{"id":10979,"date":"2023-04-20T10:24:47","date_gmt":"2023-04-20T07:24:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=10979"},"modified":"2025-08-02T10:09:09","modified_gmt":"2025-08-02T07:09:09","slug":"perspectives-of-ukraines-security-umbrella-the-countrys-latest-pacts-and-alliances","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/fr\/2023\/04\/20\/perspectives-of-ukraines-security-umbrella-the-countrys-latest-pacts-and-alliances\/","title":{"rendered":"Perspectives du parapluie s\u00e9curitaire de l\u2019Ukraine : les derniers pactes et alliances du pays"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"19250\" data-page-id=\"8262\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Veuillez patienter\u2026\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger le PDF en anglais<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">723 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Les \u00c9tats sont les seuls sujets du droit international \u00e0 poss\u00e9der la capacit\u00e9 juridique internationale, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire \u00e0 entretenir des relations diplomatiques et consulaires, \u00e0 participer \u00e0 des organisations internationales, \u00e0 conclure des accords, \u00e0 assumer une responsabilit\u00e9 internationale, \u00e0 avoir leurs propres citoyens, etc. En tant qu\u2019acteur des relations internationales, l\u2019Ukraine doit comprendre ses objectifs, ses besoins, ses possibilit\u00e9s d\u2019action et les moyens dont elle dispose afin de fonctionner dans le monde de mani\u00e8re rationnelle et conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 ses propres int\u00e9r\u00eats. Ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, dans un contexte de menaces \u00e9mergentes, l\u2019Ukraine a commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 r\u00e9aliser qu\u2019elle devait stabiliser sa s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et renforcer sa position internationale en participant \u00e0 des m\u00e9canismes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de d\u00e9fense collectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Priv\u00e9e des garanties de l\u2019OTAN et du \u00ab parapluie s\u00e9curitaire \u00bb de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, la diplomatie ukrainienne a concentr\u00e9 ses efforts sur la cr\u00e9ation d\u2019un r\u00e9seau r\u00e9gional de coop\u00e9ration sous la forme de petites alliances. C\u2019est ainsi qu\u2019ont vu le jour le Trio associ\u00e9 (Ukraine-Moldavie-G\u00e9orgie), le Triangle de Lublin (Ukraine-Pologne-Lituanie) et le pacte trilat\u00e9ral britannique-polonais-ukrainien. Des tactiques semblables ont \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9es par tous les nouveaux membres de l\u2019UE et de l\u2019OTAN qui, par le biais d\u2019associations r\u00e9gionales, ont d\u00e9montr\u00e9 la possibilit\u00e9 d\u2019une coop\u00e9ration dans divers domaines, renforc\u00e9 leurs relations avec leurs voisins et gagn\u00e9 en visibilit\u00e9 sur la sc\u00e8ne internationale, tout en montrant qu\u2019ils pouvaient rejoindre des alliances plus larges avec d\u2019autres \u00c9tats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Du 14 au 16 janvier 2023, le groupe sociologique Rating a men\u00e9 un sondage d\u2019opinion afin d\u2019\u00e9valuer l\u2019opinion publique sur une \u00e9ventuelle adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 des alliances de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 telles que l\u2019OTAN, ou sur la formation d\u2019une coalition politico-militaire compos\u00e9e de l\u2019Ukraine, de la Pologne et du Royaume-Uni, ou encore de l\u2019Ukraine, de la Pologne et de la Lituanie. Selon les r\u00e9sultats de l\u2019enqu\u00eate, 85 % des personnes interrog\u00e9es soutiennent l\u2019id\u00e9e de former une alliance politico-militaire regroupant l\u2019Ukraine, la Pologne et le Royaume-Uni ; 80 % soutiennent l\u2019id\u00e9e d\u2019une alliance politico-militaire r\u00e9unissant l\u2019Ukraine, la Pologne et la Lituanie ; et 86 % soutiennent l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN, soit le plus haut niveau de soutien dans l\u2019histoire des sondages.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Analysons les fondements de la coop\u00e9ration au sein des coalitions susmentionn\u00e9es, les perspectives de cr\u00e9ation d\u2019alliances de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00e0 partir de leurs accords et les perspectives d\u2019adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left\">Le Triangle de Lublin<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Lublin Triangle (L3) initiative was established on the basis of an adopted declaration at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine in Lublin on July 28, 2020. The format refers to the Republic of the Three Nations&#8217; historical, political, and cultural heritage &#8211; Poland, Lithuania, and Rus-Ukraine. The Lublin Triangle is a concept that promotes cooperation on multiple levels. \u201cThe establishment of the Lublin Triangle will have practical significance for political cooperation, military cooperation, and any other cooperation,\u201d Lithuania\u2019s foreign minister optimistically stated at the inaugural meeting in Lublin.