{"id":38143,"date":"2026-07-30T16:27:02","date_gmt":"2026-07-30T13:27:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/?p=38143"},"modified":"2026-08-13T16:54:53","modified_gmt":"2026-08-13T13:54:53","slug":"ukraine-defense-innovation-brave1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/ar\/2026\/07\/30\/ukraine-defense-innovation-brave1\/","title":{"rendered":"Ukraine as an Organizing State: How the Institutions of War Were Structured Before the International System Could Adapt"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-quick-download-button-download-button aligncenter qdbn-wrapper\"><div class=\"qdbn\" data-plugin-name=\"qdbn\" data-style=\"small\" data-file=\"hide-file\" data-size=\"hide-size\" data-icon-position=\"left\"><div class=\"qdbn-download-button-inner\"><button type=\"button\" data-button-type=\"small\" class=\"g-btn f-l\" style=\"background-color:#0e107b;color:#ffffff;border-radius:25px\" data-attachment-id=\"56782\" data-page-id=\"18850\" data-post-id=\"\" data-have-external=\"false\" data-external-url=\"\" data-wait-duration=\"0\" data-target-blank=\"true\" data-msg=\"Please wait...\" data-member=\"0\" data-has-icon-dark=\"true\" title=\"\u062a\u0646\u0632\u064a\u0644 \u0645\u0644\u0641 PDF \u0628\u0627\u0644\u0644\u063a\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0625\u0646\u062c\u0644\u064a\u0632\u064a\u0629\"><span class=\"download-btn-icon\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M18 11.3l-1-1.1-4 4V3h-1.5v11.3L7 10.2l-1 1.1 6.2 5.8 5.8-5.8zm.5 3.7v3.5h-13V15H4v5h16v-5h-1.5z\"><\/path><\/svg><\/span><span>\u062a\u0646\u0632\u064a\u0644 \u0645\u0644\u0641 PDF \u0628\u0627\u0644\u0644\u063a\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0625\u0646\u062c\u0644\u064a\u0632\u064a\u0629<\/span><\/button><p class=\"up\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><i class=\"fi fi-pdf\"><\/i><\/p><p class=\"down\" style=\"border-radius:0\"><svg xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" viewbox=\"0 0 24 24\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><path fill=\"currentColor\" d=\"M10 4H4c-1.1 0-1.99.9-1.99 2L2 18c0 1.1.9 2 2 2h16c1.1 0 2-.9 2-2V8c0-1.1-.9-2-2-2h-8l-2-2z\"><\/path><\/svg><span class=\"file-size\">2 MB<\/span><\/p><\/div><\/div><quick-download-button-info class=\"qdb-btn-info\"><\/quick-download-button-info><\/div>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-1024x576.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-38144\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-600x338.jpg 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-768x432.jpg 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-18x10.jpg 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed.jpg 1280w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Ukrainian soldiers watch drone feeds from an underground command center in Bakhmut, Donetsk region, Ukraine. Source: <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/spectrumlocalnews.com\/us\/snplus\/international\/2022\/12\/28\/minister--ukraine-aims-to-develop-air-to-air-combat-drones\"><em>Spectrum news<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All wars produce, consciously or unconsciously, an official narrative of themselves. A couple getting married days before they both head to the front. Grandmothers knitting camouflage nets. This is the narrative with which the West has come to identify the war. It is true and legitimate; the rhetoric of courage and resistance has become the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2076-0752\/13\/1\/38\">cornerstone<\/a> of Ukraine\u2019s self-presentation to the outside world since the full-scale invasion. And, given the growing war fatigue, it proves particularly effective in sustaining strategic communication and national morale.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That said, where then does the problem with the heroic narrative lie if it is neither false nor exaggerated? The main problem lies in the fact that presenting it as the only available explanatory framework for the success of Ukraine\u2019s resistance is insufficient. <strong>The heroic narrative answers the question \u201cIs Ukrainian civil society brave and resilient?\u201d, but not the question \u201cWhy and how is the Ukrainian state able to resist indefinitely in an asymmetric war?\u201d<\/strong> If one analyses only individual courage, one overlooks the explanation of how a large-scale production system has come about or how the military network is coordinated on the front line.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The main explanation lies in the institutions that initiated an accelerated transformation and formalized these individual acts of courage by civil society into institutional infrastructures. To better understand why Kyiv has decided to carry out these rapid transformations, what the turning point was, and why precisely these transformations have been implemented rather than others, we must go back to 2014 and to the most complete expression of these transformations: Brave1. Analyzing the creation of this ecosystem means examining the highest forms of institutional expression through which Ukraine, under the pressure of external aggression, built a multidimensional technological architecture capable of connecting start-ups, investors, developers, and state structures horizontally, almost simultaneously. Under a vertical, centralized hierarchy, these actors would operate in a slow and bureaucratic manner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-the-limits-of-the-heroic-narrative-and-its-danger\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><strong>The Limits of The \u201cHeroic\u201d Narrative and Its Danger<\/strong><\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is not about taking credit away from one side and giving it to another, but rather about identifying the problem with how Western media reports on it. By focusing solely on the image of a brave soldier, in most cases, the narrative leaves out the institutional framework \u2014 largely built from the ground up as a grassroots movement \u2014 that has been able to develop institutional capacity based on that courage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Furthermore, idealizing individual resistance is politically dangerous. It absolves the external aggressor of responsibility and, to a certain extent, normalizes the suffering of an entire society by presenting it indirectly, almost as a cultural trait or a feature of the national character. It is not presented as the direct consequence of an invasion, in which the attacked society is left with no choice. According to journalist Peter Swope, the media\u2019s idealization of sacrifice in combat ends up<a href=\"https:\/\/brownpoliticalreview.org\/ukrainian-sacrifice-and-war-death\/\"> distracting<\/a> from the true brutality of war. Recognizing this does not diminish the value of what Ukrainian civilian society is doing; on the contrary, it restores their humanity and realism, showing that suffering is not part of their nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"862\" height=\"485\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-1.