{"id":22348,"date":"2024-02-15T13:01:13","date_gmt":"2024-02-15T11:01:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=22348"},"modified":"2026-07-04T12:00:48","modified_gmt":"2026-07-04T09:00:48","slug":"the-difficulties-of-ukrainian-policy-towards-the-war-in-the-gaza-strip","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2024\/02\/15\/the-difficulties-of-ukrainian-policy-towards-the-war-in-the-gaza-strip\/","title":{"rendered":"Les difficult\u00e9s de la politique ukrainienne face \u00e0 la guerre dans la bande de Gaza"},"content":{"rendered":"<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-by-oleksandr-bulin\"><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"40994\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">1 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\" id=\"h-key-takeaways\"><strong>Principaux enseignements<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Cons\u00e9quences diplomatiques impr\u00e9vues<\/strong>: Ukraine&#8217;s support for Israel had unexpected repercussions on its relationships with Arab nations and its standing in the Global South. This diplomatic stance strained Ukraine&#8217;s previously balanced relations in the Middle East and challenged its geopolitical strategies.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Failure to Alter Israel&#8217;s Neutrality in the Russo-Ukrainian War<\/strong>: Despite Ukraine&#8217;s efforts, the strategy to strengthen ties with Israel and sway its neutral stance on the Russo-Ukrainian war was unsuccessful. Israel&#8217;s strategic relationship with Russia remained a priority, highlighting the complex nature of international relations.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>D\u00e9gradation des relations avec des \u00c9tats arabes cl\u00e9s<\/strong>: Ukraine&#8217;s one-sided support for Israel led to a cooling of relations with important Arab partners, including Qatar, a key mediator in the Russo-Ukrainian war and a significant partner for Ukraine in the Middle East.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Reassessment of Ukraine&#8217;s Stance<\/strong>: l\u2019Ukraine doit r\u00e9\u00e9valuer sa politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re, notamment en maintenant une approche \u00e9quilibr\u00e9e du conflit isra\u00e9lo-palestinien. Cela suppose de reconna\u00eetre l\u2019importance de cette question pour le monde arabe et le Sud global.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"354\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-8-1024x354.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Difficulties of Ukrainian Policy towards the War in the Gaza Strip\" class=\"wp-image-22350\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-8-1024x354.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-8-600x207.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-8-768x265.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-8-18x6.png 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-8.png 1244w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019attaque terroriste du Hamas et la guerre qui s\u2019en est suivie dans la bande de Gaza ont suscit\u00e9 un niveau de soutien sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl dans le monde. L\u2019Ukraine figurait parmi les \u00c9tats qui ont activement soutenu Isra\u00ebl au d\u00e9but de l\u2019escalade. Toutefois, les d\u00e9veloppements ult\u00e9rieurs ont montr\u00e9 que cette politique \u00e9tait un \u00e9chec et ne faisait que nuire aux int\u00e9r\u00eats ukrainiens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-ukrainian-view-on-the-palestinian-israeli-conflict\"><strong>La vision ukrainienne du conflit isra\u00e9lo-palestinien<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Depuis la d\u00e9claration d\u2019ind\u00e9pendance de l\u2019Ukraine, des liens \u00e9troits se sont d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s entre les deux \u00c9tats sur le plan culturel. Dans les ann\u00e9es 1990, lors de la Grande Aliyah depuis l\u2019espace post-sovi\u00e9tique, de nombreux Juifs ont quitt\u00e9 l\u2019Ukraine pour Isra\u00ebl. Aujourd\u2019hui, plus de 500 mille personnes originaires d\u2019Ukraine vivent en Isra\u00ebl, parmi lesquelles environ 35 mille appartiennent \u00e0 des familles mixtes et sont consid\u00e9r\u00e9es comme des Ukrainiens de souche. