{"id":29934,"date":"2025-07-10T11:20:12","date_gmt":"2025-07-10T08:20:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=29934"},"modified":"2025-07-10T11:20:14","modified_gmt":"2025-07-10T08:20:14","slug":"building-defence-in-a-post-american-european-security-order-ukraines-integration-burden-sharing-and-the-new-transatlantic-reality","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/de\/2025\/07\/10\/building-defence-in-a-post-american-european-security-order-ukraines-integration-burden-sharing-and-the-new-transatlantic-reality\/","title":{"rendered":"Building Defence in a Post-American European Security Order: Ukraine\u2019s Integration, Burden-Sharing, and the New Transatlantic Reality"},"content":{"rendered":"<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>By Vitalii Rishko<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px;border:1px solid #e2e2e2\" data-attachment-id=\"48786\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"false\" title=\"Herunterladen\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"22\" height=\"22\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>Herunterladen<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"background:transparent;border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi-folder-o\"><\/i><span class=\"file-size\">3 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1244\" height=\"505\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-29937\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image.png 1244w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-600x244.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-1024x416.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-768x312.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-18x7.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1244px) 100vw, 1244px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Europe must urgently build autonomous defense capabilities to make sure it can protect itself and ease the pressure on the US. <strong>The EU can no longer be fully dependent on US security guarantees<\/strong>. Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine and Washington\u2019s pivot to Asia and Middle East have made a <strong>post-American European security order<\/strong> both more likely and more urgent.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Ukraine is not a burden but a critical contributor to European defense<\/strong>. With a resilient and rapidly scaling defense sector, especially with regard artillery, ammunition, drones, and joint ventures with European counterparts. Ukraine is becoming an industrial and operational backbone for European security.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The EU has developed <strong>the right strategic documents<\/strong>, but faces real implementation challenges. From the Strategic Compass to the ReArm Europe Plan and SAFE, the EU has frameworks in place, yet it <strong>still faces legal, financial, and political hurdles<\/strong> to achieving defense integration at scale.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Closer EU\u2013Ukraine defense industrial cooperation is a strategic win for the US as well and, therefore, must be supported by American decision-makers<\/strong>. Greater EU self-sufficiency enables Washington to rebalance toward the Indo-Pacific without leaving Europe vulnerable. Supporting this process is a strategic investment for US decision-makers and America\u2019s global interests.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>A new Road Map is needed. <strong>A jointly agreed transatlantic Road Map between the EU, US (NATO), Ukraine, and other close partners to clarify burden-sharing arrangements, timeline goals, and defense production responsibilities for the coming decade<\/strong>. If a significant US retreat from Europe is to take place, it should be well-planned, mutually agreed upon, gradual, and organized.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Introduction: Why Europe Must Build Defence Capacity amid US Rebalancing and Russia\u2019s War<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The question of building European defence is as old as the process of <a href=\"https:\/\/aei.pitt.edu\/503\/2\/chai43e.pdf\">European integration<\/a> itself. What began as a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/profile\/Wolfram-Kaiser-3\/publication\/384009815_The_History_of_the_European_Union_Origins_of_a_Trans-_and_Supranational_Polity_1950-1972\/links\/66e4165dfa5e11512cb70446\/The-History-of-the-European-Union-Origins-of-a-Trans-and-Supranational-Polity-1950-1972.pdf\">peace-oriented project<\/a> after World War II to guarantee stability on the continent, the European Communities and later the European Union (EU) were designed to institutionalize peace. Initially, the European project focused on intertwining and integrating national economies and key sectors, including coal and steel relevant to military production, in order to make the outbreak of another war less plausible. Security, including the nuclear umbrella, was mostly provided by the United States (US).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>During the Cold War, the EU was able to concentrate on developing non-defence common policies, essentially adopting a low-key security posture grounded and instead leveraging its economic and <a href=\"https:\/\/rucforsk.ruc.dk\/ws\/portalfiles\/portal\/38384208\/Ian_Manners_The_normative_power_of_the_European_Union_in_a_globalised_world_Laidi_2008_proof.pdf\">normative power<\/a>, while largely outsourcing its defense and security to the US and NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Despite recurring proposals to establish a <a href=\"https:\/\/hal.