{"id":18475,"date":"2023-08-10T10:30:00","date_gmt":"2023-08-10T07:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=18475"},"modified":"2025-08-02T09:22:22","modified_gmt":"2025-08-02T06:22:22","slug":"a-ukrainian-path-to-natohow-to-make-a-bumpy-road-smoother","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2023\/08\/10\/a-ukrainian-path-to-natohow-to-make-a-bumpy-road-smoother\/","title":{"rendered":"La voie ukrainienne vers l\u2019OTAN : comment aplanir une route sem\u00e9e d\u2019emb\u00fbches"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"26466\" data-page-id=\"18157\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">516 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Leading up to the most recent NATO Summit in Vilnius, the informational hailstorm has been covering not only Ukrainian but global media. They were constantly coming back to one question &#8211; will Ukraine be accepted or invited to NATO this time? This dilemma was evident after the Ukrainian Presidential Office decided to file an official application to NATO in 2022, at the brink of Russian aggression. Up till a few hours before the start of the Summit\u2019s official part, President Zelenskyi was neither confirming nor denying his arrival in the Lithuanian capital, at the same time demanding an invitation for membership. However, despite bringing some good practical results, such as new weapon supplies and a G7 Declaration that featured the long-awaited security guarantees for Ukraine, a highly anticipated event did not clear out many issues but instead sparked numerous controversies regarding the Ukrainian diplomatic strategy, contemporary media landscape, military power, and future of the NATO itself. Discover how did the Vilnius Summit become a reflection of the bumpy road that Ukraine is going through in its aspiration to become a full NATO member, which hints did it give to make this road a bit easier, and how it gave the long-sought answers for other important questions.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-a-train-ukraine-nato-that-has-not-stopped-yet\"><strong>Un train \u00ab Ukraine-OTAN \u00bb qui ne s\u2019est pas encore arr\u00eat\u00e9<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is not that easy to transform from a country that is a part of the core competitor of NATO (that picked such a role for itself) to a country that embraces something that was considered to be your enemy. Opponents of this statement argue that the example of Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, and even Albania contradict it as these states were in a similar situation. While there may be some truth to this, it&#8217;s also not completely accurate.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"407\" height=\"579\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18477\" style=\"width:337px;height:480px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image.png 407w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-8x12.png 8w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 407px) 100vw, 407px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Publicit\u00e9 de campagne \u00e9lectorale de <\/em><br><em>Natalia Vitrenko. &#8220;A woman who will save<\/em><br><em> l\u2019Ukraine. Contre la pauvret\u00e9, l\u2019anarchie, le manque <\/em><br><em>de spiritualit\u00e9, le ch\u00f4mage, le nazisme, la m\u00e9decine payante, <\/em><br><em>medicine, crime, land sales, US colony.&#8221;<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00c0 l\u2019\u00e9poque sovi\u00e9tique, l\u2019OTAN \u00e9tait un mot d\u00e9clencheur pour les Ukrainiens. Il est difficile de se r\u00e9inventer et de se d\u00e9faire des r\u00e9p\u00e9titions quotidiennes sur la nocivit\u00e9 de l\u2019Occident, l\u2019OTAN \u00e9tant per\u00e7ue comme son incarnation compl\u00e8te, et sur la volont\u00e9 de chaque Occidental de d\u00e9truire tous les habitants de l\u2019Union sovi\u00e9tique. Ce processus de m\u00e9tamorphose, conjointement \u00e0 d\u2019autres processus sociopolitiques importants tels que la transformation de l\u2019\u00e9ducation et du paysage m\u00e9diatique, prend du temps, mais peut produire de bons r\u00e9sultats \u00e0 long terme. Il aurait pu se d\u00e9rouler graduellement, mais certains \u00e9v\u00e9nements l\u2019ont acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9\u2026 provoqu\u00e9s par la Russie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Paradoxically, Russia&#8217;s vigorous reaction to NATO expansion to the East and paranoid fear of the military bloc on its borders followed by the attempts to \u201cprotect Ukraine\u201d from it became the ones responsible for Ukraine becoming closer to the West than ever before. Two revolutions in 2004 and 2014 respectively, which both have a Russian root cause, created a wave of (sometimes too) high hopes among Ukrainians. They realized their need and readiness for NATO (even if not all of them and