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9but de l\u2019agression russe contre l\u2019Ukraine en 2014, un r\u00e9cit sur les similitudes entre l\u2019Ukraine et Isra\u00ebl, \u00ab forteresses assi\u00e9g\u00e9es \u00bb combattant un ennemi plus puissant, est devenu populaire. Isra\u00ebl est devenu le mod\u00e8le d\u2019un pays pour lequel une menace permanente de guerre n\u2019emp\u00eache ni les r\u00e9formes ni le d\u00e9veloppement. Ainsi, en 2019, lors de son discours d\u2019investiture, le pr\u00e9sident Volodymyr Zelenskyi a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que les Ukrainiens \u00ab doivent devenir les Isra\u00e9liens dans la d\u00e9fense de leur terre natale \u00bb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">De tels liens, associ\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019image d\u2019un \u00c9tat puissant et tr\u00e8s d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 capable de se d\u00e9fendre contre un ennemi plus grand, sont devenus un excellent exemple pour beaucoup en Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tout en exprimant globalement son soutien \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl, l\u2019Ukraine adh\u00e8re officiellement \u00e0 la position de \u00ab deux \u00c9tats pour deux peuples \u00bb et entretient des relations diplomatiques avec l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 nationale palestinienne. M\u00eame apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9but de la guerre actuelle dans la bande de Gaza, l\u2019Ukraine a continu\u00e9 \u00e0 s\u2019y tenir. Ainsi, le 12 novembre 2023, elle a soutenu une r\u00e9solution de l\u2019ONU d\u00e9clarant ill\u00e9gales les colonies isra\u00e9liennes en Cisjordanie. En d\u00e9cembre, le pr\u00e9sident Zelenskyi a affirm\u00e9 : \u00ab L\u2019Ukraine reconna\u00eet tant le peuple ind\u00e9pendant d\u2019Isra\u00ebl que le peuple ind\u00e9pendant de Palestine. \u00bb<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cette politique s\u2019explique par le souhait de l\u2019Ukraine de ne pas d\u00e9t\u00e9riorer ses relations avec les \u00c9tats arabes et d\u2019autres pays du Sud global, pour lesquels le conflit isra\u00e9lo-palestinien est devenu un important facteur d\u2019autod\u00e9termination. En outre, l\u2019Ukraine ne soutient pas l\u2019expansion et l\u2019occupation isra\u00e9liennes, puisqu\u2019elle est elle-m\u00eame victime de l\u2019expansion russe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-ukrainian-support-for-israel-after-the-hamas-led-attack\"><strong>Le soutien ukrainien \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl apr\u00e8s l\u2019attaque men\u00e9e par le Hamas<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Apr\u00e8s l\u2019attaque terroriste du Hamas du 7 octobre, l\u2019Ukraine a apport\u00e9 son soutien \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl. Selon une enqu\u00eate d\u2019opinion de l\u2019Institut international de sociologie de Kyiv (KIIS), 69 % des Ukrainiens sympathisaient avec Isra\u00ebl, contre seulement 1 % avec la Palestine. 18 % ont d\u00e9clar\u00e9 sympathiser avec les deux parties et 12 % ont eu des difficult\u00e9s \u00e0 r\u00e9pondre.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"901\" height=\"507\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-9.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Difficulties of Ukrainian Policy towards the War in the Gaza Strip\" class=\"wp-image-22351\" style=\"width:709px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-9.png 901w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-9-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-9-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-9-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 901px) 100vw, 901px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Un drapeau national isra\u00e9lien est affich\u00e9 sur un \u00e9cran dans un centre commercial en soutien \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl, \u00e0 Kyiv, le 8 octobre<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les actions des terroristes du Hamas, qui ont tu\u00e9 environ 700 civils et pris des centaines d\u2019autres en otage, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 compar\u00e9es \u00e0 celles de l\u2019arm\u00e9e russe en Ukraine. Dans son discours \u00e0 l\u2019Assembl\u00e9e parlementaire de l\u2019OTAN \u00e0 Copenhague le 9 octobre, le pr\u00e9sident Zelenskyi a ainsi \u00e9tabli un parall\u00e8le entre l\u2019attaque du Hamas et Boutcha, ville de l\u2019oblast de Kyiv devenue un symbole mondialement connu de la brutalit\u00e9 de l\u2019arm\u00e9e russe envers les civils. Le 11 octobre \u00e0 Bruxelles, Zelenskyi a appel\u00e9 les dirigeants de tous les pays \u00e0 se rendre en Isra\u00ebl. Dans le m\u00eame temps, des informations ont circul\u00e9 au sujet de sa prochaine visite en Isra\u00ebl.