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr\/hal-02970613\/document\">European Defence Union (EDU)<\/a>, that is, to reduce Europe\u2019s dependence on US security guarantees, such initiatives consistently faced pushback from both within Europe and, paradoxically, from Washington itself. US policymakers often cited the risk of <a href=\"https:\/\/aei.pitt.edu\/502\/1\/chai42e.pdf\">duplicating NATO\u2019s functions<\/a>. This long-standing miscommunication between the US and Europe, combined with a lack of forward-looking strategic planning and trust, led to the consistently shrinking attention to European defence. Following the Cold War, and in the absence of a perceived immediate military threat from Russia, European <a href=\"https:\/\/aei.pitt.edu\/79661\/1\/Schilde.Wieluns.pdf\">defence budgets declined<\/a>, armed forces stagnated, and strategic focus on conventional security steadily diminished.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Today, however, the imperative to build European defence, whether through the EDU, a broader EU strategic autonomy, or a strengthened European pillar within NATO, has become more urgent than ever. Russia\u2019s full-scale war against Ukraine has reintroduced a direct military threat to Europe. Not to mention the fact that NATO\u2019s Secretary General Mark Rutte <a href=\"https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2025\/06\/nato-chief-mark-rutte-warns-russia-could-use-military-force-against-alliance-five-years\">recently stated<\/a> that <strong>Russia could attack a NATO member state within the next five years<\/strong> due to its increasing domestic production of military capabilities, and such a possibility is also confirmed by several European intelligence services, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/russia-has-plans-test-natos-resolve-german-intelligence-chief-warns-2025-06-09\/\">including Germany\u2019s<\/a>. Simultaneously, the shifting global balance of power has prompted the US to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.belfercenter.org\/transatlantic-bargain\">rebalance its security commitments<\/a>. Washington now faces overstretched resources due to the tensions in the Middle East and the challenge of containing its primary strategic competitor: China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This analysis outlines the key developments shaping the reconstruction of Europe\u2019s security architecture in the context of potential US disengagement from European defence and its reorientation toward Asia. Some analysts already describe this moment as pivotal, one in which <strong>the EU <\/strong><strong>must prepare for a <\/strong><strong>so-called <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/europe\/post-american-europe-justin-logan-joshua-shifrinson?utm_source=chatgpt.com\"><strong>post-American <\/strong><strong>European <\/strong><strong>security order<\/strong><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Taking into account Russia\u2019s ongoing aggression against Ukraine and the Kremlin\u2019s reluctance to engage in diplomacy meaningfully, even amid US President Donald Trump\u2019s attempts to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.globalgovernance.eu\/publications\/bound-to-fail-the-limits-of-diplomacy-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-the-future-of-european-security\">push for negotiations<\/a>, this paper explores how Europe, together with Ukraine, can navigate the enduring challenges of war and waning US engagement, in order to achieve a greater degree of autonomy and continue providing sustained support to Kyiv, while stressing the need for Americans to stay in the loop.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><strong>Evolving Frameworks for European Defence: From Debate to a Comprehensive Long-Term Strategy?<\/strong><\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-group is-nowrap is-layout-flex wp-container-core-group-is-layout-6c531013 wp-block-group-is-layout-flex\">\n<p>As mentioned previously, long-standing tensions and misunderstandings between Europe and the US regarding the need for Europe to do more to ensure its own defence have significantly impacted the state of affairs in this domain. These dynamics have, in fact, slowed down the EU\u2019s potential to meaningfully embrace defence integration. On the one hand, the US has long encouraged Europe to ease pressure on American resources by building up its own defence capabilities and meeting NATO\u2019s 2% GDP spending on defence target. On the other hand, <strong>Washington has often criticized European governments for encroaching on NATO\u2019s territory<\/strong> whenever concrete initiatives were proposed. This ambivalence contributed to significant budget cuts across European militaries, slowed domestic production, weakened defence infrastructure, and made much of it outdated and unfit for rapid deployment. As a result, the EU lost momentum in developing a stronger defence and security posture between 1992 and the early 2000s. Another issue here is the <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/the-meaning-of-sovereignty-ukrainian-and-european-views-of-russias-war-on-ukraine\/\">persistent scepticism<\/a> among European publics and policymakers about increasing defence spending, even as a major war unfolds at the EU\u2019s doorstep.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignright size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"506\" height=\"337\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-2.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-29939\" style=\"width:360px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-2.png 506w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-2-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 506px) 100vw, 506px\" \/><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n<p>In the current transatlantic reality, Washington has set a course to reduce its involvement in European security and intends to <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/us-to-cut-military-aid-to-ukraine-hegseth-says\/\">significantly limit<\/a> its military support for Ukraine, most likely to preserve its own defence stockpiles and capabilities for its <a href=\"https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/reviews\/pivot-wasnt-mastro-lost-decade-china?