{"id":29427,"date":"2025-05-29T10:42:00","date_gmt":"2025-05-29T07:42:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=29427"},"modified":"2026-07-04T12:01:51","modified_gmt":"2026-07-04T09:01:51","slug":"the-eu-and-south-korea-a-rising-military-partnership-amid-global-security-shifts","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2025\/05\/29\/the-eu-and-south-korea-a-rising-military-partnership-amid-global-security-shifts\/","title":{"rendered":"L\u2019UE et la Cor\u00e9e du Sud : un partenariat militaire en plein essor dans un contexte d\u2019\u00e9volution de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 mondiale"},"content":{"rendered":"<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"48115\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">2 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\"><strong>Principaux enseignements<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>La guerre en Ukraine et l\u2019incertitude potentielle entourant la future aide militaire des \u00c9tats-Unis obligent l\u2019UE \u00e0&nbsp;<strong>rechercher d\u2019urgence des partenaires de d\u00e9fense alternatifs<\/strong>&nbsp;et des fournisseurs d\u2019armes.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La Cor\u00e9e du Sud est un partenaire potentiel convaincant non seulement en raison de&nbsp;<strong>pr\u00e9occupations communes<\/strong>&nbsp;over unpredictable state behavior (like North Korea&#8217;s missile launches) but also because of&nbsp;<strong>un cadre \u00e9tabli<\/strong>, comprenant un partenariat strat\u00e9gique renforc\u00e9 en 2010 et un nouveau partenariat en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de d\u00e9fense sign\u00e9 en novembre 2024.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>La Cor\u00e9e du Sud dispose d\u2019&nbsp;<strong>une industrie de d\u00e9fense en expansion rapide<\/strong>, comme en t\u00e9moignent des exportations pass\u00e9es de $2.97 milliards de dollars en 2020 \u00e0 $14 milliards de dollars en 2023. Cette capacit\u00e9 r\u00e9pond directement aux besoins europ\u00e9ens.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Par exemple, la Cor\u00e9e du Sud a export\u00e9 trois fois plus d\u2019&nbsp;<strong>artillerie&nbsp;<\/strong>(735 TIV) que les \u00c9tats-Unis (245 TIV) entre 2022 et 2024, et des syst\u00e8mes sp\u00e9cifiques comme le K239 Chunmoo&nbsp;<strong>MLRS&nbsp;<\/strong>constituent des alternatives viables aux approvisionnements auparavant domin\u00e9s par les \u00c9tats-Unis.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The basis for deeper ties is already present through South Korea&#8217;s past&nbsp;<strong>participation de la Cor\u00e9e du Sud aux op\u00e9rations de gestion de crise de l\u2019UE<\/strong>&nbsp;par le pass\u00e9 (comme l\u2019envoi de l\u2019unit\u00e9 Cheonghae \u00e0 l\u2019op\u00e9ration Atalanta) et \u00e0 de r\u00e9cents&nbsp;<strong>accords bilat\u00e9raux de d\u00e9fense<\/strong>, notably Poland&#8217;s plans to acquire K2 tanks, K9 howitzers, and other machinery.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Les r\u00e9centes&nbsp;<strong>turbulences politiques en Cor\u00e9e du Sud<\/strong>, including the former president&#8217;s impeachment process (December 2024 &#8211; April 2025) and upcoming elections, introduce&nbsp;<strong>un facteur d\u2019incertitude<\/strong>&nbsp;regarding the consistency and direction of Seoul&#8217;s foreign policy, which could impact the pace of cooperation with Europe.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"419\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-12-1024x419.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The EU and South Korea: A Rising Military Partnership Amid Global Security Shifts\" class=\"wp-image-29429\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-12-1024x419.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-12-600x245.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-12-768x314.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-12-18x7.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-12.png 1238w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Pourquoi l\u2019UE devrait \u00e9tendre ses partenariats \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9chelle mondiale<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Depuis que la Russie a lanc\u00e9 une invasion \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle de l\u2019Ukraine en f\u00e9vrier 2024, le paysage s\u00e9curitaire europ\u00e9en a connu des changements radicaux. L\u2019UE a rapidement pris conscience de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de d\u00e9velopper les instruments de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de d\u00e9fense commune afin de r\u00e9sister efficacement \u00e0 la menace s\u00e9curitaire que repr\u00e9sente la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re agressive de Moscou. Malgr\u00e9 quelques retards, les \u00c9tats membres de l\u2019UE et les \u00c9tats-Unis ont r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 fournir \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine une aide financi\u00e8re et militaire consid\u00e9rable jusqu\u2019en 2024.