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"740\" height=\"424\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-8.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10981\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-8.png 740w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-8-600x344.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-8-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 740px) 100vw, 740px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dans le cadre du Triangle de Lublin, les domaines de coop\u00e9ration suivants ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9tablis :<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Regional policies and security. Countering Russia\u2019s aggressive policies in the region and leveraging NATO capabilities to ensure the region&#8217;s security.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Commerce, investissements et projets structurels visant \u00e0 assurer la coh\u00e9sion r\u00e9gionale, le d\u00e9veloppement et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 au sens large.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile et communication sociale. Cr\u00e9er des liens horizontaux entre les \u00c9tats par l\u2019interm\u00e9diaire de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La dimension institutionnelle de la coop\u00e9ration au sein de l\u2019initiative comprend des sommets de chefs d\u2019\u00c9tat, des r\u00e9unions de pr\u00e9sidents de parlements, de ministres des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res et d\u2019agents de liaison.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The security dimension is very important in the Lublin Triangle agenda. Because of their proximity to Russia and historical experience, Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine, all share a similar perception of \u2018traditional\u2019 military and political threats, as well as a new type of threat in the form of disinformation. Russia is regarded as the primary source of such threats among these countries. In this context, the initiative should serve as a vital forum for regional cooperation in order to maintain regional stability in the face of Russia&#8217;s aggressive policy. This is in everyone\u2019s best interests, especially since Ukraine, by clearly articulating its aspirations for NATO membership, relies on the support of its neighbors (Alliance members) in this regard.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"702\" height=\"469\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-9.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10982\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-9.png 702w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-9-600x401.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-9-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 702px) 100vw, 702px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Le pr\u00e9sident ukrainien Volodymyr Zelenskyi, le pr\u00e9sident polonais Andrzej Duda et le pr\u00e9sident lituanien Gitanas Nauseda ont sign\u00e9 la d\u00e9claration du Triangle de Lublin en faveur de l\u2019adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. Source : Holos Ukrainy<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In particular, in a declaration on January 11, 2023, the presidents of Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Andrzej Duda, and Gitanas Naus\u0117da stated, at the Lublin Triangle Summit in Lviv, that Lithuania and Poland support Ukraine&#8217;s membership in NATO and are seeking consensus among the Alliance&#8217;s allies on this issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Lublin Triangle not only ensures the political support of its members but also strengthens its own position within the framework of the Central and Eastern European regional framework and NATO security architecture. It will be easier to push through certain solutions and decisions if there is a \u2018Lublin Triangle common position\u2019 or \u2018Lublin Triangle interests\u2019 rather than playing \u2018one-on-one,\u2019 based on individual states&#8217; interests and potential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En mati\u00e8re de coop\u00e9ration militaire, la brigade lituano-polono-ukrainienne (nota bene bas\u00e9e \u00e0 Lublin) renvoie \u00e0 la tradition s\u00e9culaire de coop\u00e9ration militaire entre les trois pays. Cette coop\u00e9ration pourrait \u00e9voluer vers un dispositif de d\u00e9fense plus complet, pr\u00e9voyant par exemple une assistance en cas de conflit avec un pays tiers, dont l\u2019ampleur pourrait aller de l\u2019assistance technique \u00e0 la fourniture d\u2019une aide militaire limit\u00e9e.