everywhere in the country) sooner than some NATO Member States&#8217; leaders. Yet, at the same time, up till 2014, Russia was spreading the narrative about NATO taking over the residential blocks in Ukrainian cities and their gardens at summer houses. And despite always admiring the West and listening to the stories of those Ukrainians who have already been there, the fear of the unknown was helping this narrative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La r\u00e9volution orange de 2004 et l\u2019int\u00e9gration de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN sont \u00e9troitement li\u00e9es. Celle-ci \u00e9tait l\u2019un des \u00e9l\u00e9ments cl\u00e9s de la campagne \u00e9lectorale de l\u2019ancien pr\u00e9sident ukrainien Viktor Iouchtchenko et l\u2019un de ceux qui ont rencontr\u00e9 le plus de r\u00e9sistance. Les sujets de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 dure ont toujours \u00e9t\u00e9 difficiles pour les Ukrainiens, car il est assez difficile de penser \u00e0 la puissance militaire et aux armes lorsqu\u2019il n\u2019y a ni stabilit\u00e9 \u00e9conomique ni stabilit\u00e9 politique dans son pays. \u00c0 l\u2019approche du d\u00e9sormais tristement c\u00e9l\u00e8bre sommet de l\u2019OTAN de Bucarest de 2008, les Ukrainiens n\u2019\u00e9taient pas enti\u00e8rement pr\u00eats, mentalement, \u00e0 rejoindre l\u2019OTAN. En comparant leur niveau de connaissance de l\u2019OTAN en 2008, en 2014 et surtout aujourd\u2019hui, on constate une \u00e9volution dont le point de d\u00e9part \u00e9tait une connaissance \u00e0 peine existante de l\u2019organisation, de ses objectifs et de ce qu\u2019exige r\u00e9ellement le statut d\u2019\u00c9tat membre. Dans le m\u00eame temps, les grands espoirs de la r\u00e9volution orange se sont bris\u00e9s sur la dure r\u00e9alit\u00e9 d\u2019une <strong>interaction politique<\/strong> entre diff\u00e9rents groupes politiques en qu\u00eate d\u2019influence. Tout cela a donn\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine une position quelque peu instable pour le sommet, o\u00f9 la Russie a r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 convaincre les \u00c9tats-Unis et Bush Jr. que l\u2019entr\u00e9e de l\u2019Ukraine comme de la G\u00e9orgie dans l\u2019OTAN constituait une d\u00e9cision tr\u00e8s risqu\u00e9e.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In 2010, Viktor Yanukovych, a freshly elected at that time President of Ukraine who was financially and politically backed by the Kremlin, decided to change the destination, trying to embrace neutrality. A neutral status for Ukraine was one of his central campaign promises. In support of it, Yanukovych and his peers were capitalizing on the \u201cNATO horror\u201d. As he tried to say this, it would be better to focus on the economy rather than think about the military. Was it real neutrality, like, for example, in Austria? It is debatable. As the standards for many aspects of the military are the core element of NATO integration, it is definitely fair to say that the Ukrainian military at that time was drifting away from NATO. The arms reduction, the decline in conditions for soldiers, rising corruption, bullying campaigns for \u201cfreshmen\u201d of the military draft, issues with gender parity &#8211; all of these problems were at their worst during the Yanukovych presidency, and some of them are still lingering as the obstacles on the Ukrainian path to NATO. When Yanukovych&#8217;s policies became unbearably Russian, Ukrainians took another leap of faith in a better future with the 2014 Revolution of Dignity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In 2014, these new hopes helped Petro Poroshenko to get his presidency. He came to power promising to get Ukraine into the EU and NATO topping it all with \u201cfinishing the war in two weeks\u201d. When he gained some success in keeping Ukraine on the radar of Western leaders and had some small wins in the course of European integration, all other issues (that were either impossible to tackle for him alone, like Russian aggression) or implementation of reforms (such as modernization of the military complex) were ignored. Indeed, the transformation was happening, but not everywhere, not every time, and not fast enough. All of that, together with other factors such as imperfections in public diplomacy and its efficiency, \u201clack of fully self-reliant and resilient democratic institutions\u201d, and the worst of them &#8211; too big of a focus on creating his own political cult that still damages Ukrainian politics in its most crucial chapter. The very same reasons were making the West skeptical of Ukraine in NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"856\" height=\"482\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-1.