{"id":35027,"date":"2026-03-16T17:35:43","date_gmt":"2026-03-16T15:35:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=35027"},"modified":"2026-03-22T00:25:42","modified_gmt":"2026-03-21T22:25:42","slug":"germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/es\/2026\/03\/16\/germanys-next-steps-to-support-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Los pr\u00f3ximos pasos de Alemania para apoyar a Ucrania"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"53876\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"Descargar el PDF en ingl\u00e9s\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Descargar el PDF en ingl\u00e9s<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">321 KB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The US administration&#8217;s foreign policy shift has made European support the lifeline for Ukraine&#8217;s defense. After the most devastating winter since the full-scale invasion began, the pressure on Ukraine is only intensifying. As Europe&#8217;s largest economy and top contributor of military aid, Germany is uniquely positioned to lead. The Bundestag, with its authority over defense policy, budgetary decisions, and international commitments, can turn this position into immediate, concrete action to sustain Ukraine&#8217;s ability to defend itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-procuring-from-ukraine-s-defense-industry\"><strong>Procuring from Ukraine&#8217;s Defense Industry<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-\">Ukraine&#8217;s defense production capacity <a href=\"https:\/\/mod.gov.ua\/en\/news\/the-ministry-of-defence-secured-over-6-billion-for-ukraine-s-defense-industry-in-2025\">alcanz\u00f3 los 35.000 millones de d\u00f3lares<\/a> en 2025, pero el Estado solo puede adquirir un tercio de esta producci\u00f3n. La financiaci\u00f3n extranjera mediante el <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/production-procurement-how-europe-and-ukraine-are-transforming-defense-supply-chains\">modelo dan\u00e9s<\/a> y sus variantes <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rnbo.gov.ua\/en\/Diialnist\/7361.html\">alcanz\u00f3 los 6.700 millones de d\u00f3lares<\/a> en 2025. Incluso combinadas, las adquisiciones nacionales y extranjeras dejan una capacidad significativa sin utilizar. Alemania \u2014con solo <a href=\"https:\/\/quantum-systems.com\/news\/first-joint-co-production-of-ukrainian-drones-in-europe-launched-by-quantum-systems-and-frontline-robotics\/\">una planta de producci\u00f3n conjunta<\/a> de sistemas de defensa ucranianos en su territorio\u2014 apenas est\u00e1 aprovechando el potencial de la asociaci\u00f3n.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-\"><strong>Fundamento estrat\u00e9gico<\/strong>: Ukrainian producers offer combat-tested systems at a fraction of Western costs. German procurement would sustain Ukrainian capacity that risks being lost to underuse, while helping address Europe&#8217;s own defense production shortfalls \u2014 a strategic investment in collective deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-\"><strong>Desaf\u00edo actual: <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.juergenhardt.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/10-Punkte-Plan-DEU-UKR-Ruestungskooperation.pdf\">Plan de 10 puntos<\/a> para reforzar la cooperaci\u00f3n industrial de defensa germano-ucraniana contempla empresas conjuntas, garant\u00edas de inversi\u00f3n y la adquisici\u00f3n de sistemas ucranianos, pero las adquisiciones efectivas a Ucrania siguen siendo marginales en relaci\u00f3n con su presupuesto de defensa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u00c1mbito de actuaci\u00f3n<\/strong>: Alemania puede destinar m\u00e1s fondos de asistencia militar a adquirir directamente a productores ucranianos, al tiempo que adquiere sistemas fabricados en Ucrania para la propia Bundeswehr. Ambas v\u00edas deber\u00edan priorizarse en \u00e1mbitos en los que Ucrania posee una ventaja tecnol\u00f3gica demostrada, como los drones, la guerra electr\u00f3nica y los sistemas interceptores.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-accelerating-ukraine-s-eu-accession\"><strong>Accelerating Ukraine&#8217;s EU Accession<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As the US withdraws from European security commitments, Ukraine becomes indispensable to Europe&#8217;s own defense. Yet the traditional enlargement framework is increasingly mismatched with today&#8217;s urgency. A new accession model is needed \u2014 one that reflects the security reality and can be advanced separately from other candidacies. The European Commission is already developing <a href=\"https:\/\/table.media\/en\/europe\/news-en\/ukraine-commission-proposes-gradual-integration\">posibles modelos<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Fundamento estrat\u00e9gico<\/strong>: EU membership is the only credible long-term guarantee of Ukraine&#8217;s stability and prosperity as well as a structural deterrent against future aggression. A stalled process weakens not only Ukraine but the EU&#8217;s own credibility, creating openings for hostile external actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Desaf\u00edo