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">pivot towards Asia<\/a>. The American vision is grounded in a willingness to be better prepared for a <strong>potential outbreak of conflict in the Indo-Pacific<\/strong>, particularly over Taiwan. Under such circumstances, the NATO 2% of GDP defence spending benchmark <a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/europe\/2025\/03\/20\/europe-needs-to-spend-more-on-defence-not-just-pretend-to\">no longer seems sufficient<\/a> to guarantee Europe\u2019s security. A more comprehensive, consistent, well-planned, and well-communicated strategy is urgently needed to enable European governments to succeed in the domain of defence and security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This is essential for several reasons. First, the EU must find ways to ensure its own security in the face of declining US commitment to Europe. Second, the EU must be ready to fully or significantly sustain Ukraine militarily, especially since diplomatic solutions remain elusive. Third, one of the key lessons from Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine is the danger of overreliance on external suppliers and even most trusted partners. These supply chains may be vulnerable or constrained in wartime. Therefore, the EU must ramp up domestic production, revitalize its defence-industrial base, and ensure that joint procurement, manufacturing, and interoperability mechanisms are fully in place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Since Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, <strong>the EU has undergone a number of meaningful transformations<\/strong>. The tone and emphasis set by the leaders of the EU institutions, such as, for instance, Ursula von der Leyen\u2019s vision for <a href=\"https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/priorities-2019-2024\/story-von-der-leyen-commission\/stronger-europe-world_en\"><strong>a geopolitical Commission<\/strong><\/a>, have stressed the imperative for the EU to act as a global security actor, a defender of peace, freedom, and democracy, and a long-term security partner to Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-full is-resized\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"534\" height=\"356\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-3.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-29940\" style=\"width:383px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-3.png 534w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-3-18x12.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 534px) 100vw, 534px\" \/><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n<p>In parallel, broad debate among EU Member States, institutions, and the wider public has led to the <strong>adoption of several crucial frameworks and strategies<\/strong> aimed at guiding the Union\u2019s transition toward a more robust defence posture. Nevertheless, the EU\u2019s efforts to build a common European defence still face serious <strong>legal, political, and technical challenges<\/strong>. These include, most notably, the tension between the national prerogative over defence matters (enshrined in <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02\/DOC_1&amp;format=PDF\"><strong>Article 4.2 of the Treaty on European Union<\/strong><\/a>) and the intergovernmental nature of EU defence policy, which requires consensus among all 27 Member States. This process is often too slow and politically constrained, particularly when it comes to decision-making during times of crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Among the most important strategic documents adopted since February 2022 is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en\"><strong>A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence<\/strong><\/a>. This marked the first major step toward positioning the EU as a credible global security provider. It lays out a shared strategic assessment of threats, a common strategic culture, and the steps necessary to strengthen the EU\u2019s defence and security capabilities by 2030.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>From Vision to Action: Tools, Priorities, and the Politics of Implementation<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>To support defence-industrial capacity, the adoption of the <a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en\"><strong>European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS)<\/strong><\/a><strong> <\/strong>organisiert und wird gemeinsam mit der <a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/edip-dedicated-programme-defence_en\"><strong>European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP)<\/strong><\/a> has been pivotal. These initiatives set long-term goals to promote joint defence procurement, boost intra-EU defence trade, and support the broader vision of \u201cproducing and buying European.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>One of the most recent and influential documents is the <a href=\"https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/document\/download\/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc0-3867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20\u2013%20Readiness%202030.pdf\"><strong>White Paper for European Defence \u2013 Readiness 2030<\/strong><\/a>, introduced by the new leadership of the European Commission: High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas and Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius. This White Paper incentivizes capability development in response to both short- and long-term threats. It also reflects the reality of Russia\u2019s continued aggression and the potential risk of its military success amid waning US engagement. It calls for stronger collaboration among EU Member States, greater joint procurement, and