{"id":28381,"date":"2025-03-20T10:22:00","date_gmt":"2025-03-20T08:22:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=28381"},"modified":"2025-08-05T13:42:02","modified_gmt":"2025-08-05T10:42:02","slug":"the-contemporary-political-landscape-of-moldova-more-than-meets-the-eye","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2025\/03\/20\/the-contemporary-political-landscape-of-moldova-more-than-meets-the-eye\/","title":{"rendered":"Le paysage politique contemporain de la Moldavie : plus qu\u2019il n\u2019y para\u00eet"},"content":{"rendered":"<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"47040\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">2 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\"><strong>Principaux enseignements<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>La fracture politique de la Moldavie :<\/strong>&nbsp;Le pays reste divis\u00e9 entre des factions pro-europ\u00e9ennes et pro-russes, les \u00e9lections l\u00e9gislatives de juillet 2025 devant fa\u00e7onner son orientation g\u00e9opolitique.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>L\u2019influence oligarchique :<\/strong>&nbsp;Des personnalit\u00e9s comme Ilan Shor et Vlad Plahotniuc continuent de manipuler le syst\u00e8me politique moldave par le contr\u00f4le des m\u00e9dias, la corruption et le pouvoir financier.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>La Transnistrie et la Gagaouzie, foyers de tension :<\/strong>&nbsp;Les deux r\u00e9gions s\u2019opposent \u00e0 l\u2019int\u00e9gration de la Moldavie dans l\u2019UE ; la Transnistrie s\u2019aligne \u00e9troitement sur la Russie et les dirigeants de la Gagaouzie recherchent activement le soutien de Moscou.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Les m\u00e9dias, un champ de bataille :<\/strong>&nbsp;La d\u00e9sinformation soutenue par la Russie reste largement r\u00e9pandue malgr\u00e9 les efforts du gouvernement pour limiter l\u2019influence \u00e9trang\u00e8re, ce qui approfondit les divisions politiques.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Les \u00e9lections de 2024 et le r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum sur l\u2019UE :<\/strong>&nbsp;La pr\u00e9sidente Maia Sandu a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9\u00e9lue, mais la forte opposition dans les r\u00e9gions pro-russes a mis en \u00e9vidence les fractures internes de la Moldavie. Le r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum sur l\u2019UE a \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9 de justesse (50,35 % de voix favorables).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Les difficult\u00e9s de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re :<\/strong>&nbsp;Alors que le gouvernement moldave promeut l\u2019int\u00e9gration \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN, les groupes d\u2019opposition d\u00e9fendent la f\u00e9d\u00e9ralisation et un rapprochement avec la Russie.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Crise identitaire :<\/strong>&nbsp;Les tensions historiques, linguistiques et g\u00e9opolitiques alimentent les d\u00e9bats sur l\u2019identit\u00e9 nationale et polarisent davantage l\u2019\u00e9lectorat.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Un cas d\u2019\u00e9cole pour l\u2019influence r\u00e9gionale :<\/strong>&nbsp;Les difficult\u00e9s de la Moldavie offrent des enseignements essentiels \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine et aux autres \u00c9tats post-sovi\u00e9tiques confront\u00e9s \u00e0 des d\u00e9fis semblables.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1240\" height=\"507\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-3.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-28382\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-3.png 1240w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-3-600x245.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-3-1024x419.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-3-768x314.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-3-18x7.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1240px) 100vw, 1240px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Moldova\u2019s contemporary political landscape is a dynamic and often volatile space, shaped by historical legacies, geopolitical pressures, and internal struggles between reform and corruption. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the country has oscillated between pro-European and pro-Russian political forces, a divide that continues to define its governance, foreign policy, and national identity. While the 2009 &#8220;Twitter Revolution&#8221; set Moldova on a path toward European integration, systemic corruption and oligarchic influence have repeatedly undermined progress. At the heart of Moldova\u2019s political tug-of-war are key players such as the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), led by President Maia Sandu, and the pro-Russian Socialist Party (PSRM), represented by former president Igor Dodon. The country\u2019s media landscape further complicates its political trajectory, with outlets aligning along ideological lines and Russian-backed disinformation shaping public opinion. Meanwhile, Moldova\u2019s unresolved territorial disputes, particularly with the breakaway region of Transnistria and the autonomous region of Gagauzia, serve as critical flashpoints that Moscow continues to exploit. Against this backdrop, the 2024 presidential elections and EU membership referendum have deepened societal divisions, with narrow margins reflecting an electorate torn between European aspirations and historical ties to Russia. As Moldova prepares for the crucial 2025 parliamentary elections, the stakes remain high. The outcome will not only determine the country\u2019s path toward European integration but also test its resilience in the face of internal and external challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Les principaux acteurs de la sc\u00e8ne politique int\u00e9rieure<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The contemporary political landscape of Moldova is characterized by a complex interplay of political parties, influential politicians, oligarchic structures, and a diverse media environment. It reflects the country&#8217;s ongoing struggle to navigate its identity and governance in the post-Soviet context, particularly in light of its geopolitical positioning between the European Union and Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Few key political parties dominate there that align with either pro-European or pro-Russian ideologies. The Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), led by Maia Sandu, emerged as a significant force following the 2021 parliamentary elections, advocating for European integration and anti-corruption measures. The PAS&#8217;s victory marked a shift in the political landscape, as it capitalized on public discontent with corruption and governance issues associated with previous administrations<strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Conversely, the Socialist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), which has historically favored closer ties with Russia, remains a prominent player. The PSRM has utilized populist rhetoric to appeal to voters nostalgic for the Soviet era, often framing its agenda around social welfare and national identity. Representing the pro-Russian camp, PSRM has traditionally enjoyed strong support in regions like Gagauzia and Transnistria. It focuses on preserving Moldova&#8217;s neutrality and maintaining close ties with Russia. Igor Dodon is the most prominent representative of the party at the moment, being its former president and leader, advocating for Moldova&#8217;s neutrality and close ties with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1049\" height=\"229\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-4.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-28387\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-4.png 1049w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-4-600x131.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-4-1024x224.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-4-768x168.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-4-18x4.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1049px) 100vw, 1049px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Maia Sandu, Iian Shor et Vlad Filat. Sources diverses.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Founded by businessman and controversial politician Ilan Shor, the Shor Party blends populism with regional development promises. Shor has been implicated in the &#8220;billion-dollar bank scandal,&#8221; but his party continues to gain traction in economically depressed areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ion Marandici introduces the concept of oligarchic state capture in the case study of Moldova to describe the temporary dominance of wealthy elites over all branches of government, hindering democracy and perpetuating corruption. Oligarchs, as winners of the post-Soviet economic transition, exploited state institutions for personal gain. That is why they play a crucial role in Moldova&#8217;s political landscape, often exerting significant influence over political parties and the electoral process. The intertwining of business and politics has led to a system where oligarchic interests can overshadow democratic processes, contributing to widespread corruption and public disillusionment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Des figures notables telles que Vlad Plahotniuc, qui dirigeait auparavant le Parti d\u00e9mocrate, illustrent les d\u00e9fis pos\u00e9s par le contr\u00f4le oligarchique : elles ont \u00e9t\u00e9 accus\u00e9es