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-38145\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-1.jpg 862w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-1-600x338.jpg 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-1-768x432.jpg 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-1-18x10.jpg 18w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 862px) 100vw, 862px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Ukrainian couple fighting against Russian invasion marry on the front line. Source: <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.abc.net.au\/news\/2022-03-07\/ukrainian-defence-fighters-marry-in-frontline-wedding\/100888214\"><em>ABC<\/em><\/a><br><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Furthermore, even the war communication under the Ukrainian president\u2019s leadership has avoided constructing an individual-centered narrative. According to NVivo <a href=\"https:\/\/thezelenskyeffect.com\">analysis<\/a>, Zelenskyy said \u201cUkraine\u201d 1.726 times and \u201cpeople\u201d 1.236 times in the first six months of the war. The pronoun \u201cI,\u201d used in a personal sense, was almost never recorded. When listing achievements in his speeches, he does not build a personality cult but rather a collective identity, using \u201cwe\u201d to refer to the Ukrainian people and \u201cyou\u201d to refer to the country\u2019s defenders<em>.<\/em> Even the highest representative of Ukrainian resistance in the West has structured his communication in the opposite way, centered on collective agency rather than his own personal agency. Therefore, an individual-centered interpretation is an oversimplification observed from the outside, rather than a reflection of how Ukraine explains itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-2014-the-starting-point-of-ukraine-s-quiet-buildup-of-military-self-efficiency\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong><strong>2014: The Starting Point of Ukraine&#8217;s Quiet Buildup of Military Self-Efficiency<\/strong><\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is important to note that the year 2022 marks the beginning of a large-scale invasion, not of Russian aggression. Therefore, 2014, with the annexation of Crimea and the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, was the year Kyiv realized that no external guarantees \u2014 diplomatic, legal, or military \u2014 could replace its own capacity for self-defense. Therefore, it is essential to understand that the main reason the territorial escalation of the war in 2022 did not come as a \u201cshock\u201d is that Ukraine had been investing in its own institutional infrastructure for eight years before it became decisive for its resistance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 id=\"h-the-doctrine-of-escalation-dominance-and-its-effect-on-ukraine\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>The doctrine of escalation dominance and its effect on Ukraine<\/em><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-the-doctrine-of-escalation-dominance-and-its-effect-on-ukraine\">As Ukraine sought to regain control of Crimea, which had already been annexed by Russia, then President Petro Poroshenko traveled to the United States to ask Congress for more lethal military aid, including Javelin missiles. However, the Obama administration<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cbc.ca\/news\/world\/obama-trump-biden-ukraine-military-aid-1.6371378\"> limited<\/a> aid shipments to strictly humanitarian and non-lethal assistance (body armor, night-vision goggles, vehicles), resisting requests to send lethal military support. Ukraine\u2019s <strong>near-total lack of foreign support<\/strong> in the early years following 2014 was primarily due to the military theory of \u201cescalation dominance\u201d. This theory, developed by Herman Kahn, is illustrated by a ladder with forty-four<a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/pulse\/what-escalation-dominance-means-why-longer-applies-used-ingo-piepers-3wj3e\/\"> rungs<\/a>: at the bottom lies a low-intensity crisis, and at the top, total nuclear war. Dominance over such escalation depends on the actor\u2019s capability and credibility. That actor has the potential to dominate the escalation against the adversary if three conditions are met simultaneously: possessing a real capacity to escalate, credibility that such a possibility exists, and the adversary\u2019s recognition of the possibility of<a href=\"https:\/\/geopol.uk\/concepts\/deterrence-theory\/\"> both<\/a> situations. When applying the theory to the war in Donbas, from a Western perspective, Russia demonstrated this dominance in Ilovaisk and Debaltseve, where, regardless of Ukraine\u2019s advances, Russia<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/military-assistance-ukraine-rediscovering-virtue-courage\"> deployed<\/a> additional capabilities and prevailed. In the face of any Ukrainian escalation, Russia would respond with a greater one. Consequently, Washington concluded that any aid would be counterproductive both for the United States and, above all, for Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This interpretation of events from the perspective of escalation dominance is neither isolated nor retrospective. There is significant criticism from security think tanks regarding how applying this doctrine defensively has produced the very outcome it was intended to avoid. According to the Atlantic Council, the response to the occupation of Crimea was \u201ca geopolitical<a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/ukrainealert\/putins-unpunished-crimean-crime-set-the-stage-for-russias-2022-invasion\/\"> blunder<\/a> of historic proportions that emboldened Vladimir Putin and set the stage for the biggest European invasion since World War II.\u201d The absence of escalation was understood as a deterrent success. However, what it really was is a sign of weakness. Verbal warnings with no real cost \u2014or what James Fearon calls<a href=\"https:\/\/web.stanford.edu\/group\/fearon-research\/cgi-bin\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/10\/Domestic-Political-Audiences-and-the-Escalation-of-International-Disputes.pdf\"> cheap talk<\/a>\u2014 did not alter the adversary\u2019s calculations, since they entail no commitment. The only signals that do imply a cost would be explicit military mobilization or a public commitment that is difficult to retract. Between 2014 and 2018, the White House sent cost-free signals to the Kremlin, without ever turning them into costly and credible signals. It wasn\u2019t until 2018 that the United States<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/military-assistance-ukraine-rediscovering-virtue-courage\"> provided<\/a> its first non-lethal assistance, delivering Javelin anti-tank missiles, a move followed by other countries such as the Czech Republic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The repeated statements by NATO, the EU, the United States, and Germany that they would not become directly involved in the event of a Russian invasion had a significant impact on Russia\u2019s cost calculations. Due to the scarcity of lethal weapons and the lack of involvement by Western allies, the Russian military calculated that the Ukrainian military could not resist indefinitely; therefore, it estimated that the<a href=\"https:\/\/www.swp-berlin.org\/en\/publication\/failing-to-deter-russias-war-against-ukraine-the-role-of-misperceptions\"> costs<\/a> of war against Ukraine would be acceptable and limited, without causing significant consequences for the country or its economy.