{"id":26487,"date":"2024-11-07T09:53:00","date_gmt":"2024-11-07T07:53:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=26487"},"modified":"2025-08-05T13:12:47","modified_gmt":"2025-08-05T10:12:47","slug":"european-energy-policy-and-security-in-light-of-russias-war-in-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2024\/11\/07\/european-energy-policy-and-security-in-light-of-russias-war-in-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Politique \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique et s\u00e9curit\u00e9 europ\u00e9ennes \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de la guerre de la Russie contre l\u2019Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"45386\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">2 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\"><strong>Principaux enseignements<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>D\u00e9pendance \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique de l\u2019UE envers la Russie :<\/strong>&nbsp;L\u2019UE demeure vuln\u00e9rable en raison de sa d\u00e9pendance aux combustibles fossiles russes, qui financent la guerre en cours en Ukraine. L\u2019ind\u00e9pendance \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique totale vis-\u00e0-vis de la Russie est cruciale pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Progr\u00e8s dans la diversification \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique :<\/strong>&nbsp;L\u2019UE a chang\u00e9 de position, r\u00e9duit sa consommation de gaz et nou\u00e9 de nouveaux partenariats avec les \u00c9tats-Unis, la Norv\u00e8ge et le Qatar. Toutefois, le d\u00e9couplage complet de l\u2019\u00e9nergie russe, en particulier du GNL, reste lent et complexe.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>La transition verte comme strat\u00e9gie :&nbsp;<\/strong>La transition verte est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme essentielle tant pour les objectifs climatiques que pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique. Cependant, de nouvelles d\u00e9pendances \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de minerais critiques provenant de r\u00e9gions instables font \u00e9merger des risques.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Le r\u00f4le potentiel de l\u2019Ukraine :<\/strong>&nbsp;La capacit\u00e9 de stockage de gaz et les r\u00e9serves de lithium de l\u2019Ukraine offrent des possibilit\u00e9s strat\u00e9giques pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique de l\u2019UE, mais les risques pesant sur les infrastructures et les d\u00e9fis g\u00e9opolitiques limitent les gains imm\u00e9diats.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Urgence d\u2019agir :<\/strong>&nbsp;La d\u00e9pendance persistante \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9nergie russe affaiblit le soutien occidental \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine. L\u2019UE doit acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer la transition vers les renouvelables et s\u2019assurer des partenaires fiables pour garantir son ind\u00e9pendance \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique et une plus grande stabilit\u00e9 g\u00e9opolitique.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1240\" height=\"507\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-26488\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image.png 1240w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-600x245.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-1024x419.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-768x314.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-18x7.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1240px) 100vw, 1240px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia has been waging a full-scale war against Ukraine for three years now. The democratic states of the West are united in their support of Ukraine, providing various types of aid. While unprecedented sanctions were imposed on Russia, energy remains the weak spot of the EU due to its dependence on Russia\u2019s energy supplies. It is not yet clear how quickly its members will be able to disconnect from it. Thus, the energy trade that some EU countries continue to engage in huge volumes still finances Russia&#8217;s military machine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As analysts aptly note, aid to Ukraine is not charity. The Russian invasion and the subsequent courageous resistance of the Ukrainian people were a watershed moment for the transatlantic security architecture, demonstrating the value and importance of Ukraine to Europe. So, refusal from Russian energy carriers is also neither an act of charity nor a noble gesture. Therefore, this article will consider the EU&#8217;s sharp shift in its stance towards Russia as an energy supplier in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. It will explore the challenges the European Union faces in reducing its dependency on Russia, as well as the EU&#8217;s green transition and the potential role