{"id":20732,"date":"2023-11-16T10:00:00","date_gmt":"2023-11-16T08:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=20732"},"modified":"2025-08-05T13:27:30","modified_gmt":"2025-08-05T10:27:30","slug":"a-saga-of-the-black-sea-grain-initiative","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2023\/11\/16\/a-saga-of-the-black-sea-grain-initiative\/","title":{"rendered":"La saga de l\u2019Initiative c\u00e9r\u00e9ali\u00e8re de la mer Noire"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"39342\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">2 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\" id=\"h-key-takeaways\"><strong>Principaux enseignements<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Importance strat\u00e9gique<\/strong>: The Black Sea Grain Initiative&#8217;s suspension underscores the strategic importance of Ukrainian grain exports in the global market. The suspension has caused significant economic implications, not just for Ukraine but for the global market, intensifying inflationary pressures and affecting commodity trade.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Impact humanitaire<\/strong>: The halt of grain exports from one of the world&#8217;s largest producers has exacerbated the global food crisis, particularly affecting countries dependent on UN food programs.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Man\u0153uvres russes<\/strong>: Russia&#8217;s involvement in the suspension reveals a calculated use of grain export dynamics to pursue its own interests, influencing global grain prices and leveraging its position in the war.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>R\u00e9silience ukrainienne<\/strong>: Despite the suspension, Ukraine&#8217;s exploration of alternative routes and temporary solutions showcases its resilience and determination to maintain its role in the global grain market.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Perspectives d\u2019avenir<\/strong>: Si les perspectives de relance de l\u2019accord initial restent incertaines, la recherche d\u2019alternatives viables se poursuit, refl\u00e9tant la nature dynamique du paysage g\u00e9opolitique actuel.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Implications plus larges<\/strong>: Cette situation rappelle l\u2019interd\u00e9pendance des syst\u00e8mes mondiaux, dans lesquels les conflits r\u00e9gionaux peuvent avoir des r\u00e9percussions \u00e9tendues sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 alimentaire et les relations internationales.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1244\" height=\"431\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20734\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8.png 1244w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8-600x208.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8-1024x355.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8-768x266.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-8-18x6.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1244px) 100vw, 1244px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">De la flamb\u00e9e des prix du p\u00e9trole \u00e0 la crise migratoire, la guerre en Ukraine a provoqu\u00e9 de graves bouleversements dans de nombreux domaines \u00e0 travers le monde. Peu \u00e0 peu, la communaut\u00e9 internationale trouve des moyens de limiter l\u2019impact des facteurs n\u00e9gatifs sur la stabilit\u00e9 mondiale. Toutefois, l\u2019\u00e9volution de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 rend difficile la recherche de solutions plus ou moins durables. Nous voyons ainsi des initiatives autrefois approuv\u00e9es buter, quelques mois plus tard, sur les circonstances, ramenant la question sur la table. Les exportations c\u00e9r\u00e9ali\u00e8res ukrainiennes comptent parmi ces sujets cruciaux. En juin, la Russie s\u2019est retir\u00e9e de l\u2019Initiative c\u00e9r\u00e9ali\u00e8re de la mer Noire, mettant fin \u00e0 un accord vieux d\u2019un an. Depuis lors, des consultations ont eu lieu afin d\u2019examiner et d\u2019\u00e9valuer les options permettant de r\u00e9soudre le probl\u00e8me. Nous avons d\u00e9cid\u00e9 d\u2019analyser le fonctionnement de l\u2019initiative afin d\u2019\u00e9valuer les perspectives de reprise de son activit\u00e9, sous une forme ou une autre. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-footnote-the-grain-market-nbsp\"><strong>Note de bas de page : le march\u00e9 des c\u00e9r\u00e9ales&nbsp; <\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Let&#8217;s take a quick look at the trends of the grain market before and after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Two groups of commodities are usually considered in this regard: grains themselves and fertilizers. Grains play an important role in the food market stability because they are at the center of all price chains. According to the FAO, it is their shortage that caused the greatest levels of acute food insecurity in 2019-2020. Among many aspects that influence pricing in this area, fertilizers play a decisive role. The fact that in many least-developed countries imports of fertilizers prevail over production leads to greater market volatility. The prices of grains and fertilizers have already surged before 2022 as a result of the pandemic effects. The situation has been worsened by the extremes of climate change, as low production levels resulting from floods and droughts have mostly affected the countries experiencing acute food insecurity. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Both Russia and Ukraine are among the top 10 exporters of crops, with Russia being the main exporter of wheat (with a share of around 14% of global exports) and Ukraine being the main exporter of sunflower oil (with a share of around 40% of global exports). Russia is also the biggest exporter of fertilizers, with gas ammonia among the top 5 related export items. Russia is a world leader in ammonia exports, and this gas constitutes an important share of Russia&#8217;s agricultural revenues, being the 4th most important fertilizer. The key infrastructure for ammonia transportation is the Togliatti-Odesa pipeline, the world&#8217;s longest ammonia pipeline. It stopped working after the start of the war. The launch of war has determined the overall challenges that the world food market will have to face in the coming years. While Ukraine is unable to harvest crops at the pre-war level and maintain stable grain supplies, Russia faces limitations on its exports. To tackle the problems, a mutually acceptable bargain had to be made.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1048\" height=\"590\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20735\" style=\"width:666px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9.png 1048w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9-1024x576.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-9-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1048px) 100vw, 1048px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-brief-history-of-the-grain-deal\"><strong>Br\u00e8ve histoire de l\u2019accord sur les c\u00e9r\u00e9ales<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Au d\u00e9but de la guerre, apr\u00e8s les bombardements intenses des villes ukrainiennes, les combats acharn\u00e9s et des heures de n\u00e9gociations, l\u2019accord sur les c\u00e9r\u00e9ales a sembl\u00e9 \u00eatre l\u2019une des premi\u00e8res perc\u00e9es apr\u00e8s le 24 f\u00e9vrier. L\u2019id\u00e9e \u00e9tait de cr\u00e9er un corridor maritime humanitaire \u00ab afin de faciliter une navigation s\u00fbre pour l\u2019exportation de c\u00e9r\u00e9ales, de produits alimentaires connexes et d\u2019engrais \u00bb, et ainsi de freiner les prix alimentaires mondiaux. Bien que la t\u00e2che principale \u2014 activer les exportations \u2014 f\u00fbt la m\u00eame pour toutes les parties aux n\u00e9gociations, il convient de noter les divergences essentielles dans leurs positions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>L\u2019Ukraine.<\/strong> L\u2019Ukraine \u00e9tait d\u00e9sireuse de mettre en \u0153uvre cette id\u00e9e, car de nouveaux obstacles au commerce des c\u00e9r\u00e9ales auraient d\u00e9truit son \u00e9conomie. Avant la guerre, les exportations de c\u00e9r\u00e9ales constituaient l\u2019une des principales sources de recettes en devises du budget de l\u2019\u00c9tat. \u00c9tant donn\u00e9 que la part de l\u2019agriculture dans le PIB ukrainien est la plus \u00e9lev\u00e9e de tous les secteurs de l\u2019\u00e9conomie, d\u00e9passant 10 %, la r\u00e9duction des exportations de c\u00e9r\u00e9ales comporte des cons\u00e9quences pr\u00e9caires : l\u2019impossibilit\u00e9 d\u2019exporter les r\u00e9coltes pourrait provoquer un effondrement des prix int\u00e9rieurs. Les attaques russes ont aussi affect\u00e9 la disposition des compagnies d\u2019assurance \u00e9trang\u00e8res \u00e0 coop\u00e9rer. Afin de r\u00e9duire les risques, des garanties de la Russie \u00e9taient n\u00e9cessaires. Toutefois, certaines craintes ont entrav\u00e9 l\u2019avancement des n\u00e9gociations. Kyiv s\u2019opposait r\u00e9ellement au d\u00e9minage de ses propres ports, car on craignait que, sans garanties suffisantes, la Russie utilise ce flanc expos\u00e9 pour attaquer l\u2019Ukraine depuis la mer. Une autre question controvers\u00e9e \u00e9tait le souhait de la Russie de garantir la pr\u00e9sence d\u2019observateurs russes dans les ports ukrainiens. Cela pourrait conduire \u00e0 de l\u2019espionnage et \u00e0 des sabotages potentiels<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>L\u2019ONU.