{"id":3501,"date":"2022-04-09T19:26:52","date_gmt":"2022-04-09T16:26:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=3501"},"modified":"2025-08-21T14:48:14","modified_gmt":"2025-08-21T11:48:14","slug":"why-did-russia-invade-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/es\/2022\/04\/09\/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"\u00bfPor qu\u00e9 Rusia invadi\u00f3 Ucrania?"},"content":{"rendered":"<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"665\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/Russia-MIlitary-2021-1024x665.webp\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-3503\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/Russia-MIlitary-2021-1024x665.webp 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/Russia-MIlitary-2021-600x390.webp 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/Russia-MIlitary-2021-768x499.webp 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/Russia-MIlitary-2021.webp 1536w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El estamento dirigente ruso ha justificado su guerra contra Ucrania con diversas consideraciones, desde amenazas a la seguridad nacional y la prevenci\u00f3n de un posible ataque contra territorios rusos hasta la \u00abdesnazificaci\u00f3n\u00bb de Ucrania. Sin embargo, los horrores de la guerra que Rusia libra contra su vecino brindan la oportunidad de analizar y reevaluar la interpretaci\u00f3n de la pol\u00edtica rusa que ha desarrollado y aplicado persistentemente durante las dos \u00faltimas d\u00e9cadas. Una comprensi\u00f3n profunda de los motivos subyacentes de esta posici\u00f3n de los dirigentes rusos es crucial a la hora de dise\u00f1ar una estrategia futura hacia Rusia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li><strong>La b\u00fasqueda de estatus<\/strong><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">En el orden mundial establecido a principios de la d\u00e9cada de 1990, la Federaci\u00f3n de Rusia no era la superpotencia que hab\u00eda sido su predecesora, la URSS. Con la independencia de muchas antiguas rep\u00fablicas sovi\u00e9ticas, Rusia perdi\u00f3 territorios, as\u00ed como influencia econ\u00f3mica y pol\u00edtica. La b\u00fasqueda de una nueva <em>raz\u00f3n de ser <\/em>combinada con el recuerdo, arraigado en la mente de la poblaci\u00f3n rusa, de la influencia y el poder recientes de su Estado dio lugar a ideas revisionistas sobre la configuraci\u00f3n actual del sistema de relaciones internacionales.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Era evidente que Estados Unidos no percib\u00eda a Rusia como un adversario igual y no hab\u00eda demasiados \u00e1mbitos en los que esta pudiera contrarrestarlo. Uno de ellos era la seguridad y la estabilidad estrat\u00e9gica, que se convirti\u00f3 en uno de los temas transversales de las relaciones ruso-estadounidenses. Al advertir que los temas relacionados con la seguridad eran fruct\u00edferos para acercarse al estatus de potencia mundial y al no poder lograr resultados considerables en otros campos, Rusia comenz\u00f3 a securitizar su pol\u00edtica exterior o, en otras palabras, a considerar como asuntos de seguridad la mayor\u00eda de las cuestiones que surg\u00edan a su alrededor, incluso si no lo eran. Este paradigma ha sido evidente en la ret\u00f3rica de los funcionarios rusos sobre temas como la energ\u00eda, la econom\u00eda y la pol\u00edtica.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Por tanto, desde esta perspectiva, la reciente pol\u00edtica rusa hacia Ucrania y las potencias occidentales (es decir, la construcci\u00f3n del gasoducto Nord Stream-2 para manipular a los Estados europeos; la concentraci\u00f3n de tropas en la frontera ucraniana y su uso como factor de presi\u00f3n; el env\u00edo de ultim\u00e1tums a las potencias occidentales sobre la reestructuraci\u00f3n del sistema de seguridad europeo; y la invasi\u00f3n de Ucrania tras fracasar las negociaciones) ten\u00eda como objetivo alcanzar el estatus de actor global en la toma de decisiones, que habla de igual a igual con las grandes potencias.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li><strong>Proteger la esfera de influencia<\/strong><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Como continuaci\u00f3n de las consideraciones anteriores, los rusos creen que su Estado tiene una esfera de influencia que otros actores deben respetar. Naturalmente, esta \u00abzona de inter\u00e9s exclusivo\u00bb abarca a las antiguas rep\u00fablicas sovi\u00e9ticas y a los miembros del bloque socialista. Esto explica por qu\u00e9 Putin calific\u00f3 el colapso de la Uni\u00f3n Sovi\u00e9tica como la mayor cat\u00e1strofe geopol\u00edtica del siglo XX, pues abri\u00f3 el camino para que los antiguos aliados de Rusia se alejaran de ella y algunos de ellos se unieran a la OTAN y a la Uni\u00f3n Europea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Con esto en mente, cualquier se\u00f1al de una pol\u00edtica prooccidental que implique la p\u00e9rdida de influencia pol\u00edtica rusa se percibe como una amenaza para los intereses nacionales y el Kremlin la recibe de manera especialmente dolorosa. Esto qued\u00f3 patente durante los levantamientos p\u00fablicos en Bielorrusia y Kazajist\u00e1n, donde Rusia apoy\u00f3 activamente a los gobiernos prorrusos; en 2008, cuando invadi\u00f3 Georgia despu\u00e9s de que esta expresara su intenci\u00f3n de unirse a la OTAN; y en 2014 en Ucrania, cuando la Revoluci\u00f3n de la Dignidad derroc\u00f3 al presidente prorruso Yanuk\u00f3vich y Rusia ocup\u00f3 Crimea e instig\u00f3 la guerra en la regi\u00f3n ucraniana del Donb\u00e1s. Las renovadas hostilidades en curso son una continuaci\u00f3n natural de esta l\u00ednea de la pol\u00edtica rusa, orientada a vulnerar los derechos humanos y limitar la soberan\u00eda de Estados independientes que considera dentro de su esfera de influencia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li><strong>La b\u00fasqueda de un enemigo externo para ocultar problemas internos<\/strong><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A pesar de que Rusia es el pa\u00eds m\u00e1s grande del mundo y rico en recursos naturales, la mayor parte de su poblaci\u00f3n vive bastante mal. Como al Kremlin le preocupa mucho mantenerse en el poder, debe crear una apariencia de procesos democr\u00e1ticos en el Estado y asegurar el apoyo p\u00fablico. Para desviar la atenci\u00f3n de los problemas que los rusos comunes afrontan en su vida cotidiana, se crea y difunde mediante la maquinaria propagand\u00edstica una amplia gama de mitos que presentan a enemigos extranjeros haciendo todo lo posible por arruinar el Estado. Naturalmente, esas narrativas se centran sobre todo en las potencias occidentales y la OTAN, consideradas actores hostiles culpables de todas las desgracias rusas.