de manipuler les r\u00e9sultats politiques pour conserver le pouvoir. Outre Ilan Shor, Vlad Filat \u00e9tait \u00e9galement un acteur central, utilisant les partis politiques et les ressources de l\u2019\u00c9tat \u00e0 des fins priv\u00e9es. Ces oligarques ont employ\u00e9 des m\u00e9canismes tels que le contr\u00f4le des m\u00e9dias et du syst\u00e8me judiciaire, le financement des partis et l\u2019engagement direct en politique, ainsi que l\u2019exploitation des ressources de l\u2019\u00c9tat par des montages comme la fraude bancaire de 2014, \u00e9galement appel\u00e9e le \u00ab vol du si\u00e8cle \u00bb. Dans le cadre de ce montage, 1 milliard de dollars a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9tourn\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00e9conomie, soit 12 % du PIB de la Moldavie. Les rivalit\u00e9s entre oligarques ont d\u00e9clench\u00e9 des r\u00e9formes et des arrestations, mais ont aussi intensifi\u00e9 l\u2019exploitation des ressources de l\u2019\u00c9tat. La r\u00e9action populaire et la pression internationale ont mis en \u00e9vidence la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de r\u00e9formes syst\u00e9miques.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1048\" height=\"536\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-6.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-28389\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-6.png 1048w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-6-600x307.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-6-1024x524.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-6-768x393.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-6-18x9.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1048px) 100vw, 1048px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Source : <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rise.md\/english\/laundromat-two-huge-scams-one-moldovan-businessman\/\">Rise Moldova<\/a><\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">\u00c0 la recherche d\u2019une d\u00e9finition de la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re moldave<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Moldova&#8217;s foreign policy is shaped by its historical oscillation between pro-European and pro-Russian alignments and reflects the internal political division of the country. It includes three main tendencies at the moment &#8211; EU and NATO integration, special relations with Romania, and federalization. The EU aspirations in Moldova reflect a preference for cooperative internationalism that is constrained by economic dissatisfaction and Russian influence, while NATO membership is the least supported tendency, constrained by constitutional neutrality and Russia\u2019s strong opposition. Federalization is often seen as a pro-Russian policy due to its potential to strengthen Transnistria\u2019s influence. Poverty, as a multidimensional indicator, is significantly correlated with opposition to foreign policy openness in Moldova &#8211; subjective poverty aligns with resistance to EU membership and unification with Romania. Trust in Russian media also correlates strongly with opposition to EU and NATO membership, underscoring Moscow\u2019s ability to shape narratives in Moldova. Higher education and younger demographics favor cooperative internationalism, opposing isolationist and federalist measures<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As of late 2024, Moldova remains politically polarized. The recent elections showed a divided electorate, with significant support for both pro-European and pro-Russian factions. The upcoming parliamentary elections in 2025 will be crucial in determining Moldova&#8217;s future direction amid ongoing pressures from Russia and aspirations for EU membership. This polarization between pro-European and pro-Russian parties has created a dynamic political environment where party allegiances can shift based on public sentiment and external influences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Le paysage m\u00e9diatique en Moldavie<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The media landscape in Moldova during 2020\u20132025 reflects its broader socio-political and cultural dynamics, defined by tensions between pro-European aspirations and Russian influence. The sector is marked by political alignment, oligarchic ownership, and challenges in fostering independent journalism. External factors, such as Moldova&#8217;s path toward EU integration and domestic issues, such as media literacy, play critical roles in its development. Despite the Internet becoming the main information source in the country, television is still a primary source for news in Moldova, which is especially important with every prominent Moldovan TV channel having its own web portal. According to Media Ownership Monitor Moldova, in the first half of 2024, Cinema1 was the most-watched TV channel in the country, followed by PRO TV and Jurnal TV. This proves that even despite attempts to block it, Russian influence through the media is still quite prevalent in Moldova.