deeper cooperation with European defence industries through aggregated demand and long-term contracts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The document also underlines the importance of international partnerships and, in particular, close coordination with the United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, T\u00fcrkiye, and other like-minded countries in the EU\u2019s neighborhood, including Ukraine. It also extends to strategic Indo-Pacific partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. In addition, it highlights the critical role of NATO\u2013EU coordination in strengthening European security, and makes clear that EU-level efforts can help NATO\u2019s European members meet defence goals set by the Alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Crucially, the White Paper identifies <strong>seven priority areas<\/strong> for further capability development:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Air and missile defence<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Artillery systems<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Ammunition and missiles<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Drones and anti-drone systems<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Military mobility<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>AI, quantum, cyber, and electronic warfare<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection, including strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, maritime domain awareness, and space asset protection<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p>Many of these priorities are informed by lessons learned from Ukraine\u2019s wartime needs and the EU\u2019s recognition that it must reduce dependence on US-provided capabilities. While this ambition is commendable and well-intentioned, a full replacement of US capabilities in the short- to mid-term is neither realistic nor feasible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/research-paper\/2025\/05\/defending-europe-without--the-united-states-costs-and-consequences\/\">report<\/a> \u201cDefending Europe Without the United States: Costs and Consequences\u201d, <strong>the EU would need to spend at least $1 trillion to replace key assets currently provided by the US through NATO<\/strong>. Such a transformation faces immense obstacles, to start with the lack of available funding, insufficient political will, and divergent security perceptions across EU Member States. These conditions explain why, in light of both legal limitations and national sovereignty vs security, the EU may need to rely on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gmfus.org\/news\/coalition-willing\">\u201ccoalitions of the willing\u201d<\/a> to begin partially replacing US-provided capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1048\" height=\"568\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-4.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-29941\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-4.png 1048w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-4-600x325.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-4-1024x555.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-4-768x416.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-4-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1048px) 100vw, 1048px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Among the seven capability areas outlined in the White Paper, certain strategic enablers could be prioritized for phased replacement. Financing this step could be supported through new EU instruments introduced under the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/RegData\/etudes\/BRIE\/2025\/769566\/EPRS_BRI(2025)769566_EN.pdf\">ReArm Europe Plan<\/a>, innovative financial tools, and loan mechanisms such as the newly adopted <a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2025\/05\/27\/safe-council-adopts-150-billion-boost-for-joint-procurement-on-european-security-and-defence\/\">Security Action for Europe (SAFE).<\/a> This effort is also supported by the creation of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kmu.gov.ua\/en\/news\/task-force-ukrainaies-z-pytan-oboronno-promyslovoho-spivrobitnytstva-bude-instrumentom-zaluchennia-ukrainskoho-opk-v-ievropeisku-initsiatyvu-safe\">EU\u2013Ukraine Task Force on Defence Industrial Cooperation<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Overall, the EU\u2019s evolving defence and security architecture provides a solid framework to reduce its dependency on US commitments and rebalance burden-sharing across the transatlantic space. However, <strong>good strategies do not always translate into implementation<\/strong>. Many of the challenges outlined above remain unresolved. Therefore, there is a strong need to develop a collaborative and unifying <strong>Comprehensive Road Map<\/strong> endorsed by the EU, NATO, the US, and their partners. This document should define how all these important actors can jointly navigate the shifting power dynamics between the US and China while maintaining the pressure on Russia and supporting Ukraine. Such a Road Map should also incorporate the perspectives and contributions of key partners-particularly Ukraine, the UK, Norway, and T\u00fcrkiye.