of Ukraine in contributing to Europe&#8217;s energy security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">\u00c9volution de la position de l\u2019UE sur les combustibles fossiles russes<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Trade in energy carriers used to be one of the points of relations between the EU and Russia. For many years, Russia has been the main supplier of oil and gas to the European Union. In addition to this EU-Russia energy trade included coal and nuclear materials. At first, this cooperation was considered by the European side as quite convenient and profitable. Geographical proximity, existing infrastructure, and Russia&#8217;s ability to export large quantities were the most important reasons why the Russian Federation seemed to be the best partner. In 2021, Russia supplied more than 45,3% of the EU&#8217;s gas consumption. Additionally, Russia was responsible for 27% and 46% of the imports of both oil and coal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Imm\u00e9diatement apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9but de la guerre russo-ukrainienne \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle, la plupart des d\u00e9put\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens ont convenu que l\u2019UE devait rapidement renforcer son autonomie strat\u00e9gique en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9fense et d\u2019\u00e9nergie. Ils ont plaid\u00e9 pour la diversification des achats d\u2019\u00e9nergie et l\u2019investissement dans les \u00e9nergies renouvelables. Il a finalement \u00e9t\u00e9 reconnu que l\u2019invasion ill\u00e9gale et non provoqu\u00e9e de l\u2019Ukraine par la Russie n\u2019\u00e9tait pas seulement une atteinte \u00e0 l\u2019int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale du pays, mais aussi un grave risque pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et la stabilit\u00e9 de toute l\u2019Europe. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It appeared that after several decades of close cooperation and turning a blind eye to Russia&#8217;s ever-increasing decline into an undemocratic, authoritarian, and aggressive regime, the EU and its leaders have come to an epiphany. The war showed that the EU&#8217;s belief that economic interdependence would have a positive effect on the regime in Russia was deeply mistaken. Russia&#8217;s massive invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the risks of relying on a single supplier of fossil fuels. Since the spring of 2022, Russia has used the stoppage of gas supplies to its European consumers as a means of blackmail, attempting to force them into changing their policy towards Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le 8 mars 2022, la Commission europ\u00e9enne a publi\u00e9 la strat\u00e9gie REPowerEU, visant \u00e0 r\u00e9duire aussi rapidement que possible la d\u00e9pendance aux combustibles fossiles russes. \u00c0 l\u2019issue de n\u00e9gociations, les \u00c9tats membres sont parvenus \u00e0 un consensus sur une r\u00e9duction de 15 % de l\u2019utilisation de gaz naturel. D\u2019ao\u00fbt 2022 \u00e0 janvier 2023, l\u2019UE a fait mieux encore : l\u2019Union a r\u00e9duit sa consommation de gaz de 19 %. Par la suite, les \u00c9tats membres ont men\u00e9 des n\u00e9gociations plus longues et plus difficiles sur les sanctions visant le p\u00e9trole russe.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"804\" height=\"447\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-3.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-26491\" style=\"width:754px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-3.png 804w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-3-600x334.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-3-768x427.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-3-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 804px) 100vw, 804px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In 2023, the US and Norway became the top gas suppliers to the EU. Nearly 30% of all the&nbsp;EU\u2019s gas imports came from Norway. Qatar, the UK, and countries in North Africa are further providers. This exploration has the potential to have negative impacts that include physical disruption of environments important for marine biodiversity and pollution. Nevertheless, in the near future, increased attention is expected to be paid to hydrocarbon production in this area. Moreover, in 2022, Norway decided to extend coal mining in Svalbard until 2025, as the Norwegian Minister of Industry stated that coal is used for steel production in Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Lorsque nouveaux et anciens probl\u00e8mes se conjuguent<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As of 2022, EU members found themselves in very different conditions regarding the energy situation. Dependence varied greatly, which started to create and still creates problems for the EU. Unfortunately, despite the quick reaction, the actions of the EU were not so immediate. The complete elimination of the EU&#8217;s dependence on Russian oil and natural gas is a long-term goal for the EU. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table aligncenter\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><tbody><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Non d\u00e9pendants<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>D\u00e9pendants dans une certaine mesure<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>D\u00e9pendants dans une large mesure ou totalement<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Belgique, France, Portugal, Slov\u00e9nie, Espagne, Su\u00e8de<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Italie, Allemagne, Gr\u00e8ce, Finlande, Roumanie, Pologne et Lituanie<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Bulgarie, R\u00e9publique tch\u00e8que, Hongrie, Lettonie, Slovaquie<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Le degr\u00e9 de d\u00e9pendance des pays aux ressources naturelles de la Russie (en particulier au gaz naturel)<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En 2023, le gaz russe repr\u00e9sentait 15 % de l\u2019ensemble du gaz achet\u00e9 par l\u2019UE, ce qui, par rapport aux indicateurs pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents, est une v\u00e9ritable r\u00e9ussite. Dans le m\u00eame temps, en mai 2024, l\u2019UE \u00e9tait le quatri\u00e8me acheteur de combustibles fossiles russes, repr\u00e9sentant 13 % (1,9 milliard d\u2019euros) de toutes les exportations de gaz russe. Le gaz achemin\u00e9 par gazoduc repr\u00e9sentait la plus grande part des achats de combustibles fossiles de l\u2019UE en Russie (45 %), suivi du GNL (27 %) et du p\u00e9trole brut par ol\u00e9oduc (22 %). Les trois principaux acheteurs d\u2019\u00e9nergie russe \u00e9taient la Hongrie, la Slovaquie et la R\u00e9publique tch\u00e8que (p\u00e9trole brut et gaz par gazoduc). L\u2019UE a continu\u00e9 d\u2019importer et de revendre du GNL russe, transport\u00e9 par navire-citerne sous forme liquide surrefroidie. Cette situation est devenue une source d\u2019embarras consid\u00e9rable pour le bloc. L\u2019Espagne, la France et la Belgique ont \u00e9t\u00e9 les principaux acheteurs de GNL russe l\u2019ann\u00e9e pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le pays largement reconnu comme ayant d\u00e9clench\u00e9 la guerre en Europe et per\u00e7u comme la plus grande menace pour le continent continue de recevoir un soutien financier substantiel de plusieurs nations europ\u00e9ennes. Depuis le d\u00e9but de la guerre russo-ukrainienne \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle, les d\u00e9penses de la R\u00e9publique tch\u00e8que en p\u00e9trole et gaz russes ont \u00e9t\u00e9 cinq fois sup\u00e9rieures \u00e0 son aide financi\u00e8re \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine. Le diagramme compare certains pays.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"784\" height=\"475\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-9.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-26531\" style=\"width:646px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-9.png 784w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-9-600x364.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-9-768x465.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-9-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 784px) 100vw, 784px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>En milliards (depuis le d\u00e9but de la guerre \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle jusqu\u2019\u00e0 environ avril 2024, pour la Tch\u00e9quie \u2014 jusqu\u2019en septembre).<\/em><br><em> R\u00e9alis\u00e9 par l\u2019auteur. Sources : CREA, Politico, Kiel Institute for the World Economy<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans de nombreux cas, la d\u00e9pendance \u00e9conomique, principalement \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique, cr\u00e9e une d\u00e9pendance politique. Celle-ci peut \u00e0 son tour mettre en danger ou acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer la d\u00e9rive du r\u00e9gime politique vers l\u2019illib\u00e9ralisme et l\u2019absence de d\u00e9mocratie. Ces pays deviennent alors des centres de diffusion de r\u00e9cits et d\u2019influences pro-russes, sapent l\u2019unit\u00e9 politique de l\u2019UE et cr\u00e9ent des probl\u00e8mes internes suppl\u00e9mentaires. Des pays tels que la Hongrie et la Slovaquie, tout en continuant d\u2019acheter du combustible russe, d\u00e9fendent aussi obstin\u00e9ment au niveau de l\u2019UE le r\u00e9tablissement des liens \u00e9conomiques avec la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie, estimant qu\u2019il s\u2019agit du meilleur choix pour l\u2019UE.