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cinema 1 is an aggregator TV channel that was used to broadcast Russian content manufactured by foreign Russian broadcasting services after the Chi\u0219in\u0103u authorities suspended or withdrew the licenses of several TV stations retransmitting programs produced in Russia. TRM, the state broadcaster, is positioned as a neutral entity but has been criticized for perceived biases toward the ruling government. Efforts to modernize TRM&#8217;s infrastructure and programming have been initiated, aiming to meet European broadcasting standards. Known for its pro-European stance and investigative journalism, Jurnal TV has gained a reputation for exposing corruption. It is a popular source among urban audiences critical of oligarchic influence. Positioned as a neutral and independent outlet, TV8 focuses on investigative reporting and political analysis. It receives funding from international organizations to maintain its editorial independence. Part of the Romanian ProTV network, ProTV Chisinau focuses on entertainment, cultural programming, and news. Its content appeals to younger audiences and promotes a pro-European narrative. Formerly linked to oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, Publika TV leans toward pro-Russian narratives and sensationalist content. Its credibility has been questioned due to political affiliations. Its TV license was suspended in 2023, and currently, it is broadcasted only via the web.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">M\u00e9dia d\u2019investigation de premier plan en Moldavie, Ziarul de Gard\u0103 se consacre \u00e0 r\u00e9v\u00e9ler la corruption et les atteintes aux droits humains. Il jouit d\u2019une grande estime au sein de la communaut\u00e9 internationale, mais fait face \u00e0 des difficult\u00e9s financi\u00e8res. M\u00e9dia ind\u00e9pendant et multilingue, NewsMaker.md couvre en profondeur la politique, l\u2019\u00e9conomie et les enjeux sociaux de la Moldavie. Il s\u2019est b\u00e2ti une r\u00e9putation de traitement \u00e9quilibr\u00e9 de l\u2019information. Connu pour son orientation pro-europ\u00e9enne, Deschide.md propose des actualit\u00e9s et des analyses sur la politique moldave et les relations internationales. Il constitue une source fiable d\u2019informations actualis\u00e9es.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Li\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019oligarque exil\u00e9 Ilan Shor, TV6 s\u2019est vu retirer sa licence de diffusion en raison d\u2019accusations de propagation de propagande russe. Son contenu a \u00e9galement migr\u00e9 vers des plateformes en ligne. Autre cha\u00eene associ\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019empire m\u00e9diatique de Shor, Orizont TV se consacrait aux informations locales et r\u00e9gionales, mais a \u00e9t\u00e9 suspendue en 2023 pour diffusion de d\u00e9sinformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">M\u00e9dia pro-Kremlin ciblant les publics russophones, Sputnik Moldova est critiqu\u00e9 pour la diffusion de propagande et de d\u00e9sinformation conformes aux int\u00e9r\u00eats g\u00e9opolitiques russes. Une \u00e9dition moldave du tablo\u00efd russe Komsomolskaya Pravda promeut les r\u00e9cits du Kremlin et cible les publics russophones de Moldavie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le paysage m\u00e9diatique varie consid\u00e9rablement entre zones urbaines et rurales. Les publics urbains ont acc\u00e8s \u00e0 des sources diversifi\u00e9es, tandis que les r\u00e9gions rurales d\u00e9pendent souvent de m\u00e9dias pro-russes. Les r\u00e9seaux sociaux sont devenus une force dominante, en particulier parmi les populations plus jeunes. Ils ont toutefois aussi servi de canal aux campagnes de d\u00e9sinformation, notamment sur des sujets tels que l\u2019int\u00e9gration \u00e0 l\u2019UE et les droits des minorit\u00e9s, par exemple par l\u2019interm\u00e9diaire d\u2019un r\u00e9seau de cha\u00eenes Telegram en russe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">La Transnistrie et la Gagaouzie, variable la plus importante de la politique moldave<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The situation with Transnistria is more or less known to the general public. After the active phase of the armed conflict that lasted from 1990 to 1992, a Russian military contingent remained in the country, which is why the conflict itself is still being considered \u201cfrozen.