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Many international analyses have noted that the weak response to the annexation of Crimea \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/ukrainealert\/putins-unpunished-crimean-crime-set-the-stage-for-russias-2022-invasion\/\">emboldened<\/a>\u201d Russia. This Kremlin perspective confirms how the lack of Western commitment in 2014 was sufficient for the aggressor to conclude that the war would yield more benefits than costs. And that this is not a misperception on Ukraine\u2019s part regarding its Western allies. The fact that two actors with completely opposing interests agree that support for Ukraine between 2014 and 2021 was insufficient to create a real deterrent demonstrates that this is a verified fact from both sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Therefore, this is not a matter of unfounded mistrust toward its allies, but rather a realistic assessment of the situation based on empirical evidence. On this basis, Ukraine began to make the decision not to rely exclusively on agreements, external actors, memoranda, or even international organizations to guarantee its own security and territorial integrity. The Minsk process, led by France and Germany between 2014 and 2015, reinforced Kyiv\u2019s conclusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 id=\"h-the-minsk-agreements-and-their-lack-of-structural-resolution\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>The Minsk Agreements and Their Lack of Structural Resolution<\/em><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If the allies&#8217; reluctance to arm Ukraine was a military signal that the West was unwilling to bear the real costs in exchange for Ukraine\u2019s security, the Minsk processes demonstrate the same thing, but on the diplomatic front.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These were peace plans promoted by the then-Ukrainian president that covered<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/article\/ukraine-russia-and-the-minsk-agreements-a-post-mortem\/\"> a range of<\/a> multidimensional areas: security, humanitarian issues, economic matters, and political aspects. The first agreement was signed in September 2014 following the \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-49426724\">Ilovaisk<\/a> tragedy,\u201d and Minsk II in February 2015. Although both agreements<a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/what-were-the-minsk-agreements-and-why-did-they-fail-to-bring-peace-in-ukraine\/\"> call for<\/a> a ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the border, and a special status for the separatist regions of the Donbas under OSCE supervision, ceasefire violations were reported within minutes of their entry into force. However, since the operational failure of the agreements is already widely documented, what has received little analysis is why the agreements were designed in such a way that, even as the plans were being carried out, many analysts took it for granted that they would fail. There were no direct obligations imposed on Russia in the conflict, as Moscow presented itself as a mediator rather than a belligerent party, positioning itself on the same level as France, Germany, and the OSCE \u2014 even though it was providing military support to the separatist forces on the ground. <strong>Failing to recognize Russia as a party to the conflict<\/strong> on paper, even though it was demonstrably managing the conflict in practice, <strong>gave the Kremlin free rein to ramp up or scale back the intensity of the invasion <\/strong>as it saw fit at any given moment: intensifying the fighting when it was in its interest to pressure Kyiv, or scaling it back to ease international pressure on Russia. All of this came at no real political cost, something that would have occurred had Russia been<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/article\/ukraine-russia-and-the-minsk-agreements-a-post-mortem\/\"> recognized<\/a> as an aggressor state and a party to the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This fundamental design flaw meant that, with the Minsk agreements, the same outcome occurred as had already been analyzed on the military front: a commitment without any real cost, leaving the door open for noncompliance. Just as verbal warnings were issued without being backed by lethal weapons, frameworks for compromise were established but were not supported by binding enforcement mechanisms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The military and diplomatic findings lead to the same conclusion through two independent lines of reasoning: neither military aid \u2014 limited by escalation dominance \u2014 nor the diplomatic framework \u2014 constrained by poorly drafted agreements \u2014 established enforcement mechanisms. <strong>This dual confirmation explains why Kyiv concluded that no external guarantee can replace its own capacity for self-defense.<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-the-doctrine-of-escalation-dominance-and-its-effect-on-ukraine\">That is why Ukraine\u2019s institutional transformations \u2014uneven, imperfect, yet progressive and real\u2014 began in 2014 and not in 2022. It was not the large-scale invasion that led Ukraine to reach these conclusions, but rather reaffirmed them. Consequently, Ukraine\u2019s resistance and resilience since 2022 are not a spontaneous response, but rather the result of a state that had spent eight years building institutional infrastructure that the shock of 2022 would ultimately put into practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"682\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-2-1024x682.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-38146\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-2-1024x682.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-2-600x399.jpg 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-2-768x511.jpg 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-2-1536x1022.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-2-18x12.jpg 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-2.jpg 1920w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Normandy format talks in Minsk (February 2015): Alexander Lukashenko, Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande, and Petro Poroshenko take part in the talks on a settlement to the situation in Ukraine. Source: <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Normandy_format_talks_in_Minsk_(February_2015)_03.jpeg\"><em>Wikimedia Commons<\/em><\/a><br><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-security-and-defense-reforms-and-capability-building\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Security and Defense Reforms and Capability Building<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In light of the lack of an international response to the events in Ukraine, both Kyiv and Ukrainian civil society responded with profound internal transformations in the defense sector, some of which had to be built from the ground up. These three transformations cannot be understood in isolation, as it is precisely the simultaneous existence of all three changes that explains why and when Ukraine decided to merge these three elements \u2014 which had been developing separately for nearly a decade \u2014 starting in 2022. This led to the creation of <em>Brave1<\/em>, but first, it is necessary to explain the three components of its origins.