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18478\" style=\"width:798px;height:449px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-1.png 856w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-1-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-1-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-1-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 856px) 100vw, 856px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko addressed Parliament on Feb 19, after signing a constitutional amendment committing the country to becoming a member of NATO and the European Union. He saw securing Ukraine&#8217;s membership in NATO and the EU as his &#8220;strategic mission.&#8221;<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Au d\u00e9but de cette partie, certains pays du pacte de Varsovie ont \u00e9t\u00e9 mentionn\u00e9s \u00e0 juste titre. Des experts ukrainiens avancent parfois que l\u2019Ukraine elle-m\u00eame n\u2019est pas moins bonne et est m\u00eame, \u00e0 certains \u00e9gards, meilleure que les pays d\u00e9j\u00e0 admis dans l\u2019OTAN. Ils peuvent laisser entendre l\u2019existence de pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019Ukraine. Si ce sc\u00e9nario peut \u00eatre l\u2019une des explications possibles, il faut aussi garder \u00e0 l\u2019esprit que le regard occidental est tr\u00e8s diff\u00e9rent et ressemble \u00e0 celui port\u00e9 sur l\u2019int\u00e9gration de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019UE. Oui, malgr\u00e9 les efforts de la Russie pour prouver le contraire, l\u2019Ukraine lutte mieux contre la corruption qu\u2019on ne le croit g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement. En outre, ses progr\u00e8s ne sont pas inf\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 ceux de la Roumanie, de la Bulgarie et de l\u2019Albanie, qui sont d\u00e9j\u00e0 membres de l\u2019OTAN. Compte tenu des tendances g\u00e9opolitiques actuelles, certains experts pourraient m\u00eame consid\u00e9rer une Ukraine membre de l\u2019OTAN comme plus logique et viable que la Hongrie. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Toutefois, les <strong>devoirs non faits de ces pays<\/strong> expliquent le scepticisme de l\u2019OTAN \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019Ukraine. Comme nous le voyons, la mont\u00e9e de la politique d\u2019extr\u00eame droite en Pologne et en Hongrie ainsi que l\u2019instabilit\u00e9 \u00e9conomique de la Bulgarie et de la Roumanie ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 cr\u00e9\u00e9 des fissures dans la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne. Oui, l\u2019adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Albanie \u00e9tait un choix risqu\u00e9, mais il est plus facile de g\u00e9rer les probl\u00e8mes d\u2019un pays aussi grand que l\u2019Albanie que ceux de l\u2019Ukraine. Il est temps de comprendre que l\u2019Ukraine dans l\u2019OTAN est une occasion pour l\u2019OTAN comme pour l\u2019Ukraine de devenir plus r\u00e9silientes si les cartes sont bien jou\u00e9es. Malheureusement, l\u2019Occident ne le pr\u00e9sente pas assez clairement, et toutes ces incertitudes ont terni le r\u00e9cent sommet de Vilnius.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-what-on-earth-was-in-vilnius\"><strong>Mais que s\u2019est-il donc pass\u00e9 \u00e0 Vilnius ?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Even after days passed since that Summit, we still have so many questions. Usually, these summits fly under the radar of the general public, but this time because of the tension over \u201cthe Ukrainian case\u201d it looked like a reality show. We had it all &#8211; a dramatic commentary, a plot twist, and an ending that leaves everyone arguing whether it was actually a good one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It was one of the rare occasions where President Zelenskyi could meet all leaders who were interested in helping Ukraine in one place. Stakes were high, and risks were not lower, so it is not surprising that Ukraine chose a risky gambling strategy. It is actually quite traditional for modern diplomacy &#8211; try to land on the Moon, so if you fail, you can reach the stars. It seems that this time the Ukrainian team had it in mind &#8211; it is acceptable to demand a sharp guarantee that we would be accepted into NATO. After all, <strong>le traumatisme du m\u00e9morandum de Budapest hante encore les Ukrainiens<\/strong>, car il symbolise pour eux l\u2019inefficacit\u00e9 diplomatique et la confiance trahie. Pour l\u2019\u00e9viter, l\u2019\u00e9quipe de Zelenskyi voulait obtenir quelque chose de concret. Mais l\u00e0 encore, le manque de volont\u00e9 d\u2019entrer dans les nuances a jou\u00e9 en sa d\u00e9faveur.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"819\" height=\"546\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-2.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18479\" style=\"width:761px;height:507px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-2.png 819w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-2-600x400.