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cette situation est devenue possible parce que des pays enclav\u00e9s d\u2019Europe centrale tels que la Hongrie, la Slovaquie et la R\u00e9publique tch\u00e8que ont obtenu le droit de continuer \u00e0 importer des ressources \u00e9nerg\u00e9tiques russes. Alors que la Bulgarie a interdit l\u2019importation de p\u00e9trole russe malgr\u00e9 son exemption des sanctions de l\u2019UE, les trois pays susmentionn\u00e9s ne font qu\u2019augmenter ces approvisionnements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00c0 la suite de l\u2019agression russe, plusieurs \u00c9tats fortement d\u00e9pendants du p\u00e9trole et du gaz russes se sont oppos\u00e9s aux sanctions \u00e9nerg\u00e9tiques, tandis que les \u00c9tats membres moins d\u00e9pendants ont appel\u00e9 \u00e0 une transition imm\u00e9diate et rapide loin des sources russes. Les sanctions n\u2019ont abord\u00e9 l\u2019\u00e9nergie que dans leur cinqui\u00e8me paquet, adopt\u00e9 en avril 2022, avec un embargo sur le charbon russe ; un embargo partiel sur le p\u00e9trole a \u00e9t\u00e9 instaur\u00e9 par le sixi\u00e8me paquet en juin 2022 (avec d\u2019importantes exemptions pour certains \u00c9tats membres) et un plafonnement du prix du p\u00e9trole n\u2019a \u00e9t\u00e9 obtenu que dans le huiti\u00e8me paquet, adopt\u00e9 en octobre 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Despite efforts made by the EU to reduce dependence on Russian gas, some countries continue to receive significant volumes indirectly. Austria&#8217;s pipeline imports from Russia increased to 98%, while Russian gas is being routed through Azerbaijan and Turkey to meet EU demands. Deals with Azerbaijan entail infrastructure that is partly held by Lukoil in Russia, and the country itself depends more on imports from Russia to meet its own needs. The gas deals that Romania and Hungary have with Turkey most likely involve Russian gas. Furthermore, a few nations, including France and Austria, have long-term agreements with Russian energy suppliers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the end, the first sanctions on Russian gas were approved by the EU only in June 2024. However, even after that, the majority of Russia\u2019s liquid natural gas (LNG) exports to the EU remain unaffected by the sanctions. Instead, the measures prohibit EU ports from reselling Russian LNG upon arrival and obstruct funding for Russia&#8217;s proposed LNG installations in the Arctic and Baltic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">La transition verte est-elle une solution ?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In recent decades, the energy transition, which is characterized by a shift from fossil fuels to renewable and low-carbon energy sources, has become an important climate change mitigation strategy. The European Climate Law sets objectives of meeting the 2050 climate neutrality objective and a 55% reduction of net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2030. The war showed not only that the EU and European countries need to choose reliable partners for the provision of strategically important resources. It showed that climate neutrality by 2050 is both a necessity to slow down climate change and a thorough way to ensure&nbsp;the security of the EU. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La transition \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique renforce la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et la souverainet\u00e9 \u00e9nerg\u00e9tiques des pays. L\u2019UE et ses \u00c9tats membres ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9tendu l\u2019utilisation des \u00e9nergies renouvelables, accru l\u2019efficacit\u00e9 \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique et adopt\u00e9 des technologies propres ; ils doivent d\u00e9sormais prot\u00e9ger ces acquis et les consolider. Dans ce domaine, l\u2019UE rencontre aussi des probl\u00e8mes potentiels qu\u2019il faut r\u00e9soudre ou pr\u00e9venir rapidement. <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"798\" height=\"600\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-5.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-26493\" style=\"width:686px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-5.png 798w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-5-600x451.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-5-768x577.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-5-16x12.png 16w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 798px) 100vw, 798px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Forte de son exp\u00e9rience avec la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie, l\u2019UE devrait \u00eatre tr\u00e8s prudente dans le choix de partenaires pour l\u2019approvisionnement en produits aussi importants. La d\u00e9pendance aux pays fournissant des combustibles fossiles peut se transformer en d\u00e9pendance aux pays fournissant les ressources n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9nergie verte, notamment les terres rares. De nombreux pays disposent de r\u00e9serves min\u00e9rales importantes, strat\u00e9giques pour l\u2019industrie europ\u00e9enne. L\u2019UE a \u00e9tabli des partenariats avec l\u2019Argentine, l\u2019Australie, le Canada, le Chili, la R\u00e9publique d\u00e9mocratique du Congo, le Groenland, le Kazakhstan, la Namibie, la Norv\u00e8ge, le Rwanda, la