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cette collaboration a d\u00e9j\u00e0 produit quelques premiers r\u00e9sultats. Le 11 janvier, le pr\u00e9sident Volodymyr Zelenskyi a rencontr\u00e9 les dirigeants de la Pologne et de la Lituanie, Andrzej Duda et Gitanas Nausda, et des d\u00e9cisions importantes ont \u00e9t\u00e9 prises pour l\u2019Ukraine et sa r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe. Andrzej Duda a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que <em>\u00ab dans le cadre de la formation d\u2019une coalition internationale, une compagnie de chars Leopard sera transf\u00e9r\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine. La Pologne a d\u00e9j\u00e0 pris une d\u00e9cision \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard. \u00bb<\/em> Le pr\u00e9sident Zelenskyi a exprim\u00e9 sa gratitude \u00e0 la Pologne pour sa d\u00e9cision de transf\u00e9rer les chars. Il a en outre d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la Lituanie fournirait \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine des syst\u00e8mes de d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne et antia\u00e9rienne. Le dirigeant lituanien l\u2019a confirm\u00e9 sans toutefois pr\u00e9ciser quelles armes seraient livr\u00e9es.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The ongoing war on Ukrainian territory necessitates intensive work by the Ukrainian defense sector. Cooperation in this area could also benefit Ukraine and Poland, both of which are interested in modernizing their armed forces. The Lublin Triangle could be transformed into a military-political alliance, as the alliance members are now more united than ever before by a common threat in the form of Russia. However, for the time being, the Triangle&#8217;s formula is to be a <strong>plateforme consultative<\/strong>, de sorte que l\u2019institutionnalisation de la nouvelle initiative n\u2019est pas \u00e0 l\u2019ordre du jour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Closer cooperation within the framework of the Lublin Triangle may be hampered in the future by strained relations conditioned by differences in interests, mutual perceptions, and historical policies. This has been most visible in Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Lithuanian relations &#8211; in this context, the initiative may become a factor for improving bilateral relations, by reducing competing interests, but it may also be a weakness of the initiative, e.g., if circles in either country that are historically antagonistic towards their neighbors take power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left\">Pacte trilat\u00e9ral britannique-polonais-ukrainien<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The British\u2013Polish\u2013Ukrainian trilateral pact is a trilateral military and political cooperation format between the United Kingdom, Poland, and Ukraine to counter the Russian threat and work for European security. The formation of a new London-Warsaw-Kyiv axis coincides with a significant deterioration in Ukraine&#8217;s border security and the United Kingdom&#8217;s active supply of weapons to Ukraine. Representatives of the three newly allied countries said in a statement that the countries have \u201cdeep historical ties\u201d and \u201ca common history of confronting aggressors who threaten freedom in Europe.\u201d The alliance&#8217;s stated goal is to \u201cwork together to ensure stability and strengthen Ukraine&#8217;s resilience by reinforcing democracy along the border in Eastern Europe\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"787\" height=\"589\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-10.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10983\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-10.png 787w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-10-600x449.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-10-768x575.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-10-16x12.png 16w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 787px) 100vw, 787px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Source : Council on Geostrategy<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019Ukraine a lanc\u00e9 cette coop\u00e9ration trilat\u00e9rale en octobre 2021. Le 1er f\u00e9vrier 2022, le ministre ukrainien des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res Dmytro Kuleba a annonc\u00e9 une petite alliance entre l\u2019Ukraine, le Royaume-Uni et la Pologne. Le lancement de l\u2019alliance a \u00e9t\u00e9 annonc\u00e9 le 17 f\u00e9vrier 2022, mais elle n\u2019a toujours pas de nom officiel ni de documentation ; elle a pourtant d\u00e9j\u00e0 commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 fonctionner dans la pratique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La coop\u00e9ration s\u2019est d\u2019abord concentr\u00e9e sur la coordination du soutien \u00e0 la Plateforme de Crim\u00e9e, la coop\u00e9ration en mati\u00e8re de cybers\u00e9curit\u00e9 et de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique, ainsi que le renforcement des communications strat\u00e9giques. La coop\u00e9ration et l\u2019interaction militaires pourraient relever de l\u2019alliance, mais il est trop t\u00f4t pour dire si elles en constitueront les principaux domaines. En effet, le Royaume-Uni apporte une assistance directe \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, plut\u00f4t que dans le contexte d\u2019une alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"741\" height=\"494\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-11.