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-2-768x512.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-2-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 819px) 100vw, 819px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>En marge du sommet de l\u2019OTAN \u00e0 Vilnius, avec la participation du pr\u00e9sident de l\u2019Ukraine, les dirigeants des pays du Groupe des Sept ont convenu de la D\u00e9claration conjointe de soutien \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine le 12 juillet 2023.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En des temps aussi difficiles, nous avons tendance \u00e0 comprendre par la g\u00e9n\u00e9ralisation les processus complexes qui nous entourent. C\u2019est rassurant d\u2019un point de vue psychologique. Dans cette qu\u00eate, tout ne peut pas \u00eatre g\u00e9n\u00e9ralis\u00e9, et cette situation en est un exemple parfait.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019id\u00e9e de donner \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine \u00ab le ticket d\u2019or pour l\u2019OTAN \u00bb est g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement bonne et fond\u00e9e sur de bonnes intentions. Elle n\u2019est cependant pas planifi\u00e9e avec assez de pr\u00e9cision. <strong>Cette id\u00e9e manque de vision, et sa justification d\u2019une compr\u00e9hension plus profonde<\/strong>. Yes, the Budapest Memorandum is one of the proofs that not every promise is kept in the Western world. But there is one crucial detail &#8211; it is not a legally binding document. And there are situations in modern geopolitics when even a legally binding document can be thrown into a trash can. It is indeed painful to give away your nuclear weapons, but would it be more painful to be isolated from the outer world with them?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Et qu\u2019est r\u00e9ellement une \u00ab invitation \u00bb pour l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 rejoindre l\u2019OTAN ? Ce type d\u2019\u00ab invitation \u00bb a-t-il jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 adress\u00e9 \u00e0 quiconque ? Que signifie-t-il ? De nombreux dirigeants occidentaux ont r\u00e9p\u00e9t\u00e9 que l\u2019Ukraine rejoindrait l\u2019OTAN d\u00e8s la fin de la guerre. Simultan\u00e9ment, les Ukrainiens sont galvanis\u00e9s par cette perc\u00e9e vers l\u2019OTAN qui est n\u00e9cessaire pour\u2026 mais pour quoi est-elle n\u00e9cessaire ? Cette \u00ab invitation \u00bb peut-elle \u00eatre un document juridiquement contraignant ? Il y a de s\u00e9rieux doutes \u00e0 ce sujet. Nous pourrions plut\u00f4t revivre un moment comparable au m\u00e9morandum de Budapest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Il est difficile de calibrer une bonne strat\u00e9gie pour un tel \u00e9v\u00e9nement lorsqu\u2019il faut \u00e9quilibrer les messages destin\u00e9s aux publics national et \u00e9tranger, surtout quand le sujet est tellement exacerb\u00e9 dans le pays. Si Zelenskyi avait \u00e9t\u00e9 trop conciliant \u00e0 Vilnius, on lui aurait reproch\u00e9 d\u2019abandonner les efforts sur le champ de bataille. S\u2019il avait \u00e9t\u00e9 trop dur, il aurait risqu\u00e9 de perdre tout soutien additionnel des partenaires occidentaux. S\u2019il n\u2019\u00e9tait pas venu du tout au sommet, il aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 moqu\u00e9 pour avoir ignor\u00e9 l\u2019occasion et ne s\u2019\u00eatre concentr\u00e9 que sur ses demandes. La situation elle-m\u00eame \u00e9tait manifestement un champ de mines. La strat\u00e9gie choisie a en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 mieux fonctionn\u00e9 dans le pays qu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger, bien qu\u2019elle ait \u00e9t\u00e9 initialement con\u00e7ue pour correspondre \u00e0 la mentalit\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La guerre est un processus tr\u00e8s \u00e9motionnel, surtout lorsqu\u2019elle dure depuis plus de neuf ans. Il est parfois difficile de g\u00e9rer toutes ces \u00e9motions sans nuire \u00e0 ses autres activit\u00e9s. Les responsables politiques sont aussi des personnes, particuli\u00e8rement ceux qui n\u2019ont pas une solide exp\u00e9rience politique. En m\u00eame temps, tout ce qui est charg\u00e9 d\u2019\u00e9motions intenses, positives ou n\u00e9gatives, \u00e9puise l\u2019\u00e9nergie avec le temps. C\u2019est aussi un enseignement essentiel pour la diplomatie : <strong>la guerre \u00e9puise \u00e9motionnellement tout le monde<\/strong>. Surtout lorsqu\u2019elle est constamment dans les m\u00e9dias. Pour l\u2019Ukraine, il semble bon d\u2019\u00eatre toujours expos\u00e9e ; toutefois, lorsqu\u2019il n\u2019y a rien pour contrebalancer cela, le moindre faux pas peut devenir un immense drame<strong>. Les \u00e9motions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 le plus grand probl\u00e8me du sommet de Vilnius.