Serbie, l\u2019Ukraine et la Zambie. Le graphique ci-dessous r\u00e9v\u00e8le une forte d\u00e9pendance de l\u2019UE \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de partenaires susceptibles d\u2019\u00eatre touch\u00e9s par des conflits ou de participer \u00e0 des guerres commerciales, principalement la Chine, le Congo ou la Turquie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En raison du besoin croissant de transition verte, la demande de minerais essentiels de la part d\u2019acteurs mondiaux majeurs tels que la Chine augmente \u00e0 un rythme consid\u00e9rable. La lutte pour le Chili ou le Groenland illustre vivement cette course. En juillet 2023, l\u2019UE et le Chili ont sign\u00e9 un protocole d\u2019accord sur les mat\u00e9riaux critiques et les cha\u00eenes d\u2019approvisionnement afin de renforcer leur coop\u00e9ration. En d\u00e9cembre, les deux parties sont parvenues \u00e0 un accord sur un accord d\u2019association modernis\u00e9. Le Chili est un partenaire tr\u00e8s attractif pour l\u2019UE \u00e0 bien des \u00e9gards : c\u2019est une d\u00e9mocratie lib\u00e9rale fermement attach\u00e9e au multilat\u00e9ralisme, aux droits de l\u2019homme et au droit international, qui souhaite vivement devenir une \u00e9conomie sans carbone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En novembre 2023, l\u2019UE a conclu un partenariat avec le Groenland sur les mati\u00e8res premi\u00e8res critiques et ouvert un nouveau bureau dans la capitale groenlandaise. M\u00fate Bourup Egede, Premier ministre du Groenland, et la pr\u00e9sidente de la Commission europ\u00e9enne Ursula von der Leyen ont sign\u00e9 deux accords. L\u2019un porte sur les investissements dans les cha\u00eenes de valeur des \u00e9nergies renouvelables et des mati\u00e8res premi\u00e8res critiques, auxquels 22 millions d\u2019euros sont allou\u00e9s. Le second concerne la coop\u00e9ration et l\u2019investissement dans l\u2019\u00e9ducation, pour lesquels l\u2019UE fournit 71 millions d\u2019euros. Comme l\u2019a montr\u00e9 le discours d\u2019Ursula von der Leyen, l\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat de l\u2019UE pour le Groenland a deux raisons : ses mati\u00e8res premi\u00e8res recherch\u00e9es et sa situation g\u00e9ostrat\u00e9gique importante.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"679\" height=\"791\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-6.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-26494\" style=\"width:495px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-6.png 679w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-6-515x600.png 515w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/image-6-10x12.png 10w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 679px) 100vw, 679px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Principales sources d\u2019\u00e9nergie dans les pays europ\u00e9ens <\/em><br><em>(nov. 2021 \u2013 nov. 2022)<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Another reliable and almost ideal partner in the EU&#8217;s green transition could be Norway. In Norway, 98% of electricity is produced from renewable energy sources, and the source of most of it at the moment is hydropower. In general, the situation with this country is particularly interesting since it is now the world&#8217;s fifth oil exporter and the world&#8217;s third natural gas exporter. As mentioned earlier, it is currently the leading supplier of gas and oil to the EU. However, with a huge potential to increase, it aims to become a green power plant for the EU. This country is a pioneer in carbon capture and storage research and is also investing in battery manufacturing, hydrogen and pure ammonia projects, and renewable energy technologies such as offshore wind and solar panels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il convient \u00e9galement de mentionner d\u2019autres probl\u00e8mes auxquels l\u2019UE est confront\u00e9e sur la voie de z\u00e9ro \u00e9mission de carbone. Chaque \u00c9tat membre a naturellement sa propre r\u00e9partition des vecteurs \u00e9nerg\u00e9tiques pour produire l\u2019\u00e9lectricit\u00e9. Le gaz est la source principale en Hongrie, en Italie, aux Pays-Bas et en Slovaquie ; les combustibles solides en Pologne, en R\u00e9publique tch\u00e8que et en Estonie ; le nucl\u00e9aire en France ; et les sources renouvelables occupent la plus grande part en Su\u00e8de, au Danemark, en Finlande et en Lettonie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Member states started to re-evaluate their energy policies in order to find domestic reserves that would allow them to improve their own energy security. While some countries focused on doubling down on renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, and other measures with the potential to reduce the share of fossil fuels in the EU&#8217;s energy mix, several member states, being in a critical situation, had no other choice but to choose coal as a suitable solution. For example, Germany restored a significant capacity of coal-fired electricity generation. Austria, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands also started considering coal as a crucial energy security element<strong>.