<\/strong> Apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9but de la guerre, les organes et agences de l\u2019ONU ont examin\u00e9 diff\u00e9rentes solutions pour att\u00e9nuer la crise. Toutefois, le secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Ant\u00f3nio Guterres \u00e9tait alors convaincu qu\u2019il fallait agir sans forcer les choses. Plus tard, apr\u00e8s la conclusion de l\u2019accord, Guterres \u00e9crirait sur Twitter : \u00ab L\u2019initiative d\u00e9montre l\u2019importance d\u2019une diplomatie discr\u00e8te pour trouver des solutions multilat\u00e9rales. \u00bb La raison de cette approche d\u00e9licate r\u00e9sidait dans le r\u00f4le crucial des contributions russes et ukrainiennes aux programmes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 alimentaire de l\u2019ONU. Ainsi, l\u2019une des t\u00e2ches prioritaires de l\u2019ONU depuis le d\u00e9but de la guerre est devenue le maintien, par les deux parties, d\u2019un soutien continu aux op\u00e9rations humanitaires dans les pays les plus touch\u00e9s par l\u2019ins\u00e9curit\u00e9 alimentaire<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>La Turquie.<\/strong> As for Turkey, the establishment of the route posed an opportunity to once again present itself as a separate leading power in the region. For some years Ankara tried to distance itself from the West. The possibility to act as one of the key mediators between Ukraine and Russia could enhance the country&#8217;s image and allow maneuvers (e.g., to evade sanctions). That\u2019s why Turkey became a crucial advocate of the agreement. It also explains why Turkey is so desperate to revive the work of the corridor as it was (including Russia as a party to the document).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>La Russie.<\/strong> C\u2019est en Russie que Guterres s\u2019est rendu en premier pour proposer l\u2019id\u00e9e d\u2019un corridor humanitaire. Obtenir le consentement de Poutine \u00e9tait vital pour que l\u2019accord soit sign\u00e9 \u00e0 la fois par Moscou et Kyiv. D\u00e8s le d\u00e9but, la Russie s\u2019est d\u00e9clar\u00e9e favorable \u00e0 des arrangements si certaines conditions \u00e9taient remplies. La position de la Russie durant les n\u00e9gociations est examin\u00e9e dans la section suivante de l\u2019article. <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"503\" height=\"343\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-10.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20736\" style=\"width:415px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-10.png 503w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-10-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 503px) 100vw, 503px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Les inspecteurs de l\u2019ONU effectuent une inspection pour le Centre conjoint<\/em><br><em> de coordination (JCC). Source : ONU<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the end, the Grain Deal Initiative was the result of third parties&#8217; efforts. The initiative took the form of two separate agreements (Ukraine\/Turkey\/UN and Russia\/Turkey\/UN). The parties refused to view a temporary truce and demining of selected ports as conditions. Instead, the Joint Coordination Centre (comprising representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey) was established in Istanbul to monitor the cargo routes and conduct inspections<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019accord conclu comportait certaines contraintes. En raison des bombardements russes constants, l\u2019\u00e9ventail des ports disponibles \u00e9tait limit\u00e9 \u00e0 trois villes de l\u2019oblast d\u2019Odesa \u2014 Odesa, Tchornomorsk et Youjne \u2014, excluant Mykola\u00efv, le deuxi\u00e8me plus grand port maritime d\u2019Ukraine. Les propositions ukrainiennes d\u2019ajouter Mykola\u00efv \u00e0 l\u2019initiative ont suscit\u00e9 la r\u00e9ticence de la Russie. En outre, l\u2019accord ne pr\u00e9voyait aucun m\u00e9canisme d\u2019ex\u00e9cution et reposait sur la parole donn\u00e9e, ce qui rendait son application essentiellement d\u00e9pendante des d\u00e9cisions russes. Il a donc \u00e9t\u00e9 consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme provisoire. Pour souligner son pouvoir d\u2019y contrevenir \u00e0 tout moment, la Russie a lanc\u00e9 une attaque contre l\u2019infrastructure portuaire d\u2019Odesa le lendemain de la signature de l\u2019accord<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-\"><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Initiative c\u00e9r\u00e9ali\u00e8re de la mer Noire \u00e9tait con\u00e7ue pour \u00eatre mutuellement avantageuse. Bien que l\u2019attention se porte g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement sur l\u2019avantage qu\u2019en tire l\u2019Ukraine, il ne faut pas n\u00e9gliger les gains, mat\u00e9riels et immat\u00e9riels, obtenus par la Russie. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En termes d\u2019image, l\u2019accord a am\u00e9lior\u00e9 la perception positive de la Russie, en particulier parmi les nations en d\u00e9veloppement. Au d\u00e9part, la Russie a interpr\u00e9t\u00e9 l\u2019Initiative de la mer Noire comme une concession de sa part, pour ainsi dire un geste de bonne volont\u00e9. Cette interpr\u00e9tation a permis \u00e0 Moscou de rendre plus tangibles ses affirmations concernant sa pr\u00e9occupation pour le bien-\u00eatre des \u00c9tats les moins s\u00fbrs sur le plan alimentaire. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En outre, la p\u00e9riode de validit\u00e9 du document permettait de tenir l\u2019Ukraine, pour ainsi dire, en laisse, en alimentant l\u2019instabilit\u00e9 des exportations c\u00e9r\u00e9ali\u00e8res ukrainiennes. Un autre avantage obtenu \u00e9tait celui de la v\u00e9ritable concurrence entre la Russie et l\u2019Ukraine, caract\u00e9ristique de la p\u00e9riode d\u2019avant-guerre. La participation aux inspections des navires donnait \u00e0 Moscou la possibilit\u00e9 de ralentir les exportations ukrainiennes tout en occupant avec ses c\u00e9r\u00e9ales l\u2019espace disponible sur les principaux march\u00e9s lointains<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"874\" height=\"492\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-11.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20737\" style=\"width:670px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-11.png 874w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-11-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-11-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-11-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 874px) 100vw, 874px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En outre, le jour m\u00eame de la conclusion de l\u2019Initiative c\u00e9r\u00e9ali\u00e8re, la Russie a sign\u00e9 avec le Secr\u00e9tariat de l\u2019ONU un m\u00e9morandum d\u2019entente sur la promotion des produits alimentaires et des engrais russes sur les march\u00e9s mondiaux. La Russie d\u00e9clarerait par la suite l\u2019interd\u00e9pendance des documents. Le m\u00e9morandum \u00e9tait en effet li\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019initiative de la mer Noire par des dispositions concr\u00e8tes : la facilitation des exportations ukrainiennes via les ports figurait parmi les points \u00e9num\u00e9r\u00e9s. Toutefois, la valeur principale de l\u2019instrument r\u00e9sidait dans l\u2019engagement de l\u2019ONU \u00e0 faciliter les exportations sans entrave de denr\u00e9es alimentaires depuis la Russie. Ni les \u00c9tats-Unis ni l\u2019UE n\u2019ayant impos\u00e9 de sanctions sur les produits agricoles russes depuis f\u00e9vrier, les efforts de m\u00e9diation de l\u2019ONU visaient donc principalement \u00e0 supprimer et att\u00e9nuer les obstacles logistiques et financiers et \u00e0 reprendre l\u2019exploitation du pipeline d\u2019ammoniac \u00ab Togliatti \u2013 Odesa<strong>\u201d. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Presque imm\u00e9diatement apr\u00e8s le lancement de l\u2019accord, Moscou a men\u00e9 une campagne visant \u00e0 saper la r\u00e9putation de l\u2019Ukraine au niveau international. La Russie a employ\u00e9 deux r\u00e9cits marquants :<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Le volume de c\u00e9r\u00e9ales export\u00e9 par l\u2019Ukraine n\u2019est pas d\u00e9terminant pour r\u00e9soudre la crise alimentaire mondiale ;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>L\u2019Ukraine a tromp\u00e9 \u00ab tout le monde \u00bb \u2014 la Russie et les \u00c9tats les plus pauvres \u2014 et a commercialis\u00e9 avec l\u2019Occident une initiative initialement humanitaire.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ces affirmations ne refl\u00e8tent pas la r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Selon les estimations du PAM, l\u2019Ukraine nourrissait environ 400 millions de personnes gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 ses approvisionnements. Il convient aussi de relever que le volume r\u00e9el des exportations pour la p\u00e9riode 2022-2023 dans le cadre de l\u2019Initiative c\u00e9r\u00e9ali\u00e8re s\u2019est av\u00e9r\u00e9 inf\u00e9rieur aux pr\u00e9visions en raison des perturbations caus\u00e9es par l\u2019arm\u00e9e russe. La Russie a entrav\u00e9 le fonctionnement du corridor, notamment en ralentissant et en retardant les inspections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">S\u2019agissant de la deuxi\u00e8me affirmation, plusieurs points m\u00e9ritent d\u2019\u00eatre mentionn\u00e9s. Le terme \u00ab corridor maritime humanitaire \u00bb implique une zone s\u00fbre et l\u2019interdiction de tirs directs. Il n\u2019exclut pas le passage de navires marchands