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 id=\"h-the-end-of-hierarchical-centralization\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>The end of hierarchical centralization<\/em><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first transformation was the shift away from centralized command doctrine toward mission command, a long-standing doctrine widely embraced by modern military forces. This model emphasizes the importance of leaders who trust their subordinates, granting them the freedom to make critical decisions in real time and to adapt to circumstances without the need for rigid and constant<a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensa.gob.es\/ceseden\/-\/liderazgo_y_mission_command_en_el_contexto_de_la_guardia_nacional_republicana-1\"> guidelines<\/a>. In 2014, the Ukrainian army lacked all the characteristics of this model; the various Ukrainian army battalions<a href=\"https:\/\/www.lvivherald.com\/post\/from-legacy-to-resilience-the-evolution-of-ukraine-s-military-doctrine-since-2014\"> lacked<\/a> initiative and had no practical interoperability. By the time authorization to carry out an attack was issued, the tactical opportunity had already been lost.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With support from the United States and certain European NATO member countries, Ukraine established for the first time a professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, a role that had been almost nonexistent. This marked the first step toward adopting decentralized decision-making and building a mechanism of mutual trust among the ranks. These units acquired key competencies to<a href=\"https:\/\/www.armyupress.army.mil\/Journals\/NCO-Journal\/Archives\/2024\/October\/NCO-Lessons-from-Ukraine\/\"> refine<\/a> mission command: shared understanding, commander\u2019s intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance, which gave them a significant advantage over Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 id=\"h-the-end-of-the-state-monopoly-on-arms-production\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>The End of the State Monopoly on Arms Production<\/em><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The second set of reforms is based on a shift in procurement priorities and the end of the monopoly on arms production. Before 2014, Ukroboronprom (a conglomerate of companies within the country\u2019s military-industrial complex) determined which weapons were developed, directing production toward its own interests in maintaining Soviet-era weapons systems rather than developing new capabilities. For such a company, it was more economical and easier to produce the same tanks and ammunition without changing the production line, rather than investing in new technology, researchers, risk-taking, and more time. Therefore, while it is true that there have been changes, they were minimal: 20% of R&amp;D projects in 2020 had been underway for twenty or more years without any tangible results, acting as<a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/how-ukraine-rebuilt-its-military-acquisition-system-around-commercial-technology\"> mechanisms<\/a> for siphoning off public funds. Ukroboronprom was characterized by major corruption scandals, excessive<a href=\"https:\/\/www.corruptionjusticeandlegitimacy.org\/post\/accomplishing-the-impossible-how-ukraine-advanced-anti-corruption-reforms-in-defense-security\"> classification of<\/a> information, and an overly top-down decision-making process: only 13% of the General Staff\u2019s<a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/how-ukraine-rebuilt-its-military-acquisition-system-around-commercial-technology\"> requests for<\/a> new or upgraded equipment were fulfilled between 2014 and 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As various cases of corruption within Ukroboronprom came to light, external pressure grew from Ukrainian civil society anti-corruption organizations, notably<a href=\"https:\/\/nako.org.ua\/en\/\"> NAKO<\/a>, the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission, which monitors corruption, advocates for transparency, and upholds accountability in support of Ukraine\u2019s national security and sovereignty. It was founded in 2016 as a joint initiative of Transparency International Ukraine and Transparency International Defense &amp; Security. Thanks to pressure from NAKO and Western partners, in 2017, it<a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/ukrainealert\/are-things-really-changing-at-ukroboronprom\/\"> committed<\/a> Ukroboronprom to undergoing an international audit. And in 2018, it pledged that the audit would meet international standards and include an assessment of its corporate governance in accordance with OECD standards. NAKO participated directly in drafting the bill to reform the conglomerate, submitting specific<a href=\"https:\/\/nako.org.ua\/news\/verxovna-rada-pidtrimala-reformu-ukroboronpromu\/\"> amendments<\/a> to the Ukrainian Parliament, Verkhovna Rada, prior to its adoption, specifically regarding designating the Cabinet of Ministers as the sole managing entity for the transformed defense industry companies, thereby minimizing conflicts of interest, among other measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The result was a law signed by Volodymyr Zelenskyy in 2021, which mandated the<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ukrinform.net\/rubric-economy\/3326028-president-zelensky-signs-law-on-reforming-ukroboronprom.html\"> transformation of<\/a> Ukroboronprom into a joint-stock company under OECD corporate governance standards. With a single shareholder \u2014 the state, represented by the Cabinet of Ministers \u2014 the law established the corporate restructuring of its 118 scattered enterprises with <strong>the explicit goal of introducing modern corporate governance standards<\/strong> to protect them from risks of corruption, conflicts of interest, and direct political influence, and <strong>to enable the creation of joint ventures<\/strong> with domestic and foreign partners, as well as technology transfer and the attraction of direct investment, including foreign one, for the manufacture of modern weaponry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 id=\"h-a-culture-of-innovation-born-on-the-front-lines-drones\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>A Culture of Innovation Born on the Front Lines: Drones<\/em><\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The final component of <em>Brave1 <\/em>is the growth of a drone culture. Until 2014, the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not have a modern drone. The closest thing they had was the<a href=\"https:\/\/www.orfonline.org\/expert-speak\/ukraine-s-drone-war-from-improvisation-to-systematised-combat\"> Tupolev Tu-143<\/a>, a short-range tactical reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As such, it was already nearly ineffective for modern military operations. The response to this gap did not come from the Ministry of Defense, but rather from civil society and volunteers. During the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, Volodymyr Kochetkov-Sukach and other colleagues founded<a href=\"https:\/\/www.military.com\/daily-news\/2022\/04\/10\/we-are-all-soldiers-now-inside-ukrainian-drone-unit-founded-volunteer-it-experts.html\"> Aerorozvidka<\/a>, a nongovernmental organization that closely supports the Ukrainian military and is dedicated to building or modifying commercial drones,which they can purchase from readily available retail stores, to make them ready for use in a military context. At the same time,<a href=\"https:\/\/savelife.in.ua\/en\/\"> Come Back Alive<\/a>, one of Ukraine\u2019s largest NGOs, was founded to raise funds for the purchase of unmanned vehicles, intelligence equipment, and even to provide training for soldiers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"768\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-3-1024x768.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-38147\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-3-1024x768.