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10984\" style=\"width:741px;height:494px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-11.png 741w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-11-600x400.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-11-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 741px) 100vw, 741px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>La ministre britannique des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res Liz Truss (\u00e0 gauche) et le ministre ukrainien des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res Dmytro Kuleba participent \u00e0 une conf\u00e9rence de presse conjointe apr\u00e8s leurs entretiens \u00e0 Kyiv, le 17 f\u00e9vrier 2022. (Photo d\u2019Efrem Lukatsky\/Pool\/AFP via Getty Images)<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">L\u2019expert militaire ukrainien Oleh Zhdanov pr\u00e9dit que si les trois pays parviennent \u00e0 s\u2019entendre en tant qu\u2019alli\u00e9s, une coordination des \u00e9tats-majors et du commandement militaires, ainsi qu\u2019une aide militaire, sera probablement mise en place, plut\u00f4t qu\u2019un simple soutien technique dans le domaine de la d\u00e9fense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ukraine&#8217;s interest in this type of cooperation can be explained by the fact that it will be easier to rely on practical and concrete assistance from countries that are already willing to assist, i.e., no time is required to reach a consensus among countries in larger alliances such as the European Union or NATO. However, Poland and the United Kingdom have influence in these alliances, and as in the case of the Lublin Triangle, they will be able to better convey Ukraine\u2019s position and requests, whether in the EU or NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Oleksii Danilov, secr\u00e9taire du Conseil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale et de d\u00e9fense de l\u2019Ukraine, estime que l\u2019Ukraine doit former une alliance de d\u00e9fense avec un pays dot\u00e9 de l\u2019arme nucl\u00e9aire. Dans une interview du 15 mars, l\u2019homme politique a indiqu\u00e9 qu\u2019un tel pays \u00e9tait le Royaume-Uni.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u00ab De nombreuses organisations internationales cr\u00e9\u00e9es apr\u00e8s la Seconde Guerre mondiale n\u2019ont aucune influence et ne font qu\u2019exprimer leur pr\u00e9occupation. L\u2019Ukraine doit rejoindre une nouvelle alliance de d\u00e9fense qui inclut un \u00c9tat dot\u00e9 d\u2019armes nucl\u00e9aires. \u00c0 l\u2019heure actuelle, il s\u2019agit du Royaume-Uni. \u00bb<\/em> Danilov&#8217;s words were quoted by the National Security and Defense Council&#8217;s press service.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By taking part in the trilateral cooperation initiative, the United Kingdom is pursuing a \u201cglobal Britain\u201d policy and attempting to play an active role in the world outside of the European Union. The concept of \u201cglobal Britain\u201d first appeared in the policy document \u201cGlobal Britain in a Competitive Age\u201d, a year after the UK\u2019s withdrawal from the European Union. The same document identifies Russia as the primary threat to NATO and the United Kingdom while emphasizing support for Ukraine&#8217;s territorial integrity and willingness to assist in the development of Ukrainian armed forces. Due to the fact that not all NATO countries are prepared to decisively counter the Russian threat, Britain continues to use small alliance tactics to work more effectively in Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"696\" height=\"463\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-12.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10985\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-12.png 696w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-12-600x399.