<\/strong> Du point de vue psychologique, le pr\u00e9sident Zelenskyi a charg\u00e9 la situation d\u2019\u00e9motions alors que les autres acteurs voulaient la traiter avec sang-froid. Imaginez un enfant tentant de r\u00e9soudre un probl\u00e8me de math\u00e9matiques, auquel un enseignant se met \u00e0 crier de le r\u00e9soudre imm\u00e9diatement parce que, sinon, il pourrait ne pas \u00eatre pay\u00e9 et n\u2019aurait rien pour r\u00e9gler ses factures. Cela refl\u00e8te fid\u00e8lement la situation et s\u2019est naturellement retourn\u00e9 contre lui. Les \u00e9motions sont parfois un outil tr\u00e8s utile et puissant, mais pas lorsque tous les autres essaient de se calmer dans une situation d\u00e9j\u00e0 tr\u00e8s \u00e9motionnelle.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"463\" height=\"297\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-3.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18480\" style=\"width:391px;height:251px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-3.png 463w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-3-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 463px) 100vw, 463px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Pourtant, tout n\u2019est pas aussi mauvais qu\u2019il y para\u00eet. Ce sommet a donn\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine des garanties de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 qui fixent les mesures que les partenaires occidentaux prendront si la Russie intensifie son action \u00e0 l\u2019avenir. Il a apport\u00e9 davantage d\u2019armes, ce qui est important dans le contexte de la contre-offensive. Enfin, l\u2019Ukraine a re\u00e7u la garantie de pouvoir acc\u00e9der \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN sans plan d\u2019action pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion, \u00e0 l\u2019instar de la Finlande. Malgr\u00e9 tout cela, le ministre des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res Dmytro Kouleba a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la route ukrainienne vers l\u2019OTAN \u00e9tait devenue \u00ab plus courte, mais pas plus rapide \u00bb. Cela ne signifie-t-il pas qu\u2019avec moins d\u2019obstacles, il serait plus facile d\u2019y arriver ? Comme nous le voyons, ce r\u00eave fi\u00e9vreux d\u2019un sommet a r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 certains <strong>malentendus dans l\u2019approche ukrainienne<\/strong> non seulement de l\u2019int\u00e9gration atlantique, mais aussi de l\u2019int\u00e9gration europ\u00e9enne. Comment \u00e9viter que ce processus ne se perde davantage dans la traduction ?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-the-current-nato-scoreboard\"><strong>Le tableau de bord actuel de l\u2019OTAN<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is a challenging task not to lose sight in the case of the current diffusion between the NATO member states. In fact, they are divided on how to support Ukraine and whether to invite it to join the Alliance. Many of Ukraine&#8217;s Western partners, except for a few, have different best-case scenarios in mind for Ukraine, and these are not always NATO membership. In addition to Hungary&#8217;s well-known position against Ukraine&#8217;s accession to NATO, the United States also has a fairly clear stance on this issue, saying that it is inappropriate for Ukraine to join NATO right now. At the same time, under the influence of the full-scale invasion, countries such as France, Italy, and Germany have become more positive about the idea of Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Alliance than before. However, it is difficult to speak about clear blocks of positions within NATO, except for Poland and the Baltic States, which are unanimously in favor of Ukraine&#8217;s accession.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Comme nous le voyons, les positions et opinions des pays \u00e9voluent sous la pression des circonstances et des d\u00e9veloppements r\u00e9cents sur le champ de bataille. Dire m\u00eame que l\u2019Allemagne est plus positive qu\u2019auparavant ne signifie pas le m\u00eame soutien assur\u00e9, dans les d\u00e9clarations et les actes, que celui des pays pr\u00e9cit\u00e9s. Il faut tenir compte du fait que le chancelier Scholz agit avec beaucoup de prudence sur ce sujet et que le ministre allemand de la D\u00e9fense a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que l\u2019Ukraine ne pourrait compter sur son entr\u00e9e dans l\u2019Alliance et sur l\u2019afflux d\u2019investissements qu\u2019apr\u00e8s la fin de la guerre. Il existe donc un soutien sans \u00e9quivoque \u00e0 l\u2019adh\u00e9sion de la part d\u2019un groupe de pays, dont la Pologne et les \u00c9tats baltes, tandis que les autres sont prudents dans leurs d\u00e9clarations.