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Toutefois, depuis l\u2019\u00e9lection de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en novembre dernier, la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne conna\u00eet de nouveau un bouleversement majeur. Depuis le 24 f\u00e9vrier 2022, les \u00c9tats-Unis ont fourni $66.5 milliards de dollars d\u2019aide militaire \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, tandis que l\u2019UE a mobilis\u00e9 \u20ac49.3 milliards pour Kyiv. Cela signifie que si l\u2019administration Trump cesse toute aide militaire, l\u2019UE devra doubler son assistance afin de maintenir le rythme pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent, ce qui p\u00e8serait lourdement sur l\u2019\u00e9conomie de l\u2019UE.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En outre, selon les donn\u00e9es fournies par l\u2019Institut de Kiel, les \u00c9tats-Unis ont transf\u00e9r\u00e9, en moyenne, d\u2019un tiers \u00e0 deux tiers de divers types d\u2019armes en dollars am\u00e9ricains (voir tableau 1). Par cons\u00e9quent, la guerre russo-ukrainienne demeurant non r\u00e9solue malgr\u00e9 les n\u00e9gociations en cours en Arabie saoudite, l\u2019UE doit trouver une autre source d\u2019importations d\u2019armes pour garantir un approvisionnement ininterrompu de l\u2019Ukraine et reconstituer ses propres stocks. Apr\u00e8s tout, si l\u2019Ukraine est en s\u00e9curit\u00e9, le reste de l\u2019Europe est lui aussi hors de danger.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table aligncenter\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\"><strong>Aide<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center translation-block\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>United States<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Europe<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Part des \u00c9tats-Unis dans l\u2019aide totale des \u00c9tats-Unis et de l\u2019Europe<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">Aide militaire totale<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$66.5 milliards de dollars<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$53.3 milliards de dollars (l\u2019UE)<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">55.5%<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">Chars (valeur)<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$634 millions<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$1.815 milliard (Pologne, Allemagne, Royaume-Uni, Australie, Tch\u00e9quie, Pays-Bas, Su\u00e8de, Danemark, Espagne, Portugal, Slov\u00e9nie, Croatie, Canada, Norv\u00e8ge)<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">25.88%<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">Syst\u00e8mes de d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne (valeur)<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$1.513 milliard<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$7.620 milliards (Allemagne, Roumanie, Italie, Tch\u00e9quie, Espagne, Slovaquie, Canada, France)<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">16.57%<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">Obusiers (valeur)<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$977 millions<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$3.476 milliards (Royaume-Uni, Allemagne, Italie, France, Danemark, Norv\u00e8ge, Estonie, Pays-Bas, Pologne, Tch\u00e9quie, Su\u00e8de, Australie, Lettonie, Canada, Luxembourg)<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">21.93%<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">V\u00e9hicules de combat d\u2019infanterie (valeur)<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$669 millions<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$1.386 milliard (Pays-Bas, Allemagne, Tch\u00e9quie, Danemark, Su\u00e8de, Gr\u00e8ce, Pologne, Slov\u00e9nie, Croatie, Slovaquie)<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">32.57%<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-left\" data-align=\"left\">Syst\u00e8mes de lance-roquettes multiples (valeur)<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$588 millions<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$269 millions (Tch\u00e9quie, Norv\u00e8ge, Allemagne, Royaume-Uni, France, Italie)<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">68.64%<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Tableau 1. Aide militaire \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine fournie par les \u00c9tats-Unis et l\u2019Europe. Sources : D\u00e9partement d\u2019\u00c9tat des \u00c9tats-Unis, Commission europ\u00e9enne, Institut de Kiel pour l\u2019\u00e9conomie mondiale&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Bien que la pr\u00e9sidente de la Commission europ\u00e9enne, Ursula von der Leyen, ait d\u00e9j\u00e0 propos\u00e9 l\u2019initiative ReArm afin de mobiliser environ \u20ac800 milliards pour accro\u00eetre les d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense, le renforcement des partenariats de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 avec d\u2019autres alli\u00e9s reste crucial. Dans cette perspective, la Cor\u00e9e du Sud appara\u00eet comme un partenaire partageant les m\u00eames valeurs. Tout d\u2019abord, le cadre bilat\u00e9ral entre les deux parties est d\u00e9j\u00e0 bien d\u00e9velopp\u00e9. Non seulement les relations bilat\u00e9rales UE-Cor\u00e9e ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9lev\u00e9es au rang de partenariat strat\u00e9gique en 2010, mais un nouvel accord dans le domaine de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de la d\u00e9fense a \u00e9galement \u00e9t\u00e9 sign\u00e9 en novembre 2024.