\u201d Russia&#8217;s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has revitalized the debate over Transnistria, as the Russian army stationed there poses a security risk to both Ukraine and Moldova itself. Transnistria and its internationally unrecognized \u201cauthorities\u201d lightly oppose Moldova&#8217;s European integration course and are gradually synchronizing their legislation with Russian law. For instance, since 2017, the Russian flag has become the second official flag to be used in Transnistria. Recently, the Transnistrian \u201cauthorities\u201d asked Russia to help solve the problem of \u201cMoldova&#8217;s transport and economic blockade,\u201d appealing to the OSCE for \u201cnew methods of conflict resolution.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"616\" height=\"400\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-8.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-28391\" style=\"width:469px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-8.png 616w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-8-600x390.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-8-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 616px) 100vw, 616px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Supported significantly by the Russian Federation, Transnistria functions as a de facto state. The region&#8217;s governance has been marked by a hybrid regime that combines elements of authoritarianism with some degree of pluralism, particularly evident during the 2011 presidential elections when long-standing leader Igor Smirnov was ousted, indicating a shift in political dynamics. Often described as a Russian \u201cenclave,\u201d Transnistria resembles and depends on Russia. Transnistrian officials frequently advocate for annexation by Russia, though Russia itself does not officially recognize it. A 2006 referendum indicated strong support (98%) for joining the Russian Federation, despite a number of ways Russia uses to distort the concept of \u201creferendum.\u201d Russian passport holders in Transnistria can vote in Russian elections at local polling sites, and the region still maintains 1,500 Russian soldiers on its territory as \u201cpeacekeeping\u201d personnel. Transnistria&#8217;s economic existence as a \u201csuccessful failed state\u201d relies heavily on Russian support through financial aid, subsidies, and free natural gas, even though it is slowly changing. Culturally, over 95% of Transnistrians see their region as part of the <em>russkiy mir<\/em>, which is the ideological term for the Russian sphere of influence. Yet, Transnistria promotes a civic identity that transcends ethnic divisions rooted in Soviet internationalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On a d\u2019abord suppos\u00e9 que la Transnistrie jouerait un r\u00f4le militaire dans la guerre russe contre l\u2019Ukraine. Cette hypoth\u00e8se s\u2019est toutefois r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9e peu plausible en raison de son isolement logistique vis-\u00e0-vis de la Russie, de ses capacit\u00e9s militaires limit\u00e9es et du manque de soutien aux r\u00e9cits favorables \u00e0 la guerre dans la r\u00e9gion. Apr\u00e8s l\u2019invasion russe \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle de l\u2019Ukraine, les soi-disant \u00ab responsables \u00bb transnistriens, tels que le pr\u00e9sident transnistrien Krasnoselsky, ont qualifi\u00e9 l\u2019agression russe de guerre, et non d\u2019\u00ab op\u00e9ration militaire sp\u00e9ciale \u00bb, comme le font les m\u00e9dias russes. Depuis lors, la Transnistrie a conserv\u00e9 une position neutre sur la guerre, ce qui a intrigu\u00e9 les chercheurs. Cette d\u00e9cision semble li\u00e9e aux vastes liens avec l\u2019Ukraine et \u00e0 la minorit\u00e9 ukrainienne. Environ 100 000 habitants poss\u00e8dent la citoyennet\u00e9 ukrainienne, ce qui mod\u00e8re les sentiments anti-ukrainiens. Elle pourrait \u00e9galement \u00eatre li\u00e9e \u00e0 une certaine d\u00e9ception face \u00e0 l\u2019inaction de la Russie et au r\u00f4le de la Transnistrie dans l\u2019accord de libre-\u00e9change entre la Moldavie et l\u2019UE. La situation a toutefois chang\u00e9 en raison de la r\u00e9cente d\u00e9cision de l\u2019Ukraine de mettre fin au transit de gaz russe vers l\u2019Europe, qui a provoqu\u00e9 des coupures d\u2019\u00e9lectricit\u00e9 dans la r\u00e9gion. Aujourd\u2019hui, les \u00ab autorit\u00e9s \u00bb de Transnistrie accusent l\u2019Ukraine d\u2019avoir provoqu\u00e9 l\u2019effondrement \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique, et cette rh\u00e9torique est amplifi\u00e9e par la propagande russe pr\u00e9sente sur les cha\u00eenes Telegram locales.