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le gouvernement ukrainien a adopt\u00e9 une position active de soutien \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl pour plusieurs raisons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Premi\u00e8rement, en raison du r\u00e9cit populaire pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment \u00e9voqu\u00e9 sur les similitudes entre l\u2019Ukraine et Isra\u00ebl. Apr\u00e8s l\u2019attaque du Hamas, les autorit\u00e9s ukrainiennes ont continu\u00e9 \u00e0 s\u2019y r\u00e9f\u00e9rer, comparant les actions du Hamas \u00e0 celles de la Russie et affirmant qu\u2019Isra\u00ebl et l\u2019Ukraine luttaient ensemble contre le terrorisme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Deuxi\u00e8mement, l\u2019Ukraine cherchait \u00e0 am\u00e9liorer ses relations avec Isra\u00ebl dans le cadre de la lutte contre l\u2019agression russe. Isra\u00ebl adopte une position de relative neutralit\u00e9 concernant la guerre en Ukraine. Il n\u2019a impos\u00e9 aucune sanction \u00e0 la Russie depuis 2014 et n\u2019a fourni \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine aucune arme l\u00e9tale, que celle-ci a pourtant demand\u00e9e \u00e0 plusieurs reprises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Troisi\u00e8mement, l\u2019Ukraine esp\u00e9rait tirer parti du niveau de soutien sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent dont Isra\u00ebl b\u00e9n\u00e9ficiait parmi les pays occidentaux pour attirer l\u2019attention sur sa guerre. Les derniers mois ont \u00e9t\u00e9 marqu\u00e9s par une baisse de l\u2019attention mondiale port\u00e9e \u00e0 la guerre russo-ukrainienne et de l\u2019aide occidentale \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine. De plus, la guerre dans la bande de Gaza a remplac\u00e9 la guerre en Ukraine comme conflit le plus pressant. En r\u00e9unissant donc les guerres d\u2019Ukraine et d\u2019Isra\u00ebl sous la banni\u00e8re de la lutte contre l\u2019axe du mal russo-iranien et de la lutte de la civilisation contre la barbarie, les autorit\u00e9s ukrainiennes tentent d\u2019attirer une partie du soutien accord\u00e9 \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl apr\u00e8s l\u2019attaque du Hamas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">N\u00e9anmoins, ces actions n\u2019ont pas produit le r\u00e9sultat escompt\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-failure-to-strengthen-ukrainian-israeli-relations\"><strong>\u00c9chec du renforcement des relations ukraino-isra\u00e9liennes<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ukraine&#8217;s efforts to encourage Israel to change its neutral position in favor of Ukraine have failed. Despite the support expressed by the Ukrainian leadership and statements that Ukraine aims to establish itself as an ally of Israel, relations with Russia remain strategically important for Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00c0 premi\u00e8re vue, la Russie a adopt\u00e9 une position anti-isra\u00e9lienne : elle coop\u00e8re activement avec l\u2019Iran, n\u00e9gocie \u00e0 Moscou avec les dirigeants du Hamas, condamne les attaques des pays occidentaux contre les Houthis y\u00e9m\u00e9nites, malgr\u00e9 leurs tirs contre Isra\u00ebl et leurs attaques contre des navires civils, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"451\" height=\"251\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-10.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Difficulties of Ukrainian Policy towards the War in the Gaza Strip\" class=\"wp-image-22352\" style=\"width:365px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-10.png 451w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-10-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 451px) 100vw, 451px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Moussa Abou Marzouk rencontr\u00e9 avec <\/em><br><em>le ministre russe des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res Sergue\u00ef Lavrov en 2017<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans le m\u00eame temps, les relations russo-isra\u00e9liennes restent \u00e0 un niveau \u00e9lev\u00e9. Poutine s\u2019est entretenu deux fois par t\u00e9l\u00e9phone avec Netanyahou depuis le 7 octobre (\u00e0 titre de comparaison, Zelenskyi n\u2019a eu qu\u2019un seul appel).