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-12-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 696px) 100vw, 696px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Le Premier ministre polonais Mateusz Morawiecki et le Premier ministre ukrainien Denys Shmygal participent \u00e0 un point de presse apr\u00e8s leurs entretiens \u00e0 Kyiv, en Ukraine, le 1er f\u00e9vrier 2022. REUTERS\/Valentyn Ogirenko<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La Russie constitue \u00e9galement une menace pour la Pologne ; la capacit\u00e9 de d\u00e9fense d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e de l\u2019Ukraine aura donc une incidence sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 polonaise. La Pologne renforce aussi sa position au sein de l\u2019UE et de l\u2019OTAN gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 sa participation active aux petites alliances. Selon le Premier ministre polonais Mateusz Morawiecki, le principal avantage de ce nouveau format de coop\u00e9ration est le renforcement de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 r\u00e9gionale. L\u2019attaque hybride du r\u00e9gime de Loukachenko \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re polono-bi\u00e9lorusse constitue un argument suppl\u00e9mentaire pour la Pologne. Une autre question de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 pour la Pologne est la concentration probablement permanente de troupes russes au B\u00e9larus. Il est donc n\u00e9cessaire de se concentrer sur le renforcement du flanc oriental et des fronti\u00e8res de la Pologne, qui sont \u00e9galement les fronti\u00e8res ext\u00e9rieures de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne et de l\u2019OTAN.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00c0 l\u2019heure actuelle, pendant l\u2019agression russe en cours, le Royaume-Uni fournit \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine l\u2019une des plus importantes aides militaires et s\u00e9curitaires, et la Pologne, qui a naturellement int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00e0 ce que l\u2019Ukraine renforce ses capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense, coop\u00e8re avec elle \u00e0 un niveau plus large qui d\u00e9passe le cadre de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9. <em>\u00ab Cela les place au m\u00eame niveau que les Britanniques, les renforce au sein de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne et montre que la Pologne associe la Grande-Bretagne \u00e0 des t\u00e2ches de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 auxquelles toute l\u2019UE s\u2019int\u00e9resse \u00bb,<\/em> d\u00e9clare Serhii Herasymchuk, directeur adjoint du Conseil de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re \u00ab Ukrainian Prism \u00bb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>\u201cDeeper cooperation in this triangle appears to be natural. After all, we&#8217;re talking about two countries that take Russia&#8217;s threat seriously and have dealt with it to varying degrees. Because not all NATO countries are prepared to resolutely counter the Russian threat, Britain continues to use small alliance tactics to work more effectively in Eastern Europe. As a result, a three-way alliance can function as a Small Entente, similar to how Central and Eastern Europe formed a small bloc and shared the goals of the Great Entente in the early twentieth century.\u201d<\/em> &#8211; says expert Oleksandr Kraiev.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-text-align-left\">OTAN<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">NATO is a military-political alliance with a history dating back more than 70 years, whose primary function is to provide member states with mutual defense through civilian and military means. And it also serves as a forum for cooperation and consultation in a variety of other security-related areas. The Alliance is based on the North Atlantic Treaty, which was drafted in Washington on April 4, 1949, and is currently in effect indefinitely. After WWII, the Soviet Union and its satellite states posed a growing political and military threat to Western countries, prompting the treaty&#8217;s conclusion. The key provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, a founding act of NATO, concern the principles of member states&#8217; defense self-sufficiency (Article 3), allied consultations on security matters (Article 4), mutual assistance in a situation of armed aggression &#8211; the so-called \u201ccollective defense\u201d (Article 5), its application to the sum of the allied states&#8217; territories (Article 6), and the conditions for the organization&#8217;s enlargement (Article 10.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After Ukraine became independent in 1991, it initially pursued a non-aligned foreign policy, which meant it did not join any military alliances.&nbsp; Ukraine began cooperating with NATO in 1994, but it wasn&#8217;t until 2002 that it officially declared its desire to join the alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"739\" height=\"477\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-13.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10986\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-13.png 739w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-13-600x387.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-13-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 739px) 100vw, 739px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Ukraine&#8217;s President Viktor Yushchenko talks with US President George W. Bush, at the NATO Summit conference in Bucharest, where one of the most controversial decisions of the Alliance was made. Thursday, April 3, 2008. Source: White House by Eric Draper.