&nbsp; <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">EU countries with substantial fossil fuel reserves should not be allowed to rely on these resources indefinitely under the assumption that it ensures their energy independence and security. This creates the risk that some countries would begin not to diversify their energy sources but just replace them with similar or even greater polluters of the atmosphere. It can become a reality for Poland, where in 2022, thanks to domestic reserves, 70% of electricity was generated from coal, and the conservative government was clearly not very ambitious about the transition. However, in the first seven months of 2024, this country demonstrated very positive results. Thanks to the arrival of the new government of Donald Tusk, the situation began to change rapidly, and in July, the share of coal reached a monthly minimum of 53%. It is interesting how the situation with electricity in this country will develop in the future, as the previous administration&#8217;s procrastination on climate action will definitely complicate matters. In addition, the Polish energy and climate research group Forum Energii recently disheartened that the country&#8217;s energy transition is still largely driven by market forces and reforms that remove barriers to clean energy developers rather than a concerted push from the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Following the adoption of the Climate Law and most of the \u2018fit for 55\u2019 legislative revisions, member states had to update their national energy and climate plans. The 2030 EU Climate Law target is binding at the EU level. Its achievement, however, depends on the success of plans and measures at the national level across a range of policy areas. And here, accordingly, another problem arises \u2013 the pace of the green transition in all countries is very different; for example,&nbsp;the countries of Eastern Europe have much lower indicators compared to the successes of Northern or Western ones. Accordingly, the EU should provide assistance to these countries that would facilitate the transition and significantly improve the overall performance of the EU. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At the same time, there were also some misunderstandings between major European countries over energy sources. Particularly, tensions between France and Germany over nuclear power. Currently, approximately 70% of France&#8217;s electricity is generated from nuclear power, and under Emmanuel Macron&#8217;s plan, it will only increase. While in Germany, this source of electricity was completely banned and still causes a lot of opposition. Additional challenges may be caused by the fact that the new European Parliament elected in 2024 is less \u201cgreen\u201d compared to the previous one, as the Green Party received 53 seats compared to the previous 70. Additionally, a lack of coordination at the EU level resulted in most agreements with new energy partners being negotiated independently by member states. As a result, some contracts for fossil fuel supplies extend until 2050 or beyond, contradicting the EU Green Deal&#8217;s objective of achieving carbon neutrality by that time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En outre, la diplomatie environnementale et climatique constitue un outil essentiel de soft power, jouant un r\u00f4le crucial dans la formation de l\u2019image et de l\u2019influence de l\u2019UE. L\u2019int\u00e9gration europ\u00e9enne, qui a d\u00e9but\u00e9 dans les ann\u00e9es 1950 autour du charbon et de l\u2019industrie lourde afin d\u2019\u00e9viter les guerres entre grandes puissances europ\u00e9ennes, semble aujourd\u2019hui boucler la boucle. En visant \u00e0 devenir le premier continent vert d\u2019ici 2050, l\u2019Europe atteindra l\u2019ind\u00e9pendance \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique et renforcera \u00e0 nouveau sa s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Cette transformation refl\u00e9terait donc une \u00e9volution majeure et symbolique. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">R\u00f4le potentiel de l\u2019Ukraine<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Addressing the current situation in the EU and its members&#8217; gas needs, Ukraine has the potential to play a significant role in enhancing Europe\u2019s energy security. Ukraine&#8217;s position offers an opportunity to help Europe reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies. With the largest underground gas storage facilities in Europe, Ukraine even provided valuable storage capacity for EU companies last year. Currently, Europe&#8217;s gas storage facilities are over 90% full. \u201cWe can offer our partners enough free space in Ukrainian storage facilities to store their gas,\u201d stated Oleksii Chernyshov, CEO of NJSC Naftogaz. However, the ongoing shelling of Ukrainian territory by Russia raises concerns among European partners