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Compar\u00e9e \u00e0 la Transnistrie, la situation de la Gagaouzie est tr\u00e8s diff\u00e9rente. Sous le r\u00e9gime sovi\u00e9tique, la Gagaouzie est pass\u00e9e d\u2019une r\u00e9gion relativement pauvre \u00e0 une r\u00e9gion \u00e9conomiquement et culturellement bien d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e. Cela a favoris\u00e9 l\u2019essor du nationalisme gagaouze dans les ann\u00e9es 1980. \u00c0 cette \u00e9poque, les dirigeants gagaouzes ont exprim\u00e9 le souhait d\u2019une autod\u00e9termination politique, motiv\u00e9s par la crainte d\u2019une disparition culturelle, faute de protecteur politique des Gagaouzes ailleurs. Ils ont recherch\u00e9 l\u2019autonomie, voire l\u2019ind\u00e9pendance vis-\u00e0-vis de la Moldavie, organisant en 1990 un r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum pour \u00e9tablir une r\u00e9publique sovi\u00e9tique ind\u00e9pendante et fonctionnant de mani\u00e8re semi-ind\u00e9pendante pendant plusieurs ann\u00e9es.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Following the Transnistria conflict, concerns over potential Gagauz secession led to complex and often contentious negotiations between the Moldovan government in Chi\u0219in\u0103u and Gagauz authorities in Comrat on achieving autonomy. Gagauzia\u2019s autonomy was formalized through a December 1994 law that created the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, known as Gagauz Yeri. This law granted Gagauzia the right to self-determination should Moldova lose its sovereignty, largely reflecting Gagauz&#8217;s concerns over a potential Moldovan unification with Romania. The law also recognized Moldovan, Gagauz, and Russian as the official languages of the region and established Gagauzia\u2019s political structures: the People\u2019s Assembly as its legislature and the Bashkan (governor) as its executive leader. Regional borders were determined based on ethnic demographics and referenda held in 1995. Nearly a decade later, the principles of Gagauz autonomy were integrated into the Moldovan constitution through amendments to Article 111.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"385\" height=\"578\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-10.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-28393\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-10.png 385w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-10-8x12.png 8w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 385px) 100vw, 385px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Evgenia Gutsul, dirigeante de l\u2019autonomie gagaouze, a rencontr\u00e9 Vladimir Poutine.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The political system in Gagauzia is characterized by a degree of self-governance, yet it remains intertwined with the national political landscape of Moldova. The relationship between Gagauzia&#8217;s regional elites and the central government has been historically fraught, with ongoing tensions regarding autonomy and representation. The Gagauz people, predominantly Turkic-speaking, have sought to assert their identity and political claims, often in response to perceived marginalization by the Moldovan state. The region&#8217;s political dynamics are further complicated by external factors, particularly the influence of Russian politics, which has historically supported Gagauz autonomy as a counterbalance to Moldovan nationalism. The sympathy for Russia is growing and evident with the results of the most recent elections. In particular, if we talk about the case of Evgenia Gutsul, who is the current Bashkan of Gagauzia, she has made a trip to the World Youth Festival in Russia, had a personal meeting with Putin, and signed cooperation agreements with a number of Russian local governments, including the Krasnodar region\u2019s one. As well as the \u201cauthorities\u201d of Transnistria, Gutsul also asked Moscow for help with the \u201cblockade\u201d issue. Both regions call<strong> <\/strong>the recent implementation of a new version of the Customs Code of Moldova, according to which both Transnistria and Gagauzia must reimburse entrepreneurs for taxes on their own, calling it a blockade. The Bashkan of Gagauzia responded to this with a stamp of Russian propaganda &#8211; she said that this was an \u201cinfringement of the rights of the Gagauz.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Gutsul is a person from the pool of Shor. Neither Maia Sandu nor Western diplomats are in contact with her. Officials from Gutsul&#8217;s team can be found on EU sanctions lists, and Gutsul herself is under US sanctions. Russian propaganda is fueling this conflict through anonymous Telegram channels, spreading messages within several messages localized to the Moldovan context and sometimes in line with Russian propaganda in other parts of the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Les \u00e9lections et le r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum de 2024, catalyseurs de la fracture moldave<\/h4>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"929\" height=\"526\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-12.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-28395\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-12.png 929w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-12-600x340.