neutres. Par cons\u00e9quent, l\u2019utilisation de ce corridor \u00e0 des fins commerciales ne constitue pas une violation du droit international ; en fait, les Russes avaient eux-m\u00eames pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment accept\u00e9 d\u2019organiser un passage s\u00fbr depuis les ports ukrainiens pour des navires marchands dans le cadre du corridor mentionn\u00e9<strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That\u2019s why claims regarding the commercialization of the corridor are irrelevant. Likewise, the final destination was not determined as the decisive prerequisite for calling the corridor \u201chumanitarian\u201d when the treaty was designed. Though generally speaking, Ukraine has devoted an adequate share of its exports to the least developed countries. According to the UN data, Ukraine exported 57% of its grain to developing nations, and these figures include 20% of exports to low-income and lower-middle-income countries. Later President Zelenskyi announced a special program \u201cGrain from Ukraine\u201d as a separate humanitarian food program directed specifically at the least secure countries in Africa. The idea behind both narratives is to discredit Ukraine\u2019s efforts and use its damaged image as a favorable background for Russia&#8217;s actions and reputation.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"872\" height=\"490\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-12.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20738\" style=\"width:691px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-12.png 872w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-12-600x337.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-12-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-12-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 872px) 100vw, 872px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Le 1er juin, peu avant la prochaine \u00e9ch\u00e9ance de prolongation de l\u2019accord de la mer Noire, la Russie a annonc\u00e9 qu\u2019elle bloquerait l\u2019enregistrement des navires au port de Youjne jusqu\u2019\u00e0 la reprise des exportations d\u2019ammoniac par le pipeline Togliatti-Odesa. Une semaine plus tard, le 7 juin, ce m\u00eame pipeline a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9truit. Cet incident a accru les tensions entre les deux parties, qui se sont accus\u00e9es mutuellement de l\u2019avoir fait exploser. \u00c0 la veille d\u2019une autre date d\u2019expiration, le 17 juillet, une nouvelle attaque contre le pont de Crim\u00e9e, symbole de la domination russe sur la p\u00e9ninsule, a \u00e9t\u00e9 men\u00e9e par le Service de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u2019Ukraine. Le m\u00eame jour, la Russie a annonc\u00e9 son retrait du trait\u00e9. Il est toutefois int\u00e9ressant de noter que l\u2019explosion sur le pont de Crim\u00e9e n\u2019a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 cit\u00e9e parmi les raisons d\u00e9clar\u00e9es. Les d\u00e9clarations russes se sont plut\u00f4t concentr\u00e9es sur l\u2019\u00ab \u00e9chec complet \u00bb de l\u2019ONU et de l\u2019Occident, selon la formule de Poutine, \u00e0 remplir leurs obligations envers la Russie. <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"625\" height=\"415\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-13.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20739\" style=\"width:462px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-13.png 625w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-13-600x398.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-13-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 625px) 100vw, 625px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption translation-block\"><em>Un pompier ukrainien \u00e9limine les cons\u00e9quences de l\u2019<\/em><br><em>attaque russe contre Odesa le 19 juillet 2023. Source : <\/em><br><em>minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Int\u00e9rieur de l\u2019Ukraine<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, despite Russia&#8217;s claims that the grain deal didn&#8217;t appear to be beneficial for it at all, the figures show the opposite. Unlike Ukraine, whose revenue from agricultural exports decreased by 15%, Russia\u2019s earnings weren&#8217;t even stalled. According to the Russian Agriculture Ministry&#8217;s Agroexport Center, they increased by 18%. The truth is, from the very beginning Russians perceived the treaty as a hidden instrument of manipulation. The termination of the treaty was regularly used for blackmailing Ukraine and as a way to achieve new stakes during negotiations rather than for a constructive decision based on statistics. This time, new priorities were sounded by Putin right after the termination of the treaty: the resumption of the Togliatti-Odessa