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The EU\u2019s evolving defence architecture offers a pathway <strong>not to replace the United States<\/strong>, but to recalibrate the transatlantic partnership around a more resilient and capable Europe. This shift would allow Washington to responsibly rebalance toward other regions without jeopardizing NATO\u2019s eastern flank. If the US recognizes and supports Europe\u2019s current trajectory into the defence domain, it can help stabilize transatlantic relations and avoid chaos in European security, particularly in the event of a sudden, uncoordinated US withdrawal from the continent. Moreover, deeper EU\u2013Ukraine integration in defence production and operational planning could unlock opportunities for US industry as well and strengthen allied deterrence across both European, the Middle East, Indo-Pacific theatres, and elsewhere. For American policymakers, supporting this evolution is not a concession-it is a strategic investment in the future of a stronger, more sustainable transatlantic partnership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The next section of this analysis explores Ukraine\u2019s evolving role in European defence, the benefits of closer EU\u2013Ukraine defence cooperation, and the ways in which joint production and integration could help the EU make real progress toward strategic autonomy while still preserving the central role of the US in European security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Ukraine as the Vanguard of European Defence: Integration, Innovation, and the Strategic Resilience of Its Defence Sector<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Ukraine\u2019s integration into various defence-oriented cooperation formats, alongside other non-EU states, represents a crucial milestone and strategic necessity in the effort to build a common European defence, manufacturing base, and joint procurement ecosystem. In this context, Ukraine is not merely a beneficiary but an active contributor to a more secure and protected European and transatlantic space. This is largely thanks to the vibrant, resilient, and increasingly innovative defence sector it has built throughout Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While not without challenges, <strong>Ukraine\u2019s defence sector has demonstrated consistent growth <\/strong>and tangible potential to further ramp up its capacity. For example, defence production has grown <a href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/2025\/06\/12\/ukraines-defense-sector-growth\/\">35 times between 2022 and 2025<\/a>. This scale-up has been driven by two key factors: the sustained demands of high-intensity warfare and the uncertainty created by the limited capacity of Europe\u2019s defence industry to meet Ukraine\u2019s wartime needs, as well as the experience of stalled military aid in the US Congress in 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine has made clear that quantity does not always equate to quality, but quantity still has a decisive effect on the battlefield. In this regard, Ukraine achieved critical results between 2023 and 2024 in the domestic production of mortar and artillery ammunition, ranging from 60mm to 155mm calibres. Output grew from 1 million to 2.5 million rounds annually, representing a 150% increase by 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1048\" height=\"590\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-5.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-29942\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-5.png 1048w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-5-600x338.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-5-1024x576.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-5-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-5-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1048px) 100vw, 1048px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Drone production has also grown steadily. As of October 2024, President Volodymyr Zelenskyi <a href=\"https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/en\/news\/zavdyaki-oboronnim-industriyam-ukrayina-maye-stati-odnim-iz-93617\">announced<\/a> that Ukraine\u2019s defence sector had surpassed 2 million drones produced annually, with a new target of 4 million drones set. This is a solid achievement, particularly considering that Ukrainian drones are constantly being upgraded for better protection against electronic warfare, extended range, and overall battlefield performance. These improvements allow drones to complement and, in some cases, replace long-range missile capabilities-while remaining cheaper and more adaptable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Importantly, the progress is not limited to aerial drones. Ukraine has also significantly advanced the design and deployment of maritime drones, which have repeatedly proven their effectiveness in asymmetric warfare. These capabilities are relevant not only to Ukraine, but also to Europe and the US in light of their broader military engagements and deterrence strategies-especially in scenarios such as a potential conflict over Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In terms of artillery platforms, Ukraine is approaching the point at which it can meet its own front-line requirements, thanks to the 2S22\u202fBohdana-Ukraine\u2019s first NATO-calibre (155mm) self-propelled howitzer. Monthly production increased from approximately six units in 2023 to over twenty units per month by 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The continued success of Ukraine\u2019s defence-industrial expansion hinges on additional financing, which is precisely where the EU (and potentially the US) can step up. The Union\u2019s evolving defence cooperation frameworks and mechanisms can not only support Ukraine\u2019s domestic production but also bring Ukraine closer to the EU in the defence domain-while simultaneously contributing to Ukraine\u2019s post-war recovery and long-term economic growth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deepening EU\u2013Ukraine cooperation would allow both sides to reduce dependency on the US supply. This goal aligns with the EU\u2019s defence priorities laid out in the White Paper for European Defence \u2013 Readiness 2030, and benefits from the growing interest of European defence firms in establishing joint ventures with Ukrainian enterprises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For example, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rheinmetall.com\/en\/media\/news-watch\/news\/2024\/02\/2024-02-19-joint-venture-in-the-ukraine?utm_source=chatgpt.com\"><strong>Rheinmetall<\/strong><\/a><strong> und <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/czechoslovakgroup.com\/en\/news\/csg-ukrainska-bronetechnika-agreement-artillery-ammunition-ukraine?utm_source=chatgpt.com\"><strong>Czechoslovak Group (CSG)<\/strong><\/a> are collaborating with Ukrainian companies to jointly produce 155mm artillery shells in Ukraine. Similarly, Germany\u2019s <strong>Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) and France\u2019s Nexter Systems<\/strong> are <a href=\"https:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/en\/economy\/article\/2024\/03\/25\/france-and-germany-to-co-produce-military-equipment-in-ukraine_6651439_19.