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-3-600x450.jpg 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-3-768x576.jpg 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-3-16x12.jpg 16w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-3.jpg 1280w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>The first testing of UAV by Aerorozvidka in 2014. Source: <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Aerorozvidka,_UAV.jpg\"><em>Wikimedia Commons<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Over time, both organizations evolved to play a key role in these transformations. Aerorozvidka pioneered multirotor unmanned aerial vehicles such as the<a href=\"https:\/\/bavovna.ai\/manufactures\/aerorozvidka\/\"> octocopter<\/a> R18, capable of carrying payloads or performing precision munitions drops, with vertical takeoff, a 40-minute flight time, and a payload capacity of 5 kg. Come Back Alive became one of the first organizations to obtain the<a href=\"https:\/\/war.ukraine.ua\/articles\/come-back-alive-ukraines-largest-charity-foundation\/\"> license<\/a> to purchase military and dual-use goods, including lethal weapons, internationally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, the fact that it originated in civil society rather than within a state structure posed real limitations and demonstrated the need for <em>Brave1<\/em>. The integration of weapons developed by civil society startups was slow and uneven. For example, the Furia reconnaissance UAV developed in 2014 by the Kyiv-based company Athlon Avia was not officially<a href=\"https:\/\/www.orfonline.org\/expert-speak\/ukraine-s-drone-war-from-improvisation-to-systematised-combat\"> \u0625\u0642\u0631\u0627\u0631<\/a> until 2019. Innovation existed, but it took time to build a bridge between these innovations and the institutions to formalize these developments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Therefore, the three main pillars that underpinned the creation of <em>Brave1 <\/em>are:&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>a military doctrine that already relied on decentralized decision-making at the front lines, which changed how and by whom decisions are made in the heat of battle.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>A legal framework was approved to establish defense industries and open the door to private investment.\u00a0<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>And a developing culture of technological innovation, demonstrating how, in some respects, civil society can innovate faster than institutions.\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus, the problem was not a lack of will or legislation, but rather the absence of an ecosystem capable of merging these three transformations into a system that could operate at the speed demanded by large-scale warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This institutional ecosystem is also one of the main reasons why both military and financial aid from allies is proving so effective. Although in some respects this aid is essential, as Ukraine still relies heavily on US-supplied air defense systems \u2013 particularly the Patriot systems \u2013 to protect its critical infrastructure. However, if this aid is viewed solely as the sole explanatory factor for the country\u2019s resilience, it overlooks Ukraine\u2019s own agency and this developing ecosystem. Such aid has functioned indispensably as a multiplier; however, it can only operate on a foundation that already exists within the country. If the institutional infrastructure were absent and unable to integrate, operate, and deploy the aid effectively, the aid would have been far less effective than it is now.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-brave1-as-a-case-study-nbsp\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Brave1 as a case study&nbsp;<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The platform was officially launched in 2023 as a <a href=\"https:\/\/techukraine.org\/2023\/04\/27\/brave1-ukrainian-defence-tech-cluster-launch\/\">joint<\/a> initiative of the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, the Ministry of Strategic Industries of Ukraine, and the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To date, it is the only technology platform that acts as a bridge for cooperation between defense technology companies, the state, and the armed forces, as well as with investors, voluntary organizations, the media, and all those who are helping to bring Ukraine closer to victory through technology. Its primary aim is to create a fast track, free from the bureaucracy that hinders decision-making, for the development of defense technologies, <a href=\"https:\/\/odessa-journal.com\/defense-tech-cluster-brave1---one-year-the-main-achievements-of-the-project\">covering<\/a> all stages of their creation, from the initial idea through to formal military certification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Brave1\u2019s <\/em>approach has several key objectives: to invest in and prioritize the needs of the security and defense forces; to create a platform that brings together all industry stakeholders; to ensure interaction with the defense forces and gather feedback on the technology\u2019s use; and to provide comprehensive support for priority projects at this time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, it is first worth explaining in detail how Brave1 operates across the board in order to understand its impact and development. The application process is initiated by the developers themselves when they register on the Ukrainian Startup Fund (USF) portal, a relatively straightforward procedure with minimal red tape. There is a screening process that excludes companies with links to Russia or with questionable records regarding tax compliance or legality. Prior to Brave1, there was no single point of entry for defense technology developers, which hindered many manufacturers in the early stages of development. Once approved, the project is passed on to a committee of around 80 experts with scientific, technical, and military backgrounds. Each project is assigned to three of these experts, who assess it against various criteria \u2014 scalability, relevance to national security, applicability on the front line, etc. \u2014 and award it a score, with a minimum threshold of 6 required. Projects falling within the bottom 50 percent are not accepted. The top 50 percent become official Brave1 participants, with a status known as \u2018BRV1\u2019. And of that group, only the top 20\u201325 percent become eligible for grants, which range from $50,000 to $200,000<strong> per product, not per company,<\/strong> meaning that a single company with several developments in progress can apply for multiple grants at the same time.