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Par ailleurs, les r\u00e9cents bouleversements g\u00e9opolitiques imposent eux aussi la coop\u00e9ration. Avec l\u2019implication de troupes nord-cor\u00e9ennes dans la guerre russo-ukrainienne aux c\u00f4t\u00e9s de Moscou \u00e0 l\u2019automne 2024, la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de la Cor\u00e9e du Sud est encore davantage menac\u00e9e. La Cor\u00e9e du Nord s\u2019est d\u00e9j\u00e0 forg\u00e9 la r\u00e9putation d\u2019un \u00c9tat tr\u00e8s impr\u00e9visible en lan\u00e7ant \u00e0 plusieurs reprises des missiles balistiques dans la mer pr\u00e8s de S\u00e9oul et du Japon. Apr\u00e8s leur d\u00e9ploiement en Russie, ses soldats acqui\u00e8rent directement une exp\u00e9rience du combat, que cette puissance nucl\u00e9aire pourrait ou non utiliser ailleurs. Sans compter que Pyongyang recevrait de Moscou, en \u00e9change de sa contribution, une aide alimentaire, des ressources financi\u00e8res et peut-\u00eatre des technologies militaires avanc\u00e9es, autant d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ments susceptibles de r\u00e9pondre aux besoins de son arm\u00e9e.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">De l\u2019autre c\u00f4t\u00e9 de l\u2019oc\u00e9an Pacifique, la rh\u00e9torique de Trump en mati\u00e8re de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re suscite \u00e9galement des craintes. \u00c9tant donn\u00e9 que le pr\u00e9sident s\u2019\u00e9loignera probablement des alli\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens, rien ne garantit qu\u2019il continuera \u00e0 soutenir les partenaires d\u2019Asie de l\u2019Est dans le cadre multilat\u00e9ral \u00e9tabli. Comme l\u2019UE s\u2019inqui\u00e8te elle aussi des soldats nord-cor\u00e9ens au front et des politiques de Trump, S\u00e9oul et Bruxelles partagent d\u00e9sormais davantage de pr\u00e9occupations qui peuvent leur permettre de renforcer leurs liens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Fondements de la coop\u00e9ration UE-Cor\u00e9e<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019important cadre bilat\u00e9ral avec l\u2019Union et les exemples r\u00e9ussis de collaboration de S\u00e9oul avec certains pays europ\u00e9ens donnent \u00e0 penser que les relations UE-Cor\u00e9e pourraient consid\u00e9rablement progresser prochainement.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">S\u2019agissant des liens UE-Cor\u00e9e, leur partenariat strat\u00e9gique a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9tabli en octobre 2010, lorsque les parties ont sign\u00e9 l\u2019accord-cadre r\u00e9vis\u00e9 et l\u2019accord de libre-\u00e9change. Trois ans plus tard, l\u2019UE et la R\u00e9publique de Cor\u00e9e (ROK) ont \u00e9tabli un autre \u00ab partenariat tourn\u00e9 vers l\u2019avenir \u00bb. En outre, S\u00e9oul a \u00e9galement contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de d\u00e9fense commune (PSDC) de l\u2019UE. Apr\u00e8s l\u2019entr\u00e9e en vigueur en 2016 de l\u2019accord-cadre relatif \u00e0 la participation aux op\u00e9rations de gestion de crise de l\u2019UE, la Cor\u00e9e a d\u00e9ploy\u00e9 l\u2019unit\u00e9 Cheonghae pour lutter contre la piraterie dans le cadre de l\u2019op\u00e9ration navale militaire Atalanta de l\u2019UE.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"700\" height=\"421\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-13.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The EU and South Korea: A Rising Military Partnership Amid Global Security Shifts\" class=\"wp-image-29430\" style=\"width:499px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-13.png 700w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-13-600x361.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-13-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 700px) 100vw, 700px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Rencontre du ministre sud-cor\u00e9en de la D\u00e9fense nationale Shin Won Sik<\/em><br><em> avec le vice-ministre polonais de la D\u00e9fense Pawel Bejda \u00e0 S\u00e9oul en<\/em><br><em> avril 2024. Source : Indo-Pacific Defense Forum.