ammonia pipeline and the reconnection of Russian banks to SWIFT. The first would increase Russian revenue from diversified selling of fertilizers, the second would possibly undermine EU sanctions<strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">D\u00e8s le 18 juin, la Russie a attaqu\u00e9 massivement Odesa avec des drones et a commenc\u00e9 un blocus pour obtenir ces concessions. Le 19 juillet, la premi\u00e8re attaque contre l\u2019infrastructure portuaire de la ville depuis longtemps a eu lieu<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Et maintenant ? Les alternatives <\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ce n\u2019est pas la premi\u00e8re fois que la Russie met fin \u00e0 un trait\u00e9 \u2014 apr\u00e8s tout, ce m\u00e9canisme avait \u00e9t\u00e9 pos\u00e9 comme fondement \u2014, mais c\u2019est la premi\u00e8re fois que Moscou met fin \u00e0 cet accord particulier sans que ce soit un bluff. Alors que les tentatives de relance du trait\u00e9 se poursuivent, des alternatives ont \u00e9t\u00e9 recherch\u00e9es. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La relance de l\u2019Initiative c\u00e9r\u00e9ali\u00e8re au prix d\u2019une r\u00e9vision des modalit\u00e9s de coop\u00e9ration entre l\u2019Occident et la Russie est principalement soutenue par l\u2019ONU et la Turquie. L\u2019ONU a m\u00eame \u00e9t\u00e9 soup\u00e7onn\u00e9e de mener des n\u00e9gociations secr\u00e8tes avec la Russie. Selon BILD, qui a publi\u00e9 des informations pr\u00e9tendument divulgu\u00e9es, l\u2019ONU aurait propos\u00e9 de reconnecter les banques russes \u00e0 SWIFT, d\u2019assurer les navires russes contre les attaques ukrainiennes, de d\u00e9geler les actifs gel\u00e9s et de faciliter l\u2019acc\u00e8s des navires russes aux ports de l\u2019UE dans le contexte du commerce agricole. Ces efforts d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9s pour renouveler le trait\u00e9 s\u2019expliquent par son importance pour les programmes alimentaires de l\u2019ONU : en 2023 seulement, l\u2019Initiative a permis \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine de fournir du bl\u00e9 au PAM, ce qui repr\u00e9sentait environ 80 % de l\u2019approvisionnement total de bl\u00e9 du PAM. Toutefois, l\u2019Ukraine a clairement indiqu\u00e9 qu\u2019elle n\u2019accepterait jamais les conditions divulgu\u00e9es, tandis que l\u2019UE a d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9cart\u00e9 la possibilit\u00e9 de reconnecter les banques russes \u00e0 SWIFT avant la fin de la guerre.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Transit routes via Poland and Romania were among the first suggested substitute routes functioning prior to the Black Sea initiative. The operation of the aforementioned passages received high support from the EU: in spring it took the first steps to lift all duties and quotas on Ukrainian agricultural products and devised the Solidarity Lanes Action Plan to develop transport infrastructure. During the first months of the war, these decisions contributed to the mitigation of the domestic economic crisis in Ukraine, as they offered the way from Ukraine to European ports. However, after several months of work, the first dissatisfied European farmers started to voice their concerns. The decision to lift restrictions on Ukrainian exports under the instant zero-duty policy of the EU, accompanied by speculations about cheaper Ukrainian products, led to a short adaptation period of neighboring countries\u2019 markets. The grievance reached its climax when Poland and Hungary imposed unilateral restrictions on Ukraine\u2019s exports, followed by the same move in the name of Slovakia, Bulgaria, and later Romania. To address the issue, the European Commission had to impose &#8220;exceptional safeguard measures&#8221; on the Ukrainian export of \u201csensitive products\u201d (wheat, corn, rapeseed, sunflower seeds) to neighboring states. To prevent the piling up of agricultural commodities in those countries, the EU introduced regulations allowing only direct transit via five frontline Member States. To mitigate the crisis, Ukraine has already introduced licensing of its grain exports to five countries and together with Poland and Lithuania agreed to transfer control of agricultural cargo from the Ukrainian-Polish border to a Lithuanian port to reduce the pressure on the Polish transfer capacity. <\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"888\" height=\"500\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-14.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20740\" style=\"width:726px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-14.png 888w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-14-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-14-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-14-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 888px) 100vw, 888px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Source : VOA. *La couleur violette indique la route baltique.