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">According to <a href=\"https:\/\/intpolicydigest.org\/ukraine-s-brave1-is-racing-to-redefine-warfare\/\">official<\/a> figures, by April 2025, Brave1 had distributed some $30 million across approximately 500 grants. For foreign developers, the \u2018Test In Ukraine\u2019 initiative was launched in 2025, offering the opportunity to test their systems in real combat conditions alongside Ukrainian units with extensive battlefield experience. To date, 45 companies have joined the initiative. Finally, in order to be validated, Ukrainian products require a NATO Stock Number (NSN) so that they can be procured by the state. This is a process that can take up to two or three years in EU countries or the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, to accelerate innovation, Brave1 supports developers throughout this process, reducing the timeframe to two to three months. In Brave1\u2019s first year, it operated primarily as a <a href=\"https:\/\/getgrant.eu\/brave1-grant-support-for-ukrainian-defence-tech-innovations\/\">grant scheme<\/a>, awarding 186 grants worth $3 million to fund the development of ideas and prototypes, rather than finished products. One of the <a href=\"https:\/\/ukrainesarmsmonitor.substack.com\/p\/brave1-the-engine-behind-ukraines\">companies<\/a> benefiting from these grants described Brave1 as a government \u2018angel investor\u2019 for awarding small grants to new projects, start-ups, and early-stage R&amp;D. Another company praised the platform for helping them organize field trials of their products in collaboration with Defense Forces units. Two years later, in 2025, the number of inventions had multiplied; however, the most significant change was what this had enabled: real, completed projects ready for deployment. Due to the large number of such projects, <a href=\"https:\/\/odessa-journal.com\/mykhailo-fedorov-over-1000-innovative-solutions-have-already-been-listed-on-the-military-marketplace\">Brave1 Marke<\/a>t was launched in April 2025: an online platform where military units can log in and browse the available catalog of over a thousand products, ranging from drones to AI-based tools. Purchases are made just as one would for an everyday online shop, placing an order directly using the unit\u2019s budget, thereby saving the time traditionally involved in the procurement process.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"683\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-4-1024x683.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-38148\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-4-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-4-600x400.jpg 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-4-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-4-18x12.jpg 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-4.jpg 1456w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Inside of the Brave1 Market. Source: <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/BRAVE1ua\/status\/1955647864245534810\/photo\/1\"><em>Brave1 X<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Looking at how Brave1 operates, it is clear that it has effectively integrated the documented reforms. On the expert committee, the members have shifted from military to civilian personnel, with each project being assessed on a case-by-case basis. Prior to the 2014 reforms, an order had to pass through the entire chain of command before it could be executed. At Brave1, neither the civilian nor the military waits for the other; there is no rigid hierarchy. This has enabled a project to progress from registration to securing a grant in a matter of weeks rather than years \u2013 a process that previously took much longer under the old General Staff system. Furthermore, it enables the technologies most needed in the context of the conflict to reach the battlefield much more quickly, without the tactical response being delayed by the passage of time.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As previously analyzed, Ukroboronprom\u2019s main problems were sluggishness, secrecy, and the fact that the conglomerate decided what to produce based on its own interests, rather than the needs of the war. Brave1 overcomes these problems in several ways. Its platform enables thousands of developers and start-ups to compete for the same grant under a scoring system that is the same for everyone, moving away from prioritizing one company over another based on interests beyond technological development. Consequently, its criteria are based on what is actually needed on the front line right now, rather than what is easiest to produce. The official criteria and scoring are provided by various experts with direct knowledge of combat. Each project is analysed and assessed according to the specific needs of the moment.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, so far, we have explained how companies and developers connect with the State. It is precisely <strong>the Army of Drones Bonus System<\/strong> that explains how the individual actions of each soldier on the front line can drive and improve the production of an entire country, determining what is to be produced within the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-army-of-drones-bonus-system-the-soldier-as-a-production-agent\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><em>Army of Drones Bonus System: the soldier as a production agent<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Army of Drones Bonus System answers the question of who decides which of the products on the Brave1 Market should be produced in greater quantities and at what time. Only those on the front line know which specific drone model is most effective against Russia\u2019s latest electronic warfare system, which is constantly evolving.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This mechanism, launched in 2025, sees every Ukrainian unit that eliminates Russian military targets using drones and provides video evidence receive a set number of points based on the damage inflicted. These \u2018e-points\u2019 can be redeemed on Brave1 to purchase new Ukrainian drones or the equipment they <a href=\"https:\/\/united24media.com\/es\/war-in-ukraine\/como-ucrania-convirtio-un-sistema-de-recompensas-por-puntos-en-un-modelo-eficaz-de-gestion-de-la-guerra-8528\">need most<\/a> at that moment. <a href=\"https:\/\/ukrainesarmsmonitor.substack.com\/p\/brave1-market-ukraines-catalogue\">Delivery<\/a> is handled via DOT-Chain Defense, which usually takes around 10 days, or 6 if the product is in stock. According to the most reliable sources, 20 points are awarded for each attack that causes damage and 40 for each attack that results in destruction \u2014 although the points vary depending on current military priorities. Currently, in order to adapt to the needs of the front line, points are awarded not only for eliminating enemy forces and disrupting mining operations, but also for reconnaissance and logistics missions. Each point <a href=\"https:\/\/ukrainesarmsmonitor.substack.com\/p\/brave1-market-ukraines-catalogue\">is worth<\/a> around 10,000 hryvnias \u2014 $224 at the current exchange rate. In 2025, 4 billion UAH was raised for equipment requested by units in just 2.5 months, and up to 820,000 enemy targets were struck.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But what is significant is the <a href=\"https:\/\/lieber.westpoint.edu\/gamifying-war-reward-incentives-outlawry-armed-conflict\/\">points system<\/a>: whilst 12 points are awarded for killing an enemy soldier, capturing one with the aid of a drone is worth 120 points. Although there is debate amongst analysts regarding the legitimacy of a points system and whether it dehumanizes the conflict, this design is not arbitrary. Under the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law, there is an obligation to protect prisoners of war, evacuate the wounded, and minimize suffering and casualties in combat. In practice, this is a complicated task, even though these obligations are legally binding, as it is often more difficult and costly to capture a soldier than to kill them. The points system resolves this <a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/gamified-war-in-ukraine-points-drones-and-the-new-moral-economy-of-killing\/\">dilemma<\/a>, making compliance with international standards a worthwhile endeavor for soldiers, whilst also enabling Ukraine to use captured soldiers to negotiate a prisoner-of-war exchange with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-5-1024x576.