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\">En ce qui concerne la coop\u00e9ration militaire avec les pays europ\u00e9ens, la Pologne et la R\u00e9publique tch\u00e8que constituent des exemples de r\u00e9ussite. Le gouvernement tch\u00e8que a notamment s\u00e9lectionn\u00e9 Korea Hydro &amp; Nuclear Power Company (KHNP) pour construire deux blocs suppl\u00e9mentaires de la centrale nucl\u00e9aire de Dukovany. Varsovie a \u00e9galement nou\u00e9 des liens avec KHNP et est all\u00e9e encore plus loin, en organisant plusieurs r\u00e9unions de d\u00e9fense avec la ROK. En outre, apr\u00e8s une visite de responsables polonais de la d\u00e9fense \u00e0 S\u00e9oul en avril 2024, la Pologne a annonc\u00e9 son intention d\u2019acqu\u00e9rir des armements cor\u00e9ens, tels que des chars K2 Black Panther, des obusiers automoteurs K9 Thunder, des avions l\u00e9gers de combat FA-50 et des syst\u00e8mes de lance-roquettes multiples Chunmoo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">De plus, la R\u00e9publique de Cor\u00e9e entretient une relation de longue date avec l\u2019OTAN, qui s\u2019est intensifi\u00e9e apr\u00e8s l\u2019invasion \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle de l\u2019Ukraine par la Russie. Les mesures prises apr\u00e8s 2022 comprennent la cr\u00e9ation de la mission diplomatique de la Cor\u00e9e aupr\u00e8s de l\u2019OTAN, la signature d\u2019un accord de reconnaissance mutuelle pour la certification de navigabilit\u00e9 militaire et la participation aux sommets de l\u2019OTAN. Auparavant, S\u00e9oul avait directement contribu\u00e9 aux efforts militaires de l\u2019Alliance en dirigeant une \u00e9quipe provinciale de reconstruction civilo-militaire int\u00e9gr\u00e9e (environ 470 personnes) dans la province de Parwan, en Afghanistan, et en d\u00e9ployant une force navale pour lutter contre la piraterie dans le golfe d\u2019Aden.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9ploiement de troupes nord-cor\u00e9ennes sur le front de la guerre russo-ukrainienne, S\u00e9oul a \u00e9galement donn\u00e9 les premiers signes de sa volont\u00e9 de coop\u00e9rer avec Kyiv. L\u2019ambassadeur d\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 S\u00e9oul a notamment affirm\u00e9 que la participation de la RPDC \u00e0 la guerre russo-ukrainienne pousserait la Cor\u00e9e du Sud \u00e0 accro\u00eetre l\u2019ampleur de son aide militaire \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine et \u00e0 approfondir la coop\u00e9ration militaro-technique. Auparavant, S\u00e9oul n\u2019avait aid\u00e9 l\u2019Ukraine que par des dispositifs financiers et \u00e9vitait l\u2019envoi direct d\u2019armes. En 2023, le pays a opt\u00e9 pour un compromis en envoyant 300,000 obus d\u2019artillerie de 155 mm aux \u00c9tats-Unis, \u00e0 charge pour Washington de fournir lui-m\u00eame ces approvisionnements \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Toutefois, aucune mesure concr\u00e8te visant \u00e0 approfondir la coop\u00e9ration n\u2019a \u00e9t\u00e9 prise jusqu\u2019\u00e0 pr\u00e9sent, hormis ces premi\u00e8res d\u00e9marches. En d\u00e9cembre, en confirmant que l\u2019Ukraine avait captur\u00e9 un soldat nord-cor\u00e9en, la Cor\u00e9e du Sud a d\u00e9montr\u00e9 un \u00ab partage d\u2019informations en temps r\u00e9el avec l\u2019organisation de renseignement d\u2019une nation amie \u00bb. De plus, tout r\u00e9cemment, en mars 2025, S\u00e9oul et Kyiv se sont entretenus par t\u00e9l\u00e9phone afin de n\u00e9gocier le rapatriement de militaires nord-cor\u00e9ens captur\u00e9s.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"778\" height=\"413\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-14.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The EU and South Korea: A Rising Military Partnership Amid Global Security Shifts\" class=\"wp-image-29431\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-14.png 778w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-14-600x319.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-14-768x408.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-14-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 778px) 100vw, 778px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Un soldat nord-cor\u00e9en captur\u00e9 par les forces arm\u00e9es ukrainiennes. Source : <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nknews.org\/2025\/01\/ukraine-releases-first-testimony-from-captured-north-korean-soldiers\/\"><em>NK News<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">S\u2019appuyant sur cette exp\u00e9rience, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne pourrait \u00e9galement engager une coop\u00e9ration militaire plus approfondie avec la R\u00e9publique de Cor\u00e9e. Elle pourrait le faire, par exemple, en acqu\u00e9rant des armes cor\u00e9ennes, en partageant des donn\u00e9es de renseignement ou en mettant en place des forums conjoints de d\u00e9fense afin d\u2019\u00e9laborer ensemble des moyens de contrer les politiques agressives de la Russie et de la Cor\u00e9e du Nord.