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The detrimental impact of Ukraine&#8217;s exports on the economy of neighboring countries seems to become a solid obstacle that will impede the fostering of the work of grain corridors in the future. Since Ukraine strives to increase exports from European ports, the problem of where to store huge amounts of grain remains relevant. Although the EU has already lifted restrictions under certain conditions, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia have extended the embargo. The situation remains tense as Ukraine puts a complaint to the WTO against those states. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Quelques autres id\u00e9es ont \u00e9t\u00e9 propos\u00e9es par des pays r\u00e9gionaux de l\u2019UE, notamment les routes baltiques et balkaniques. Toutefois, sur le plan logistique, ces itin\u00e9raires sont consid\u00e9r\u00e9s comme plus co\u00fbteux et moins avantageux. Les ports propos\u00e9s ont une faible capacit\u00e9 de transit et ne peuvent donc pas couvrir enti\u00e8rement la demande<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019un des itin\u00e9raires alternatifs les plus prometteurs, reconnu par les \u00c9tats-Unis et l\u2019Ukraine, est la route dite du Danube passant par les ports roumains. Elle est non seulement la meilleure option pour transporter les marchandises des ports ukrainiens vers les ports roumains, mais elle est aussi bien accueillie par la Roumanie. La route du Danube est d\u00e9j\u00e0 devenue la principale voie d\u2019exportation de l\u2019Ukraine. Cependant, plusieurs probl\u00e8mes restent \u00e0 r\u00e9soudre. Tout d\u2019abord, les bombardements russes constants des ports ukrainiens compliquent les exportations de c\u00e9r\u00e9ales par ces ports. Cela r\u00e9duit non seulement les transferts possibles, mais retarde aussi les arriv\u00e9es et les d\u00e9parts. Ensuite, la capacit\u00e9 de transit reste insuffisante. De plus, les principaux ports danubiens ukrainiens d\u2019Izma\u00efl et de Reni ne participaient pas \u00e0 une part importante du commerce avant la guerre et sont donc moins d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s qu\u2019Odesa, par exemple avec un nombre inf\u00e9rieur de silos. Enfin, le Danube est un fleuve \u00e9troit, qui n\u2019est pas con\u00e7u pour un commerce r\u00e9gulier et intensif ni pour accueillir de grands navires. Un facteur aggravant est que le niveau d\u2019eau du Danube baisse en raison de conditions m\u00e9t\u00e9orologiques extr\u00eames. Tous ces facteurs ralentissent la navigation et limitent la capacit\u00e9 de passage des navires<strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>L\u2019Ukraine peut-elle y parvenir seule ?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"573\" height=\"312\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-15.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20741\" style=\"width:443px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-15.png 573w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/image-15-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 573px) 100vw, 573px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It&#8217;s important to mention that since the termination of the Black Sea agreement Ukraine was determined to continue the work of the grain corridor without Russia. Thus, in consultation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the country began devising an alternative corridor in the Black Sea for merchant vessels. The launch of the corridor&#8217;s operation was announced in August and despite concerns, there have already been several cases of successful evacuation of ships stuck in Ukraine&#8217;s port since February 24. On top of that, the first civilian ships passed through the temporary corridor to the port of Chornomorsk in September. After the above-mentioned cases, some Western countries offered their assistance in ensuring the corridor&#8217;s operation. In particular, English Lloyd\u2019s of London insurer has been devising strategies to cover grain ships traveling, while Germany has promised to supply air defense systems to protect the grain corridors. In the same month, Ukraine proposed Turkey and Romania establish a new framework for the corridor\u2019s work without Russia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cependant, bien que le nombre de navires ayant emprunt\u00e9 le nouveau corridor ait progressivement augment\u00e9 \u2014 au 24 octobre, 45 navires avaient d\u00e9j\u00e0 utilis\u00e9 cette voie, dont 25 avaient transport\u00e9 avec succ\u00e8s des marchandises entre les ports ukrainiens et \u00e9trangers \u2014, cette