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, it is worth noting that the Allies never agreed on clear goals of the war, nor on how Ukraine should win. Unfortunately, there is also an error on Ukraine&#8217;s part. Since January of this year, the Ukrainian counteroffensive has been one of the main topics of discussion. After the transfer of German Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, the Ukrainian media space was filled with statements that tanks and infantry fighting vehicles such as Marder, etc. were needed to prepare for a counteroffensive and breakthrough of Russian defenses in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"464\" height=\"309\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-4.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18481\" style=\"width:367px;height:244px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-4.png 464w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/image-4-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 464px) 100vw, 464px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En mai, les Ukrainiens et leurs partenaires attendaient toujours une contre-offensive, qui restait un sujet br\u00fblant dans les m\u00e9dias. Cette strat\u00e9gie s\u2019accorde bien avec l\u2019objectif d\u2019obtenir des armes, mais elle a aussi cr\u00e9\u00e9 des <strong>attentes irr\u00e9alistes<\/strong> among Western partners. Despite the fact that Ukraine&#8217;s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba emphasized that the upcoming operation should not be perceived as a &#8220;decisive battle&#8221; and shared the opinion that Ukraine may need more than one counteroffensive to liberate all the temporarily occupied territories, this did not help to reduce expectations. For example, in an interview with The Guardian, the Czech president said that a counteroffensive could be the &#8220;last chance&#8221; this year because it would be difficult for Ukraine to quickly train new troops if the Armed Forces suffer heavy losses if they are not well-prepared for offensive operations, and it would be extremely difficult to re-provision the necessary ammunition and fuel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At the same time, the Vilnius Summit also confirmed that the strategy of &#8220;last chance weapons&#8221; is not that efficient in its informational planning. After all, those who communicated those needs from the Ukrainian side were portraying various types of weaponry in a progressive timeline as its last chance, which is technically true, but in terms of diplomacy is not clear enough. Therefore, Europeans became tired of the &#8220;last chance&#8221; narrative and started to pay less attention to the decisive matter of military help for Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En observant l\u2019approche informationnelle du Bureau du pr\u00e9sident vis-\u00e0-vis de l\u2019OTAN, il est \u00e9vident qu\u2019elle ne visait que les \u00c9tats-Unis. Malheureusement, cela se retourne contre lui, car nombre de repr\u00e9sentants des \u00e9lites politiques europ\u00e9ennes et ukrainiennes y voient une confirmation du r\u00e9cit de la propagande russe selon lequel les \u00c9tats-Unis seraient le seul v\u00e9ritable dirigeant de tels formats et l\u2019Europe leur simple marionnette. Comment quelque chose cr\u00e9\u00e9 seulement pour le public cible am\u00e9ricain pourrait-il fonctionner aussi en Europe, o\u00f9 plusieurs sous-r\u00e9gions ont des contextes m\u00e9diatiques et des cultures diff\u00e9rents ? Par exemple, si les appels vid\u00e9o de Zelenskyi \u00e0 l\u2019\u00eele des Serpents ont bien fonctionn\u00e9 aupr\u00e8s du public am\u00e9ricain, les Europ\u00e9ens n\u2019en ont pas tr\u00e8s bien saisi le message. Il est bon d\u2019\u00e9quilibrer les risques et implications possibles du produit m\u00e9diatique que l\u2019\u00e9quipe du pr\u00e9sident partage avec un public international. Il est encore plus important de cr\u00e9er quelque chose qui soit acceptable pour les publics national et international.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Still, the summit in Vilnius did not bring Ukraine an official invitation to join NATO and left open all further scenarios for the development of cooperation with the Alliance. However, it is worth noting that this does not slow down the process of Euro-Atlantic integration for Ukraine, but it also does not speed it up. Although the political objectives set by Kyiv did not work, the task of &#8220;getting weapons&#8221; worked again at the summit. As early as August, the 11-nation coalition may begin training Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets. All of that leaves a lingering feeling of chaos and confusion, where answers are needed fast to move on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-how-should-ukraine-proceed-further\"><strong>Comment l\u2019Ukraine doit-elle poursuivre ?