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">working with Ukrainian partners<\/a> to provide maintenance, spare parts, and local production of systems such as the CAESAR and PzH 2000 howitzers. These examples highlight how European industry is increasingly engaged in bolstering Ukraine\u2019s defence capacity-and how this, in turn, strengthens European defence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Given mutual interests in advancing cooperation between Ukrainian and European defence industries, and with new EU frameworks allowing for more active Ukrainian participation in EU defence-related projects, the EU should seize this opportunity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1048\" height=\"589\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-6.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-29943\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-6.png 1048w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-6-600x337.png 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-6-1024x576.png 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-6-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-6-18x10.png 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1048px) 100vw, 1048px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Still, notable challenges remain-particularly the gap between Ukraine\u2019s immediate wartime needs and the EU\u2019s longer-term rearmament goals. Additional hurdles include financing constraints, legal barriers, and technical obstacles that may delay joint manufacturing and procurement efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This is where the US could play a pivotal role. If Washington actively participates in EU\u2013Ukraine defence integration discussions-and is willing to provide financial contributions, leveraging its <strong>budgetary flexibility relative to the EU-27<\/strong>-it could become a decisive enabler of common European defence. In such a scenario, the EU and Ukraine would need to take care of the rest: coordination, legal harmonization, planning, logistics, and ensuring the security of supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Importantly, institutional mechanisms for such collaboration already exist. Ukrainian and European defence industry representatives regularly exchange information and best practices, often <strong>facilitated by NGOs and advocacy groups<\/strong>. These civil society actors play an essential role in organizing visits, building mutual understanding, and enabling practical cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At the institutional level, the <strong>European Defence Agency (EDA)<\/strong> plays a <a href=\"https:\/\/eda.europa.eu\/what-we-do\/all-activities\">unique and increasingly strategic role<\/a>. It serves as a key facilitator and matchmaker-bringing together EU defence industries and Ukraine\u2019s defence sector to coordinate joint procurement, integrate Ukraine into EU defence R&amp;D programs, and support innovation through the <strong>EU Defence Innovation Office (EUDIO) in Kyiv<\/strong>. The EDA also addresses potential administrative and regulatory issues related to Ukraine\u2019s participation in European projects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>One illustrative example of this role was the <a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/pl\/ip_25_1193\">EU\u2013Ukraine Defence Industries Forum<\/a>, co-organized in May 2024 by the EDA, European Commission, and European External Action Service (EEAS). The forum convened key stakeholders, including HR\/VP Josep Borrell and senior Ukrainian officials, and enabled direct dialogue between EU and Ukrainian defence industry representatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In this light, EU\u2013Ukraine cooperation in defence is not simply a support mechanism for Ukraine-it has become a cornerstone of the broader effort to build European defence and military readiness. This partnership strengthens the security of the entire continent and positions Ukraine as a strategic asset in shaping Europe\u2019s evolving security order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The US must remain present in the European security architecture<\/strong> and actively support the integration of Ukraine\u2019s defence sector into EU frameworks. Despite shifting global priorities, Washington has compelling reasons to maintain its role in Europe, at least in the short to mid-term, while continuing to incentivize the development of a common European defence. Doing so will help deter China and other potential adversaries, while ensuring that Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine is not rewarded and that <strong>the transatlantic alliance remains strategically cohesive in the face of current and future challenges.