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-38149\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-5-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-5-600x338.jpg 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-5-768x432.jpg 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-5-18x10.jpg 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-5.jpg 1536w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Ukrainian soldiers operating drones remotely on the west bank of the Dnipro. Source: <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-67991772\"><em>BBC<\/em><\/a><br><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The system offers several strategic advantages that demonstrate the rapid transformation of Ukraine\u2019s military institutions. Each verified video provides unique battlefield data that progressively enhances learning, leaving behind, once and for all, the outdated Soviet-style organization of previous years. Direct access to equipment via <em>Brave1 <\/em>eliminates the bureaucratic and slow system documented previously, which had been the greatest obstacle to date. The ability for a soldier to purchase equipment gives them a strategic advantage, as they know first-hand what is most needed at that moment. Tracking and verification generate measurable results, determining which types of drones are most effective and in what types of combat, as the largest orders are based on operational evidence rather than economic interests. This advantage has given rise to something that companies such as Ukroboronprom were unable to create: a system that constantly adapts and improves, as it is directly connected to those using the weaponry on the front lines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Each soldier acts independently, procuring the equipment and deciding when and how to attack. The change lies in the fact that these individual decisions, though scattered, have been formalized into data that determines what is produced on a national scale. This is not a sudden development, but rather an accumulation of transformations that have become institutionalized in the midst of asymmetric warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-contrast-with-the-west\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Contrast With the West<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The contrast with the West does not lie in its having been slow to adapt, but rather in that, when it finally does adapt, it openly acknowledges the source of that knowledge. This reverses the usual logic of flows and empirically refutes the narrative portraying Ukraine as a passive recipient of aid: Ukraine is generating an institutional model that the international system is increasingly actively importing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Germany, the number of major arms procurement projects approved by the Ministry of Defense has risen from 55 to 97 in just one year, a record high. The German government itself has <a href=\"https:\/\/www.grosswald.org\/germanys-accelerated-military-procurement-what-went-well-and-what-not\/\">\u0628\u0623\u0646<\/a> that the growing investment in defense is partly due to lessons learnt from the Russian-Ukrainian war, driving the faster implementation of critical defense measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the case of the United States \u2013 a country traditionally seen as an exporter rather than an importer of military doctrine \u2013 the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) launched Project G.I. in June 2025, an initiative designed to rapidly accelerate the development, testing, and deployment of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and supporting technologies, with a fund of 20 million dollars. This is an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.zeitenwendegroup.com\/p\/diu-launches-project-gi-with-20m\">\u200b<\/a> that, according to several experts, is inspired by Ukraine\u2019s rapid innovation on the battlefield. The aim is for development companies to maintain constant contact with drone operators rather than primarily with procurement officers, thereby bypassing the existing hierarchy. The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.diu.mil\/latest\/diu-hosts-ukraine-and-the-future-of-unmanned-aerial-systems-forum-in-warsaw\">relationship<\/a> with DIU and <em>Brave1 <\/em>is no coincidence; in 2023, a forum on the future of unmanned systems had already been co-organized in Warsaw, with the participation of the director of DIU. It has even been <a href=\"https:\/\/www.diu.mil\/latest\/usd20m-diu-project-g-i-challenge-targets-next-generation-uas-solutions\">acknowledged<\/a> that the main objective is to reduce delivery times, something that had already been identified and rectified in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These changes, driven by lessons learnt from Ukraine, are not limited to countries but also extend to organizations. Earlier that same year, NATO and Ukraine joined forces to establish the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre \u2014<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/what-we-do\/partnerships-and-cooperation\/natos-support-for-ukraine\">JATEC<\/a>\u2014 in Poland. This is the first joint organization between Ukraine and NATO, where personnel from both countries work to identify and apply lessons from the war in real time and translate them into new strategies, policies, and operations. Subsequently, in 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/news-and-events\/articles\/news\/2025\/11\/26\/nato-and-ukraine-announce-new-joint-initiative-to-accelerate-defence-innovation-unite-brave-nato\">UNITE\u2013Brave<\/a> was launched, a joint program aimed at scaling up innovative technologies that have been prototyped and tested, focusing on strengthening air defense and frontline communications security. Its funding for 2026 is expected to amount to 50 million euros.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"683\" src=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-6-1024x683.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-38150\" srcset=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-6-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-6-600x400.jpg 600w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-6-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-6-1536x1024.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-6-18x12.jpg 18w, https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/unnamed-6.jpg 1600w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Joint NATO-Ukraine Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland. Source: <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/jatec-dev.info\/about\/structure\/\"><em>\u062d\u0644\u0641 \u0627\u0644\u0646\u0627\u062a\u0648<\/em><\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-conclusions\" class=\"wp-block-heading translation-block\">\u0627\u0644\u0627\u0633\u062a\u0646\u062a\u0627\u062c\u0627\u062a<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What is significant about the transformations taking place in other countries and organizations outside Ukraine is the direction of the learning process: they are explicitly adopting the institutional design that Ukraine is developing under the pressure of war. It is not Ukrainian individual courage that is being adopted, but specific procedures tailored to each country\u2019s unique context: shorter procurement timelines, more horizontal committees and more direct channels between the developer and the operator.