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-12-768x435.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/image-12-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 929px) 100vw, 929px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The 2024 presidential elections and EU referendum in Moldova hold significant importance, particularly in the context of its relations with Transnistria and Gagauzia. The elections were seen as a vote on Moldova\u2019s geopolitical alignment. Transnistria and Gagauzia, with their predominantly pro-Russian stances, could react by demanding greater autonomy or even seeking secession under Russian support if the country&#8217;s trajectory shifts westward. The results of the vote revealed significant regional sentiments and political divides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On October 20, 2024, Moldova held a referendum to amend its constitution to include a commitment to EU membership. The results were extremely close &#8211; 749,719 people voted in support of that idea (50.35%), and 739,155 people voted against it (49.65%). This narrow margin indicates deep divisions within the electorate. Notably, regions like Gagauzia and Transnistria contributed to the opposition against EU integration due to their pro-Russian leanings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Lors du second tour de l\u2019\u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle, le 3 novembre 2024, la pr\u00e9sidente sortante Maia Sandu a obtenu un second mandat avec environ 55 % des voix face \u00e0 son adversaire Alexandr Stoianoglo, qui a recueilli environ 45 %. Les r\u00e9sultats ont toutefois fortement vari\u00e9 selon les r\u00e9gions. Sandu a obtenu moins de 3 % des voix en Gagaouzie, ce qui t\u00e9moigne d\u2019un fort sentiment pro-russe dans cette r\u00e9gion autonome. En Transnistrie, Sandu a recueilli environ 20 % des voix, refl\u00e9tant un niveau de soutien tout aussi faible au sein d\u2019une population qui favorise largement l\u2019alignement sur la Russie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum sur l\u2019UE, organis\u00e9 parall\u00e8lement aux \u00e9lections, a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9terminant pour unifier ou polariser davantage la Moldavie. La d\u00e9cision de poursuivre l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE fait face \u00e0 une opposition farouche de la Transnistrie et de la Gagaouzie, qui plaident pour des liens plus \u00e9troits avec la Russie. Les r\u00e9sultats des \u00e9lections et du r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum pourraient inciter la Transnistrie \u00e0 faire pression en faveur d\u2019une reconnaissance internationale ou m\u00eame \u00e0 intensifier les tensions avec Moscou, mais elle rencontre davantage de difficult\u00e9s li\u00e9es \u00e0 sa politique \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique en raison des \u00e9volutions r\u00e9centes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The outcomes of both the presidential election and the EU membership referendum underscore the geopolitical tensions within Moldova, particularly in Gagauzia and Transnistria. The strong pro-Russian sentiments in these regions present challenges for Sandu&#8217;s pro-European agenda and reflect broader regional dynamics influenced by external actors like Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Crise identitaire ?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La difficult\u00e9 de d\u00e9finir une identit\u00e9 moldave coh\u00e9rente est une question complexe<strong> <\/strong>deeply rooted in the country&#8217;s historical, political, and social contexts. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova has grappled with competing national narratives, linguistic distinctions, and external influences that have shaped its contemporary identity crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Moldova&#8217;s history of foreign domination, including periods under the Ottoman Empire and the Soviet Union, has resulted in a diverse population with varying cultural affiliations. This eclectic background has fostered a duality in national identity, where many Moldovans identify either as Romanian or as part of a distinct Moldovan ethnicity. The 1991 Declaration of Independence initially emphasized a connection to Romanian heritage, but subsequent political developments have complicated this narrative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The political landscape reflects this identity struggle. There are Romanian-speaking Moldovans who often support pro-Russian politicians and Russian-speaking Moldovans who lean towards pro-European parties. This division is not merely linguistic but also ideological, as it influences political allegiances and public sentiment regarding