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Conclusions: Towards a Post-American European Security Order<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the US\u2019 ongoing pivot to Asia have placed Europe in a difficult position. Historically, views on strengthening European defence have varied on both sides of the Atlantic, evolving alongside shifting geopolitical conditions and power balances. The return of high-intensity war has reintroduced hard (military) security to Europe\u2019s agenda, while the prospect of partial US disengagement has only reinforced the urgency of developing a common European defence and the capabilities required for Europe to protect itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What is currently unfolding in transatlantic security can rightfully be described as a transition to a post-American European security order. \u201cPost-American\u201d in this context <strong>does not suggest a total US withdrawal from Europe<\/strong> or the dissolution of NATO. Rather, it signals the acceleration of Washington\u2019s strategic refocus on the Indo-Pacific and a shifting of defence responsibilities to European allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Ongoing tensions and mutual criticisms between Europe and the US are counterproductive. They risk weakening the transatlantic bond and handing a strategic advantage to adversaries like Russia and China, both of whom seek to sow discord among allied democracies.<\/strong> What is needed instead is deeper EU\u2013US communication and coordinated planning around specific milestones, deliverables, and timelines for responsibly rebalancing America\u2019s military footprint. These conversations must include Ukraine, which is not only a key frontline state but also a growing partner in European defence production and strategic planning. Ukraine\u2019s integration into these efforts would enhance European military readiness, foster greater strategic autonomy, and strengthen the European pillar within NATO, an essential element of democratic resilience and continental security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The foundations for the EU to become a more geopolitical and security-oriented actor are now in place<\/strong>. But transforming strategic ambitions into operational outcomes will require clear alignment among the US, the EU, and key partners like Ukraine. To that end, a <strong>Comprehensive Road Map<\/strong> outlining a division of labor for European defence development is urgently needed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague could prove pivotal<\/strong>. It offers an opportunity to present concrete proposals for advancing this new defence agenda and could serve as a test of whether Brussels and Washington are capable of narrowing differences and rebuilding strategic consensus. An updated <strong>Joint Declaration on EU\u2013NATO Cooperation <\/strong>could serve as the vehicle to launch this much-needed Road Map.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>EU leadership appears <\/strong><strong>to be serious and ready to step up<\/strong>. In her <a href=\"https:\/\/europa.eu\/newsroom\/ecpc-failover\/pdf\/speech-25-1366_en.pdf\">Aachen speech<\/a>, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasized that Europe must craft a new form of Pax Europaea for the 21st century-one that is shaped and safeguarded by Europeans themselves. While she acknowledged NATO\u2019s and the transatlantic alliance\u2019s historic role in providing Europe\u2019s security, she also declared that the era of peace dividends is over. Speaking at the European Defence and Security Summit on 10 June 2025, Commissioner Andrius Kubilius <a href=\"https:\/\/europa.eu\/newsroom\/ecpc-failover\/pdf\/speech-25-1461_en.pdf\">underscored<\/a> that while the EU is not at war, it acts in times of war. The EU, he argued, must build up its defence readiness, revitalise its defence industry, and help construct a new European security architecture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If the EU fails to meet its goals for defence preparedness or proves unable to sustain support for Ukraine in repelling Russian aggression, the consequences could be severe. <strong>A<\/strong><strong>n impulsive<\/strong><strong>, uncoordinated, and chaotic US retreat from European security would harm both sides of the Atlantic.<\/strong><strong> <\/strong>The EU, NATO, Ukraine, and other like-minded partners must therefore set aside secondary differences and cooperate on building a shared vision for the post-American European security order. <strong>If they do not, that order will be shaped instead by Russia and its allies<\/strong>, and Europe, if this scenario materializes, may face decades of instability, coercion, and conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Disclaimer: The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in the papers published on this site belong solely to the authors and not necessarily to the Transatlantic Dialogue Center, its committees, or its affiliated organizations. The papers are intended to stimulate dialogue and discussion and do not represent official policy positions of the Transatlantic Dialogue Center or any other organizations with which the authors may be associated.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Vitalii Rishko Introduction: Why Europe Must Build Defence Capacity amid US Rebalancing and Russia\u2019s War The question of building European defence is as old as the process of European integration itself. What began as a peace-oriented project after World War II to guarantee stability on the continent, the European Communities and later the European [&hellip;]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":29941,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-29934","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-papers"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v20.0 (Yoast SEO v23.5) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Building Defence in a Post-American European Security Order: Ukraine\u2019s Integration, Burden-Sharing, and the New Transatlantic Reality - Transatlantic Dialogue Center<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Transatlantic Dialogue Center (TDC) is a non-governmental and non-partisan think tank that provides high-quality policy advice to private and public clients. 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