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En 2008, l\u2019Ukraine et la G\u00e9orgie se sont vu promettre un plan d\u2019action pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN, qui devait conduire \u00e0 l\u2019adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019Alliance. Toutefois, l\u2019opposition politique au sein de l\u2019Ukraine et celle de la Russie, qui consid\u00e9rait l\u2019\u00e9largissement de l\u2019OTAN comme une menace, ont frein\u00e9 les perspectives d\u2019adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Ukraine, et le plan n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 officiellement propos\u00e9. La corruption, les probl\u00e8mes politiques, l\u2019insuffisance des r\u00e9formes et, par-dessus tout, l\u2019agression russe contre l\u2019Ukraine ayant entra\u00een\u00e9 l\u2019annexion de territoires ukrainiens ont entrav\u00e9 la progression du pays vers l\u2019OTAN.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">N\u00e9anmoins, en juin 2017, le Parlement ukrainien a reconnu l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN comme un objectif de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re du pays et, en f\u00e9vrier 2019, l\u2019objectif d\u2019adh\u00e9rer \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN et \u00e0 l\u2019UE a \u00e9t\u00e9 inscrit dans la Constitution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014, the annexation of Crimea, and the creation of Russian proxies in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, NATO responded by reinforcing the alliance&#8217;s defenses in Eastern Europe and halting all civilian and military cooperation with Russia. But for Russia, the lack of a strong consolidated response, which would entail steps to actively support Ukrainian resistance, proved to be a signal of the appropriateness of further campaigning against Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty and independence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the time frame that preceded the full-scale Russian invasion, the Ukrainian-NATO partnership encompassed various initiatives, such as enhancing Ukraine&#8217;s abilities and compatibility with NATO forces, facilitating reforms in the country`s defense and security sectors, and supporting non-military endeavors like joint scientific research and public diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Toutefois, l\u2019adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019organisation est rest\u00e9e absente de la table des n\u00e9gociations. Parmi les \u00ab obstacles \u00bb figuraient la r\u00e9ticence de la population du pays \u00e0 rejoindre l\u2019Alliance \u2014 le soutien, qui \u00e9tait de 19 % des Ukrainiens en octobre 2012, est pass\u00e9 \u00e0 47 % en janvier 2016 puis \u00e0 86 % en 2023, selon les sondages Rating de 2012, 2016 et 2023 \u2014, l\u2019impossibilit\u00e9 d\u2019adh\u00e9rer en raison du conflit en cours et la crainte de provoquer la Russie, qui a traditionnellement emp\u00each\u00e9 l\u2019OTAN de s\u2019engager plus profond\u00e9ment aupr\u00e8s de l\u2019Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9clenchement d\u2019une guerre d\u2019agression russe \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle en 2022, les pays membres de l\u2019OTAN ne sont pas parvenus \u00e0 s\u2019entendre sur l\u2019adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019Alliance, craignant que cela n\u2019aggrave les relations avec la Russie et n\u2019entra\u00eene l\u2019implication directe de l\u2019OTAN dans la guerre. Mais l\u2019Alliance a soutenu les efforts de l\u2019Ukraine pour d\u00e9fendre son ind\u00e9pendance et son int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale. Depuis le d\u00e9but de l\u2019invasion \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle, les \u00c9tats membres de l\u2019OTAN ont fourni \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine une aide militaire substantielle, d\u2019une valeur de plusieurs milliards de dollars, et se sont engag\u00e9s \u00e0 la poursuivre \u00ab aussi longtemps qu\u2019il le faudra \u00bb. Pour cette raison, l\u2019Ukraine a d\u00e9j\u00e0 re\u00e7u un grand nombre de syst\u00e8mes d\u2019armes standard de l\u2019OTAN qui, \u00e0 long terme, rapprocheront consid\u00e9rablement son arm\u00e9e des normes de l\u2019OTAN, les armes de l\u2019\u00e8re sovi\u00e9tique s\u2019\u00e9puisant rapidement sur le champ de bataille.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En effet, la d\u00e9fense r\u00e9ussie de l\u2019Ukraine contre l\u2019offensive russe en a fait un alli\u00e9 plus prometteur pour l\u2019OTAN. L\u2019Ukraine poss\u00e8de d\u00e9sormais l\u2019une des arm\u00e9es les plus nombreuses d\u2019Europe, aguerrie au combat et entra\u00een\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019emploi d\u2019armements occidentaux modernes en situation r\u00e9elle. En outre, les op\u00e9rations des unit\u00e9s ukrainiennes, men\u00e9es contre un ennemi bien plus nombreux, sont aujourd\u2019hui \u00e9tudi\u00e9es afin de permettre \u00e0 l\u2019organisation de r\u00e9pondre plus efficacement et plus rapidement \u00e0 d\u2019\u00e9ventuelles menaces s\u00e9curitaires. Une \u00e9ventuelle adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Ukraine renforcera donc consid\u00e9rablement le potentiel militaire de l\u2019Alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"735\" height=\"490\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-14.