initiative n\u2019a pas encore recueilli un soutien g\u00e9n\u00e9ral en raison du refus des navires \u00e9trangers d\u2019op\u00e9rer sans garanties de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 suffisantes de la part de la Russie. En outre, les tarifs d\u2019assurance restent \u00e9lev\u00e9s en raison de l\u2019instabilit\u00e9 de la situation s\u00e9curitaire. Toutes les options mentionn\u00e9es ci-dessus ont un point commun qui les rend incertaines : elles n\u2019incluent pas la Russie comme garante. Toutes les tentatives de la Turquie, de l\u2019ONU et des \u00c9tats-Unis pour relancer l\u2019initiative c\u00e9r\u00e9ali\u00e8re lanc\u00e9e en 2022 indiquent qu\u2019ils ne veulent pas isoler la Russie. Ils cherchent au contraire \u00e0 la ramener \u00e0 la table des n\u00e9gociations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Conclusions<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All in all, the Grain Initiative has lasted for over one year and proved to be effective. It is critical not only for relieving hunger and reducing prices but also for keeping the Ukrainian economy on its toes. Although several proposals offering alternative routes were made, most of them have notable drawbacks compared to the Grain Deal. Ukrainian export appeared to be a complex issue, the nature of solutions to which is significantly influenced by the interests of neighboring states. In general, it seems that in order to raise the confidence of foreign businessmen and states in the safety of humanitarian passages, Moscow&#8217;s agreement for the vessels&#8217; passage is highly desirable. That is why the renewal of the existing deal with specified revisions is more preferred than Ukraine&#8217;s new proposal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Quant \u00e0 la Russie, elle continuera tr\u00e8s probablement \u00e0 percevoir les exp\u00e9ditions de c\u00e9r\u00e9ales comme un outil de manipulation. Moscou cherche \u00e0 saper la confiance envers l\u2019Ukraine en manipulant les faits et les chiffres, tout en mettant de nombreux b\u00e2tons dans les roues de Kyiv pour l\u2019affaiblir. Poutine conna\u00eet le prix de son approbation des routes et y voit donc une occasion d\u2019obtenir de meilleures conditions pour son pays. La Russie est par cons\u00e9quent peu susceptible de renoncer \u00e0 l\u2019id\u00e9e de passages communs \u00e0 l\u2019avenir, car perdre un tel levier serait un immense gaspillage. Ainsi, la reprise d\u2019un corridor maritime stable et op\u00e9rationnel, coordonn\u00e9 \u00e0 la fois par la Russie et l\u2019Ukraine, est demand\u00e9e, et les d\u00e9veloppements ult\u00e9rieurs d\u00e9pendront de la d\u00e9termination des pays \u00e0 revenir \u00e0 ce format. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Avertissement : les points de vue, pens\u00e9es et opinions exprim\u00e9s dans les documents publi\u00e9s sur ce site appartiennent exclusivement \u00e0 leurs auteurs et ne refl\u00e8tent pas n\u00e9cessairement ceux du Transatlantic Dialogue Center, de ses comit\u00e9s ou de ses organisations affili\u00e9es. Ces documents ont pour but de stimuler le dialogue et la discussion et ne repr\u00e9sentent pas les positions politiques officielles du Transatlantic Dialogue Center ni d\u2019aucune autre organisation \u00e0 laquelle les auteurs peuvent \u00eatre associ\u00e9s.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Key Takeaways From extreme oil prices to the migration crisis, the war in Ukraine caused severe upheavals in numerous areas all over the world. Gradually, the international community finds ways to limit the impact of negative factors on global stability. However, the shifting reality makes it difficult to find more or less lasting solutions. As [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":20742,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13],"tags":[],"topic":[90,115,84,87,86],"class_list":["post-20732","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","topic-economy","topic-resilience","topic-russia","topic-security","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>A Saga of the Black Sea Grain Initiative - Transatlantic Dialogue Center<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The suspension of the Black Sea Grain Initiative impacts global food security, inflates prices, and highlights Ukraine\u2019s resilience in the face of Russian maneuvers.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2023\/11\/16\/a-saga-of-the-black-sea-grain-initiative\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"A Saga of the Black Sea Grain Initiative\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center (TDC) is a non-governmental and non-partisan think tank that provides high-quality policy advice to private and public clients. 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