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Comment l\u2019UE pourrait en b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier : les capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense de S\u00e9oul<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En mati\u00e8re d\u2019armement, la Cor\u00e9e du Sud offre \u00e0 l\u2019Union une excellente occasion de diversifier ses importations de d\u00e9fense et de trouver de nouveaux fournisseurs fiables. Non seulement S\u00e9oul se classe globalement parmi les vingt \u00e9conomies les plus prosp\u00e8res du monde, mais le pays a aussi consid\u00e9rablement d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 son industrie de d\u00e9fense ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es. Les exportations d\u2019armes et de munitions ont augment\u00e9 d\u2019environ 40 % entre 2013 et 2019 (voir tableau 2), tandis que les exportations totales de d\u00e9fense ont bondi de $2.97 milliards de dollars en 2020 \u00e0 $14 milliards de dollars en 2023 (voir graphique 1).&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table aligncenter is-style-regular\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><td><strong>Ann\u00e9e<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Valeur commerciale (USD)<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>2019<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$547,450,930<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>2015<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$437,201,544<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>2013<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">$390,208,376<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Tableau 2. Exportations sud-cor\u00e9ennes d\u2019armes et de munitions,<\/em> <em>de pi\u00e8ces et d\u2019accessoires connexes. Source : <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/comtradeplus.un.org\/TradeFlow?Frequency=A&amp;Flows=X&amp;CommodityCodes=TOTAL&amp;Partners=251&amp;Reporter\"><em>UN Comtrade<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"841\" height=\"624\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-16.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The EU and South Korea: A Rising Military Partnership Amid Global Security Shifts\" class=\"wp-image-29433\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-16.png 841w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-16-600x445.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-16-768x570.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-16-16x12.png 16w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 841px) 100vw, 841px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Graphique 1. Exportations totales de l\u2019industrie de d\u00e9fense de la Cor\u00e9e du Sud de 2014 \u00e0 2023 (en milliards de dollars am\u00e9ricains). Source : Statista<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les m\u00e9dias ont qualifi\u00e9 une telle r\u00e9ussite de ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne \u00ab K-Defence \u00bb. Bien entendu, la Cor\u00e9e du Sud ne peut \u00e0 elle seule remplacer les \u00c9tats-Unis \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard. Si sa part des exportations mondiales d\u2019armes est pass\u00e9e de 2.1 % \u00e0 2.2 %, celle de Washington atteint 43 %. N\u00e9anmoins, parmi les dix premiers exportateurs d\u2019armes, la ROK reste suffisamment importante pour que l\u2019UE envisage d\u2019acqu\u00e9rir davantage de ses \u00e9quipements de d\u00e9fense.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"748\" height=\"483\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-17.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The EU and South Korea: A Rising Military Partnership Amid Global Security Shifts\" class=\"wp-image-29434\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-17.png 748w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-17-600x387.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-17-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 748px) 100vw, 748px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Le complexe industriel de la ville de Changwon, c\u0153ur de l\u2019industrie de d\u00e9fense sud-cor\u00e9enne. Source : East Asia Forum<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les donn\u00e9es de l\u2019Institut international de recherche sur la paix de Stockholm concernant les exportations d\u2019armes des \u00c9tats-Unis et de la Cor\u00e9e du Sud montrent que, si la ROK est tr\u00e8s loin derri\u00e8re les \u00c9tats-Unis pour les exportations de v\u00e9hicules blind\u00e9s et de syst\u00e8mes de d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne, son offre d\u2019artillerie est tr\u00e8s prometteuse. Entre 2022 et 2024, S\u00e9oul a fourni trois fois plus d\u2019armes d\u2019artillerie que Washington (voir tableau 3).