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia is one of the main players in the region. It is an ally of Israel&#8217;s principal adversaries, Iran and Syria. Therefore, relations with Russia are strategically important to Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il existe une opinion largement admise sur le pr\u00e9tendu consensus russo-isra\u00e9lien concernant la Syrie. Isra\u00ebl et la Russie entretiennent des relations \u00e9troites, et cette derni\u00e8re, dont les forces militaires sont pr\u00e9sentes en Syrie, n\u2019emp\u00eache pas les frappes isra\u00e9liennes contre les forces arm\u00e9es de Bachar al-Assad et les groupes mandataires iraniens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Malgr\u00e9 l\u2019intensification de la coop\u00e9ration militaire entre la Russie et l\u2019Iran, illustr\u00e9e par l\u2019 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.voanews.com\/a\/iran-finalizes-deal-to-buy-russian-fighter-jets---tasnim-\/7373046.html\">acquisition<\/a> of Russian military planes and helicopters, Israel aims to hinder further rapprochement between Moscow and Tehran. This is particularly evident in Israel&#8217;s efforts to prevent Russia from openly supporting Iran in such events as a potential Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Despite the hopes of the Ukrainians, it is unlikely that Israeli policy will change in favor of sending lethal weapons or air defense systems to Ukraine. Netanyahu has previously stated that one of the reasons for this policy is the fear that Israeli weapons will be seized by Russia and passed on to Iran and Syria. Given that Russia&#8217;s transfer of captured infantry weapons has been confirmed by Ukrainian intelligence, it is unlikely that Israel will take the risk of its weapons ending up in the hands of their enemies.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"426\" height=\"309\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-11.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Difficulties of Ukrainian Policy towards the War in the Gaza Strip\" class=\"wp-image-22353\" style=\"width:356px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-11.png 426w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-11-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 426px) 100vw, 426px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Le pr\u00e9sident ukrainien Volodymyr Zelenskyi <\/em><br><em>(\u00e0 gauche) serre la main du Premier ministre isra\u00e9lien<\/em><br><em> Benjamin Netanyahou en marge de l\u2019<\/em><br><em> Assembl\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l\u2019ONU \u00e0 New York le<\/em><br><em> 19 septembre<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Malgr\u00e9 le souhait du pr\u00e9sident Zelenskyi de se rendre en Isra\u00ebl et les nombreuses informations annon\u00e7ant cette visite, elle n\u2019a jamais eu lieu. Parall\u00e8lement, plusieurs dirigeants occidentaux \u2014 Biden, Sunak, Macron, Scholz, le Premier ministre tch\u00e8que Fiala, le chancelier autrichien Nemacher et des responsables d\u2019institutions europ\u00e9ennes \u2014 se sont rendus en Isra\u00ebl. En d\u00e9cembre, Zelenskyi a dit vouloir effectuer une visite, mais ses homologues isra\u00e9liens avaient apparemment d\u2019autres priorit\u00e9s. Cela montre qu\u2019Isra\u00ebl ne fait pas du d\u00e9veloppement de ses relations avec l\u2019Ukraine une priorit\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Although there have been some positive developments (for example, for the first time in January 2024, an Israeli representative attended a meeting on the Ukrainian &#8220;peace formula&#8221; in Davos), it can be argued that Ukraine\u2019s desire to strengthen relations with Israel by appealing to countering terrorism from the Russian-Israeli alliance has failed. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Malgr\u00e9 la d\u00e9gradation des relations russo-isra\u00e9liennes, qui ont atteint leur niveau le plus bas depuis des ann\u00e9es, elles demeurent fortes et un changement important de la politique isra\u00e9lienne \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de la guerre en Ukraine est peu probable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-freeze-in-the-ukrainian-arab-relations\"><strong>Gel des relations ukraino-arabes<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9but de l\u2019invasion russe \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle, les \u00c9tats arabes ont, pour la plupart, tent\u00e9 d\u2019adopter une position neutre et de coop\u00e9rer