actual: <\/strong>Member states, including Germany, have not prepared domestically for enlargement. The conversation about its implications has barely begun, while in Ukraine and Moldova accession dominates the agenda. Hungary&#8217;s blocking of the opening of negotiation clusters has exposed how one spoiler can undermine the entire process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u00c1mbito de actuaci\u00f3n<\/strong>: Germany should launch a substantive domestic and European debate on EU enlargement, positioning itself as a constructive leader on both the substance and the process. Concrete steps include working with the European Commission on its reform proposals and building consensus among member states for a solution that preserves both the merit-based principle and the strategic urgency of Ukraine&#8217;s European path.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-circumventing-vetoes-on-ukraine-aid\"><strong>Sortear los vetos a la ayuda para Ucrania<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hungr\u00eda y Eslovaquia siguen <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/hungary-vows-block-eu-sanctions-russia-eve-ukraine-war-anniversary-2026-02-23\/\">bloqueando el paquete de ayuda de la UE de 90.000 millones de euros<\/a> para Ucrania. En respuesta, los pa\u00edses n\u00f3rdicos y b\u00e1lticos se han comprometido a aportar <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/europe-plan-to-keep-ukraine-afloat-hungary-blocking-e90b-loan\/\">hasta 30.000 millones de euros en pr\u00e9stamos bilaterales<\/a> to meet Ukraine&#8217;s immediate financial needs through mid-2026, regardless of the veto.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Fundamento estrat\u00e9gico<\/strong>: Predictable financial support underpins Ukraine&#8217;s defense capacity, economic resilience, and negotiating position in peace talks. Allowing a single member state to hold European security policy hostage sets a dangerous precedent \u2014 for Ukraine and for Europe&#8217;s crisis-response capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Desaf\u00edo actual: <\/strong>With Hungary&#8217;s electoral campaign in full swing and the &#8220;threat from Ukraine&#8221; among its central themes, the blockage is unlikely to be lifted before a new government takes office around late May or June. Until then, Ukraine faces an acute funding gap that could trigger worsening conditions on the ground and a new wave of refugees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u00c1mbito de actuaci\u00f3n<\/strong>: Alemania puede sumarse a la coalici\u00f3n de pr\u00e9stamos bilaterales o codirigirla, otorg\u00e1ndole el peso financiero y pol\u00edtico que necesita. A m\u00e1s largo plazo, Berl\u00edn deber\u00eda reactivar los debates sobre una transici\u00f3n gradual a la votaci\u00f3n por mayor\u00eda cualificada en las decisiones de pol\u00edtica exterior y sanciones (como demuestra la reciente decisi\u00f3n sobre la congelaci\u00f3n indefinida de activos rusos), as\u00ed como sobre un procedimiento operativo del art\u00edculo 7 del TUE que pueda exigir responsabilidades a los Estados miembros.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-disrupting-russia-s-shadow-fleet-in-the-baltic-sea\"><strong>Disrupting Russia&#8217;s Shadow Fleet in the Baltic Sea<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">European enforcement against Russia&#8217;s shadow fleet has entered a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/online-analysis\/2026\/03\/europes-coastal-states-tighten-enforcement-on-russias-shadow-fleet\/\">nueva fase operativa<\/a>, con B\u00e9lgica, Francia y Suecia a la cabeza. Estados Unidos ha incautado al menos <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/dispatches\/when-economic-warfare-meets-gunboat-diplomacy-what-to-know-about-the-us-seizures-of-shadow-fleet-tankers\/\">siete petroleros<\/a> desde finales de 2025. Ninguna de estas operaciones provoc\u00f3 represalias rusas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Fundamento estrat\u00e9gico<\/strong>: The EU&#8217;s oil price cap stands at <a href=\"https:\/\/finance.ec.europa.eu\/news\/new-dynamic-mechanism-lower-price-cap-russian-crude-oil-4410-barrel-2026-01-15_en\">44,10 d\u00f3lares por barril<\/a>. Alrededor del 68 % de las exportaciones rusas de crudo se transportan ahora <a href=\"https:\/\/supplystatus.com\/list\/how-the-iran-war-and-sanctions-are-reshaping-russian-oil-exports-2026\/v\">en buques sancionados<\/a>, eludiendo por completo el tope. Estos mismos buques plantean graves riesgos ambientales y de inteligencia para las aguas europeas. Tras el inicio de la guerra en Ir\u00e1n, Rusia ha obtenido <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/russia-earns-additional-6-billion-euros-in-fossil-fuel-revenue-as-oil-prices-soar-amid-us-iran-war-analysis-finds\/\">6.000 millones de euros adicionales en ingresos por combustibles f\u00f3siles<\/a>. Dado que Washington <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/clyzj3g3pygo\">ya est\u00e1 relajando las sanciones<\/a>, Europa debe estar preparada para mantener y hacer cumplir el r\u00e9gimen de sanciones de forma independiente.