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If the Ukrainian resistance were to exist solely thanks to this individual \u201cheroism\u201d, there would be no military doctrine to export or replicate in other countries to cut through that bureaucracy. Ukraine is not only resisting; it is exporting institutions of war to actors on whom it traditionally relied for learning. The traditional flow of military knowledge in transatlantic relations \u2014from world powers to smaller countries such as Ukraine\u2014 is being constantly reversed.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The main research question was: through which institutional infrastructures has the courage dispersed throughout Ukrainian society been formalized into a capability that can sustain an asymmetric war indefinitely? The origin of the answer lies in 2014, when it became clear to Kyiv that no external guarantee can replace self-defense, forcing the initiation of parallel yet converging transformations. And that, already under pressure during the large-scale invasion, efficient mechanisms for war-fighting institutions have been developed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It also calls into question narratives in which Western military and financial support are presented as the sole explanation for Ukrainian resistance. Although this aid is indeed essential in many cases, as has been argued, it is only possible thanks to an institutional framework that Ukraine is building on its own. Without this ecosystem, the aid would have been less effective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What has also been demonstrated is that these innovations are not anomalies that only function in a war setting, but rather reproducible and exportable models that are already being put to the test in other countries currently at peace. Furthermore, the <em>Brave1 <\/em>case study demonstrates how, even starting from a centralized, sluggish state apparatus mired in corruption scandals, it is possible to build horizontal defense innovation systems that are adaptable to the realities of the moment.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 id=\"h-recommendations\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>\u0627\u0644\u062a\u0648\u0635\u064a\u0627\u062a<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" id=\"h-for-the-west\"><strong>For the West:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Stop viewing and treating Ukraine as a country that receives one-way aid. Instead, treat it as a partner with its own institutional capacities. The traditional view of Ukraine as a passive recipient has become obsolete and has been shown to be incomplete. It is recommended that Ukraine be progressively included on an equal footing with EU Member States for joint assessment, rather than as the primary recipient of funds\u00a0<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Review the defensive use of the \u201cescalation dominance\u201d doctrine as a response to early-stage aggression in an asymmetric war. It is recommended that decision-makers review the use of this doctrine in the event of future aggressions and replace cost-free warnings with real, specific, and verifiable commitments. This is to avoid repeating the same pattern that helped embolden the aggressor following the annexation of Crimea.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Western media and social media must stop portraying individual Ukrainian courage as merely inspiring or admirable, without explaining the context that gives rise to it. Presenting it as a cultural trait rather than an adaptation developed purely out of a survival instinct in the face of constant threat is dangerous and carries a political cost: shifting the burden of the aggression onto the affected society and gradually normalizing it. It is recommended not only to report on these specific situations, but also to ask why the individual has been forced into that situation, thereby restoring Ukrainian society\u2019s sense of humanity.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>For the EU:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Use Brave1 as a benchmark for reforming European defense procurement. The European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP) has developed BraveTech EU, with a budget of around 300 million euros, modeled on Brave1\u2019s grant system. The recommendation is not to treat it as a marginal program, but to make it the guiding principle for reforming EU defense procurement.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The EU can replicate the Brave1 mechanism to speed up its military technology certification processes. It should actively support the developer throughout the process and not leave them to navigate the bureaucracy alone, which can take years. Whilst it is true that the Joint Ammunition Qualification (JAQ) project exists, it is recommended that the mechanism be extended to other categories, not limited to ammunition, and that the process be accelerated.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><strong>For Ukraine:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>To ensure that Brave1 continues to develop effectively, it is recommended that an independent anti-corruption oversight model similar to NAKO or an equivalent body be established for Ukroboronprom. This should involve a regular review of how grants are allocated, who benefits from them, and for what purpose.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>If the aim is to continue on the path of defense innovation even after the war and beyond drones, it is recommended to build on the experience already gained with Brave1. Nor is it a question of using it as a mere template for each branch of the armed forces, but rather of drawing on the lessons of what has worked and what has not, and adapting it according to needs.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>All wars produce, consciously or unconsciously, an official narrative of themselves. A couple getting married days before they both head to the front. Grandmothers knitting camouflage nets. This is the narrative with which the West has come to identify the war. It is true and legitimate; the rhetoric of courage and resistance has become the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":24,"featured_media":38141,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,13],"tags":[],"topic":[88,84,87,89,86],"class_list":["post-38143","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eng-central-eastern-europe","category-en-analyses","topic-defense","topic-russia","topic-security","topic-technology","topic-ukraine"],"mb":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v25.6 (Yoast SEO v25.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Ukraine defense innovation Brave1 | TDC<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Explore how Ukraine\u2019s wartime institutions, Brave1 defense-tech ecosystem, drone innovation, and procurement reforms turned resilience into military capability.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/tdcenter.org\/ar\/2026\/07\/30\/ukraine-defense-innovation-brave1\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"ar_AR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"EU Energy and a Stability Belt in North Africa\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"How can the EU use Algeria\u2019s gas and Morocco\u2019s green hydrogen to build a North Africa stability belt? 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