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-10987\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-14.png 735w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-14-600x400.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/image-14-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 735px) 100vw, 735px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Le pr\u00e9sident Volodymyr Zelenskyi a annonc\u00e9, le 30 septembre 2022, une demande surprise d\u2019adh\u00e9sion acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019alliance militaire de l\u2019OTAN. Photo : Bureau pr\u00e9sidentiel ukrainien. <\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Remarkably, Russia\u2019s unprecedented war against Ukraine prompted the accession of two other countries to NATO: Sweden and Finland. They applied under the simplified procedure (without MAP), which Ukraine also did on September 30, 2022. And although there is still no explicit agreement on Ukraine\u2019s accession, there are now hopes that the words of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg that \u201cNATO&#8217;s doors are open\u201d will have a practical implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La situation actuelle a r\u00e9fut\u00e9 nombre des arguments avanc\u00e9s auparavant contre l\u2019adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN ; les perspectives d\u2019adh\u00e9sion apr\u00e8s la guerre semblent donc plus r\u00e9elles que jamais. L\u2019adh\u00e9sion de l\u2019Ukraine \u00e0 l\u2019Alliance devrait r\u00e9soudre l\u2019\u00e9ternel probl\u00e8me de son r\u00f4le de zone tampon entre l\u2019OTAN et la Russie, tout en assurant la paix et la prosp\u00e9rit\u00e9 en Europe orientale, impossibles sans des m\u00e9canismes efficaces pour contenir les attitudes agressives des pays hostiles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En conclusion, la politique ukrainienne consistant \u00e0 initier une coop\u00e9ration en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 est une d\u00e9cision judicieuse qui renforce sa position sur la sc\u00e8ne internationale. En d\u00e9montrant sa volont\u00e9 d\u2019\u00eatre un alli\u00e9 fiable et de remplir ses responsabilit\u00e9s, l\u2019Ukraine accro\u00eet ses chances d\u2019\u00eatre entendue et reconnue comme un partenaire pr\u00e9cieux. Le Triangle de Lublin et le pacte trilat\u00e9ral britannique-polonais-ukrainien contribuent d\u00e9j\u00e0 aux efforts de l\u2019Ukraine pour d\u00e9fendre sa souverainet\u00e9 et son int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale, et ces partenariats pourraient \u00e9voluer en une alliance de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 dot\u00e9e de garanties solides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Toutefois, le souhait de l\u2019Ukraine d\u2019adh\u00e9rer \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN ne s\u2019est pas encore concr\u00e9tis\u00e9 et la voie \u00e0 suivre demeure incertaine. Si l\u2019ambition de l\u2019Ukraine de devenir membre de l\u2019OTAN pourrait se r\u00e9aliser \u00e0 l\u2019avenir, elle d\u00e9pend de divers facteurs, notamment d\u2019une d\u00e9faite compl\u00e8te de la Russie. Malgr\u00e9 ces obstacles, les efforts de l\u2019Ukraine pour promouvoir la coop\u00e9ration en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 sont louables et pourraient b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier \u00e0 tous les participants.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>States are the only subjects of international law, that possess international legal capacity, i.e.: to maintain diplomatic and consular relations, participate in international organizations, enter into agreements, bear international responsibility, have their citizenship, etc. As a participant in international relations, Ukraine must understand its goals, needs, options for action, and the means at its disposal [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":10983,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13,58],"tags":[],"topic":[91,110,87,86],"class_list":["post-10979","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","category-eng-western-europe","topic-eu","topic-nato","topic-security","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Ukraine\u2019s Security Pacts and Alliances | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This analysis reviews Ukraine\u2019s recent security agreements and alliances, assessing their contribution to deterrence and longer-term security guarantees.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, 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