Moldova&#8217;s future direction. Many younger Moldovans and urban populations advocate for EU integration, viewing it as a pathway to modernization and economic stability. Conversely, older generations may favor closer ties with Russia, often due to cultural ties and economic dependencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The debate over Unionism\u2014the idea of uniting Moldova with Romania\u2014is a significant aspect of the identity struggle. Proponents argue that such a union would enhance economic opportunities and strengthen cultural ties. However, opponents fear that it would undermine Moldova&#8217;s sovereignty and alienate Russian-speaking populations. This debate intensifies during election cycles, influencing party platforms and voter mobilization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La Moldavie abrite divers groupes ethniques, notamment des Ukrainiens, des Russes et des Bulgares. Cette diversit\u00e9 ajoute des dimensions au d\u00e9bat sur l\u2019identit\u00e9 nationale, diff\u00e9rents groupes d\u00e9fendant leurs int\u00e9r\u00eats et leur reconnaissance au sein de l\u2019\u00c9tat moldave dans son ensemble.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La question de la langue<strong> <\/strong>further complicates identity formation. The designation of the language as &#8220;Moldovan&#8221; versus &#8220;Romanian&#8221; has been politically contentious and is a tool in the Russian soft power toolbox in the country. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le paysage m\u00e9diatique joue un r\u00f4le crucial dans la formation de la perception publique de l\u2019identit\u00e9 nationale. Les m\u00e9dias pro-russes promeuvent souvent<strong> <\/strong>narratives that emphasize Moldova&#8217;s separation from Romania and advocate for closer ties with Russia. In contrast, pro-European media focus on integration with the West and highlight the benefits of EU membership. This polarization contributes to the ongoing identity crisis by reinforcing existing divisions within society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Toutes ces tendances auront sans aucun doute une incidence sur les \u00e9lections l\u00e9gislatives de cette ann\u00e9e, d\u2019o\u00f9 l\u2019importance de les comprendre. \u00c0 ce stade, la Moldavie ressemble \u00e0 un parfait cas d\u2019\u00e9tude, voire \u00e0 un \u00ab patient z\u00e9ro \u00bb, pour observer en temps r\u00e9el l\u2019affrontement entre les influences russe et occidentale. Cela peut offrir des enseignements utiles non seulement \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, surtout dans le contexte actuel tr\u00e8s turbulent du soutien europ\u00e9en \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, mais aussi aux d\u00e9cideurs occidentaux et aux autres parties prenantes concern\u00e9es quant \u00e0 ce qui fonctionne dans le contexte post-sovi\u00e9tique et \u00e0 ce qui pourrait r\u00e9ellement \u00eatre am\u00e9lior\u00e9. Le plus triste dans tous ces processus est toutefois que la Moldavie, pays qui doit imp\u00e9rativement se remettre de tous les probl\u00e8mes de son pass\u00e9, ne peut conna\u00eetre de r\u00e9pit parce qu\u2019elle est d\u00e9chir\u00e9e par la Russie, ce qui laisse les Moldaves un peu moins optimistes quant \u00e0 leur avenir. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><strong><em>Avertissement : les points de vue, pens\u00e9es et opinions exprim\u00e9s dans les articles publi\u00e9s sur ce site appartiennent exclusivement aux auteurs et ne refl\u00e8tent pas n\u00e9cessairement ceux du Transatlantic Dialogue Center, de ses comit\u00e9s ou de ses organisations affili\u00e9es. Ces articles visent \u00e0 stimuler le dialogue et la discussion et ne repr\u00e9sentent pas les positions politiques officielles du Transatlantic Dialogue Center ni de toute autre organisation \u00e0 laquelle les auteurs peuvent \u00eatre associ\u00e9s.<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Key Takeaways Moldova\u2019s contemporary political landscape is a dynamic and often volatile space, shaped by historical legacies, geopolitical pressures, and internal struggles between reform and corruption. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the country has oscillated between pro-European and pro-Russian political forces, a divide that continues to define its governance, foreign policy, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":28397,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13],"tags":[],"topic":[99,111,91,93],"class_list":["post-28381","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","topic-disinformation","topic-elections","topic-eu","topic-geopolitics"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Moldova\u2019s Contemporary Political Landscape | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This analysis examines 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