&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table aligncenter\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Type d\u2019arme<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\" colspan=\"2\"><strong>Armes export\u00e9es en 2022-2024 (TIV)<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\" colspan=\"2\"><strong>Pourcentage du total des armes export\u00e9es<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><em>Pays<\/em><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center translation-block\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>United States<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><em>Cor\u00e9e du Sud<\/em><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center translation-block\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>United States<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><em>Cor\u00e9e du Sud<\/em><\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Artillerie<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">245<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">735<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">0.6%<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">40%<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">V\u00e9hicules blind\u00e9s<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">4039<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">455<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">10%<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">10%<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Syst\u00e8mes de d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">1006<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">60<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">2.5%<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">3.3%<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Tableau 3. Comparaison des exportations d\u2019armes par type des \u00c9tats-Unis et de la Cor\u00e9e du Sud. Source : base de donn\u00e9es SIPRI sur les transferts d\u2019armes<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les \u00c9tats-Unis fournissaient auparavant 68.64 % de tous les syst\u00e8mes de lance-roquettes multiples (MLRS) \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine ; l\u2019UE pourrait donc s\u00e9rieusement envisager d\u2019augmenter les exportations cor\u00e9ennes de MLRS afin de compenser cette part. En fait, certains \u00c9tats membres de l\u2019UE ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 envisag\u00e9 cette option. Ainsi, l\u2019acquisition du K239 Chunmoo sud-cor\u00e9en, un syst\u00e8me de lance-roquettes multiples d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 par Hanwha Aerospace, a \u00e9t\u00e9 envisag\u00e9e en Estonie et a d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9alis\u00e9e par la Pologne apr\u00e8s que les retards de livraison des HIMARS ont commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 susciter des inqui\u00e9tudes. Non seulement il arrive plus rapidement, mais il est aussi moins cher, ce qui en fait une alternative valable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">D\u2019un autre c\u00f4t\u00e9, le commerce des armes avec l\u2019Europe constitue \u00e9galement pour la ROK un bon moyen d\u2019\u00e9largir et de diversifier ses propres exportations de d\u00e9fense, tout en renfor\u00e7ant son influence g\u00e9opolitique. L\u2019un des outils possibles serait le transfert de technologies et la production \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger, que les industries de d\u00e9fense de S\u00e9oul ont tendance \u00e0 mettre en \u0153uvre avec les pays destinataires lors de l\u2019\u00e9tablissement de relations commerciales. Par exemple, S\u00e9oul a conclu avec Tawazun des \u00c9mirats arabes unis un accord de production conjointe d\u2019un avion de transport militaire. Si des accords similaires \u00e9taient conclus avec l\u2019UE, les deux parties en b\u00e9n\u00e9ficieraient sans aucun doute.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">D\u00e9fis possibles<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">N\u00e9anmoins, dans l\u2019\u00e9laboration d\u2019une strat\u00e9gie de coop\u00e9ration avec la Cor\u00e9e, les responsables politiques europ\u00e9ens pourraient vouloir tenir compte de la r\u00e9cente crise politique du pays et de ses cons\u00e9quences potentielles.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En d\u00e9cembre 2024, Yoon Seok Yeol, alors pr\u00e9sident de S\u00e9oul, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 la loi martiale lors d\u2019une conf\u00e9rence de presse non annonc\u00e9e, expliquant qu\u2019elle \u00e9tait n\u00e9cessaire pour \u00ab prot\u00e9ger la R\u00e9publique de Cor\u00e9e des menaces des forces communistes nord-cor\u00e9ennes \u00bb et pour combattre les \u00ab forces anti\u00e9tatiques pro-Pyongyang \u00bb. Peu apr\u00e8s, des troupes sous loi martiale sont entr\u00e9es par une fen\u00eatre \u00e0 l\u2019Assembl\u00e9e nationale, tandis que le commandant de la loi martiale et chef d\u2019\u00e9tat-major de l\u2019arm\u00e9e, Park An Su, d\u00e9clarait interdites toutes les \u00ab activit\u00e9s politiques \u00bb de l\u2019Assembl\u00e9e nationale.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"767\" height=\"431\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-19.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The EU and South Korea: A Rising Military Partnership Amid Global Security Shifts\" class=\"wp-image-29436\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-19.png 767w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-19-600x337.