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Incluso pese a la absoluta falta de fundamento de tales acusaciones contra Occidente y a las numerosas violaciones de los derechos humanos y de las leyes nacionales cometidas por Putin y todo el estamento dirigente ruso, estos son vistos como mes\u00edas y salvadores de la naci\u00f3n. De ah\u00ed el creciente apoyo p\u00fablico al presidente ruso tras la ocupaci\u00f3n de Crimea en 2014 y el inicio de la guerra no provocada a gran escala contra Ucrania hace un mes y medio.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li><strong>El odio ruso hacia Ucrania<\/strong><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A la luz de los puntos anteriores, el valor geopol\u00edtico, econ\u00f3mico y simb\u00f3lico de Ucrania revest\u00eda una importancia particular para las \u00e9lites rusas. Por ello, el Kremlin hizo todo lo posible por impedir que los ucranianos se distanciaran de Rusia. Sin embargo, la mayor\u00eda de los esfuerzos rusos por crear una imagen positiva de su pa\u00eds entre la poblaci\u00f3n ucraniana \u2014incluida, entre otras medidas, la generosa financiaci\u00f3n de candidatos presidenciales, partidos pol\u00edticos y canales de televisi\u00f3n prorrusos\u2014 produjeron el efecto contrario.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">La oposici\u00f3n del pueblo ucraniano a los numerosos intentos de opresi\u00f3n y su voluntad de seguir el camino hacia Occidente, la democracia y la libertad fomentaron un tipo espec\u00edfico de desprecio hacia los ucranianos entre el estamento dirigente ruso, ampliamente asumido y respaldado por la poblaci\u00f3n; cada paso de Ucrania hacia el \u00e9xito se percibe como hostil a Rusia. La invasi\u00f3n a gran escala ha sido otra oportunidad para que los rusos demuestren que no se detendr\u00e1n hasta que el Estado ucraniano independiente deje de existir.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, la pol\u00edtica exterior agresiva de Rusia, que ha llevado a la pr\u00e1ctica durante los \u00faltimos a\u00f1os, ha sido ampliamente malinterpretada y subestimada. Sin embargo, la agresi\u00f3n abierta contra un Estado democr\u00e1tico casi en el centro de Europa ayuda al mundo civilizado a comprender la verdadera esencia de la pol\u00edtica rusa y a entender que disuadir o apaciguar a un agresor de tal magnitud no es una alternativa a detenerlo mediante una respuesta unida y contundente.&nbsp;<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Russian establishment has been justifying its war against Ukraine by different considerations ranging from threats to national security and preventing a potential attack on Russian territories to the \u201cdenazification\u201d of Ukraine. However, the horrors of the war Russia wages against its neighbor provide an opportunity to analyze and reevaluate the interpretation of the Russian [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3503,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,31],"tags":[],"topic":[],"class_list":["post-3501","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-en-analyses","category-ger-analyses"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Why did Russia invade Ukraine? | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The analysis traces Russia\u2019s invasion to Moscow\u2019s pursuit of great-power status, control over Ukraine and rejection of the post-Cold War European order.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/es\/2022\/04\/09\/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"es_ES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Why did Russia invade Ukraine?\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The analysis traces Russia\u2019s invasion to Moscow\u2019s pursuit of great-power status, control over Ukraine and rejection of the post-Cold War European order.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/es\/2022\/04\/09\/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Transatlantic-Dialogue-Center-105645698740463\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2022-04-09T16:26:52+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2025-08-21T11:48:14+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/Russia-MIlitary-2021.webp\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1536\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"998\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/webp\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"tdcadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:title\" content=\"Why did Russia invade Ukraine?\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:description\" content=\"The analysis traces Russia\u2019s invasion to Moscow\u2019s pursuit of great-power status, control over Ukraine and rejection of the post-Cold War European order.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Escrito por\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"tdcadmin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Tiempo de lectura\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"5 minutos\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2022\/04\/09\/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2022\/04\/09\/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"tdcadmin\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#\/schema\/person\/93d6a1a71a5db737f83ae00987761c07\"},\"headline\":\"Why did Russia invade Ukraine?\",\"datePublished\":\"2022-04-09T16:26:52+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2025-08-21T11:48:14+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2022\/04\/09\/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine\/\"},\"wordCount\":1045,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2022\/04\/09\/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/Russia-MIlitary-2021.webp\",\"articleSection\":[\"English Analyses\",\"German Analyses\"],\"inLanguage\":\"es\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2022\/04\/09\/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2022\/04\/09\/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2022\/04\/09\/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine\/\",\"name\":\"Why did Russia invade Ukraine? 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