avec l\u2019Ukraine comme avec la Russie. Ils continuent de soutenir officiellement l\u2019int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale de l\u2019Ukraine ; seul le gouvernement syrien de Bachar al-Assad reconna\u00eet l\u2019annexion des territoires ukrainiens. Dans le m\u00eame temps, malgr\u00e9 les appels de l\u2019Ukraine, les membres du cartel p\u00e9trolier OPEC+ ont r\u00e9duit \u00e0 plusieurs reprises leur production, ce qui a fait monter les prix et contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 renforcer l\u2019\u00e9conomie russe. Quant \u00e0 l\u2019\u00c9gypte, les m\u00e9dias ont fait \u00e9tat d\u2019une possible vente d\u2019obus \u00e0 la Russie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Apr\u00e8s cette p\u00e9riode de neutralit\u00e9, l\u2019ann\u00e9e 2023 a commenc\u00e9 par une avanc\u00e9e positive dans les relations ukraino-arabes. En f\u00e9vrier 2023, le ministre des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res d\u2019Arabie saoudite s\u2019est rendu en Ukraine et a annonc\u00e9 une aide de 400 millions de dollars (300 millions en produits p\u00e9troliers et 100 millions d\u2019aide humanitaire). Les \u00c9mirats arabes unis ont \u00e9galement accru leur aide humanitaire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En mai, le pr\u00e9sident Zelenskyi est intervenu en tant qu\u2019invit\u00e9 au sommet de la Ligue arabe \u00e0 Djeddah, en Arabie saoudite. De plus, les 5 et 6 ao\u00fbt, la deuxi\u00e8me r\u00e9union consacr\u00e9e \u00e0 la \u00ab formule de paix \u00bb de Zelenskyi s\u2019y est tenue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, after October 7 and the one-sided statements of President Zelenskyi and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine about &#8220;supporting Israel&#8217;s right to defend itself and its people,&#8221; relations between Ukraine and the Arab governments cooled. An example of this was the absence of representatives of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain at the third meeting on the \u201cpeace formula\u201d on October 28-29 in Malta.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Separately, the relations between Ukraine and Qatar are worth noting. Qatar is Ukraine&#8217;s most important partner in the Middle East. It plays an important mediating role in the Russo-Ukrainian war, helping Ukraine return prisoners of war and children deported illegally by Russia. Qatar, the world&#8217;s second-largest producer of liquefied gas behind the United States, is gradually increasing output in order to replace Russia as Europe&#8217;s gas supply source. In this case, Ukrainian and Qatari interests coincide.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"797\" height=\"448\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-12.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Difficulties of Ukrainian Policy towards the War in the Gaza Strip\" class=\"wp-image-22354\" style=\"width:672px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-12.png 797w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-12-600x337.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-12-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-12-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 797px) 100vw, 797px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Le Qatar a n\u00e9goci\u00e9 un accord permettant \u00e0 quatre enfants ukrainiens de retrouver leur famille apr\u00e8s avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 s\u00e9par\u00e9s de leurs parents en Russie pendant l\u2019invasion \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle du pays. Sergei Chuzavkov\/AFP\/Getty Images<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans le m\u00eame temps, le Qatar est le deuxi\u00e8me \u00c9tat partenaire le plus important du Hamas apr\u00e8s l\u2019Iran. Il est aussi un m\u00e9diateur majeur dans le conflit isra\u00e9lo-palestinien. La politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re qatarie au Moyen-Orient se caract\u00e9rise par son soutien \u00e0 des organisations militantes islamistes tout en jouant simultan\u00e9ment un r\u00f4le de m\u00e9diateur dans les conflits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ainsi, la poursuite par l\u2019Ukraine d\u2019un tel soutien unilat\u00e9ral \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl pourrait compromettre la coop\u00e9ration avec Doha, qui est strat\u00e9giquement importante pour Kyiv. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Ukraine a ensuite d\u00fb ajuster sa position et insister davantage sur la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 pour les deux parties de respecter les r\u00e8gles de la guerre et le droit international, ainsi que sur le fait qu\u2019elle reconna\u00eet les peuples isra\u00e9lien et palestinien.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Although it appears that the freeze in Arab-Ukrainian relations has passed and active cooperation continues into 2024, Ukraine&#8217;s failure to provide a balanced policy in time could lead to new crises in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-the-fate-of-ukraine-israel-common-agenda\"><strong>Le sort de l\u2019agenda commun Ukraine-Isra\u00ebl<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019attaque du Hamas et la guerre qui s\u2019en est suivie ont \u00e9clips\u00e9 la guerre en Ukraine en tant qu\u2019\u00e9v\u00e9nement g\u00e9opolitique majeur. Cela a fait craindre une possible r\u00e9orientation de l\u2019aide occidentale de l\u2019Ukraine vers Isra\u00ebl. Les autorit\u00e9s ukrainiennes ont donc tent\u00e9 de r\u00e9unir les guerres en Ukraine et dans la bande de Gaza dans un r\u00e9cit unique de lutte contre l\u2019axe du mal russo-iranien. Toutefois, cette pr\u00e9sentation n\u2019a pas permis d\u2019accro\u00eetre l\u2019aide \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les derniers mois de 2023 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 marqu\u00e9s par une baisse de l\u2019aide des partenaires occidentaux jusqu\u2019aux niveaux les plus faibles depuis le d\u00e9but de l\u2019invasion \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle. Dans le m\u00eame temps, il est apparu que les obus qui devaient \u00eatre transf\u00e9r\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 livr\u00e9s \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Ukraine a r\u00e9alis\u00e9 quelques progr\u00e8s aux \u00c9tats-Unis, o\u00f9 l\u2019administration Biden a propos\u00e9 des d\u00e9penses suppl\u00e9mentaires d\u2019aide \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl, aux pays de la r\u00e9gion indo-pacifique et pour la protection de la fronti\u00e8re sud des \u00c9tats-Unis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ce paquet n\u2019a pas encore \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9 pour diverses raisons. Il est notamment devenu \u00e9vident que les r\u00e9publicains sont plus susceptibles de voter une aide \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl qu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine. Ainsi, le pr\u00e9sident de la Chambre des repr\u00e9sentants Mike Johnson a pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 le 30 octobre un plan d\u2019aide distinct pour Isra\u00ebl qui n\u2019inclut pas l\u2019Ukraine. La Maison-Blanche a annonc\u00e9 que le pr\u00e9sident Biden opposerait son veto au texte s\u2019il \u00e9tait adopt\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cette situation montre que, si les r\u00e9publicains remportent les \u00e9lections pr\u00e9sidentielle et l\u00e9gislatives de l\u2019automne, les \u00c9tats-Unis pr\u00e9f\u00e9reraient soutenir Isra\u00ebl plut\u00f4t que l\u2019Ukraine. Les raisons en sont la force du lobby pro-isra\u00e9lien aux \u00c9tats-Unis, particuli\u00e8rement au sein du Parti r\u00e9publicain, ainsi que la \u00ab fatigue \u00bb de la guerre en Ukraine, devenue de plus en plus positionnelle ces derniers mois.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"489\" height=\"307\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-13.png\" alt=\"Cover image for: The Difficulties of Ukrainian Policy towards the War in the Gaza Strip\" class=\"wp-image-22355\" style=\"width:420px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-13.png 489w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/image-13-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 489px) 100vw, 489px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Le pr\u00e9sident ukrainien Volodymyr Zelenskyi accueilli par<\/em><br><em> des dignitaires saoudiens \u00e0 son arriv\u00e9e \u00e0 Djeddah pour le<\/em><br><em> 32e sommet de la Ligue arabe organis\u00e9 par le<\/em><br><em> Royaume. (SPA)<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">N\u2019ayant pas obtenu de r\u00e9sultats significatifs dans l\u2019agenda m\u00e9diatique en Occident, l\u2019Ukraine a affaibli sa position dans les pays du pr\u00e9tendu Sud global. Apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9but de l\u2019invasion \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle, l\u2019incapacit\u00e9 de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 rallier le Sud global est devenue manifeste. La question palestinienne \u00e9tant devenue l\u2019un des facteurs d\u00e9terminants de l\u2019autod\u00e9termination des pays de cette partie du monde, le soutien \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl de l\u2019Ukraine et de ses partenaires occidentaux affaiblit encore davantage les positions ukrainiennes dans le Sud global.