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-19-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 767px) 100vw, 767px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Yoon Seok Yeol, l\u2019ancien pr\u00e9sident de Cor\u00e9e du Sud. Source : BBC&nbsp;<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le Parlement y a vu une tentative de prise de contr\u00f4le des institutions d\u00e9mocratiques et a vot\u00e9 la destitution de l\u2019homme politique. Yoon a donc \u00e9t\u00e9 emp\u00each\u00e9 d\u2019exercer ses fonctions. Il est toutefois officiellement rest\u00e9 en poste jusqu\u2019\u00e0 ce qu\u2019au moins six des huit juges de la cour constitutionnelle approuvent sa destitution. Bien que le proc\u00e8s se soit achev\u00e9 le 25 f\u00e9vrier, la cour n\u2019a confirm\u00e9 la suspension de Yoon que le 4 avril, apr\u00e8s des mois de manifestations dans tout le pays.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La strat\u00e9gie de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re de Yoon diff\u00e9rait \u00e0 bien des \u00e9gards de celle de ses pr\u00e9d\u00e9cesseurs. Son approche de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne comptait parmi les \u00e9volutions qu\u2019il a introduites. Le dirigeant a d\u00e9cid\u00e9 d\u2019accro\u00eetre le r\u00f4le de S\u00e9oul dans la r\u00e9gion en se rendant pour la premi\u00e8re fois au sommet de l\u2019OTAN en Espagne en juin 2022. Il a ensuite particip\u00e9 aux sommets de 2023 et 2024. En outre, il a adopt\u00e9 une position m\u00e9fiante \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de la Chine comme de la Russie, critiquant plut\u00f4t Tokyo.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00c0 l\u2019approche de la nouvelle \u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle, la strat\u00e9gie qu\u2019adoptera le candidat \u00e9lu reste incertaine. En 2022, le chef du Parti d\u00e9mocrate (PD), Lee Jae Myung, n\u2019a perdu face \u00e0 Yoon Seok Yeol que de peu, et le PD a remport\u00e9 les \u00e9lections l\u00e9gislatives de 2024. Lee tentera donc probablement de se pr\u00e9senter \u00e0 nouveau \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence. En f\u00e9vrier 2025, son parti a annonc\u00e9 avoir form\u00e9 un comit\u00e9 pour la paix et la coop\u00e9ration en Asie du Nord-Est afin de fa\u00e7onner une diplomatie fond\u00e9e sur une approche pragmatique. Selon ses explications, cela comprendrait le renforcement de la coop\u00e9ration trilat\u00e9rale en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 entre S\u00e9oul, Washington et Tokyo.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"570\" height=\"570\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-21.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The EU and South Korea: A Rising Military Partnership Amid Global Security Shifts\" class=\"wp-image-29438\" style=\"width:482px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-21.png 570w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-21-300x300.png 300w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-21-12x12.png 12w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 570px) 100vw, 570px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Lee Jae Myung, le chef du Parti d\u00e9mocrate. <\/em><br><em>Source : The Wall Street Journal&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/em><strong><em>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Alors que la crise politique sud-cor\u00e9enne perdurait, la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re est naturellement pass\u00e9e au second plan. Cela peut expliquer en partie pourquoi la R\u00e9publique de Cor\u00e9e a tard\u00e9 \u00e0 s\u2019engager aupr\u00e8s de l\u2019Ukraine, m\u00eame apr\u00e8s que les troupes nord-cor\u00e9ennes eurent rejoint les forces russes sur le front. \u00c0 pr\u00e9sent, toutefois, l\u2019UE devrait d\u00e9j\u00e0 se pr\u00e9parer aux issues possibles des \u00e9lections sud-cor\u00e9ennes de 2025.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans le m\u00eame temps, la menace nord-cor\u00e9enne \u00e9tant d\u00e9sormais amplifi\u00e9e par son alignement sur la Russie, il est tr\u00e8s peu probable que S\u00e9oul \u00e9carte enti\u00e8rement la coop\u00e9ration avec l\u2019Europe. Dans les circonstances actuelles, la seule ligne de conduite logique pour l\u2019Union est de d\u00e9fendre la coop\u00e9ration dans tous les cas, en recherchant des accords avantageux pour les deux parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La coop\u00e9ration militaire avec la Cor\u00e9e du Sud est donc aujourd\u2019hui tr\u00e8s pertinente et b\u00e9n\u00e9fique pour l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne. Tout d\u2019abord, le paysage s\u00e9curitaire europ\u00e9en est tr\u00e8s turbulent et impr\u00e9visible. La Cor\u00e9e du Nord s\u2019est jointe \u00e0 la Russie dans sa guerre d\u2019agression contre l\u2019Ukraine, tandis que Trump renonce \u00e0 armer l\u2019Europe et pousse Kyiv \u00e0 signer l\u2019\u00ab accord de paix \u00bb. \u00c0 la lumi\u00e8re de ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements, l\u2019UE a un besoin urgent d\u2019alli\u00e9s fiables en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9, et la Cor\u00e9e du Sud pourrait \u00eatre l\u2019un d\u2019entre eux.