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Desaf\u00edo actual: <\/strong>M\u00e1s de <a href=\"https:\/\/maritime-executive.com\/article\/european-nations-warn-shadow-fleet-shipowners-to-play-by-the-rules\">300 buques de la flota fantasma<\/a> navegan ahora bajo banderas falsas o sin bandera alguna, lo que los somete a abordaje conforme al art\u00edculo 92 de la CNUDM, pero Alemania carece de protocolos operativos para ejercer esta autoridad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u00c1mbito de actuaci\u00f3n<\/strong>: Alemania puede seguir el <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/cy8pn7jgy3no\">modelo del Reino Unido<\/a>, utilizando la legislaci\u00f3n de sanciones vigente para autorizar la aplicaci\u00f3n militar, o legislar una autoridad nacional para abordar, inspeccionar y detener buques sospechosos. Debe garantizar la transposici\u00f3n plena de la Directiva (UE) 2024\/1226 para que la elusi\u00f3n de sanciones sea perseguible como delito. Tambi\u00e9n debe asignar recursos espec\u00edficos para patrullas conjuntas en el mar B\u00e1ltico con socios n\u00f3rdicos y b\u00e1lticos, demostrando disposici\u00f3n para hacer cumplir las sanciones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-delivering-taurus-missles-to-ukraine\"><strong>Entrega de misiles Taurus a Ucrania<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ucrania ha destruido <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/robert_magyar\/2041\">54 sistemas rusos de defensa a\u00e9rea<\/a> durante el invierno y <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/robert_magyar\/2074\">19 m\u00e1s<\/a> en la primera quincena de marzo, abriendo una ventana para atacar objetivos industriales de defensa m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de la l\u00ednea del frente, como demostr\u00f3 el ataque del 10 de marzo contra <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/03\/11\/world\/europe\/ukraine-russia-electronics-plant-missiles.html\">la f\u00e1brica Kremniy-El<\/a> en Briansk. Sin embargo, el arsenal de ataques de largo alcance sigue siendo peligrosamente escaso: las capacidades de producci\u00f3n brit\u00e1nica y francesa son limitadas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Fundamento estrat\u00e9gico<\/strong>: Taurus ampliar\u00eda la capacidad de ataque de largo alcance de Ucrania y tensionar\u00eda a\u00fan m\u00e1s las defensas a\u00e9reas rusas, ya debilitadas. A medida que la guerra en Ir\u00e1n agrava la escasez de interceptores occidentales, atacar la producci\u00f3n de misiles de Rusia en origen se vuelve a\u00fan m\u00e1s crucial para evitar otra cat\u00e1strofe humanitaria en el invierno de 2026\/27.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Desaf\u00edo actual:<\/strong> Germany has prioritized Ukraine&#8217;s indigenous long-range strike program \u2014 a sound investment, but one that does not close the spring\u2013summer gap, when the Russian offensive is expected. Comparable Ukrainian systems are unlikely to reach reliable serial production before late 2026 at the earliest, and drones cannot substitute the firepower of cruise missiles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u00c1mbito de actuaci\u00f3n<\/strong>: Taurus <a href=\"https:\/\/www.twz.com\/germanys-taurus-cruise-missile-could-be-the-next-for-ukraine\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">puede integrarse en los F-16<\/a> ya en servicio ucraniano, con la <a href=\"https:\/\/deaidua.org\/news\/2025\/02\/23\/taurus-kepd-350-for-ukraine-how-a-delivery-might-look-like\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">formaci\u00f3n completada en 3\u20134 meses<\/a>. Las existencias entregadas pueden sustituirse por una variante Taurus Neo mejorada. El Bundestag puede desempe\u00f1ar un papel catalizador mediante el debate parlamentario y al exigir que el acuerdo de cooperaci\u00f3n con Ucrania sobre armas de largo alcance incluya medidas provisionales para cubrir la brecha hasta que los sistemas producidos en Ucrania alcancen la producci\u00f3n en serie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The US administration&#8217;s foreign policy shift has made European support the lifeline for Ukraine&#8217;s defense. After the most devastating winter since the full-scale invasion began, the pressure on Ukraine is only intensifying. As Europe&#8217;s largest economy and top contributor of military aid, Germany is uniquely positioned to lead. The Bundestag, with its authority over defense [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":35042,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13,53,72,58],"tags":[],"topic":[91,96,84,86],"class_list":["post-35027","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","category-reports-handbooks","category-eng-reports-german-ukrainian-partnership-program","category-eng-western-europe","topic-eu","topic-germany","topic-russia","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Germany&#039;s Next Steps to Support Ukraine | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This report sets out steps Germany can take to support Ukraine as changing U.S. 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