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A narrative has emerged that the West is being hypocritical by paying attention to the suffering of Ukrainian civilians while turning a blind eye to the same suffering of Palestinians. Russian propaganda is actively using the war in Gaza and the support of Israel by Western countries for its own purposes. Israel in the Global South is perceived primarily as an occupier. Therefore, Ukraine&#8217;s efforts to identify itself with Israel have definitely damaged its position in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It can be claimed that Ukrainian attempts to create a single international narrative around Ukraine and Israel have not achieved significant results in Western countries and have damaged Ukraine&#8217;s relations with countries of the Global South.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\" id=\"h-conclusions\"><strong>Conclusions<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9but d\u2019un nouvel \u00e9pisode du conflit isra\u00e9lo-palestinien, l\u2019Ukraine a soutenu Isra\u00ebl en poursuivant plusieurs objectifs. Dans l\u2019ensemble, cette politique peut \u00eatre qualifi\u00e9e d\u2019\u00e9chec : elle n\u2019a pas produit le r\u00e9sultat souhait\u00e9, a mis en pause des relations strat\u00e9giquement importantes avec les \u00c9tats arabes et a offert une occasion \u00e0 la propagande russe. Kyiv a donc r\u00e9cemment d\u00fb ajuster sa position dans un sens plus mod\u00e9r\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00c0 l\u2019avenir, les responsables politiques et les diplomates ukrainiens devraient accorder davantage d\u2019attention \u00e0 la relation strat\u00e9giquement importante d\u2019Isra\u00ebl avec la Russie, ainsi qu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019importance de la question palestinienne pour le monde arabe et l\u2019ensemble du Sud global.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Seule l\u2019\u00e9laboration d\u2019une politique \u00e9quilibr\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard du conflit isra\u00e9lo-palestinien permettra \u00e0 la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re ukrainienne d\u2019obtenir des r\u00e9sultats positifs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Avertissement : les points de vue, pens\u00e9es et opinions exprim\u00e9s dans les articles publi\u00e9s sur ce site n\u2019appartiennent qu\u2019\u00e0 leurs auteurs et ne refl\u00e8tent pas n\u00e9cessairement ceux du Transatlantic Dialogue Center, de ses comit\u00e9s ou de ses organisations affili\u00e9es. Ces articles visent \u00e0 stimuler le dialogue et la discussion et ne repr\u00e9sentent pas les positions politiques officielles du Transatlantic Dialogue Center ni de toute autre organisation \u00e0 laquelle les auteurs peuvent \u00eatre associ\u00e9s.<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Key Takeaways The Hamas terrorist attack and subsequent war in the Gaza Strip led to unprecedented levels of support for Israel around the world. Ukraine was among the states that actively supported Israel at the beginning of the escalation. However, further developments showed that this policy was a failure and only harmed Ukrainian interests. Ukrainian [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":22358,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[60,59,13],"tags":[],"topic":[93,101,87,86],"class_list":["post-22348","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-asiaen","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","topic-geopolitics","topic-middle-east","topic-security","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Ukraine\u2019s Policy Challenges Over the Gaza War | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Ukraine\u2019s one-sided support for Israel has cooled relations with key Arab states, including Qatar, and complicated its diplomatic efforts in the Middle East.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" 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