&nbsp;<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00c9tant donn\u00e9 que S\u00e9oul a d\u00e9j\u00e0 vendu des armes \u00e0 la Pologne et collabor\u00e9 avec la R\u00e9publique tch\u00e8que dans le domaine de l\u2019\u00e9nergie nucl\u00e9aire, l\u2019Union devrait suivre cet exemple et \u00e9tablir elle aussi une coop\u00e9ration militaire avec S\u00e9oul. L\u2019acquisition d\u2019armes cor\u00e9ennes serait particuli\u00e8rement utile, car l\u2019Europe doit diversifier d\u2019urgence ses importations de d\u00e9fense apr\u00e8s que Trump a renonc\u00e9 \u00e0 soutenir la r\u00e9gion. Pour la Cor\u00e9e du Sud, un tel commerce serait \u00e9galement tr\u00e8s avantageux. Il permettrait \u00e0 S\u00e9oul d\u2019\u00e9tendre son influence g\u00e9opolitique, de renforcer son r\u00f4le de fournisseur de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Europe et d\u2019accro\u00eetre ses exportations de d\u00e9fense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le seul obstacle emp\u00eachant l\u2019alliance militaire UE-Cor\u00e9e de se d\u00e9velopper rapidement est la crise politique sud-cor\u00e9enne, qui a dur\u00e9 des mois apr\u00e8s la destitution de l\u2019ancien pr\u00e9sident Yoon. Toute l\u2019attention de la population \u00e9tant tourn\u00e9e vers la cour constitutionnelle, qui a retard\u00e9 depuis f\u00e9vrier sa d\u00e9cision de confirmer ou de rejeter la destitution, la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re n\u2019\u00e9tait manifestement pas une priorit\u00e9 pour le gouvernement. \u00c0 pr\u00e9sent, la question importante est de savoir si le candidat \u00e9lu lors de la prochaine \u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle pour remplacer Yoon adoptera une position ferme contre la Russie et poursuivra la coop\u00e9ration avec l\u2019Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Naturellement, l\u2019UE doit aussi comprendre que ni la Cor\u00e9e du Sud ni aucun autre \u00c9tat ne peut remplacer \u00e0 lui seul le soutien de Washington en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9fense. Le retrait de Trump d\u2019Europe, ainsi que la progression mondiale des mouvements d\u2019extr\u00eame droite et pro-russes, laissent penser que des \u00e9volutions politiques similaires pourraient se produire dans n\u2019importe quel pays. C\u2019est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment pourquoi l\u2019UE ne devrait pas chercher \u00e0 remplacer les \u00c9tats-Unis d\u2019un seul coup, mais plut\u00f4t se concentrer sur la diversification de ses partenariats de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de ses sources d\u2019importations d\u2019armes. Cela \u00e9tant, la Cor\u00e9e du Sud ne doit pas \u00eatre sous-estim\u00e9e. Gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 son industrie de d\u00e9fense tr\u00e8s d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e et \u00e0 sa solide \u00e9conomie, elle repr\u00e9sente un partenaire strat\u00e9gique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 dont l\u2019UE peut tirer des avantages consid\u00e9rables.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><strong><em>Avertissement : les points de vue, pens\u00e9es et opinions exprim\u00e9s dans les articles publi\u00e9s sur ce site appartiennent exclusivement aux auteurs et ne refl\u00e8tent pas n\u00e9cessairement ceux du Transatlantic Dialogue Center, de ses comit\u00e9s ou de ses organisations affili\u00e9es. Ces articles visent \u00e0 stimuler le dialogue et la discussion et ne repr\u00e9sentent pas les positions politiques officielles du Transatlantic Dialogue Center ni de toute autre organisation \u00e0 laquelle les auteurs peuvent \u00eatre associ\u00e9s.<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Key Takeaways Why the EU Should Extend Partnerships Across the World Since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2024, the security landscape in Europe has experienced drastic changes. The EU quickly became aware of the need to develop the Common Security and Defence Policy toolkit to effectively withstand the security threat of [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":29439,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[60,59,13,58],"tags":[],"topic":[88,91,93,87,89],"class_list":["post-29427","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-asiaen","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","category-eng-western-europe","topic-defense","topic-eu","topic-geopolitics","topic-security","topic-technology"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>The EU\u2013South Korea Military Partnership | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"EU\u2013South Korea defence 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