regarding the reliability of this option. Ukraine, nevertheless, emphasizes its capacity to provide storage while stressing the need for additional measures to protect its energy infrastructure from attacks and to strengthen air defense systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Ukraine poss\u00e8de \u00e9galement d\u2019importantes r\u00e9serves de lithium, un m\u00e9tal cl\u00e9 de la transition verte, repr\u00e9sentant selon les estimations jusqu\u2019\u00e0 10 % des r\u00e9serves mondiales. Des d\u00e9fis subsistent n\u00e9anmoins. Les gisements de lithium se trouvent principalement dans l\u2019est de l\u2019Ukraine, dont certains dans des zones actuellement occup\u00e9es par la Russie. De plus, en raison de la nature particuli\u00e8re des gisements ukrainiens et de l\u2019absence de technologies mondiales pour extraire le lithium de minerais similaires, l\u2019Ukraine ne pourra pas produire de produits \u00e0 base de lithium ni vendre de concentr\u00e9 de minerai \u00e0 court terme. Ces r\u00e9serves rev\u00eatiront toutefois probablement une importance strat\u00e9gique consid\u00e9rable \u00e0 plus long terme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La persistance des combustibles fossiles russes dans l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne constitue un obstacle majeur tant \u00e0 l\u2019ind\u00e9pendance \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique qu\u2019\u00e0 la stabilit\u00e9 g\u00e9opolitique. Alors que l\u2019UE fait face aux r\u00e9percussions de la guerre en Europe, rompre les liens avec des fournisseurs russes d\u2019\u00e9nergie de longue date demeure complexe. Des d\u00e9cennies de d\u00e9pendance ne peuvent \u00eatre invers\u00e9es du jour au lendemain. Pour y rem\u00e9dier, l\u2019UE se concentre sur l\u2019am\u00e9lioration de l\u2019efficacit\u00e9 \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique, l\u2019augmentation des investissements dans les \u00e9nergies renouvelables et la diversification de ses sources d\u2019\u00e9nergie en se tournant vers l\u2019Afrique de l\u2019Ouest, l\u2019Asie centrale, les \u00c9tats-Unis et la Norv\u00e8ge. Malgr\u00e9 les progr\u00e8s r\u00e9alis\u00e9s, des efforts suppl\u00e9mentaires sont n\u00e9cessaires pour \u00e9liminer compl\u00e8tement l\u2019\u00e9nergie russe de la cha\u00eene d\u2019approvisionnement de l\u2019UE.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Additionally, the continued purchase of Russian fossil fuels directly finances the conflict in Ukraine, diminishing the impact of Western aid. This makes urgent and decisive action essential. The green transition offers the only long-term solution, and its success depends on the EU\u2019s ability to secure reliable new partners. Accelerating this transition will not only enhance Europe&#8217;s energy security but also contribute to broader geopolitical stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><strong><em>Avertissement : les points de vue, pens\u00e9es et opinions exprim\u00e9s dans les articles publi\u00e9s sur ce site appartiennent exclusivement aux auteurs et ne refl\u00e8tent pas n\u00e9cessairement ceux du Transatlantic Dialogue Center, de ses comit\u00e9s ou de ses organisations affili\u00e9es. Ces articles visent \u00e0 stimuler le dialogue et la discussion et ne repr\u00e9sentent pas les positions politiques officielles du Transatlantic Dialogue Center ni de toute autre organisation \u00e0 laquelle les auteurs peuvent \u00eatre associ\u00e9s.<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Key Takeaways Russia has been waging a full-scale war against Ukraine for three years now. The democratic states of the West are united in their support of Ukraine, providing various types of aid. While unprecedented sanctions were imposed on Russia, energy remains the weak spot of the EU due to its dependence on Russia\u2019s energy [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":26489,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13,58],"tags":[],"topic":[97,91,84],"class_list":["post-26487","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","category-eng-western-europe","topic-energy","topic-eu","topic-russia"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>European Energy Policy and Security in Light of Russia\u2019s War in Ukraine - Transatlantic Dialogue Center<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Explore the EU\u2019s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy, the role of Ukraine\u2019s resources, and the urgent need for a green transition to ensure energy security.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2024\/11\/07\/european-energy-policy-and-security-in-light-of-russias-war-in-ukraine\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"European Energy Policy and Security in Light of Russia\u2019s War in Ukraine\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center (TDC) is a non-governmental and non-partisan think tank that provides high-quality policy advice to private and public clients. 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