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There are many ways to improve the current situation. For instance, as previously mentioned the damage was done by an emotional approach to communications. One more example of this is the debacle between the UK\u2019s Minister of Defense Ben Wallace and Zelenskyi. It appears that actually, the media focused on the emotional part which appeals to the public more, though Wallace&#8217;s core message was about the difficulties of getting weapons to Ukraine. Yet the Ukrainian President\u2019s response appeared too emotionally charged. There might have been alternative, perhaps more diplomatic, ways to communicate his message. After all, in his role as the President of a parliamentary-presidential republic, not all matters fall within his direct purview, including the conduct of individuals communicating with Wallace. It would look even better from the perspective of Ukrainian integration into the EU, as it would show the power to delegate in such difficult times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There seems to be a discrepancy in perceptions when it comes to the provisioning of critically needed weapons to Ukraine. While Kyiv may view the requested aid as a relatively small portion of foreign nations&#8217; capabilities, the reality in these donor countries, particularly those in the West, might be different. For instance, changes in the U.S. military manufacturing sector, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, illustrate the complex interplay between large defense conglomerates and smaller contractors. This complexity, alongside resource and facility constraints, could impact the speed and scale of weapon production and distribution. All of these details have to be taken into consideration while asking the West for more weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But after all of that, a question remains &#8211; why does Ukraine need NATO? To answer simply, many in Ukraine see NATO membership as a magic wand able to solve all problems. It is just a vehicle for its aspirations, reforms, and security improvements, like a train that goes to its final destination. While Ukrainians might think that they are ready and deserve membership, it would be good not to put heads too high yet, as there are still some issues in the Ukrainian military complex. We have to reject a mindset where security is only about the military and the military is only about weapons and the number of people. Ukraine needs NATO to improve the situation with the rights of soldiers, the procedures of a military draft, the bureaucracy at the local military centers, the living conditions of the military, their equipment, their knowledge and training, and the situation with the women and LGBTQI+ rights in the army. There is still so much to learn, and NATO can be that helping hand that can push Ukraine toward these improvements. However, the utilization of such aid ultimately rests with the Ukrainian government. It would thus be strategic to remind international counterparts of Ukraine&#8217;s need for NATO to progress with the proposed reforms, and of Ukraine&#8217;s readiness to swiftly implement these reforms. Negotiations could potentially be smoothed if the dialogue was to incorporate discussions on potential successful outcomes that could arise concurrently with the provision of aid. After all, Ukraine has no desire to let the efforts made and sacrifices endured be in vain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><em>Avertissement : les points de vue, pens\u00e9es et opinions exprim\u00e9s dans les articles publi\u00e9s sur ce site n\u2019appartiennent qu\u2019\u00e0 leurs auteurs et ne refl\u00e8tent pas n\u00e9cessairement ceux du Transatlantic Dialogue Center, de ses comit\u00e9s ou de ses organisations affili\u00e9es. Ces articles visent \u00e0 stimuler le dialogue et la discussion et ne repr\u00e9sentent pas les positions politiques officielles du Transatlantic Dialogue Center ni de toute autre organisation \u00e0 laquelle les auteurs peuvent \u00eatre associ\u00e9s.<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Leading up to the most recent NATO Summit in Vilnius, the informational hailstorm has been covering not only Ukrainian but global media. They were constantly coming back to one question &#8211; will Ukraine be accepted or invited to NATO this time? This dilemma was evident after the Ukrainian Presidential Office decided to file an official [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":18479,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13],"tags":[],"topic":[110,87,86],"class_list":["post-18475","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","topic-nato","topic-security","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>A Ukrainian Path to NATO: How to Make a Bumpy Road Smoother<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This analysis examines Ukraine\u2019s path to NATO membership, the political and security obstacles it faces and options for strengthening integration.\" \/>\n<meta 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