european-security\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Daryna Sydorenko\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/98e2f5bb6c890bd0e4fb5c6144121453\"},\"headline\":\"Strategic Retreat? 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